Opinion
A153683
04-16-2018
N.O. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU et al., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1600715)
N.O. (Mother) and R.N. (Father) are the parents of K.N., a one-and-a-half-year-old dependent of the juvenile court. Mother and Father each filed a petition seeking review by extraordinary writ of the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. We deny their petitions and requests for a stay of the section 366.26 hearing.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dependency Petition, Detention, and Jurisdiction Hearing
K.N. was born in July 2016 with methamphetamine in his system. The Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) filed a dependency petition on his behalf, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged K.N. was at substantial risk of harm due to Mother's and Father's substance abuse. Specifically, it was alleged Mother tested positive for methamphetamine at a prenatal exam, K.N. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, and Father was arrested on the day of K.N.'s birth for possession of a controlled substance. Both parents denied having a substance abuse problem. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found Father was K.N.'s presumed father, and K.N. was detained and placed in foster care. Weekly supervised visitation was ordered.
The jurisdiction hearing was continued several times after Mother and Father failed to appear. When they did appear, Mother and Father each signed a waiver of rights, and pleaded no contest to the possession of a controlled substance and K.N.'s positive toxicology result allegations. These were the only sustained allegations; the remaining allegations were dismissed.
Disposition Report and Hearing
The disposition hearing was originally calendared for December 14, 2016, but was continued, ultimately to February 3, 2017, after the Bureau filed a late report. In the disposition report, the Bureau noted Mother had two other minor children who were not in her care, and both Mother and Father had very extensive criminal conviction histories dating back to the 1990's and 1980's, respectively. By September 28, 2016, the Bureau had provided both Mother and Father with referrals for substance abuse treatment programs, drug testing, parenting classes, and mental health counseling, but neither parent moved forward with the referrals. Mother and Father also failed to communicate with the social worker and missed random drug tests.
Mother was also referred to substance abuse treatment programs by the emergency response social worker in July 2016, when K.N. was initially placed in foster care.
Regarding K.N., the social worker observed he was developmentally on track and "bonded exceptionally well" with his foster parents. Mother and Father had failed to take full advantage of weekly visitation, each missing numerous visits and often arriving very late. When they did visit, Mother and Father were affectionate and demonstrated a basic understanding of how to care for an infant. The social worker recommended family reunification services for Mother and Father, including substance abuse treatment, random drug/alcohol testing, parenting education, and mental health counseling.
At the contested disposition hearing, Mother appeared in custody, and Father failed to appear. The juvenile court adjudged K.N. a dependent child and ordered him removed from parental custody. The juvenile court also adopted the Bureau's case plan, which required Mother and Father to (1) obtain a suitable residence; (2) maintain a legal source of income; (3) establish a relationship with K.N.; (4) comply with all orders of the court; (5) avoid arrests and convictions; (6) show an ability to live free from drug dependency; and (7) accept responsibility for their actions.
The six-month status review report indicated Mother was taken into custody on a forged check charge on January 6, 2017.
Six-Month Review Report and Hearing
On June 30, 2017, the Bureau filed its six-month review report, which indicated both Mother and Father were recently incarcerated. Mother had been in jail for identity theft since January 2017. Father had been in jail on identity theft and related charges since April. Both expected to be released in December 2017.
Prior to incarceration, Mother visited K.N. on nine occasions, and Father had seven visits. Visits were appropriate and affectionate, but neither parent had visited K.N. since December 2016. In February 2017, visitation was suspended by the Bureau due to the parents' inconsistency. The social worker contacted the jail where Mother and Father were housed, and determined K.N. could not have contact visitation with either parent, only visits through a telephone, while separated by glass. Thus, in the intervening time between disposition and the contested six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered suspension of the previously ordered visits, finding visitation would be detrimental to K.N.
The social worker communicated with Mother and Father while they were in custody and noted they had begun to engage in services. Specifically, Mother reported completing a parenting class, participating in a work readiness program, and completing a 60-day substance abuse treatment program. However, the social worker had no verification of Mother's participation in substance abuse counseling services and no information regarding drug testing. Father participated in a work readiness program, anger management classes, and drug and alcohol support groups. However, the social worker did not know if he was drug testing. Despite their recent efforts, the Bureau recommended termination of the parents' reunification services.
