Opinion
No. HHD X04 CV-02-4034702 S
October 20, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS (#322)
The parties presented oral arguments to the court on October 1, 2008 concerning the defendant The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation (Diocesan Corporation or movant)'s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Diocesan Corporation presented a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The plaintiff, William Noll, submitted an objection in opposition to the motion, in response to which the movant filed a reply.
Since, as to the motion to dismiss, there are no disputed issues of fact, an evidentiary hearing was not requested or required. After consideration of the parties' submissions and arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Background
"The plaintiff in this matter alleges that he was sexually abused by a Roman Catholic priest, Father Stephen Foley, in approximately 1978, at a time when the plaintiff was about fifteen years old. Defendants include Foley, [and] the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation ('Archdiocese') . . . The first count of the currently operative complaint, the Revised Complaint dated April 8, 2003, alleges that the archdiocese [was] negligent in twenty-three ways, including failing adequately to supervise, evaluate, and train Foley as well as failing to investigate and to report wayward behavior. The second count alleges reckless and wanton behavior on the part of the corporate defendant . . . for behavior similar to that alleged in the first count." Noll v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket at Middletown, Docket No. X04 CV02 4000582 (July 9, 2007, Beach, J.).
The Diocesan Corporation contends that portions of the plaintiff's claims in the first and second counts, in various subparagraphs, would require the court, in adjudicating the claims, to delve into matters of church governance and clergy employment decisions. The movant asserts that such matters are protected from government involvement by the religion clauses of the United States and Connecticut Constitutions, and General Statutes § 52-571b, and are therefore not justiciable, making them not within the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
A court may grant a motion to dismiss which is addressed to parts of a count. See Orsini v. Department of Transportation, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 07 4007290 (February 15, 2008, Sferrazza, J.) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 30).
In response, the plaintiff asserts that prior decisions in this case by other judges on motions to strike rejected the same contentions and that the movant seeks a third bite at the apple. In particular, the plaintiff argues that the court has twice held that the First Amendment is not a bar to the present cause of action. The plaintiff also asserts that the state and federal constitutions do not divest the civil justice system of the authority and duty to hold religious institutions accountable for violations of neutral principles of tort law.
II Discussion
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.C. Equity Group, LLC v. Zoning Commission of Bourough of Newtown, 285 Conn. 240, 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008).
"Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bingham v. Dept. of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008).
"[I]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader[.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 290, 933 A.2d 256 (2007). "[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008).
A Prior Decisions
The prior rulings in this case on motions to strike, by other judges, did not adjudicate the constitutional and statutory interpretation issues raised in the instant motion. Judge Peck's September 3, 2004 ruling denied the movant's motion to strike portions of the first and second counts (paragraph 10 of each), stating that it was procedurally improper, since paragraphs of a complaint may only be stricken when they attempt to set out a separate cause of action. Judge Beach's September 30, 2005 ruling granted the plaintiff's motion to strike special defenses, which were "largely qualified and are directed at specific allegations rather than at entire counts." He stated that he was "following Judge Peck's rulings at this point . . ." Neither ruling addressed the constitutional and statutory issues.
B Justiciable Claims
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." Similarly, Article first, § 3, of the Connecticut Constitution provides, in relevant part,: "The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to all persons in the state . . ."
The religious freedoms embraced in the first amendment to the United States Constitution apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960). The United States Supreme Court has "consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Employment Division, Dept. Of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).
The Diocesan Corporation does not claim absolute immunity based on its constitutional and statutory arguments. Rather, it asserts that "it may properly be subjected to civil liability only on the limited claim that, prior to the date the plaintiff was allegedly first molested, the Diocesan Corporation had knowledge that Stephen Foley had a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct with minors and that it failed to act prudently in the face of that knowledge." (Emphasis in original.) See movant's memorandum of law, p. 7. It contends that this is a recognized tort claim based on laws of general applicability which can be adjudicated without excessive governmental entanglement in religion, since such adjudication would not require subjective judgments concerning its internal administrative and employment rules and procedures or its relationship with its ordained clergy. For the reasons stated below, the court is unpersuaded by the movant's assertion that it is only in connection with this limited aspect of the plaintiff's claims that the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
All of the plaintiff's claims stem from the allegations that, when he was a child, he was subjected to sexual abuse by a Catholic priest. While, as to his claims that the Diocesan Corporation failed adequately to supervise, evaluate, and train Foley, as well as that it failed to investigate and to report wayward behavior, proof would be required concerning internal church policies and procedures relating to sexual abuse of minors, matters of faith and doctrine do not appear to be involved.
