Opinion
No. FA 04-0476800S
November 3, 2004
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The court issued a memorandum of decision on November 1, 2004, in open court with parties and their counsel present. This corrected decision corrects typographical errors in the original written decision read and given to the parties that day.
This decision dissolves the two-year marriage of Jennifer and Jason Novaco. The parties appeared for trial on October 1, 2004, when each one testified, as did family relations counselor Rob Lang, who conducted two custody evaluations, the first one completed on January 2, 2004, and the other on September 16, 2004. The principal issues in dispute are the parenting plan and child support for their only child, Taylor Rae, who was born on September 3, 2002.
The court has observed the demeanor of the parties and family relations counselor and evaluated their credibility. The court has carefully considered all of the evidence, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, according to the standards required by law, and the statutory criteria for dissolving a marriage and entering orders regarding custody, visitation, child support, and other matters.
After making jurisdictional findings and a brief summary as to the background and situation of each party, the court will discuss the key issues here.
I — JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS
The court finds that it has jurisdiction over the marriage. The parties were married in East Haven, Connecticut, on July 14, 2002, and have one minor child, Taylor Rae Novaco, who was born on September 3, 2002. One party has resided in Connecticut continually for more than one year before the bringing of this action. The parties have not been recipients of state or municipal assistance. The marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably. Each party has waived alimony, and neither seeks an order distributing property, assigning debt, or ordering payment of counsel fees.
II — DISCUSSION A. The parties
After marrying, the parties moved into a basement apartment in the home of the husband's mother, but living there proved ill-fated for the success of the marriage, as the parties did not find a way to integrate the new marital family into already-existing relationships with biological family. In April 2003, the plaintiff told her husband that she had become so unhappy in the marriage that she wanted a divorce. The defendant fled upstairs to his mother's residence with Taylor, then six months old. The plaintiff followed, demanding that the defendant hand the child over to her, saying that she planned to leave, and asking her in-laws to let her and the defendant resolve this matter themselves. Twice, however, the husband's mother stepped between the parties when plaintiff tried to take the child from her husband. The plaintiff eventually left the home without the baby, and the defendant and his mother then called the police, to whom they claimed that plaintiff had struck the defendant's mother. The plaintiff was subsequently arrested, and an ensuing criminal protective order prevented her from returning to the premises, where the child remained with its father. Both parties then went separately to Superior Court seeking custody orders, but they met by chance in the court hallways and agreed to pendente lite orders of joint legal custody, primary residence with the defendant. The plaintiff's parenting time since then has varied under different court orders. Under the initial order, Taylor was to spend one weekend day and night with the plaintiff and two weekday overnights, but in August 2003 that order was modified so that Taylor would spend Wednesday evening to Friday morning with her mother. The August 2003 order remained in effect until trial.
When the parties lived together, the plaintiff held a demanding job as manager of a video store, where she supervised 8 to 10 employees and had to work six days and more than 50 hours a week. The defendant also worked, and the parties agreed that his mother would babysit while they were at work. The many days that plaintiff had to spend in court after the parties separated because of her arrest and this dissolution caused her to lose her job, and for many months she has been unemployed. After leaving the marital home, she had no home of her own for a while, floating between homes of her mother, her grandmother, and her father. After losing her job, she has also had many months of financial difficulty — her car was repossessed, she was in a car accident, and her phone service was terminated. She stopped paying child support. Without a strong family support system, she became depressed, but she commendably sought professional assistance and has been compliant in her treatment, which has consisted primarily of dealing with the stress of the divorce and improving her parenting skills. By the time of trial, her personal and financial situation was improving. She has a new boyfriend, and together they have rented a three-bedroom condominium in Southington with the plaintiff's ailing father. She has been offered a well-compensated job with flexible work hours in the insurance industry if she can pass a state licensing examination.
