Opinion
No. 2:02-CV-54-BO(1).
March 19, 2004
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's and Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. A hearing on these motions was held in Elizabeth City, North Carolina on March 17, 2004. In the underlying Complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants David McGlaughon ("McGlaughon"), Rickard B. Mercer ("Mercer"), and Jim Harrison ("Harrison") infringed on Plaintiff's copyrighted house plan, which is known as the Virginia Dare Trail Plan. Plaintiff claims that Defendants infringed his copyright by redrawing his plan, building a house with his plan, and marketing and selling a home designed with his plan. Plaintiff brought additional state law claims against Defendant McGlaughon and Defendant Mercer.
The Court notes that after Plaintiff settled his case with Defendant Harrison, Plaintiff amended his Complaint against the remaining Defendants. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges copyright infringement of architectural works, copyright accounting of profits, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.
Plaintiff and Defendant Harrison have reached a settlement in their dispute, so Defendant Harrison is no longer a party to this case. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Mercer is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant McGlaughon is DENIED. Defendant McGlaughon's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant Mercer's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
A court may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden to show the court that there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. In order to survive the motion, the non-moving party must then show that there is "evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. The Court must accept all of the non-moving party's evidence as true and must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 255.
1. Defendant McGlaughon
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant McGlaughon. It is undisputed that Defendant McGlaughon had no access to the plans at issue. Additionally, it is undisputed that Defendant McGlaughon had no involvement in the copying or use of the plans, or construction of the home. In fact, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Defendant McGlaughon had no type of involvement with Plaintiff's proposed plans for the construction of the beach house, other than being the chief financier of the project between Plaintiff and Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown no evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor regarding his copyright claim against Defendant McGlaughon. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant McGlaughon for copyright infringement must fail as a matter of law.
Likewise, Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant McGlaughon for fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices must fail. Plaintiff cites no evidence to show that Defendant McGlaughon possessed the knowledge or intent to support his allegations of fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation. Additionally, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim fails as Plaintiff did in fact receive the $10,000 bargained for in exchange for the plan, albeit a little late. The lack of evidence of fraud precludes Defendant McGlaughon from being found liable for unfair and deceptive trade practices.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant McGlaughon's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
2. Defendant Mercer
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Plaintiff's claims of copyright infringement against Defendant Mercer. The record is clear that Defendant Mercer had access to the plans at issue, as Plaintiff and Defendant Mercer reviewed the plans together. Additionally, the Court finds that the plans copyrighted by Plaintiff are substantially similar to those eventually used to build the house on Lot 6, Virginia Dare Trail. Even Defendant Mercer, when presented with the two house plans at depositions, could not determine which plan was Plaintiff's and which one was used to build the house. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has produced circumstantial evidence of copying, such that Plaintiff prevails as a matter of law on his copyright infringement claim.
However, with respect to the issue of damages, this Court finds that issues of material fact remain. For this reason, the Court will set the case for trial on the sole issue of damages relating to Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim against Defendant Mercer. Plaintiff's remaining state law claims against Defendant Mercer are held in abeyance until the issue of damages has been resolved.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Mercer is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Mercer's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.