On September 1, 2017, both parents appeared in custody at the six-month review hearing. The parties stipulated to continuation of reunification services until the 12-month review hearing, which was less than a month away—having been calendared for September 29, 2017. The stipulated findings and order also provided that Mother and Father had made partial progress on their case plans, supervised visitation was to resume upon their release, and the Bureau had provided reasonable services.
Twelve-Month Review Report and Hearing
A contested 12- and 18-month review hearing was held on February 2, 2018. In advance of the September 29, 2017 hearing, the Bureau filed a memorandum to update the court. The memo indicated both parents remained incarcerated but continued to participate in services available in jail. Father had obtained a high school equivalency certificate and completed anger management and employment training programs. Mother completed a second parenting class and developed a "next phase" plan, in anticipation of her release in December. Her plan included obtaining a sponsor and attending 12-step meetings. The Bureau continued to recommend termination of reunification services and suspension of visitation because, due to his very young age, noncontact visitation would not provide K.N. "with a developmentally appropriate opportunity to interact and develop a healthy bond with his parents." K.N. was thriving in his foster home.
The matter was continued at least twice due to calendar congestion.
On January 17, 2018, the Bureau filed another status review report, indicating both parents were released on probation in December 2017. Despite engaging with housing and employment services since release, neither Mother nor Father engaged in one-on-one substance abuse counseling or drug tested for the Bureau. The social worker reported Mother was referred for drug testing on January 11, 2018, but no further information was provided. Father missed up to four drug tests. Mother and Father resumed supervised visits with K.N. Although they were reported to be loving and attentive, they appeared 20 minutes late to the first visit, at which K.N. was disoriented and cried.
The Bureau continued to recommend termination of reunification services. The social worker wrote: "[K.N.] was detained at birth . . . [and] has spent the past 17 months of his life in foster care, and has not seen his parents for almost 12 months . . . primarily due to the parent's [sic] incarceration, but additionally due to [their] inconsistency with attending and confirming scheduled visits prior to their respective arrests earlier in the year. This lack of contact for the past year has not provided the child any opportunity to bond with [Mother] or [Father] . . . . They have made progress on their recovery efforts that is to be commended . . . . Unfortunately, the parents have not been fully compliant in their case plan and have not mitigated the safety issues that originally brought the family to the attention of the Bureau. . . . [I]t was essential that both parents participate in individual counseling services to address their substance abuse challenges . . . . Prior to incarceration, the Bureau was unaware of any efforts by [the] parents to address this particular issue. In addition, the focus of the parents since release appears to have been to primarily focus on employment and housing services. . . . The Bureau currently has no evidence that either parent [is] engaged in further support services for their substance abuse at this time." The Bureau also observed K.N. was bonded with his foster parents, with whom he had lived since birth; he referred to them as "mama" and "dada."
At the contested hearing, Mother's and Father's counsel argued reunification services should be extended to 24 months, pursuant to sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(4), and 366.22, subdivision (b). Counsel for K.N. supported the Bureau's recommendation. Neither Mother nor Father sought to cross-examine the social worker, but both testified. Mother conceded she had not truly engaged with her case plan before her incarceration. Prior to incarceration, she only visited K.N. periodically and attended a few Narcotics Anonymous meetings. In jail, she completed a counseling program that touched on substance abuse, parenting, domestic violence, and mental health. However, she admitted it was not a true substance abuse treatment program. Since her release, Mother testified she had been testing clean for her probation officer, but she did not present any verification. Although told to drug test with the Bureau as well, Mother claimed she was not informed of a specific date to begin such testing and took no further action. She visited K.N. twice since her release and believed K.N. recognized her. Mother continued to deny using methamphetamine within four or five months of K.N.'s birth.
Father visited K.N. twice after release from jail. While incarcerated, Father participated in substance abuse classes. He did not complete a parenting class because none were offered while he was in jail. After his release, he located such a class. Father testified he submitted two clean tests to his probation officer. He also acknowledged missing several drug tests with the Bureau, but attributed this to his work location.