The defendant also worked during the marriage, also lost that job during the pendency of these proceedings, was unemployed for a while, and has recently resumed working, now as an executive assistant. He remained in the basement apartment that had been the marital home until recently, when he moved into a two-bedroom apartment in Branford with his new girlfriend.
B. Issue Presented: Custody and Visitation 1. Legal Criteria
The parties here dispute the custody and visitation orders, which by law the court must determine based on the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 46b-56(b). See, e.g., Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134, (1997); Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118, 121, 438 A.2d 441 (1982); and Stewart v. Stewart, 177 Conn. 491, 408, 418 A.2d 62 (1979). Many factors affect a best interest determination, which "involves weighing all the facts and circumstances of the family situation. Each case is unique." Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 43, 440 A.2d 782 (1981). As this court has noted before, "[t]he best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare." In re Diane W., Superior Court for juvenile matters, child protection session at Middletown (December 21, 2002). See also Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 710ff, 433 A.2d 1005 (1980); Janik v. Janik, 61 Conn.App. 175, 181, 763 A.2d 65 (2000), cert. den., 255 Conn. 940, 768 A.2d 949 (2001); Rudolewicz v. Rudolewicz, 12 CLT No. 39, p. 664, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain (October 6, 1986, Arena, J.). In making its decision here, this court has considered the body of case law regarding best interest, the specific facts of this case, the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, and the court's assessment and evaluation of the best interest of the minor child affected here.
2. The pendente lite orders and recommendations at trial of the family relations counselor
The court has fully considered the reports and testimony of the family relations counselor, who recommended that the court assign primary residence to the father but increase the amount of the mother's parenting time. While a court may take into consideration the opinion of a family relations counselor, Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 281, 440 A.2d 899 (1981), the court is not bound by that opinion as to individual best interest factors or the child's overall best interest. Id.
The last pendente lite order was for plaintiff to have parenting time each week from Wednesday afternoon to Friday morning. Taylor has been in her father's care the remainder of the time. The defendant has continued to use his mother for daycare on Mondays through Wednesdays, and recently placed her in more formal, institutional daycare one day a week, on Fridays. The family relations counselor's first custody study recommended parenting time for the mother that appeared to mirror the last pendente lite order:
[The plaintiff] shall parent Taylor from after work on the day preceding her day off) as long as it is before 8:00 p.m. until one hour before she is to return to work on her next scheduled day. If she gets out of work after 8:00 p.m. on the day preceding her day off, she shall pick up Taylor at 9:00 a.m. the next day.
The first custody report also recommended that plaintiff have parenting time "any other time that she has four continuous hours available between 9:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m." The second custody study recommended a more traditional schedule under which plaintiff would "parent the child on alternating weekends from Friday after work until Sunday evening and every Tuesday and Thursday from after work until 7:30 p.m." At trial the family relations counselor testified that he still recommended that the plaintiff have additional parenting time whenever she had four continuous hours available on weekday days, despite his having omitted that recommendation from the second custody report.
3. Discussion
Each party here seeks to be the primary custodial parent of their daughter, who has lived with her father, the defendant, since shortly before the dissolution action began. Both parties and the family relations counselor agree that he has provided Taylor with a safe, stable, and nurturing environment in which she has done well, and the defendant's principal argument for physical custody is that, as the family relations counselor wrote in his first custody study, it could be detrimental and distressing to Taylor to remove her from that environment now. The defendant also claimed to the family relations counselor that the plaintiff was incapable of caring adequately for Taylor, but there was no credible evidence offered either to this court or the family relations counselor that would support this assertion.