In support of its argument, the Diocesan Corporation relies, in particular, on General Statutes § 52-571b and Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51 (2007), cert. denied 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007).
Section 52-571b, concerning action or defense authorized when state or political subdivision burdens a person's exercise of religion, provides, in relevant part,
(a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a person's exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the Constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the principles which govern statutory interpretation. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio Machine Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union, Local 14, 285 Conn. 278, 286-87, 939 A.2d 561 (2008).
In Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, which concerned the appeal of a dismissal of a Roman Catholic priest (Justinian Ryeyemamu)'s employment discrimination complaint by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, Ryeyemamu asserted that he had been refused a promotion to the position of parish administrator based on racial discrimination. See id., 98 Conn.App. 650-51.
The Appellate Court analyzed whether § 52-571b precluded the application of the "ministerial exception to judicial authority to adjudicate employment disputes between religious institutions and their religious leaders." Id., 648. "[T]he ministerial exception is judicial shorthand for two conclusions: the first is that the imposition of secular standards on a church's employment of its ministers will burden the free exercise of religion; the second, that the state's interest in eliminating employment discrimination is outweighed by a church's constitutional right of autonomy in its own domain." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 652.
After finding that the terms of the statute as applied to the facts of the case were not plain and unambiguous, see id., 658, the court reviewed the history and purpose of § 52-571b, including its legislative history, see id., 659-61, and noted, concerning a similar bill introduced two years prior to the passage of § 52-571b, that "[o]f particular import for our decision in this case is the testimony of one proponent who pointed out that [Employment Division, Dept. Of Human Resources of Oregon v.] Smith [, supra] would have the undesired consequence of making employment discrimination laws applicable to religious institutions." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 98 Conn.App. 661.
The court stated, "[i]n protecting the religious practices of individuals, the legislature made the distinction between the 'exercise of religion,' which it protected with the strict scrutiny test found in subsections (a) and (b) of § 52-571b, and 'religious beliefs,' which the legislature prevented from being burdened by subsection (d)." Id., 98 Conn.App. 662.
The Appellate Court also stated, at 98 Conn.App. 665, that "the employment of ministers and clergy by a religious institution is a 'religious belief' under subsection (d)" and that "the employment practices of religious institutions are a form of 'religious belief' for purposes of subsection (d)" of § 52-571b. (Footnote omitted.) Id., 665. As noted above, § 52-571b(d) provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief." The Appellate Court concluded that § 52-571b does not displace the ministerial exception and that the trial court properly affirmed the Commission's dismissal of the complaint. See id., 98 Conn.App. 665.
The factual context presented is central to the process of statutory interpretation. The Appellate Court expressly noted that other cases dealt with the applicability of § 52-571b to zoning laws. See id., 98 Conn.App. 665-66 n. 11. The court stated, that "[b]ecause of the factual difference between those cases and the present one . . . [we do not] find those cases helpful in interpreting the language of § 52-571b." Id. Clearly, Rweyemamu concerned the applicability of § 52-571b to the enforcement of this state's laws on employment discrimination. See id., 654. Rweyemamu did not concern a claim about sexual abuse of a child by a clergyman.
In a footnote, the court referred to its earlier decision in DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society Of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003), wherein it "concluded that [u]nder both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause, the first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 654 n. 3.
