Opinion
C. A. 3:21-2216-TLW-PJG
05-31-2023
Summer Nolan, Plaintiff, v. Holiday Kamper Company, LLC, doing business as Camping World RV Sales; Freedom Roads LLC, doing business as Camping World, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Summer Nolan filed this employment action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas raising claims of sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The defendants removed the action and the parties agreed to dismiss this matter and proceed to arbitration. This matter is again before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Nolan's motion to vacate the arbitration award. (ECF No. 11.) The defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 13), and Nolan filed a reply (ECF No. 14). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court finds that the motion should be denied.
“Convincing a federal court to vacate an arbitral award is a herculean task.” Warfield v. Icon Advisers, Inc, 26 F.4th 666, 669 (4th Cir. 2022). “[T]he scope of review of an arbitrator's . . . decision is among the narrowest known at law because to allow full scrutiny of such awards would frustrate the purpose of having arbitration at all-the quick resolution of disputes and the avoidance of the expense and delay associated with litigation.” Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998). “Thus, in reviewing arbitral awards, a district or appellate court is limited to determining whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do-not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.” Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts are not free to overturn an arbitration result because they would have reached a different conclusion if presented with the same facts.” Id.
A district court may vacate an arbitration award on one of the statutory grounds listed in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), or where the arbitration award rests upon a manifest disregard of the law. Warfield, 26 F.4th at 669 (citing Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir. 2012)). “To establish manifest disregard, a party must demonstrate: (1) the disputed legal principle is clearly defined and is not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrator refused to apply that legal principle.” Warfield, 26 F.4th at 669-70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nolan moves to vacate the arbitration award based on manifest disregard of the law, arguing that three decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit “foreclose dismissal of [Nolan's] claims by dismissal under Rule 56,” citing to the following cases: Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2021); Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201 (4th Cir. 2022); and Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015). (Pl.'s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 11-1 at 9-10.) However, Nolan fails to identify a clearly defined legal principle that the arbitrator refused to apply. Warfield, 26 F.4th at 669-70. Instead, Nolan's entire memorandum in support of the motion to vacate analyzes the facts and law in this case as if Nolan were moving for summary judgment. That is not the appropriate standard here.
A district court's mere disagreement with an arbitrator's application of the law does not justify vacation of an arbitration award. Remmey, 32 F.3d at 149. Instead, Nolan must “show that the arbitrators were aware of the law, understood it correctly, found it applicable to the case before them, and yet chose to ignore it in propounding their decision.” Id.; see also Warfield, 26 F.4th at 672 (“This prong of the manifest disregard analysis requires something more than merely establishing that the arbitrators misapplied the law; instead, it requires evidence that they knowingly rejected a controlling precedent.”). While Nolan cites from the three Fourth Circuit decisions upon which she claims manifest disregard, she fails to articulate specific legal principles from those decisions that control the outcome in this case. Tellingly, where she does cite those decisions in her memorandum supporting the motion, Nolan fails to identify any portion of the arbitrator's decision that is controlled by the principles. Thus, the court is unable to evaluate whether the arbitrator disregarded those principles.
For instance, Nolan briefly cites Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc. for the general principle that Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for complaining about discrimination. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 11-1 at 10.) Nolan's remaining argument after that citation is that the facts in this case show she was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination. What is absent from her argument is identification of any portion of the arbitrator's decision that disregards Roberts. Nolan's mere disagreement with the arbitrator's decision is not sufficient to meet the “sky-high standard of judicial review” in manifest disregard cases that the arbitrator “refused to heed” binding precedent. Warfield, 26 F.4th at 674. Consequently, Nolan fails to demonstrate that the arbitration award rests upon a manifest disregard of the law.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends Nolan's motion to vacate the arbitration award be denied.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).