Opinion
Case No. 1:20 CV 49
2021-07-22
The NOCO COMPANY, Plaintiff v. SHENZHEN VALUELINK E-COMMERCE CO., LTD., et al., Defendants
Jonathon W. Groza, Justine L. Konicki, Kyle D. Stroup, Jon J. Pinney, Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff. Hao Ni, Timothy T. Wang, Ni Wang & Massand, Dallas, TX, Thomas G. Kovach, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants Shenzhen Valuelink E-Commerce Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Mediatek Tong Technology Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Bi Te Yi Technology Co., Ltd. David A. Bernstein, Jay R. Campbell, Tucker Ellis, Cleveland, OH, Peter James Curtin, Arch & Lake, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Shenzhen Gooloo E-Commerce Co., LTD. Jonathan T. Hyman, Wickens Herzer Panza, Avon, OH, Peter Turner, Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Tii Trading, Inc. David A. Bernstein, Jay R. Campbell, Tucker Ellis, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Guangzhou Unique Electronics Co., LTD. Nice Team Enterprise Limited, Pro Se. Shenzhen Jieqi Digital Technology Co., Ltd., Pro Se.
Jonathon W. Groza, Justine L. Konicki, Kyle D. Stroup, Jon J. Pinney, Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.
Hao Ni, Timothy T. Wang, Ni Wang & Massand, Dallas, TX, Thomas G. Kovach, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants Shenzhen Valuelink E-Commerce Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Mediatek Tong Technology Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Bi Te Yi Technology Co., Ltd.
David A. Bernstein, Jay R. Campbell, Tucker Ellis, Cleveland, OH, Peter James Curtin, Arch & Lake, Chicago, IL, for Defendant Shenzhen Gooloo E-Commerce Co., LTD.
Jonathan T. Hyman, Wickens Herzer Panza, Avon, OH, Peter Turner, Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Tii Trading, Inc.
David A. Bernstein, Jay R. Campbell, Tucker Ellis, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Guangzhou Unique Electronics Co., LTD.
Nice Team Enterprise Limited, Pro Se.
Shenzhen Jieqi Digital Technology Co., Ltd., Pro Se.
ORDER
SOLOMON OLIVER, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case are two Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction: one from Defendant TII Trading Inc. ("TII") (ECF No. 76) and another from Defendants Shenzhen Valuelink E-Commerce Co. Ltd. ("Valuelink"), Shenzhen Mediatek Tong Technology Co., Ltd. ("Mediatek"), and Shenzhen Bi Te Yi Technology Co., Ltd. ("BTY") (collectively, the "Shenzhen Defendants") (ECF No. 90). Also pending before the court is Plaintiff The NOCO Company's ("NOCO") Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply Instanter (ECF No. 123) to the Shenzhen Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the court denies all three Motions.
I. BACKGROUND
NOCO, TII, and the Shenzhen Defendants sell automotive accessories on the Amazon Marketplace, an e-commerce platform owned and operated by Amazon. With Amazon accounting for nearly half of online retail sales in the United States, product placement on the Amazon Marketplace is an important avenue for merchants seeking to reach American consumers over the internet. (Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 1.) While NOCO is organized under Ohio law, where it maintains its principal place of business, TII is incorporated and headquartered in California and the Shenzhen Defendants are based in China. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 15.)
In its Complaint, filed January 9, 2020, NOCO alleges that TII and the Shenzhen Defendants have "manipulated" the Amazon Marketplace through various methods designed to "gain market share, divert revenue, and harm their competition," such as soliciting false product reviews; manipulating Amazon's algorithms to obtain, undeservingly, Amazon-awarded accolades designating their products as "Amazon's Choice;" and using so-called click farms to drive up advertising costs. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) NOCO asserts that Defendants’ actions violate the Lanham Act's prohibition against deceptive advertising and unfair trade practices, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (Claim One), and Ohio's deceptive trade practice statute, O.R.C. § 4165.02 (Claim Two). (Id. ¶¶ 247–65.) NOCO further alleges tortious interference with a business relationship (Claim Three), trade libel (Claim Four), and civil conspiracy (Claim Five). (Id. ¶¶ 266–80.)