The facts in DeCorso are also quite different than those at issue here. There, the court addressed the plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against elders of the Jehovah's Witnesses, based on their counseling of her. "At all times, the counseling she received from the defendant elders was spiritual in nature, and based on the writings and teachings of the scriptures as interpreted by the religion of the Jehovah's Witnesses." DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible Tract Society Of New York, Inc., supra, 78 Conn.App. 867. "Throughout her complaint, the plaintiff cites various writings and scripture of the Jehovah's Witnesses, alleging that the defendant elders did not act in conformity with their own religious teachings." Id., 867-68.
The Appellate Court concluded that "the plaintiff's claims cannot be addressed without violating the first amendment. The plaintiff's allegations are essentially that she sought counsel from the defendants and that they negligently caused her emotional distress in giving her bad advice contrary to teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses. In fact, throughout her complaint, the plaintiff cites to scripture and publications of the Jehovah's Witnesses, which, according to the plaintiff, show what the defendants should have done. As other courts have recognized, that is a claim of clergy malpractice, which usually is barred by first amendment principles." Id., 878. "Determining whether the defendants' counseling created an unreasonable risk of emotional harm or that the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable would require a court to evaluate the proprieties of religious teachings. Furthermore, the plaintiff cites certain Jehovah's scriptures, which would require the court to evaluate whether the defendants counseled in accordance therewith." Id., 879-80.
Here, in contrast, the bulk of the plaintiff's claims have nothing to do with scripture or religious teachings. These allegations concern child sex abuse by a Catholic priest, and whether the Diocesan Corporation knew or should have known of the same, about which there would be no need for the court to evaluate the proprieties of scripture or religious teachings. As is the case with Connecticut tort law, there is no doubt that the Catholic Church views the sexual abuse of children as wrongful.
As discussed below in part C, portions of the plaintiff's claims, which apparently would involve the court in such matters, are dismissed.
The court is also unpersuaded that either Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevech, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) or Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), cited by the court in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 662, requires dismissal of the bulk of the challenged subparagraphs here. In Serbian Orthodox Diocese, the respondent filed suit in the Illinois courts seeking to enjoin the petitioners from interfering with Diocesan assets of respondent not-for-profit Illinois corporations and to have himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop. In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court stated that, "civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense 'arbitrary' must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them." Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevech, supra, 426 U.S. 713. Here, inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly mandate would not be required. No religious controversy would be involved. Instead, neutral principles of Connecticut tort law would govern.
In Kedroff, the United States Supreme Court determined that "[l]egislation which determines, in an hierarchical church, ecclesiastical administration or the appointment of the clergy, or transfers control of churches from one group to another, interferes with the free exercise of religion contrary to the Constitution." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 U.S. 94. Kedroff did not involve the application of principles of tort law to a religious institution.
Subsequent to the Appellate Court's decision in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 646, the Supreme Court also analyzed § 52-571b and stated, "[t]he scope and meaning of the word 'burden' as used in § 52-571b is a question of statutory interpretation . . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 422-23, 941 A.2d 868 (2008).
In Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, the Supreme Court also concluded that § 52-571b's language, as applied to the facts of that case, were not plain and unambiguous, and looked to the statute's purpose and history to ascertain its meaning. See id., 423-24. There, the plaintiffs argued that the planning and zoning commission's denial of an application for a special exception in order to build a temple substantially burdened their free exercise of religion within the meaning of § 52-571b. See id., 390, 391-2.
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded. "[Section] 52-571b does not expressly define religious exercise to include the use or improvement of real property for the purpose of religious exercise . . . [T]here is no indication in the legislative history of § 52-571b that the legislature harbored any special concerns about a statewide pattern of official discrimination against religious uses in the zoning and land use context, or that the legislature intended to provide heightened protection to religious land uses . . . [W]e do not believe either that the legislature intended that the construction of a place of worship would constitute religious exercise or that, in the absence of evidence of discrimination against a particular religious use or religious uses in general, the application of land use restrictions that are intended to protect the public health and safety to such a use generally would be subject to strict scrutiny under the statute. We therefore reject the society's claim that § 52-571b provides broader protection than [the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.] in this context and conclude that § 52-571b does not apply in the circumstances of this case." Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 425.
The resolution of the movant's argument here requires the court to consider the meaning of the terms "burden" and "religious belief," as they are used in § 52-571b, and as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language is applicable. See id., 422-23.
