Opinion
No. 2020-06565 Index No. 522888/19
02-01-2023
In the Matter of New York State Division of Human Rights, petitioner, v. Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC, etc., et al., respondents.
Caroline J. Downey, Bronx, NY (Toni Ann Hollifield of counsel), for petitioner. Bernard Weinreb, Spring Valley, NY, for respondent Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC.
Caroline J. Downey, Bronx, NY (Toni Ann Hollifield of counsel), for petitioner.
Bernard Weinreb, Spring Valley, NY, for respondent Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC.
BETSY BARROS, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & JUDGMENT
Proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to enforce a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated October 6, 2017. The determination adopted the recommendation and findings of an administrative law judge dated July 26, 2017, made after a hearing, finding that the respondent Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC, unlawfully discriminated against the complainant on the basis of her sex and familial status, awarded her compensatory damages in the principal sums of $8,599.50 for back pay and $15,000 for mental anguish, and assessed a civil fine and penalty in the principal sum of $10,000.
ADJUDGED that the petition is granted, with costs, and the determination is confirmed.
The complainant filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the SDHR) against the respondent Boro Park Senior Living Community, LLC (hereinafter the respondent), alleging, inter alia, that her employment was terminated because of her sex and familial status on the basis of her pregnancy. After a public hearing, an administrative law judge (hereinafter the ALJ) made a recommendation and findings that the respondent unlawfully discriminated against the complainant on the basis of her sex and familial status, awarded her compensatory damages in the principal sums of $8,599.50 for back pay and $15,000 for mental anguish, and assessed a civil fine and penalty in the principal sum of $10,000. Thereafter, the Commissioner of the SDHR (hereinafter the Commissioner), in a final order dated October 6, 2017 (hereinafter the final order), adopted the recommendation and findings of the ALJ. The respondent failed to comply with the final order. The SDHR subsequently commenced this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to enforce the final order, and the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).
An enforcement proceeding initiated by the SDHR raises the issue of whether its determination was supported by sufficient evidence in the record (see Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc., 167 A.D.3d 898, 899; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Team Taco Mexico, Corp., 140 A.D.3d 965, 966). "The scope of judicial review under the Human Rights Law is extremely narrow and is confined to the consideration of whether the determination of the [SDHR] is supported by substantial evidence in the record" (Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc., 167 A.D.3d at 899; see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326, 331; Matter of Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist. v Foster, 185 A.D.3d 1023, 1026). "Substantial evidence 'means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact'" (Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d at 331, quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180). "Under a substantial evidence review, courts 'may not weigh the evidence or reject [the Commissioner's] choice where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists'" (Matter of Argyle Realty Assoc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 65 A.D.3d 273, 283, quoting Matter of CUNY-Hostos Community Coll. v State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 69, 75; see Matter of Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist. v Foster, 185 A.D.3d at 1026).
"In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in employment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified to hold the position; (3) he or she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" (Johnson v North Shore Long Is. Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 137 A.D.3d 977, 978; see Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc., 167 A.D.3d at 899-900). The Human Rights Law makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual or discharge such person from employment on the basis of the individual's sex, gender, or familial status (see Executive Law § 296[1][a]). Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of gender, sex, and familial status discrimination (see Executive Law § 292[26][a]; Lefort v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d 708; Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 34; Matter of Argyle Realty Assoc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 65 A.D.3d at 283).
Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's determination that the complainant demonstrated, prima facie, that the respondent terminated her employment due to her pregnancy. The determination is supported by evidence that the complainant was discharged two days after she informed her supervisor that she was pregnant (see Matter of Club Swamp Annex v White, 167 A.D.2d 400, 402).
The award of compensatory damages for mental anguish is reasonably related to the wrongdoing, supported by substantial evidence, and comparable to other awards for similar injuries (see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207, 215; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Caprarella, 82 A.D.3d 773, 775; Matter of Argyle Realty Assoc. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 65 A.D.3d at 283).
The award of back pay is supported by substantial evidence (see Executive Law § 297[4][c][iii]; Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v County of Onondaga Sheriff's Dept., 71 N.Y.2d 623, 633-634; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Roadtec, Inc., 167 A.D.3d at 900; Matter of New York State Div. of Human Rights v Team Taco Mexico, Corp., 140 A.D.3d at 967).
"A court may set aside an administrative penalty only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Thomas v Town of Southeast, N.Y., 168 A.D.3d 955, 957). Here, we perceive no basis for disturbing the civil fine and penalty assessed against the respondent (see Matter of Murphy v Kirkland, 88 A.D.3d 267, 278). In light of the circumstances of this case, as well as the deference that must be given to the ALJ's findings, the civil fine and penalty was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 550, 554-555).
BARROS, J.P., MILLER, ZAYAS and WAN, JJ., concur.