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finding the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged she had standing to bring claims as successor in interest for her deceased son because she submitted a declaration that complied with the requirements of section 377.32
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Case No.: 3:16-cv-01974-BEN-JMA
11-04-2016
Rochelle Nishimoto, individually and as Successor in Interest to Jason Nishimoto, Plaintiff, v. County of San Diego; Does 1-100, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before this Court is Defendant County of San Diego's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Rochelle Nishimoto's Complaint. The motion is fully briefed. The Court finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers without oral argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.l. For the reasons set for below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. /// /// /// /// /// ///
BACKGROUND
The following overview of the facts are drawn from the allegations of the Complaint. The Court is not making findings of fact. The allegations relevant to each motion are detailed in analyzing the individual motions.
Decedent Jason Nishimoto ("Jason") was a troubled man who was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder when he was eighteen years old. At the time of his death, Jason was forty-four years old. Despite his diagnosis, Jason independently managed his medical care and held gainful employment. Prior to the subject incident, he had no criminal history, and had shown himself to be a high-functioning paranoid schizophrenic.
Approximately five months prior to his death, Jason became overwhelmed by the side effects of his medication. However, he continued to take his medication to control his paranoid delusions and the active hallucinations that accompanied his schizophrenia. On May 27, 2015, Jason had a conversation with his mother, Plaintiff and Successor in Interest Rochelle Nishimoto ("Rochelle"), which resulted in Rochelle taking Jason to Tri-City Medical Center ("Tri-City") to be placed in a 5150 Hold for his suicidal ideations. Jason's medical history showed he had a history of self-harm attempts, and Tri-City admitted him under a 5150 Hold "for danger to self and others."
On July 5, 2015, Jason attempted suicide by intentionally overdosing on one of his prescriptions. Jason then told Rochelle what he had done, and Rochelle and her other son, Adrian, called 911. Jason was taken to Tri-City and placed on another 5150 Hold for his suicidal ideations. While in Tri-City's care, Jason tried to hang himself, but psychiatric professionals intervened.
On August 19, 2015, Jason again attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on one of his medications. Rochelle immediately called 911, and Jason was taken back to Tri-City and admitted as a 5150 Hold for his suicidal ideations. This time, his commitment was extended to fourteen days.
On September 25, 2015, Jason made a third suicide attempt, again overdosing on one of his medications. This time, when Rochelle and Adrian attempted to intervene, Jason was resistant, and there was a physical altercation between Jason and Adrian. Adrian called 911, and when the sheriffs arrived, Adrian informed them of Jason's schizophrenia and contemporaneous suicide attempt. Adrian also advised the sheriffs of Jason's history of mental illness and prior suicide attempts.
The sheriffs arrested Jason for assault despite Adrian's representation that he would not press charges. Jason was taken to Tri-City, who released him back to the sheriff's custody less than an hour later. Jason was then transported to the Vista Detention Facility ("VDF").
Rochelle first learned that Jason was incarcerated at VDF the following day, when she received a phone call from a VDF psychiatric nurse. The nurse advised Rochelle that she had attempted to evaluate Jason, but was unsuccessful because he was too disoriented and could not answer her questions. The nurse stated her belief that Jason was schizophrenic, and requested information about his medications.
Rochelle informed the nurse of Jason's illness and medication needs, and that he had several recent suicide attempts. Rochelle also informed the nurse that Jason had attempted suicide moments before he was arrested. The nurse told Rochelle that she would expedite his psychiatric evaluation to September 27, 2015, but did not think his medication would be approved because it was too expensive.
While Jason was held at VDF, he did not receive his medications. He was housed in an "Ad-Seg" cell, which is not an observation or safety cell. The day after Rochelle's phone call with the VDF nurse, Jason was found hanging from an air vent with a noose made from his bed sheet.
If Jason had been housed in a safety cell, he would have been monitored every 15-30 minutes, and would have been monitored by a mental health professional at least daily. Additionally, safety cells do not contain fixtures, bedding, and clothing, which serve to prevent opportunity and means for suicide attempts.
