Opinion
2014-06-11
Gary NUCCI, respondent, v. Joan A. NUCCI, etc., et al., appellants.
Christopher Modelewski, P.C., Huntington, N.Y., for appellants. Michael G. Leavy, Huntington, N.Y. (James F. Matthews of counsel), for respondent.
Christopher Modelewski, P.C., Huntington, N.Y., for appellants. Michael G. Leavy, Huntington, N.Y. (James F. Matthews of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to certain real property, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated July 11, 2012, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of release.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to determine claims to certain real property. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's brother fraudulently induced their father to transfer title to the subject property to a trust controlled by the brother, who then effectively transferred the property to himself, thereby depriving the plaintiff of his rightful inheritance.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing, among other things, that the action was barred by a release that had been executed by the plaintiff when he received his share of a certain insurance trust set up by the plaintiff's father. The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion.
Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim that is the subject of the release ( see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995;Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v. Holme, 35 A.D.3d 93, 98, 824 N.Y.S.2d 210). If the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a jural act binding on the parties ( see Booth v. 3669 Delaware, 92 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 680 N.Y.S.2d 899, 703 N.E.2d 757;Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 563, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 249 N.E.2d 386).
“However, a release may not be read to cover matters which the parties did not intend to cover” ( Desiderio v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 107 A.D.3d 662, 663, 967 N.Y.S.2d 392;see Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 299, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 157 N.E.2d 505;Wechsler v. Diamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 681, 682, 815 N.Y.S.2d 639). “[I]ts meaning and coverage necessarily depend, as in the case of contracts generally, upon the controversy being settled and upon the purpose for which the release was actually given” ( Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d at 299, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 157 N.E.2d 505;see Burnside 711 LLC v. Amerada Hess Corp., 109 A.D.3d 860, 861, 972 N.Y.S.2d 604).
Here, as the Supreme Court properly concluded, the release only served to bar the plaintiff from commencing an action relating to the administration of the insurance trust or any new trust subsequently created with the assets of the insurance trust ( cf. Wechsler v. Diamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 A.D.3d at 682, 815 N.Y.S.2d 639). Since this action does not involve the administration of the insurance trust or any trust containing the assets of the insurance trust, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of release ( see Wechsler v. Diamond Sugar Co., Inc., 29 A.D.3d at 682, 815 N.Y.S.2d 639;see generally Burnside 711 LLC v. Amerada Hess Corp., 109 A.D.3d at 861, 972 N.Y.S.2d 604;Desiderio v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 107 A.D.3d at 663, 967 N.Y.S.2d 392). DICKERSON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and MILLER, JJ., concur.