Although the plaintiff can perhaps be faulted, from the minor child's perspective, for having abandoned the marital home, because in doing so she removed herself from the child's daily care, and the defendant should certainly be credited for his care of the child since then, the events of the day that the parties separated and the consequences of those events since then are not the only factors here affecting or related to the child's best interest. The instability in the plaintiff's life and her loss of involvement in Taylor's daily life during the pendente lite period do not result from character flaws, personality disorder, or psychological instability on the plaintiff's part, but rather stem primarily from aspects of the marital relationship for which the parties each share responsibility but which ended up adversely affecting the plaintiff much more than defendant. The parties chose to live in a basement apartment in the home of defendant's mother. They chose to have the husband's mother provide day care when they worked. The plaintiff did not get along well with her mother-in-law, whom she perceived as trying to interfere in her life in ways that did not respect the plaintiff's autonomy or maturity, such as offering to balance her checkbook. The defendant's flight upstairs to his mother's residence during the argument that precipitated the parties' separation and his mother's physically placing herself between the parties during their dispute exemplify the mother-in-law's involvement in the parties' marital affairs. Thus this court concludes that it was the instability of the marital relationship itself, plus the parties' inability to develop an autonomous relationship between their new marital family unit and their extended biological kin, that led to the incident in which the plaintiff fled the marital home.
The result of the separation was vastly different on the two parties and their contact and relationship with their child. That incident led to a period of instability for the plaintiff and during that time the defendant successfully assumed the role of the primary parental figure for Taylor. He has provided a safe, stable, and predictable environment for Taylor, in which she has thrived. The mother's removal from the home and Taylor's daily life and the consequent instability of her own life for many months had the effect of disenfranchising her somewhat from Taylor's life.
In Hall v. Hall, 186 Conn. 118 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized that a party's willful disobedience of court orders for several months evidenced gross disrespect for the law and raised questions about the welfare of the child. That factor does not affect this case, however, as both parties have been culpable in this respect. The plaintiff stopped paying child support after losing her employment. Defendant violated the automatic orders, by not continuing to provide plaintiff with health insurance. In their testimonies at trial, neither party adequately acknowledged the impropriety of failing to honor the court orders or the potential harm to the other.
The evidence also shows, however, that the plaintiff is now able to offer a stable and suitable environment for Taylor. After a period of unstable housing, she is moving into a three-bedroom condominium equally appropriate for Taylor as the defendant's two-bedroom home. She offered the court satisfactory daycare plans for when she returns to work. In considering the many factors relevant to the minor child's best interest, the court concludes that each parent has suitable character and adequate parenting skills and the ability to promote the child's emotional and physical development.
The family relations counselor concluded, however, that it would be detrimental to remove Taylor, at her present age, from the environment in which she has done so well for the last eighteen months. His recommendation accords with the view long acknowledged by the courts that children have a strong interest in continuity and stability of their environment. See, e.g, Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 340, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (Berdon, J., concurring in the result) ("Continuity of relationships is essential for a child's healthy development . . . Since continuity may not play as significant a role in later life, its importance may be underrated by adult decision-makers. [A child's] growth may be disrupted when upheavals and changes in the external world are added to the inevitable internal ones . . . because emotional attachments are tenuous and vulnerable in early life, and children need stability of relationships for growth and development." quoting J. Goldstein, A. Solnit, S. Goldstein A. Freud, The Best Interests of the Child; The Least Detrimental Alternative (1996) pp. 19-20.)
Although keeping the defendant as the primary residential parent would surely promote Taylor's interest in stability and continuity, the family relations counselor also credibly concluded that Taylor also needs to spend more time with her mother, particularly in view of the child's young age and her lack of a strongly developed cognitive memory. (Def.'s Ex. A, First Custody Study.) Both parties and the family relations counselor agree that joint custody, with both parents actively involved in Taylor's life, is best for her.