On August 5, 2016, Rochelle filed a Complaint, individually and as Jason's Successor in Interest, against Defendant County of San Diego ("the County") and Does 1-100. The Complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim for wrongful death against the County. (See Docket No. 1.) The County now moves to dismiss all claims against it, and to strike certain portions of the Complaint. (See Docket No. 4-1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if, taking all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. "A claim is facially plausible 'when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
DISCUSSSION
I. Plaintiff's Standing to Bring Survival Actions
In the instant Motion, Defendant County of San Diego (hereinafter, "Defendant") asserts Plaintiff Rochelle Nishimoto (hereinafter, "Plaintiff" or "Rochelle") lacks standing to bring claims as the Successor in Interest for decedent Jason Nishimoto (hereinafter, "Jason") on the grounds that her declaration is factually insufficient. (See Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 10:21-12:27.) Specifically, Defendant alleges Rochelle failed to include facts to support her assertion that she is Jason's Successor in Interest. (Id.) In other words, Defendant challenges Rochelle's standing to bring a survival action on behalf of Jason's estate.
A survival action is an action by a decedent's estate to recover damages on behalf of the decedent for injuries the decedent sustained. Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F. 3d 1223, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Davis v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 27 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994).) A party seeking to bring a survival action in a federal court "bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state's law authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets that state's requirements for bringing a survival action." Id. (quoting Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep't, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).
In California, a survival action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30; see also Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Where there is no personal representative for the estate, the decedent's 'successor in interest' may prosecute the survival action if the person purporting to act as successor in interest satisfies the requirements of California law. . .") (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 377.30, 377.32). A person who seeks to commence an action or proceeding as a decedent's successor in interest must execute and file an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California stating all of the following:
(1)Decedent's name.
(2)The date and place of decedent's death.
(3)"No proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedent's estate."
(4)If the decedent's estate was administered, a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedent's cause of action to the successor in interest.
(5)Either of the following, as appropriate, with facts in support thereof:
(A) "The affiant or declarant is the decedent's successor in interest (as defined by Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) and succeeds to the decedent's interest in the action or proceeding."
(B) "The affiant or declarant is authorized to act on behalf of the decedent's successor in interest (as defined by Section 377.11 of the California Code of Civil Procedure) with respect to the decedent's interest in the action or proceeding."See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.32(a).
(6) "No other person has a superior right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action or proceeding."
(7)"The affiant or declarant affirms or declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct."
In Hayes, the Ninth Circuit found the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff, Chelsey Hayes, had met California's statutory requirements to bring a survival action under Section 1983 because she failed to allege she was the decedent's personal representative or successor in interest. Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1229. The court found it insufficient that Hayes had alleged she was the decedent's "sole surviving heir." Id. Additionally, the court noted there was no indication from the record whether Hayes had "filed the affidavit necessary under California law to commence a survival action as decedent's successor in interest," and ultimately remanded determination of the issue of Hayes's standing to the district court. Id.
Here, Defendant acknowledges that Rochelle attached her declaration to the Complaint, in which she declared the following under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California:
1) Rochelle Nishimoto is the decedent, Jason Nishimoto's, mother. Jason Nishimoto was found dead at Vista Detention facility on August 27, 2015.
2) No proceeding is now pending in California for administration of Jason Nishimoto's estate.
3) Rochelle is Jason Nishimoto's Successor in Interest and succeed [sic] his interest in this action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 377.01, 377.11, and California Probate Code § 6402.
4) No other person has a superior right to commence the action to be substituted for the decedent in the pending action;
5) Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the death certificate of Jason Nishimoto.(See Docket No. 1-1, Decl. of Rochelle Nishimoto, attached as Ex. 1 to the Compl.). Additionally, in the Complaint, Rochelle alleges she is Jason's Successor in Interest, being Jason's mother and sole heir. (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 11.)
As stated above, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court takes all factual allegations as true; dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint fails to state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory under which relief may be granted. See Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 556. Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the Court finds Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to meet her initial burden of establishing she has standing to bring claims against Defendant as Jason's Successor in Interest. Defendant is not prevented from challenging Plaintiff's standing at the summary judgment stage, and Plaintiff may supplement her declaration to set forth additional facts to support her designation as Jason's Successor in Interest.
The Court based its finding on the facts set forth in the Complaint and its review of Plaintiff's declaration attached to the Complaint. The Court recognizes Plaintiff's declaration may contain some inconsistencies and grammatical errors, but does not find these potential typographical errors warrant finding Plaintiff lacks standing in light of the substance of the declaration.
Having determined Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to establish she has standing to bring claims as Jason's Successor in Interest, the Court address's the merits of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth and Seventh Claims for Relief for failure to state a claim.
The Court's analysis of the allegations of the claims and allegations of the Complaint are limited to the moving defendant. The Court's analysis of the Motion does not address and should not be interpreted to apply to any of the other Doe defendants.
II. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims
Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to state facts to assert any viable municipal civil rights claims against it. In order to state a claim for a municipal civil rights violation, a plaintiff must allege that an "action pursuant to official municipal policy" caused her injury. Connick v. Thompson, 56 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011) (quoting Monell v. New York City Fire Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 654, 691 (1978)). "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of the government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to have the force of law." Id. at 61 (citations omitted.) To satisfy Section 1983, a claim that a municipality failed to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to "deliberate indifference to the rights of the person with whom the [untrained employee] come into contact." Id.
"Deliberate indifference" is characterized as a "stringent standard of fault requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Connick, 56 U.S. at 61 (quoting Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. V. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)). For example, a city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if its policymakers choose to retain a program which they have actual or constructive notice that one of their training programs causes city employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights. See id. (quoting Bryan Cnty, 520 U.S. at 407.) On the other hand, a "city's 'policy of inaction' in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations 'is the functional equivalent' of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution." Id. at 61-62 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)).
a. Second Claim for Relief
In the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts a claim as Jason's Successor in Interest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging Defendant's employees violated Jason's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, which resulted in his death.
Defendant appears to assert Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the Second Claim for Relief because, under Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015), Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to implementation of particularized suicide prevention measures. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7:21-13.) As quoted by Defendant, the Taylor court stated: "No decision of this Court establishes a right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols. No decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention protocols." Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. However, the Taylor court reversed the lower courts' finding that adequate suicide prevention protocols was a "clearly established" Eighth Amendment right "at the time of the Barkes's death." Id. (emphasis added.) Thus, the Supreme Court's discussion of its own jurisprudence regarding the right to adequate suicide prevention protocols provided support that, at the time of Barkes's death, there was no such right. See id.
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss did not clearly distinguish in its discussion of how Plaintiff failed to state claims for the Second, Third and Fourth Claims for Relief.
In contrast, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges Defendant violated Jason's right to adequate treatment of his serous medical needs by engaging in a custom and practice of failing to adhere its own suicide prevention policy and/or that the same suicide prevention policy was inadequate, which constituted deliberate indifference, and resulted in Jason's death. (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 54-76.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the inadequacy of those policies have failed to address the serious problem of prisoner suicides. (Id. at ¶ 70.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that suicidal ideations constitute a serious medical need and that inmates have a Constitutional right to adequate treatment of serious medical needs. Simmons, supra, 609 F.3d at 1017; Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacated on other grounds but partially reinstated by 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, inasmuch as Defendant argues Plaintiff's Complaint failed to allege facts to assert violation of a Constitutional right, the Court disagrees.
Defendant also argues that the Court should grant its Motion because Plaintiff did not "factually allege what specific prevention measures are constitutionally required, and the absence of which makes the policies inadequate." (Id. at 8:15-17.) The argument that Plaintiff failed to allege which specific suicide prevention measures are "constitutionally required" to support her claim contradicts Defendant's assertion and reference to Taylor, which established that there is no clearly established law that provides a Constitutional right to adequate suicide prevention policies. Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. On the other hand, allegations of what makes the suicide prevention policies inadequate goes to whether Jason received adequate medical care for his serious medical needs, and as discussed above, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently stated facts to state this claim.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Claim for Relief is therefore DENIED.
b. Third Claim for Relief
In the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts a claim as Jason's Successor in Interest under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging Defendant violated Jason's Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care by engaging in a custom and practice of failing to adequately train its employees in identifying, evaluating, and treating suicidal inmates during their incarceration, which resulted in Jason's death.
When bringing a Section 1983 failure to train claim, "[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations is 'ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference." Connick, supra, 56 U.S. at 62 (citing Bryan Cnty., supra, 520 U.S. at 409). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, neither the Canton nor the Connick courts required "findings" of similar constitutional violations to establish municipal liability for a deliberately indifferent custom or program. (Docket No. 4-1 at 6:2-4.)
First, the Canton court did not squarely address what constituted a pattern of similar constitutional violations; instead, it considered whether inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for a Section 1983 claim against a municipality. See Canton, supra, 489 U.S. at 380. ("In this case, we are asked to determine if a municipality can ever be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations from its failure to train municipal employees.")
In its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant cited to pages of Canton that do not appear to be a part of Canton's opinion. Additionally, Defendant's Reply brief cited to a quote from Justice O'Conner's concurring opinion, which to be clear may be persuasive but is not binding on this Court. (Docket No. 6, Reply at 2:10-13.)
