Opinion
No. 05-17-01080-CV
05-08-2018
TRACY NIXON, Appellant v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 301st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DF-00-14691
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Evans, and Justice Brown
Opinion by Chief Justice Wright
Appellant appeals from the trial court's judgment of child support and medical support arrearages. Before the Court is appellant's "Motion to Reconsider Supersedeas Bond." In his motion, appellant asks this Court to set a supersedeas bond or, in the alternative, suspend enforcement of the judgment without requiring security. In an order signed on July 6, 2017, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suspend enforcement of the judgment.
We review a trial court's decision whether to suspend enforcement of an order under an abuse of discretion standard. See Wright v. Wright, 867 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See In re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
Section 109.002(c) of the family code provides:
An appeal from a final order, with or without a supersedeas bond, does not suspend the order unless suspension is ordered by the court rendering the order. The appellate court, on a proper showing, may permit the order to be suspended, unless the order provides for the termination of the parent-child relationship in a suit brought by the state or a political subdivision of the state permitted by law to bring the suit.TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(c) (West Supp. 2017). Thus, unless either the trial court or this Court orders suspension of the order, the order cannot be suspended even if appellant posts a supersedeas bond. For this reason, we need only determine whether the trial court erred in refusing to suspend enforcement of the order and, if not, whether we should suspend enforcement.
In his motion, appellant asserts that without suspending enforcement of the judgment, he will suffer "irrevocable harm and hardship." He does not elaborate on the harm. He also asserts that it is not likely that others will suffer any harm if enforcement of the judgment is suspended. These assertions fail to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suspend and request for supersedeas. Moreover, the combined arrearages total $86,822.02. Appellant is now consistently paying the $385 a month toward the arrearages. Given appellant's history of noncompliance, we conclude the trial court was within its discretion in not suspending enforcement of the order.
As noted earlier, this Court does have the authority to suspend enforcement of the judgment even where the trial court declines to do so. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(c) Before this Court can do so, however, appellant must make a "proper showing." Appellate courts have found a "proper showing" to avoid disrupting the current living arrangements for a child pending appeal or there is a potential danger to a child such as allowing international travel. See Marquez v. Marquez, No. 08-12-00129-CV, 2012 WL 1555204 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 2, 2012) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (staying divorce decree that increased father's limited unsupervised visitation to extended standard possession); Wiese v. AlBakry, No. 03-14-00799-CV, 2015 WL 1315890 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2015, order) (per curiam) (staying order in suit to modify parent/child relationship lifting restriction on international travel); In re R.H.M., No. 03-14-00603-CV, 2014 WL 4966543 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 3, 2014, order) (per curiam) (staying order giving the appellee the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence). Appellant has not presented the Court with any circumstances to support suspending enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.
We affirm the trial court's July 6, 2017 order denying appellant's request to suspend enforcement of the judgment. We conclude appellant has not made a proper showing before this Court to suspend enforcement of the judgment.
/Carolyn Wright/
CAROLYN WRIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE 171080F.P05