The evidence in this case, however, shows that the defendant over the last eighteen months and at trial, has shown a distinct lack of appreciation of Taylor's need for her mother. He has not been amenable to or supportive of fostering the child's relationship with the plaintiff. He picked his own mother's need for babysitting income, for example, over Taylor's need for increased time with her mother. He did not schedule Taylor's two-year physical at a time when plaintiff could attend it. His conduct words and demeanor at trial all suggested that he is not likely to facilitate or support Taylor's relationship with her mother — he even went so far at trial as to state that he did not see any evidence that Taylor loved her mother, a claim that he evidently never mentioned to the family relations counselor, who reported that the defendant had based his claims for primary residence on assertions that the plaintiff was unstable, that contact between her family and Taylor would harm the minor child, and that she was not willing or able to care adequately for Taylor, all concerns that the family relations counselor did not substantiate. An important factor in any custody case is the willingness of the parents to facilitate visitation with the other parent. Seymour v. Seymour, 180 Conn. 705, 713 (1980). In this case, the court must also consider the related factor of the willingness of the parents to facilitate the child's relationship with the other parent and, more specifically here, Taylor's need to develop a closer relationship with her mother. From the evidence offered at trial, the court concludes that it is in Taylor's best interest that the custody orders promote and protect her relationship with her mother, because the defendant is unlikely to do so.
After considering all the evidence and the many factors relevant to the minor child's best interest, the court finds that this child's best interest would be served best by an order of shared custody, in which each party has significant parenting time, but that also give Taylor ample time in the stable environment that her father has provided for her since the parties separated. The only reason the court does not now order a 50-50 shared custody arrangement is that the plaintiff has not had the opportunity to develop as close a psychological bond with Taylor, because of her much lesser involvement in Taylor's life during the pendente lite period, than the defendant. In the words of the family relations counselor, the father's residence has become Taylor's "home base" during the pendente lite period. The court finds that it is Taylor's best interest, and hence it is the purpose of these custodial orders, to increase the plaintiff's time and involvement with her daughter in order to provide Taylor with a second "home base," while maintaining enough time and contact between the defendant and Taylor to preserve his role in the minor child's life.
After the parties separated, the paternal grandmother continued to babysit for Taylor when the defendant works, although recently Taylor did begin one day a week of more formal daycare on Fridays, and Taylor has formed a close bond with her paternal grandmother. The family relations counselor based his opinion that the defendant should have primary physical custody in part on the counselor's belief that the custody orders should not disrupt the close relationship that Taylor has with her paternal grandmother. ("Taylor . . . has experienced [the grandmother] as a primary attachment in her young life. Disrupting this reality for Taylor could be distressing for her and not in her best interest . . . Taylor appears to have thrived under the [pendente lite] custodial arrangement in a large part, in this counselor's perception, due to [the paternal grandmother's] involvement in the care and providing for Taylor." Def's Ex. A, Custody Evaluation Report completed January 2, 2004.) The paternal grandmother is not a party, however. The father has not claimed that the bond between Taylor and her paternal grandmother is a parent-like relationship that would override the parties' fundamental constitutional right as parents to the "care, custody and control of their children." Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431 (2002) (holding that non-parents seeking court-ordered visitation against the wishes of a fit custodial parent must allege and prove a relationship with the child similar in nature to a parent-child relationship and that denial of visitation will cause real and significant harm to the child). The court's orders here will afford the defendant sufficient time to keep his mother actively involved in Taylor's life if he so chooses.
In the present case, after considering all the evidence and the factors relevant to the child's best interest, the court orders that the parents continue to share joint legal custody, that the plaintiff have parenting time each week from Wednesday after she gets out of work until Friday morning, and on alternating weekends from Saturday morning at 9 am. until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. Defendant will have parenting time the rest of the time.
C. Decision-making
The defendant has asked for an order of joint custody but seeks authority to make final decisions when the parties cannot agree. Section 46b-56a (a) of the General Statutes defines "joint custody" as meaning "an order . . . providing for joint decision-making by the parents . . ." As this court has noted elsewhere, there is no definitive appellate guidance on whether an order of joint custody may, when parents are unable to make a decision jointly, vest final decision-making authority in one party, but numerous courts have nonetheless entered such orders. Wasson v. Wasson, Superior Court, Regional Family Trial Docket, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FA 98-0165911S (April 23, 2003). This court concurs with the conclusion of the court in Jones v. Jones, Superior Court, Regional Family Trial Docket, Judicial District of Litchfield, Docket No. FA99-0078925 (March 13, 2000) (Munro, J.), that joint custody "requires the court to first find that the parties are capable of reasoned communication . . . regarding important custodial decisions."
