Opinion
22-CV-4475 (LTS)
01-03-2023
CLAUDIO AMAURIS NUNEZ-POLANCO, Plaintiffs, v. SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL CAPRA; F.H.S.D. RAZIA FERDOUS; C.O. SUAREZ; C.O. MAISON; P.A. MUTHA; SST PAVEL; SST MITCHELL; C.O. DE LA ROSA; C.O. COLLINS; C.O. GUZMAN, Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during his incarceration at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. By order dated June 3, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on July 5, 2022, apparently in response to the order granting Plaintiff IFP. (ECF 7.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Named as Defendants in this complaint are Sing Sing Superintendent Michael Capra; F.H.S.D. Razia Ferdous; C.O. Suarez; C.O. Maison; P.A. [Physician's Assistant] Mutha; SST Pavel; SST Mitchell; C.O. De La Rosa; C.O. Collins; and C.O. Guzman. The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which is handwritten and difficult to read. Plaintiff wrote “everyday” to Sing Sing Superintendent Michael Capra to “get treatment for H.I.V.,” but Capra never responded. (ECF 1 ¶ V.) After Plaintiff called “Albany” to complain, Capra put out a “hit” on Plaintiff, “trying to kill” him. Plaintiff appears to allege that he was shot twice, on March 18, 2022, and March 25, 2022. (Id.) On March 18, 2022, Suarez, Maison, Collins, Pavel, and an unidentified “John Doe” correctional officer entered Plaintiff's cell and tried to kill him. (Id.) Suarez and Guzman gave “the porter in C-Company and D-Company in Building 5 [a] weapon, gun, knife, hammer, gasoline, key to the cell door” so that he could kill Plaintiff. (Id.) On April 19, 2022, Capra “use[d] Suarez and Maison” to “send 4 inmates” to jump him, beat him, and spray something in his eyes. (Id.) Suarez “made” Plaintiff blind, and it took “50 minutes” for Plaintiff to receive any treatment for his eyes. Once in the hospital, 3 police officers beat Plaintiff and tried to put him in the “store room” to kill him after “5 pm medication.” (Id.)
P.A. Martin tried to put “COVID-19 in” Plaintiff's body, possibly by using dirty medical equipment. Because of the “criminal sadistic treatment” Plaintiff received, he tested positive for HIV in May 2021. In October 2021, however, another HIV test came back negative. Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Brook sent someone to hit him in the mess hall.On April 7, 2022, two officers and another individual kidnapped Plaintiff, put him in “P.S.U.,” and “play criminal same with my food 15 day [sic].” (Id.) Plaintiff was poisoned and starved, and suffered black eyes, a broken finger, and damage to his liver. (Id.) He seeks to be sent to an outside hospital for medical treatment. (Id. ¶ IV.)
Plaintiff alleges that this incident occurred in December 2022, but the Court assumes that he meant 2021.
After he filed this complaint, Plaintiff submitted to the court multiple letters regarding new events, some of which appear to have occurred at Clinton Correctional Facility and at Great Meadow Correctional Facility.
DISCUSSION
A. Notice of appeal
The Court addresses first whether it has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's complaint, in light of the pending interlocutory appeal of a nonfinal order. Normally, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance - it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). “The divestiture of jurisdiction rule is, however, not a per se rule. It is a judicially crafted rule rooted in the interest of judicial economy, designed ‘to avoid confusion or waste of time resulting from having the same issues before two courts at the same time.'” United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 540 (2d Cir. 1989)). For example, the rule “does not apply where an appeal is frivolous[,][n]or does it apply to untimely or otherwise defective appeals.” China Nat. Chartering Corp. v. Pactrans Air & Sea, Inc., 882 F.Supp.2d 579, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted).
As noted above, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in response to an order granting him leave to proceed IFP. Because Plaintiff is attempting to appeal from a nonfinal order that has not been certified for interlocutory appeal, the notice of appeal is plainly defective. Accordingly, this Court retains jurisdiction of this action. See, e.g., Rodgers, 101 F.3d at 252 (deeming a notice of appeal from a nonfinal order to be “premature” and a “nullity,” and holding that the notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction); Gortat v. Capala Bros., Inc., 07-CV-3629 (ILG), 2008 WL 5273960, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2008) (“An exception . . . [to the general rule that an appeal deprives a district court of jurisdiction] applies where it is clear that the appeal is defective, for example, because the order appealed from is not final and has not been certified for an interlocutory appeal.”). The Court therefore has jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff's complaint.
B. Federal pleading rules
Rules 18 and 20 govern the joinder of claims and parties, respectively. Rule 18 permits a plaintiff to join as many claims as he has against a particular defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a). Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, persons may be joined in one action as defendants if: “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. Although courts have interpreted Rule 20(a) liberally to allow related claims to be tried within a single proceeding, Barr Rubber Products Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1970), “the mere allegation that Plaintiff was injured by all defendants is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule 20(a),” Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F.Supp.2d 154, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Plaintiff's complaint does not comply with federal pleading rules. This is because the complaint does not plausibly allege facts suggesting that any specific defendant was personally involved in violating his federally protected rights. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (holding that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.”). Plaintiff's complaint, and subsequently filed letters, do not contain a short and plain statement of exactly what occurred or who was involved. See Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....”). Plaintiff also fails to allege how the underlying events relate to each other. It is thus unclear that the claims are properly joined so that the complaint complies with Rules 18 and 20. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot amend his pleading by submitting letters containing new claims against different defendants in other correctional facilities. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to address these deficiencies.
C. Section 1983
Plaintiff alleges that he was infected with HIV and that prison officials sent unnamed people to hurt him. The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to allege that Defendant violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A plaintiff must also allege facts showing the defendants' direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
To establish a Section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that correction officials were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's serious medical condition. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69-72 (2d Cir. 2009).
Deliberate indifference is evaluated under a two-pronged test comprised of both objective and subjective components. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011). The objective component of this standard requires that the alleged medical need be a “sufficiently serious” condition that “could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that standard contemplates “a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain”). The subjective component requires a prisoner to show that the defendant officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in depriving him of adequate medical treatment. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is, a plaintiff must show that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety by failing to take reasonable measures to avoid the harm. Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 69. Under this standard, a challenge based on the inadvertent or negligent failure to provide adequate care does not raise a constitutional claim under either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998).
Even if the Court were to disregard the complaint's deficiencies under Rules 18 and 20, Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim. Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory, and he does not allege sufficient facts showing how Defendants were personally involved in the events underlying his claims or that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to provide a short and plain statement that plausibly alleges that he is entitled to relief from Defendants under Section 1983.
D. Venue
Under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in
a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under § 1391(c), a “ natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “ entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).
Plaintiff filed this complaint regarding events occurring in Sing Sing Correctional Facility, which is located in Westchester County, and falls within this judicial district. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed letters that appear to assert claims arising in Clinton Correctional Facility (“Clinton”), located in Clinton, New York in Clinton County, and Great Meadow Correctional Facility (“Great Meadow”), located in Comstock, New York, in Washington County. Clinton and Great Meadow are located within the Northern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(a). Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant named in connection with the events that are alleged to have transpired at Clinton or Great Meadow resides in this District. Venue for those claims therefore does not appear to be proper in this District under § 1391(b)(1) or (2). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a case regarding events occurring in Clinton and Great Meadow, he should file a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.
The New York State counties that constitute this judicial district, the Southern District of New York, are the following: New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan), Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx), Westchester, Dutchess, Rockland, Orange, Putnam, and Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid Section 1983 claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail his claims.
First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the captionand in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint. The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when, and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to the court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 22-CV-4475 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.