"Because neither of those terms has a meaning that is plain and unambiguous as applied to the facts of this case, we look to the statute's purpose and history to ascertain their meaning . . . [Section] 52-571b was enacted in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Dept. Of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 885, in which the court held that a generally applicable prohibition against socially harmful conduct does not violate the free exercise clause, regardless of whether the law burdens religious exercise." (Footnote omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 423. "[T]he purpose of § 52-571b was to restore the balancing standard, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. [398,] 403, [ 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963),] under which a law that burdens religious exercise must be justified by a compelling governmental interest." (Footnote omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 424.
As the Supreme Court concluded in Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, concerning religious uses in the zoning and land use context, there is no indication in the legislative history of § 52-571b that the legislature harbored any special concerns about a statewide pattern of official discrimination against, or that the legislature intended to provide heightened protection to, religious institutions in the area of the application of neutral principles of tort law.
In particular, in its review of § 52-571b's legislative history, the Supreme Court quoted the remarks of Senator Jepsen: "[T]his bill does not expand, contract or alter the ability of a claimant to obtain relief in a manner consistent with the [United States] Supreme Court's free exercise . . . jurisprudence under the compelling interest test prior to . . . Smith." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 424 (quoting 36 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1993 Sess., p. 2785). Senator Jepsen also stated that the bill was not intended "to in any way infringe on the establishment clause of the State Constitution . . ." See 36 S. Proc., supra, p. 2776.
"When interpreting the contours of our state charter of liberty, it is clear that we may look to federal precedent . . . We employ this precedent for guidance and analogy when the federal authorities are logically persuasive and well-reasoned." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Joyce, 229 Conn. 10, 19-20, 639 A.2d 1007 (1994). "[W]hen looking to federal courts for guidance, we typically turn first to decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals." Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 460 n. 13, 904 A.2d 137 (2006). "Decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, although not binding on us, are particularly persuasive." Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 341, 752 A.2d 955 (2000).
In considering the movant's argument, the court finds persuasive the analysis by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a recent decision, which also involved Justinian Ryeyemamu, Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008). There, in a Title VII suit, Rweyemamu alleged racial discrimination. He claimed that the Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich, Connecticut, through its Bishop, misapplied canon law in denying him a requested promotion, and in terminating him. See id., 199-200. The court explained the limitations to the ministerial exception, which as noted above, was the basis for the Appellate Court's affirmance in Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 98 Conn.App. 665, upon which the Diocesan Corporation relies here.
Concerning the ministerial exception, the Second Circuit stated, "[a]lthough its name might imply an absolute exception, it is not always a complete barrier to suit; for example, a case may proceed if it involves a limited inquiry that, combined with the ability of the . . . court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion into sensitive religious matters." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rweyemamu v. Cote, supra, 520 F.3d 207. The court affirmed the vitality of the doctrine in the Second Circuit, stating that "the ministerial exception is constitutionally required by various doctrinal underpinnings of the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause protects a church's right to decide matters of governance and internal organization." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 207-08.
However, the court noted that "a plaintiff alleging particular wrongs by the church that are wholly non-religious in character is surely not forbidden his day in court." Id., 208. "Like any other person or organization, [churches] may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts." Id. "[W]hatever their emblemata, some claims may inexorably entangle us in doctrinal disputes . . . By contrast, if a plaintiff alleges, for instance, that his religious employer has deceived him within the meaning of a state's common law of fraud, his case is less likely to run afoul of the Establishment Clause." (Citation omitted.) Id., 208-09.
The Second Circuit's recently expressed analysis is consistent with that of Judge Covello in Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F.Sup. 66 (D.Conn. 1995), which applied Connecticut law, and in which the plaintiffs also alleged that they were sexually abused by a priest when they were children, and claimed that church institutional defendants were liable for damages based on negligence. In Nutt, the court reviewed the United States Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
"Although no Supreme Court decision has determined the applicability of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as a defense for a religious organization's negligent conduct, the Court has held that the First Amendment does not create a blanket tort immunity for religious institutions or their clergy, thus allowing clergy and clerical institutions to be sued for the torts they commit. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1944). Moreover, the court has 'never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.' [Employment Division,] Dept. Of Human Resources [of Oregon] v. Smith, [ supra, 494 U.S. 878-79.] The Smith court went on to state as follows: ['a]s described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 [ 60 S.Ct. 1010, 1012-13, 84 L.Ed. 1375] (1940): Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, supra, 921 F.Sup. 73.