Despite father's request for final decision-making authority, there is no evidence here that the parents cannot make major decisions together or communicate about what is best for Taylor. There is evidence, however, that the defendant has not communicated adequately with the plaintiff about Taylor or shared decision-making with her in the past, but in view of Taylor's close bond to her father, the child's interest in continuity and stability, and her young age, the court will not hold the father's failure to do so against him in the custodial orders today. But the court will not permit the father's failure to communicate with the mother to serve as a basis for giving him final decision-making authority. There was no evidence presented here of personality flaws, character disorders, or animus on the part of either party that would prevent them from cooperating and communicating in Taylor's best interest. The court thus finds that these parties are capable of "reasoned communication" on important custodial decisions. Neither party presented proof of having completed the parenting education classes required by General Statutes § 46b-69b, and perhaps their compliance with the court's order to do so within the next 60 days will motivate each toward communication and cooperation as in Taylor's best interest. See also General Statutes Sec. 46b-56(b)(2).
Section 46b-69 of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The Judicial Department shall establish a parenting education program for parties involved in any action before the Superior Court under Section 46b-1, except actions brought under Section 46b-15 and chapter 815t. For the purposes of this section, "parenting education program" means a course designed by the Judicial Department to educate persons, including unmarried parents, on the impact on children of the restructuring of families. The course shall include, but not be limited to, information on the developmental stages of children, adjustment of children to parental separation, dispute resolution and conflict management, guidelines for visitation, stress reduction in children and cooperative parenting. CT Page 16645
(b) The court shall order any party to an action specified in subsection (a) of this section to participate in such program whenever a minor child is involved in such action unless (1) the parties agree, subject to the approval of the court, not to participate in such program, (2) the court, on motion, determines that participation is not deemed necessary, or (3) the parties select and participate in a comparable parenting education program . . . A party shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed such program upon certification by the service provider of the program.
. . .
(d) Any person who is ordered to participate in a parenting education program shall pay directly to the service provider a participation fee, except that no person may be excluded from such program for inability to pay such fee.
Section 56b-56(b) provides in relevant part as follows: "In making or modifying any order with respect to custody or visitation, the court shall (1) be guided by the best interests of the child, . . . and (2) consider whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b."
D. Child support orders
The plaintiff owes an arrearage of child support in the amount of $3,105 as of November 1, 2004. Defendant also claims an arrearage for child care in the amount of $1,872. Although the Child Support Guidelines require a court to include an order for child care in its child support orders, the child support award here did not include such an order. Defendant never sought to modify or correct the child support order to comply with the guidelines by including an order to share child care expenses. Moreover, defendant did not offer satisfactory evidence of child care expenses incurred. His request to find an arrearage for child care expenses is therefore denied.
The court initially found an arrearage of $2,760 through the end of trial; but in court on November 1, both parties stipulated that the amount of the arrearage through that date was the amount set forth above.
The Child Support Guidelines (Regs. Conn. State Agen., § 46b-215a-2a(H), captioned "Determining the child care contribution,") provide that
(1) . . . the noncustodial parent shall be ordered to pay the custodial parent a child care contribution as part of each child support award . . . Such contribution shall be for the purpose of reimbursing the custodial parent for a portion of the child care costs incurred on behalf of the subject child . . .
(2) . . . (A) Qualifying Costs
Child care costs shall qualify for a contribution from the noncustodial parent only to the extent that they: (i) are reasonable, (ii) are necessary to allow a parent to maintain employment, (iii) are not otherwise reimbursed, and (iv) do not exceed the level required to provide quality care from a licensed source.