Ultimately, the court found the parents made only partial progress on their case plans, return of K.N. to his parents' custody would be detrimental, there was no substantial probability K.N. would be returned to parental custody within six months, reasonable reunification services had been provided, and it was not in K.N.'s best interests to continue services. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for May 25, 2018. This writ proceeding followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In their writ petitions, Mother and Father do not challenge the juvenile court's detriment finding, but argue the court erred (1) by failing to order additional services, pursuant to sections 361.5, subdivision (a)(4) and 366.22, subdivision (b), and (2) by setting a section 366.26 hearing when substantial evidence does not support the court's finding the Bureau provided reasonable reunification services. Neither argument has merit. A. Statutory Background
Reunification services are generally limited to six months in cases, like this one, where the child was under the age of three years when removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Here, the 12-month review hearing was repeatedly continued so it concluded approximately 19 months after K.N. was removed from parental custody. In this situation, the hearing must be deemed an 18-month hearing, which is governed by section 366.22. (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1508-1509, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 (Earl L.); In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 918.)
"At the 18-month review hearing the dependent child must be returned to his or her parents unless it would be detrimental to do so; further, the burden is on the state to show such detriment." (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748, italics & fn. omitted; § 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) Under section 366.22, subdivision (a), a parent's failure to comply with the reunification plan creates a rebuttable presumption that return of custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1); In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535, 561.) Other than in certain limited exceptions discussed post, when "the child is not returned to a parent or legal guardian at the permanency review hearing, the court shall order that a hearing be held pursuant to Section 366.26 in order to determine whether adoption, . . . guardianship, or continued placement in foster care is the most appropriate plan for the child. . . . The court shall also order termination of reunification services to the parent or legal guardian." (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
"If a court finds that returning a child to his or her parent would create a substantial risk for a child, subdivision (b) of section 366.22 provides a parent 'a limited right' to a continuance of up to six months in certain circumstances. [Citation.] The continuance is available only if 'the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the child would be met' by providing 'additional reunification services to [(1)] a parent . . . who is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program, [(2)] a parent who was either a minor parent or a nonminor dependent parent at the time of the initial hearing making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child's return, or [(3)] a parent recently discharged from incarceration, institutionalization, or the custody of the United States Department of Homeland Security and making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe home for the child's return.' (§ 366.22, subd. (b).)" (N.M. v. Superior Court (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 796, 805-806; accord, § 361.5, subd. (a)(4).)
Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) provides, in relevant part: "[C]ourt-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 24 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent or guardian if it is shown, at the hearing held pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 366.22, that the permanent plan for the child is that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period. The court shall extend the time period only if it finds that it is in the child's best interest to have the time period extended and that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366 .22 within the extended time period, or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or guardian. If the court extends the time period, the court shall specify the factual basis for its conclusion that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian within the extended time period." (Italics added.)
Thus, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the 18-month review hearing constitutes a critical juncture at which 'the court must return children to their parents and thereby achieve the goal of family preservation or terminate services and proceed to devising a permanent plan for the children.' " (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 596, fn. omitted.) B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Best Interest Finding
Mother and Father first argue that the juvenile court should have extended the provision of services beyond the 18-month review hearing, in light of their recent releases from jail. They rely on section 366.22, subdivision (b), and section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4).
As discussed above, "[u]nder the 2009 amendment to section 366.22, the juvenile court now has 'the option at the [18-month] permanency review hearing, in certain limited circumstances, to continue the matter . . . for a parent who is making "significant and consistent progress" in a substance abuse treatment program, or who has been recently released from institutionalization or incarceration and is making "significant and consistent progress" in establishing a home that is safe for the child to return to. For such individuals, services can be continued . . . if the extension of services is in the best interests of the child and there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned [citation].' " (Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504, italics added.) "Subdivision (b) provides a limited right to a continuance where additional reunification services would serve the child's best interests, and the parent is making 'significant and consistent progress' in treatment programs or in establishing a safe home after release from custody. In these cases, the juvenile court may not set a section 366.26 hearing if the court finds reasonable reunification services have not been offered or provided." (Earl L., at p. 1504, italics added.)
Thus, the key issue is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that it would not be in K.N.'s best interests to extend reunification services an additional six months. Father maintains the finding is unsupported. When we review the juvenile court's findings for substantial evidence, "[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) We uphold the court's findings "if [they are] supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence." (Ibid.)