Second, in Connick, the Court found that four reversals due to Brady violations over a ten year period prior to respondent's armed robbery trial could not have put the county district attorney or the county district attorney's office on notice that their Brady training was inadequate with respect to the type of Brady violation committed against respondent. Connick, supra, 563 U.S. 62-63. The Court noted that, unlike the Brady violation committed against respondent, none of the four reversals involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind. See id. at 54-57, 62-63. Further, the Court stated: "[b]ecause those incidents are not similar to the violation at issue here, they could not have put Connick on notice that specific training was necessary to avoid this constitutional violation." Id. at 63 (emphasis added.) The Court also stated that respondent had "every incentive at trial to establish a pattern of similar violations, given that the jury instruction allowed the jury to find deliberate indifference based on, among other things, prosecutors' 'history of mishandling' similar situations." Id. at 63 n. 7 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In short, this Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff was required to allege the existence of specific verdicts against Defendant for constitutional violations in order to maintain her action. Nevertheless, although the Court disagrees with Defendant's analysis that Canton and Connick require Plaintiff allege a pattern of "findings" of similar constitutional violations, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that a U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics study and a local news publication stated that "San Diego has the highest suicide rate among the state's largest jail systems." (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 9.) The Complaint also generally alleges "VDF medical staff were not sufficiently trained to identify, diagnose, address, and treat suicidal inmates." (Id. at ¶ 83.) The Complaint does not allege specific facts surrounding the nature or method of the other suicides, or whether the suicides occurred at the VDF. Plaintiff also did not identify other circumstances similar to Jason's, and has thus failed to state facts to state a claim for failure to train under Section 1983. Applying the reasoning in Connick, the Court finds Plaintiff is required to allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations with some specificity (i.e. that Defendant was aware of other suicides occurring under the similar circumstances as Jason's suicide). See Connick, supra, 563 U.S. 62-63 (finding respondent failed to establish a pattern of similar constitutional violations because the alleged similar Brady violations were not similar to the Brady violation committed against respondent).
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim for Relief, with leave to amend.
c. Fourth Claim for Relief
In the Fourth Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts an individual claim against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging deprivation of a familial relationship in violation the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant's Motion generally alleges Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to state a claim for the Fourth Claim for Relief. (Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 10:1-3, 14:17-18.) However, Defendant's Motion does not provide authority or even discuss how Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for deprivation of familial relationship. Plaintiff's claim is plausible and the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Claim for Relief.
III. Seventh Claim for Relief
In the Seventh Claim for Relief, Plaintiff asserts a wrongful death claim against Defendant individually, and as Jason's Successor in Interest, for Jason's death. Defendant argues the Court should dismiss this claim for relief because it is immune from suit for Jason's alleged wrongful death pursuant to California Government Code § 844.6. (Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 10:4-20.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to immunity under California Government Code § 845.6, which provides an exception to a public entity's immunity under Section 844.6. (See Docket No. 5, Opp'n at 16:23-17:22).
Under Section 844.6, a public entity is not liable for an injury proximately caused by any prisoner, or an injury to any prisoner. Cal. Gov't Code § 844.6(a)(1)-(2). However, as pointed out by Plaintiff, Section 844.6's protection is not absolute, and is subject to several exceptions, including Section 845.6. See Cal. Gov't Code § 844.6(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section and in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for" injuries caused by, or to, any prisoner)).
Section 845.6 provides, in relevant part:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6. Thus, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, may be liable for injury for failing to reasonably summon medical care to a prisoner the employee knows, or should have known was in need of immediate medical care. Id.; see also Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098-1099 (9th Cir. 2006).
As referenced above, Section 845.6 is subject to the exceptions in Sections 855.8 and 856. Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6. Relevant to the instant case, Section 855.8(a) provides that a public entity and a public employee are not liable for injury resulting from diagnosing or failing to diagnose a mental illness, or from failing to prescribe for mental illness. Cal. Gov't Code § 855.8(a). However, under Section 855.8(c) "[n]othing in this section exonerates a public employee who has undertaken to prescribe for mental illness . . . from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligence or by his wrongful act in so prescribing." Cal. Gov't Code § 855.8(c). Additionally, under Section 855.8(d): "[n]othing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission in administering any treatment prescribed for mental illness or addiction." Cal. Gov't Code § 855.8(d).