On February 25, 2020, TII moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7). (ECF No. 9.) On March 10, 2020, in response to TII's 12(b)(2) Motion, NOCO moved for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d). (ECF No. 12.) The court granted NOCO's request and denied TII's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to allow the discovery process to unfold. (ECF No. 16; ECF No. 70.) With leave from the court, TII filed a renewed Motion (ECF No. 76) on September 22, 2020, seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. On October 28, 2020, after TII and NOCO agreed to stipulate to certain facts about TII's business operations, NOCO filed a Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 96). TII then filed a Reply (ECF No. 108) on November 18, 2020.
Because TII's renewed Motion focuses solely on Rule 12(b)(2), the court deems its prior arguments under Rules 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7) abandoned.
The Shenzhen Defendants filed their own Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) on October 26, 2020. (ECF No. 90.) After conducting jurisdictional discovery as to the Shenzhen Defendants, NOCO filed a Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 121) on June 11, 2021. The Shenzhen Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 122) on June 24, 2021. NOCO then filed a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply Instanter (ECF No. 123) on July 1, 2021, which the Shenzhen Defendants opposed (ECF No. 124).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the court must "look to the law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists." Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette , 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2000). Although Ohio recently amended its long-arm statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382, to mirror the constitutional limitations for personal jurisdiction, this case was filed in January 2020, when Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382 was "not coterminous with federal constitutional limits." Schneider v. Hardesty , 669 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, because Ohio Rev. Code § 1.58(A)(1) states that a statutory amendment "does not ... [a]ffect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder[,]" the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if the plaintiff "presents a prima facie case that: (1) jurisdiction is proper under a long-arm statute or another jurisdictional rule of Ohio, the forum state; and (2) the Due Process Clause also allows for jurisdiction under the facts of the case." Conn v. Zakharov , 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2012). When making determinations of jurisdiction based on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court must "view allegations in the pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all reasonable competing inferences in their favor." Goldstein v. Christiansen , 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 638 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1994).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
1. TII
Under both the previous and revised versions of Ohio's long-arm statute, "[t]ransacting any business in [Ohio]" confers personal jurisdiction over a defendant. O.R.C. § 2307.382(A)(1). The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted an expansive interpretation of "transact." In Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc. , for example, it interpreted the statute to encompass all defendants who "carry[ ] on or prosecute[ ] business negotiations" with citizens of Ohio. 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480 (1990). And in the context of internet sales, another judge in this district has found that a single online sale suffices to establish personal jurisdiction under Ohio's long-arm statute. See Zoya Co. v. NIOS, Inc. , No. 1:13-CV-780, 2013 WL 4511922, *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2013).
Here, jurisdictional discovery revealed that from January 2016 through March 2020, TII sold $271,839.18 worth of products to Ohio consumers on the Amazon Marketplace, representing 2.37 percent of TII's total Amazon sales over that time period. (See Resp. in Opp'n to TII's Mot. at PageID #4131, ECF No. 96.) In addition, from December 1, 2017, through July 7, 2020, TII sold $4,875.07 worth of products to Ohio consumers on Walmart's e-commerce platform. (See id. at PageID #4132.) These sales plainly satisfy O.R.C. § 2307.382(A)(1) ’s "[t]ransacting any business" requirement—a point that TII apparently concedes, as it skips straight to the Due Process Clause analysis in its Motion.
2. Shenzhen Defendants
While the forum state's long-arm statute typically provides the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, the Shenzhen Defendants present one of the rare cases implicating the so-called "federal long-arm statute"— Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Lyngaas v. Curaden Ag , 992 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). To establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), "(1) the cause of action must arise under federal law; (2) the defendant must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction; and (3) the federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process." Id. (quoting Plixer Int'l v. Scrutinizer GmbH , 905 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018) ).