" 'The concept of a child's best interest "is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child's opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult." ' " (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227.) Courts consider the parent's current efforts, fitness and history, the nature and gravity of the problem that led to dependency, the strength of relative bonds between the dependent child and both his parent and caretakers, and the child's need for stability and continuity. (Id. at p. 1228.)
Here, the problem leading to dependency was the parents' substance abuse. Accordingly, the reunification plan required both Mother and Father to complete an outpatient substance abuse treatment program and demonstrate sobriety by drug testing. The juvenile court found extension of either parent's services was not in K.N.'s best interests and, in making that finding, specifically referenced the evidence of Father's recent missed drug tests, Mother's continued denial of her substance abuse problem, and the fact Mother had still not entered, much less completed, "a true substance abuse treatment program."
The juvenile court also observed that Mother and Father had not established "a real connection" with K.N. This observation was supported by the evidence of extremely limited visitation between K.N. and Mother and Father, as well as K.N.'s distress at a postincarceration visit. On the other hand, there was evidence K.N. was very tightly bonded to his foster parents, with whom he had lived his entire life and whom he called "mama" and "dada."
Mother contends it is "unjust" to consider the parents' lack of contact with K.N. because "the [juvenile] court and the Bureau prevented the contact." We disagree. It was Mother's criminal conduct that led to her incarceration during the reunification period with her infant child. It was not the Bureau's fault that the correctional facility in which she was housed would only permit "non-contact" visits. Furthermore, any challenge to the merits of the visitation order is untimely. Neither Mother nor Father appealed from the order suspending visitation due to detriment, which is now final. (See In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 703 [ruling on section 388 petition is separately appealable order]; In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 33-34 [postdisposition visitation orders are separately appealable]; In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 [unappealed postdisposition orders are final and binding and may not be challenged via later appealable order].)
We agree with the juvenile court that K.N.'s interest in permanence and stability far outweighed any benefit from providing additional services to Mother and Father, who have not demonstrated any substantial commitment to addressing their substance abuse problems. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's best interest finding. C. Reasonable Reunification Services
Accordingly, we need not address whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding there was no substantial probability K.N. would be returned to parental custody in six months.
Next, Mother and Father argue the court erred by setting a section 366.26 hearing when the juvenile court's reasonable services finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. Mother and Father primarily complain regarding the Bureau's efforts to ensure visitation. Mother argues the Bureau should have tried "no contact" visits between the parents and K.N. before concluding it would be detrimental. Father contends the Bureau failed to arrange weekly visitation after his release. Mother and Father also contend the social worker did not make sufficient efforts between the six-month and 18-month review hearings to determine what services were available in jail.
"With an incarcerated parent, reunification services must be provided 'unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child.' (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1); see In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1406.)" (Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1501.) "In determining the content of reasonable services, the court shall consider the particular barriers to an incarcerated . . . parent's access to those court-mandated services and ability to maintain contact with his or her child, and shall document this information in the child's case plan. Reunification services are subject to the applicable time limitations imposed in subdivision (a). Services may include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Maintaining contact between the parent and child through collect telephone calls. [¶] (B) Transportation services, when appropriate. [¶] (C) Visitation services, when appropriate. [¶] (D) [¶] (i) Reasonable services to extended family members or foster parents providing care for the child if the services are not detrimental to the child. [¶] (ii) An incarcerated . . . parent may be required to attend counseling, parenting classes, or vocational training programs as part of the reunification service plan if actual access to these services is provided . . . ." (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) The social services agency "must identify the services available to an incarcerated parent. [Citation.] [It] cannot delegate to an incarcerated parent the responsibility for identifying those services [citation], and may not simply conclude that reunification efforts are not feasible on the sole ground the parent is incarcerated." (Earl L., at p. 1502.)
We need not decide whether the Bureau provided or offered reasonable services during the most recent review period, because, in the context of an 18-month review hearing under section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), even if the services in that final review period were found to be unreasonable, the court was nevertheless required to set a section 366.26 hearing. (N.M. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 806; Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504 [juvenile court did not err in failing to extend reunification services beyond 18-month review and in setting § 366.26 hearing despite its determination incarcerated father had not been provided reasonable reunification services in period after 12-month review hearing].)