Section 845.6 removes government immunity for the act of failing to reasonably summon medical care by a public employee who knows, or should have known of a prisoner's immediate medical care. Cal. Gov't Code § 845.6.; see also Jett, supra, 439 F.3d at 1098-1099. Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth facts alleging Jason developed a need for immediate medical care, and alleging Defendant failed to reasonably summon medical care for that need.
Moreover, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts to state a claim under Section 855.8, which provides a basis for liability by a public entity, and the public employee acting within the scope of him employment, for negligently prescribing and/or administering treatment for a mental illness. Cal. Gov't Code § 855.8(c)-(d). Plaintiff alleged that one of Defendant's employees, a nurse at VDF, called Plaintiff to ask about Jason's medications because Jason was too disoriented to answer her questions. (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 31.) During this call, Plaintiff advised the nurse of Jason's illness and medical needs, including that he had made several suicide attempts, the most recent being in the moments before his arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.) The nurse advised Plaintiff that she would expedite Jason's psychiatric evaluation, but that she did not think his medication would be approved due to the cost. (Id. ¶ 33.) Jason allegedly did not receive his medications while incarcerated at VDF. (Id.)
Defendant's employees did not place Jason in an observation or safety cell. (Id.) If Jason had been placed in a safety cell, he would probably have been monitored every fifteen to thirty minutes, and would have been evaluated by a mental health professional at least daily. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Further, safety cells are free from fixtures, bedding, and clothing, which serve to prevent the opportunity and means for committing suicide in the manner Jason did. (Id.) Jason committed suicide at Defendant's facility by using his bed sheet to hang himself from an air vent in his cell. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) The facts in the Complaint remain to be proven, but allege Defendant's employees undertook to prescribe and/or treat Jason for his mental illness, and that his death is attributable to the employees' negligence in prescribing for his mental illness and/or administering treatment for mental illness. (Id. ¶¶ 27-42.)
Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts to state a claim for wrongful death by Defendant and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Seventh Claim for Relief.
IV. Defendant's Motion to Strike
Under FRCP 12(f), a district court may strike from any pleading "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks, citation, and first alteration omitted), rev'd on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994). A 12(f) motion to strike serves to "avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial...." Id. However, "motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are disfavored." Miles v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 08CV1195, 2009 WL 4795826, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2009) (quoting Estate of Migliaccio v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 436 F.Supp.2d 1095, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2006). When a court considers a motion to strike, it "must view the pleading in a light most favorable to the pleading party." In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec Lit., 114 F.Supp.2d 955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Courts will deny the motion if there is any doubt as to whether the allegations might be an issue in the actions. Id.
"'Immaterial' matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded. . . 'Impertinent' matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07, 711 (1990)). "Redundant" allegations are unnecessarily repetitive or wholly foreign to the issues involved in the action." Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). "Scandalous" allegations include those "that cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person." In re 2TheMart.com, 114 F.Supp.2d at 965.
Defendant moves to strike from the Complaint paragraphs 9, 70, 71, 79, and 87. (Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 14:18-20.) Paragraphs 9 and 70 reference information about an alleged pattern of suicides in the San Diego County jails that is allegedly greater than any other California jail system taken from a City Beat newspaper article. (Id. at 13:27-14:2.) Defendant does not argue that these references are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, but instead suggests they should be stricken as inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at 14:2-15.) Additionally, it appears to the Court that the references to the pattern of suicides in the San Diego County jails and the comparison to the suicide rates of other California jail systems raises an element of doubt as to whether the allegations might be an issue in this action.
The Court takes no position as to the veracity or the authenticity of the information in the newspaper article, only that such allegations, if proven, may be at issue in the present case. --------
Defendant also moves to strike paragraphs 71, 79, and 87 of the Complaint as immaterial and impertinent matter because they consist of legal argument and case citations. (Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 13:11-26.) However, Defendant admits that the legal arguments and case citations are related to the claims set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. (Docket No. 4-1, Mot. to Dismiss at 13:21-22.) They will not be stricken. Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1382, at 706-07, 711 (1990)).
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that paragraphs 9, 70, 71, 79, and 87 are redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. The Court DENIES its Motion to Strike.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Third Claim for Relief, and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second, Fourth and Seventh Claims for Relief. The Court also DENIES Defendant's Motion to Strike paragraphs 9, 70, 71, 79, and 87 of the Complaint. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty (21) days of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: November 04, 2016
/s/_________
HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ
United States District Judge