As this court held in its February 2, 2021, Order (ECF No. 111) granting jurisdictional discovery as to the Shenzhen Defendants, Rule 4(k)(2) is relevant here because this is a federal-question case and the Shenzhen Defendants assert that they are not subject to jurisdiction in any state. Thus, the first two prongs of the Rule 4(k)(2) inquiry are satisfied. Nonetheless, the Shenzhen Defendants maintain that NOCO cannot rely on Rule 4(k)(2) because "[NOCO] did not assert Rule 4(k)(2) as a basis for jurisdiction in the Complaint, nor does the Complaint contain any allegations regarding [the Shenzhen Defendants’] nationwide contacts that would support a basis for personal jurisdiction." (Shenzhen's Reply at PageID #7345, ECF No. 122.) Because the Complaint fails to invoke Rule 4(k)(2) by name, the Shenzhen Defendants argue, NOCO is "limited to the Ohio long-arm statute" in establishing personal jurisdiction. (Id. )
The Shenzhen Defendants’ attempt to sideline Rule 4(k)(2) is not well-taken. Indeed, their arguments are self-defeating. If Rule 4(k)(2) is now out of bounds because NOCO did not explicitly cite it in the Complaint, then the same should be true of Ohio's long-arm statute—which the Complaint also fails to mention by name. Yet the Shenzhen Defendants ignore the long-arm statute's omission while holding it out as the sole basis for jurisdiction that plausibly can be gleaned from NOCO's Complaint. Aside from this contradiction, the Complaint clearly alleges that the Shenzhen Defendants "direct their deceptive and disparaging Amazon Marketplace activities and anticompetitive conduct to the United States[;]" "intentionally list, market, and sell their products to United States consumers through the Amazon Marketplace[;]" and "engage[ ] in overt acts directly targeting the United States market and United States consumers." (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 28, 33, ECF No. 1.) These allegations are sufficient to invoke Rule 4(k)(2) despite NOCO's failure to mention the Rule by name.
Because NOCO has invoked Rule 4(k)(2) and there is no dispute that the first two prongs are satisfied, jurisdiction over the Shenzhen Defendants turns on the due process analysis below.
B. Constitutional Basis for Personal Jurisdiction
After deciding whether the forum's long-arm statute is satisfied, the court must determine if the Due Process Clause prohibits the court from exercising jurisdiction. The Due Process Clause allows courts to exert jurisdiction over defendants only if they have sufficient contacts with the forum, and if exercising jurisdiction is reasonable given the circumstances of the case. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). A defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy the Due Process Clause "if the defendant's conduct ... [is] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Generally, this occurs when "the defendant deliberately has engaged in significant activities within a [s]tate ... or has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475–76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The Supreme Court has explained that, generally, defendants must purposefully avail themselves of the protections and privileges of conducting activities in the state in order to create those relationships. See id. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ; see also Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). ("[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.")
The case law in this area distinguishes between general and specific personal jurisdiction, but only the latter is at issue here. The Sixth Circuit has articulated a three-part test to determine whether exercising specific jurisdiction over a defendant is proper under the Due Process Clause:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
Beydoun v. Wataniya Restaurants Holding , Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc. , 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968) ). The court addresses each prong of the Sixth Circuit's test in turn.
1. Purposeful Availment
In Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. , the Sixth Circuit adopted the Zippo "sliding scale" framework to determine when a defendant's online activities constitute purposeful availment. Neogen Corp. , 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. , 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ). Zippo identified "three levels of interactivity of websites, including: (1) passive sites that only offer information for the user to access; (2) active sites that clearly transact business and/or form contracts; and (3) hybrid or interactive sites that allow users to ‘exchange information with the host computer.’ " See, Inc. v. Imago Eyewear Pty, Ltd. , 167 F. App'x 518 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. , 952 F. Supp. at 1124 ). On this scale, a finding of purposeful availment is proper if the website manifests "a conscious choice to transact business with inhabitants of a forum state." Neogen Corp. , 282 F.3d at 890.