The court then concluded, "it is difficult to see how the plaintiff's claims against the defendants would foster excessive entanglement with religion. The common law doctrine of negligence does not intrude upon the free exercise of religion, as it does not discriminate against [a] religious belief or regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons . . . The court's determination of an action against the defendants based upon their alleged negligent supervision of [a priest] would not prejudice or impose upon any of the religious tenets or practices of Catholicism. Rather, such a determination would involve an examination of the defendants' possible role in allowing one of its employees to engage in conduct which they, as employers, as well as society in general, expressly prohibit. Since the Supreme Court has consistently failed to allow the Free Exercise Clause to relieve [an] individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs, the defendants [cannot] appropriately implicate the First Amendment as a defense to their alleged negligent conduct." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 74.
Judge Covello's analysis has been adopted in Superior Court decisions. See Hayes v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 02 0100267 (March 5, 2004, Silbert, J) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 676); Doe v. Buongirno, Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket at Norwich, Docket No. CV 00 0124271 (July 30, 2002, McLachlan, J.). As Judge Silbert similarly stated, "[i]n deciding whether the defendants were negligent in the supervision of their employee, the court would be able to apply neutral principles of tort law to determine whether the defendants failed to act when they knew or should have known of the priest's engaging in the alleged tortious conduct. There is no indication or allegation that, by taking the kind of preventive action required by tort law, the institutional defendants would have violated any doctrine, practice or law of the Roman Catholic Church . . . In the absence of such a conflict, subjecting the institutional defendants to liability does not violate their right to the free exercise of their religion. There is no constitutional bar to the application of neutral principles of tort law to determine whether the defendants failed to act if they knew or should have known of [the priest's] alleged tortious conduct." Hayes v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0100267.
Here, likewise, the bulk of the plaintiff's claims of negligent and reckless institutional failure to appropriately deal with child sexual abuse will not inexorably entangle the court in a doctrinal dispute. The court notes that, in support of its argument, the movant has stated that "[i]t is not necessary to address [the plaintiff's] various theories separately." See Diocesan Corporation's memorandum, p. 5. Accordingly, except as stated below in part C, the court has not done so.
As in Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, supra, 285 Conn. 425, which found that the legislature did not intend to address zoning law matters in § 52-571b, this court concludes that the legislature did not intend that § 52-571b would apply to preclude a plaintiff from holding a religious institution responsible for its torts in the context of sexual abuse of a child by a clergyman. Such claims also are not barred by the provisions, quoted above, of the United States and Connecticut Constitutions concerning religious freedom.
In view of the Connecticut and Second Circuit case law cited above, the authority from other jurisdictions cited by the Diocesan Corporation is not persuasive.
C Non-Justiciable Claims
Consideration of certain of the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint apparently would inexorably entangle the court in doctrinal matters. In paragraph 10(m) of the first count and paragraphs 10(e) and (p) of the second count, the plaintiff's claims expressly refer to alleged religion-based obligations, with phrases such as "induced the Catholic faithful," "moral and spiritual well being," and "representatives of God." The motion to dismiss is granted as to these portions of the plaintiff's claims, since they are so entwined with religion that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over them.
As Judge Beach stated concerning his September 30, 2005 ruling on the motion to strike special defenses, the denial of the majority of the motion to dismiss "does not mean that the defendant . . . will not be able to object to certain sorts of evidence, or that, for example, each alleged 'duty' will necessarily be presented to the jury." As in Doe v. The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F.Sup.2d 139, 146 (D.Conn. 2003), the court cautions the parties to limit the scope of this case to secular matters.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
It is so ordered.