Opinion
2013-10-1
Lisa H. Blitman, New York, for appellant. Geanine Towers, P.C., Brooklyn (Geanine Towers of counsel), for respondent.
Lisa H. Blitman, New York, for appellant. Geanine Towers, P.C., Brooklyn (Geanine Towers of counsel), for respondent.
Julian A. Hertz, Larchmont, attorney for the child.
ANDRIAS, J.P., SWEENY, ACOSTA, SAXE, CLARK, JJ.
Order, Family Court, New York County (Carol J. Goldstein, Referee), entered on or about September 2, 2010, which, after a fact-finding hearing in proceedings brought pursuant to article 8 of the Family Court Act, determined that respondent husband had committed the family offenses of attempted assault in the second degree; attempted assault in the third degree; menacing in the third degree; disorderly conduct; harassment in the second degree (two counts), and aggravated harassment in the second degree (two counts), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
It is undisputed that respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the Family Court by appearing in the family offense proceeding commenced by petitioner wife, who was then residing in a shelter in New York State, and the Family Court therefore had personal jurisdiction over him. Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction over a family offense is not limited by geography ( seeFamily Court Act §§ 812, 818), and the court therefore could receive evidence and make fact findings concerning incidents that occurred in Pennsylvania before respondent's wife moved to New York with her daughters ( see Matter of Richardson v. Richardson, 80 A.D.3d 32, 37–38, 910 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2d Dept.2010] ).
The determination that respondent committed the family offenses as enumerated above is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence ( seeFamily Court Act §§ 812[1]; 832). The court's credibility determinations are supported by the record, and there is no basis to disturb them ( see Matter of Lisa S. v. William V., 95 A.D.3d 666, 943 N.Y.S.2d 886 [1st Dept.2012] ).
Respondent's arguments concerning the order of protection issued on August 24, 2012 are not properly before this Court since he did not appeal from that order. In any event, an appeal from that order, except to the extent it gives rise to a permanent and significant stigma that might adversely affect respondent in future proceedings, would be moot since it has expired by its terms ( see Matter of Diallo v. Diallo, 68 A.D.3d 411, 888 N.Y.S.2d 744 [1st Dept.2009], lv. dismissed14 N.Y.3d 854, 901 N.Y.S.2d 135, 927 N.E.2d 556 [2010] ).