a. TII
As discussed above, there is no question that TII transacts business with Ohio residents through its interactive online storefronts. (See Stip. Facts ¶ 4, ECF No. 83.) Nevertheless, TII contends that it merely places products in the stream of commerce, which in turn carries them into the hands of Ohio residents. (See TII's Mot. at PageID #942, ECF No. 76.) Because "internet retailers" like Amazon are its "only connection" to Ohio, TII argues, it should not have to litigate here. (Id. )
In support of its position, TII relies on two recent decisions from this district; both, however, are distinguishable. First, Noco Co. v. Doe , No. 1:19-CV-2260, 2020 WL 836757 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2020), found personal jurisdiction to be lacking because NOCO, also the plaintiff there, had failed to allege a "commercial connection" between the defendant and the state of Ohio. Id. at *4–5. Here, though, NOCO unambiguously alleges—and jurisdictional discovery has independently confirmed—a commercial connection between TII and Ohio, namely in the form of TII's sales to Ohio residents. (See Compl. ¶¶ 26–27, ECF No. 1; Resp. in Opp'n to TII's Mot. at PageID #4131–32, ECF No. 96). Thus, the key rationale underpinning 12(b)(2) dismissal in Doe is inapplicable to this case. Second, Wireless Env't, LLC v. HooToo.com , No. 1:15-CV-1215, 2016 WL 4530617 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2016), analyzed a defendant retailer's proprietary website, which "merely provide[d] a link to Amazon.com," as opposed to an Amazon Marketplace storefront. Id. at *3–4. But this case is different; it involves TII's storefronts, which TII uses to sell its products directly to Ohio residents via the Amazon Marketplace. As such, despite TII's protestations to the contrary, this is not a case "in which the defendant acted by placing a product in the stream of commerce, and the stream eventually swept defendant's product into the forum State." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. , 480 U.S. 102, 110, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (emphasis added); (see also TII's Mem. in Supp. at PageID #942–43, ECF No. 76-1 (citing Asahi ).)
The Sixth Circuit has yet to address whether online storefronts face a higher purposeful-availment standard than proprietary websites, but other courts have weighed in. For example, the Southern District of New York "distinguish[es] between ‘commercial vendors who use [online storefronts] as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum’ and ‘occasional sellers who use an internet service once to sell goods to the highest bidder who happens to be in the forum state.’ " Pearson Educ., Inc. v. ABC Books LLC , No. 19-CV-7642, 2020 WL 3547217, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2020) (quoting McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC v. Mathrani , 295 F. Supp. 3d 404, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ). With this framework, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction has been found to be proper as to those in the first category, but improper as to those in the second category[.]" Id. Similarly, the Eastern District of Michigan found that it had personal jurisdiction over a group of eBay merchants because they were not "random sellers on eBay cleaning out their attic or selling knick-knacks out of their garage" but rather "highly sophisticated sellers with an extensive offering of merchandise and a volume of business that requires a warehouse." Dedvukaj v. Maloney , 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Citing favorably to Dedvukaj , the Ninth Circuit observed that e-commerce platforms do not "dig[ ] a virtual moat around the defendant, fending off jurisdiction in all cases." Boschetto v. Hansing , 539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction where the defendant used eBay for "a one-time transaction"). To the contrary, "[w]here [an online platform] is used as a means for establishing regular business with a remote forum ... then a defendant's use of [the platform] may be properly taken into account for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction." Id.