The court heard testimony that plaintiff was currently receiving unemployment compensation benefits, which were to expire in eight weeks, but was scheduled the week after trial to take a state licensing examination necessary for her to begin employment offered by Banker's Life and Casualty, but the only evidence before the court for ordering child support is that of the parties' incomes at trial. Based on that evidence, the court finds that the presumptive support amount is for plaintiff to pay child support in the amount of $76 per week for current support, an additional $14 per week toward her arrearage, and 26 per cent of unreimbursed medical (in excess of the first $100 per year, which will be defendant's responsibility) and qualifying daycare expenses.
III — ORDERS
After considering all the statutory criteria for dissolving a marriage and entering orders regarding custody, visitation, child support, orders of life and health insurance, and payment of the children's health expenditures, together with applicable case law and the evidence presented here, the court hereby enters the following orders:
Section 24 of Public Act 03-202 permits a court to order life insurance as security for payment of child support unless the party against whom such an order is directed "proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable." Plaintiff did not offer any such proof.
Section 46b-84 (e) provides as follows:
At any time at which orders are entered in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, . . . if health insurance coverage for a child is ordered by the court to be maintained, the court shall provide in the order that (1) the signature of the custodial parent or custodian of the insured dependent shall constitute a valid authorization to the insurer for purposes of processing an insurance reimbursement payment to the provider of the medical services, to the custodial parent or to the custodian, (2) neither parent shall prevent or interfere with the timely processing of any insurance reimbursement claim and (3) if the parent receiving an insurance reimbursement payment is not the parent or custodian who is paying the bill for the services of the medical provider, the parent receiving such insurance reimbursement payment shall promptly pay to the parent or custodian paying such bill any insurance reimbursement for such services. For purposes of subdivision (1), the custodial parent or custodian is responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of the order of dissolution or other order requiring maintenance of insurance for a child provided if such custodial parent or custodian fails to provide the insurer with a copy of such order, the Commissioner of Social Services may provide the insurer with a copy of such order. Such insurer may thereafter rely on such order and is not responsible for inquiring as to the legal sufficiency of the order. The custodial parent or custodian shall be responsible for providing the insurer with a certified copy of any order which materially alters the provision of the original order with respect to the maintenance of insurance for a child. If presented with an insurance reimbursement claim signed by the custodial parent or custodian, such insurer shall reimburse the provider of the medical services, if payment is to be made to such provider under the policy, or shall otherwise reimburse the custodial parent or custodian.
A. Dissolution of marriage:
The marriage of the parties, having broken down irretrievably, is hereby dissolved.
B. Custody:
(1) The court orders joint legal custody and physical custody shared as set forth herein.
(a) The parties shall confer with each other on all important matters pertaining to the child's health, education, welfare and upbringing, with the view to arriving at a harmonious policy calculated to promote Taylor's best interest. Except where someone else has specifically requested such a meeting with only one of the parties, neither party shall make an appointment with a doctor or authority figure important in the child's life without notifying the other first, soliciting that party's availability, and attempting to schedule the appointment at a time when both parties are available to attend.
(b) During each parent's time with Taylor, that parent shall make the day-to-day decisions regarding what she eats, wears to school, or does. Neither parent shall make plans that infringe on the other parent's time with the minor child.
(c) Each party will always have a working phone available and give the phone number to the other party. Taylor shall be allowed reasonable telephone access to each parent.
(d) Each of the parties shall keep the other reasonably informed at all times of Taylor's whereabouts while with the mother or the father, including the telephone number of the place where the child will be. The parties shall keep the other informed of their current cell phone and home phone numbers.
(e) When traveling out of state with Taylor, each parent shall also provide the other with a general itinerary of dates, locations, methods of travel, and telephone numbers.
(f) Neither parent shall do or say anything, or allow a third person to do or say anything to, or in the presence of, the minor child that would tend to detract from the ordinary respect, love and affection of the minor child for the other parent.