Just as we cannot address the merits of the now final visitation order, we similarly cannot address Mother's argument the reunification case plan itself was inadequate or unreasonable, when ordered, because it was not modified to account for her recent incarceration. The disposition order was separately appealable and is now final. (See In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.)
Both Mother and Father insist reasonable reunification services are a precondition to setting a section 366.26 hearing, but they erroneously rely on section 366.22, subdivision (b)(3)(C), rather than section 366.22, subdivision (a). In 1991, the Legislature amended former section 366.22, which governs 18-month hearings, to delete the requirement of a reasonable services finding as a precondition of setting a section 366.26 hearing. (See Mark. N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1015-1016 & fn. 9 (Mark N.), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504; Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 4, p. 3646.) Following this amendment, at the 18-month permanency review hearing, the juvenile court's authority to set a section 366.26 hearing was not conditioned on a reasonable services finding. (Denny H. v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1511-1512.) In 2009, section 366.22 was again amended to allow services to be continued at an 18-month review hearing under certain limited circumstances. (Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3439-3441; see Earl L., at p. 1504.) In those specified circumstances, a juvenile court cannot set a section 366.26 hearing unless it finds reasonable reunification services were provided. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); see Earl L., at p. 1503.)
In contrast, section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), provides that if the child cannot be returned to the parents at the 18-month review hearing, the court shall order a section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) Accordingly, "[i]f a court finds that returning a child to his or her parent would create a substantial risk for a child, and subdivision (b) of section 366.22 does not apply, for example, because the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuation of reunification services is not in the child's best interests—then 'the court shall order that a hearing be held pursuant to Section 366.26' and 'shall also order termination of reunification services to the parent.' (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Although the juvenile court still must make a finding regarding whether reasonable services have been offered in such circumstances, its authority to set a section 366.26 hearing ' "is not conditioned on a reasonable services finding." ' " (N.M. v. Superior Court supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 806.)
As we have already discussed, subdivision (b) of section 366.22 does not apply here—because K.N.'s best interests would not be served by an extension of services. Having reached the conclusion it did—that returning K.N. to parental custody would create a substantial risk of detriment, and that it was not in K.N.'s best interest to provide either parent additional reunification services—the juvenile court lacked discretion to grant a further continuance or to order additional reunification services. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); N.M. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 807-808.) Accordingly, we need not decide whether Mother or Father received reasonable reunification services.
Furthermore, even if the adequacy of the reunification services provided to Mother and Father was relevant, we agree with the Bureau that the parents forfeited the issue by failing to raise it below. (See N.M. v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 808; In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365, fn. 6.; Steve J. v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 810-811.) Neither Mother nor Father point to anything in the record that indicates they objected to the adequacy of the services provided at any point before filing their writ petitions with this court. In fact, at the six-month review, both Mother and Father stipulated the Bureau had provided reasonable reunification services for the maximum period provided by section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(B). A parent waives any right to challenge the adequacy of services during a particular review period if she previously stipulated that services were reasonable during that period. (In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.) Thus, Mark N. is distinguishable. (See Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1000, 1009-1010, 1017-1018; Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 [Mark N. "has no application" when the father stipulated he had been offered reasonable services at six- and 12-month reviews].)
Neither Mother nor Father explicitly argue the juvenile court retains discretion to extend services, under section 352, and that the adequacy of services must therefore be considered. (See In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 564-565 [despite intervening statutory amendment juvenile court retains discretion to extend services beyond 18-month review, pursuant to § 352, when services provided not reasonable]; Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507 & fn. 4; Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1000, 1009-1010, 1017-1018 [reversing reasonable services finding and remanding for exercise of discretion to continue 18-month hearing under § 352 because no substantial evidence social services agency had provided reasonable reunification services to incarcerated father during any of the 17-month reunification period].)
III. DISPOSITION
Mother's and Father's writ petitions are denied on the merits. The requests for a stay are also denied. Because the section 366.26 hearing is set for May 25, 2018, our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
/s/_________
BRUINIERS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P. J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.