Like the defendant in Dedvukaj , TII is a sophisticated online retailer, and its business with Ohio can fairly be described as "regular." 447 F. Supp. 2d at 823. As discussed earlier, from January 2016 to March 2020, TII consistently generated 2.25–2.52 percent of its annual Amazon sales from Ohio residents, totaling $271,839.18 in revenue. (See Resp. in Opp'n to TII's Mot. at PageID #4131–32, ECF No. 96.) And from December 1, 2017, through July 7, 2020, TII sold an additional $4,875.07 worth of products to Ohio consumers through Walmart's e-commerce platform. (See id. at PageID #4132.) These figures may not be astronomical, but "[i]t is the quality of the contacts, and not their number or status, that determines whether they amount to purposeful availment." CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson , 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the fact that TII has relied on e-commerce platforms to cultivate its Ohio market does not shield it from a finding of purposeful availment. After all, "[s]ellers cannot expect to avail themselves of the benefits of the internet-created world market that they purposefully exploit and profit from without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities that such an expanded market may bring with it." Dedvukaj , 447 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
b. Shenzhen Defendants
Because Rule 4(k)(2) provides the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction as to the Shenzhen Defendants, the court evaluates their contacts "in reference to the United States as a whole, rather than a particular state." Lyngaas , 992 F.3d at 422 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Here, jurisdictional discovery has made clear that all three Shenzhen Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the American market for automotive accessories.
For starters, the Shenzhen Defendants’ sales to American consumers independently support a finding of purposeful availment. Valuelink has sold at least 484,409 products worth $32,594,902 to Americans since 2017, Mediatek has sold at least 171,510 products worth $1,970,521.47 to Americans since 2018, and BTY has sold at least 9,068 products worth $76,908.25 to Americans since 2019. (See Resp. in Opp'n to Shenzhen Defs.’ Mot. at PageID #7075, 7078, 7082, ECF No. 121.) In addition, the Shenzhen Defendants ship and store products in the United States and target American consumers with online advertisements. (See id. at PageID #7074–83.) Given these figures, the case for purposeful availment in this case is clear.
In response, the Shenzhen Defendants cite a since-reconsidered Northern District of Illinois case for the proposition that, in order to establish purposeful availment in the context of an online retailer, "the defendant itself must ‘operate[ ] a self-hosted interactive website’ through which residents of the forum can purchase products." (See Shenzhen Defs.’ Reply at PageID #7349, ECF No. 122 (quoting Ouyeinc Ltd. v. Alucy , No. 20-C-3490, 2021 WL 1946341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2021) ).) But Ouyeinc involved a defendant's one-time sale to Illinois (which occurred only because the plaintiff's investigator made the purchase as part of its investigation)—a far cry from the Shenzhen Defendants’ substantial and repeated sales to the United States over many years. See Ouyeinc Ltd. , 2021 WL 1946341, at *2. And given the Ouyeinc court's swift about-face, whatever persuasive value that case may have held has since evaporated. See Ouyeinc Ltd. v. Alucy , No. 20 C 3490, 2021 WL 2633317, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction over defendant storefront retailers in light of recent Seventh Circuit authority).
2. Relatedness
The court next addresses the second prong in the due process test: whether NOCO's cause of action arises from Defendants’ activities in the forum. The Sixth Circuit has instructed trial courts to apply a "lenient standard ... when evaluating the ‘arising from’ criterion." Bird v. Parsons , 289 F.3d 865, 875 (6th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the "arising from" label is a bit of a misnomer; "this criterion requires only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant's in-state activities.’ " Third Nat'l Bank v. WEDGE Grp., Inc. , 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mohasco , 401 F.2d at 384 n. 27 ). Thus, "[o]nly when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the defendant's contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does not arise from that contract [sic]." Mohasco , 401 F.2d at 384 n. 29.
a. TII
Tellingly, TII does not address the relatedness requirement in its renewed 12(b)(2) Motion. For its part, NOCO argues that relatedness is satisfied because it alleges that TII "improperly influenced consumer purchasing decisions, committed trade libel, conspired with other Defendants, and tortiously interfered with NOCO's business relationships" on the Amazon Marketplace, which TII uses to reach most of its Ohio customers. (Resp. in Opp'n to TII's Mot. at PageID #4146, ECF No. 96.) The court agrees with NOCO. Because the bulk of TII's Ohio contacts stem from the Amazon Marketplace, NOCO's claims against TII "are at least marginally related" to those contacts, which is all that is required to satisfy this prong of the due process test. Bird , 289 F.3d at 875.
b. Shenzhen Defendants
While the Shenzhen Defendants argue that relatedness is not satisfied because "all the operative facts giving rise [to] the claims occurred in China," the defendant's physical location is neither dispositive nor especially probative. (See Shenzhen Defs.’ Reply at PageID #7352, ECF No. 122.) Rather, the court's focus is on the relationship between NOCO's claims and the Shenzhen Defendants’ American contacts. And like TII, most of the Shenzhen Defendants’ relevant contacts stem from their Amazon storefronts. Accordingly, the relatedness requirement is also satisfied as to the Shenzhen Defendants.
3. Reasonability
When the first two prongs of the due process test are met, as they are here, "[a]n inference arises that the third factor is satisfied." Bird , 289 F.3d at 875. To overcome this inference, a defendant must "present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn , 839 F.2d 1164, 1168 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Burger King , 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ). These considerations may include "the burden on the defendant, the forum's interest, the plaintiff's interest, and the interest of the interstate judicial system." Id. (citing Burger King , 471 U.S. at 476–77, 105 S.Ct. 2174 ).
a. TII
As with relatedness, TII's renewed 12(b)(2) Motion contains no mention of the reasonability requirement. Because it is TII's burden to establish jurisdictional unreasonableness, the court finds the reasonability requirement satisfied as to TII.
b. Shenzhen Defendants
In their 12(b)(2) Motion, the Shenzhen Defendants assert that it would be unreasonable for them to litigate in Ohio because "[NOCO] has not offered—and cannot offer—any factual allegations to show that [the Shenzhen] Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of doing business in the state of Ohio, nor have they offered any factual allegations to support that the claims in [NOCO's] Complaint arose from [the Shenzhen] Defendants’ activities with the state of Ohio." (See Shenzhen Defs.’ Mot. at PageID #1136, ECF No. 90.) To reiterate, though, the forum under consideration here is the United States as a whole, not just Ohio. And because the court has found purposeful availment and relatedness to be satisfied as to the United States, the Shenzhen Defendants’ argument falls flat. Accordingly, the court also finds the reasonability requirement satisfied as to the Shenzhen Defendants.
* * *
In sum, the court finds that it can properly exercise personal jurisdiction over both TII and the Shenzhen Defendants. Their respective Motions to Dismiss therefore are denied.
C. Sur-Reply
Sur-replies generally are disfavored. Reply affidavits or other supporting papers "that respond only to the opposing party's brief are properly filed with the reply brief." See Key v. Shelby Cty. , 551 F. App'x 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co. , 285 F.3d 456, 476 (6th Cir. 2002) ). However, sur-replies may be allowed "when new submissions and/or arguments are included in a reply brief, and a nonmovant's ability to respond to the new evidence has been vitiated." See Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 339 F.3d 454, 481 (6th Cir. 2003) ; see also Eldridge v. Cardif Life Ins. Co. , 266 F.R.D. 173, 175 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
NOCO's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply lacks merit. Tellingly, NOCO does not identify any specific arguments or evidence in the Shenzhen Defendants’ Reply that are "new." Instead, NOCO argues that the Reply "shift[ed] focus" to emphasize different issues than those raised in the Shenzhen Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (NOCO's Mot. for Leave at PageID #7360, ECF No. 123.) But "all of the arguments incorporated in the Reply are proper rebuttal to arguments raised by Plaintiff" in its Response. (Resp. in Opp'n to Mot. for Leave at PageID #7369, ECF No. 124.) Simply put, because NOCO put these issues in play through its Response brief, it was appropriate for the Shenzhen Defendants to address them in its Reply. Accordingly, the court denies NOCO's Motion for Leave.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies both TII's Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 76) and the Shenzhen Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 90). The court also denies NOCO's Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply Instanter (ECF No. 123).
IT IS SO ORDERED.