(g) Each parent shall keep the other parent informed of the child's school, sports and extracurricular activities and provide the other parent with advance 72 hours notice of events to which parents and/or the public are invited and shall provide the other parent with "parent tickets" if distributed or made available for the event. If e-mail addresses, street addresses or telephone numbers are requested of either parent in regard to the child's activities, both parents' complete information shall be provided.
(h) If the child participates in any activities intended to include a specific parent (e.g., father/daughter or mother/daughter camp-outs or dinners), that parent shall be entitled to attend the event with the child, which shall not be considered additional visitation, and permission to attend the event shall not be withheld by the other parent.
(i) Neither parent will smoke around Taylor or have the child in a closed room where smoking occurs.
C. Parenting schedule (1) Regular Schedule
The plaintiff will have parenting time each week from Wednesday after she gets out of work until Friday morning, and on alternating weekends from Saturday morning at 9 a.m. until Sunday evening at 6:00 p.m. Defendant will have parenting time the rest of the time.
(2) Holidays, Mother's Day, and Father's Day
(a) Holiday weekends with three days (such as Martin Luther King's Day, Presidents Day, Memorial Day, and Labor Day), holidays, Thanksgiving weekend, and the week between December 24 and January 2, shall be divided evenly between the parties.
(b) Taylor shall spend the weekend of Father's Day with defendant and Mother's Day with plaintiff.
(c) Holidays and weekends listed in this section suspend the regular parenting schedule, which will resume where interrupted after the holiday or extended holiday weekend. (For example, a particular weekend would, under the regular parenting schedule set forth above, be the father's weekend with Taylor. If Taylor spent the last three-day holiday weekend with her father, she would spend the upcoming three day weekend with her mother. Taylor would then spend the following non-holiday weekend with her father.)
(3) After Taylor begins school CT Page 16642
(a) The parties will share parenting time equally during vacation weeks during the school year; unless they agree otherwise, they shall do so by splitting the week, so that the party with parenting time on the weekend preceding the vacation week will have parenting time extended from Sunday evening until Wednesday morning, and the other party will have extended parenting time from Wednesday morning until Sunday evening, when the normal parenting schedule will resumes.
(b) Each party may have two non-consecutive weeks of exclusive parenting time each summer.
(4) Unless the parties agree otherwise, the party whose parenting time is ending will be responsible to transport Taylor to the other party.
D. Parenting classes
The parties shall each comply with the requirements of § 46b-69b of the General Statutes within 60 days.
E. Child Support
(1) The court orders plaintiff to pay child support in the amount of $76 per week for current support, $14 per week toward her arrearage, and 26 per cent of unreimbursed medical and qualifying daycare expenses.
(2) If the plaintiff has not obtained full-time work, she must actively seek such employment. She must notify defendant in writing within five days after obtaining full-time employment and provide him with weekly documentation of her efforts to obtain a job.
(3) If plaintiff has become employed since the end of trial, she is ordered to notify defendant immediately of her new job and salary.
(4) Defendant shall keep Taylor on his health insurance so long as it is available at a reasonable cost through employment. If not available to defendant at a reasonable cost and available through employment at a reasonable cost to plaintiff, plaintiff shall place and keep the child on her health insurance. Otherwise, the parties shall apply for any publically funded health insurance benefits available for Taylor. The provisions of General Statutes § 46b-84 (e) shall apply.
(5) The plaintiff shall obtain and maintain life insurance in the amount of $25,000, with defendant as the beneficiary, as security for her child support obligation for as long as she has such an obligation.
(6) The court retains jurisdiction over post-secondary education expenses pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c. Either party may seek a court order under that statute by filing a written motion or petition in accordance with applicable law.
F. Alimony and division of property and debts
The parties have waived orders for alimony or equitable division of property or assignment of marital debt and no such orders are entered.
G. Change of name
The court grants plaintiff's request for restoration of her birth name and orders that she shall again and henceforth be known as Jennifer L. D'Addio.
SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT