Opinion
HHDFA186090459S
01-16-2019
Karol NIETUPSKI v. Nerida DEL CASTILLO
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Robert Nastri, Jr., Judge
The plaintiff’s action for a legal separation was brought by writ of summons and complaint dated February 21, 2018 and returned to court on March 20, 2018. The defendant filed a cross complaint (# 103) on March 19, 2018 seeking a dissolution of the marriage. On December 18, 2018, the defendant filed a second amended cross complaint (# 162).
The trial of this case took place on December 17 and 18, 2018, when the court heard testimony regarding the complaint and cross complaint. The defendant was represented by counsel; the plaintiff represented himself. Both parties testified. The defendant elicited testimony from Juan Meliam, the principal of the Charter Oak International Academy in West Hartford where the parties’ minor child is enrolled in kindergarten. The defendant also elicited testimony from her sister, Irma DelCastillo, who lives in the same three-family house as the defendant. Both parties adduced testimony from Attorney Randa Hojaiban of the Children’s Law Center, which was appointed as the guardian ad litem for the parties’ minor child by the court, Adelman, J., on April 3, 2018 (# 110), pursuant to the agreement the parties reached on the same date (# 109).
The plaintiff was represented by counsel at the outset and during the early stages of the litigation but entered an appearance on his own behalf, in lieu of counsel, on September 7, 2018.
The parties also presented testimony on the plaintiff’s October 12, 2018 request to defendant’s counsel, the GAL, and the court (# 142), his October 25, 2018 motion to compel (# 148), and his November 28, 2018 request to change school district (# 156). The October 12, 2018 request was an effort to get defendant’s counsel, the GAL, and the court to curtail what the plaintiff perceived as the defendant’s misfeasance in co-parenting. The plaintiff’s October 25, 2018 motion was in essence an effort to have the defendant contribute to household expenses.
The November 28, 2018 request to change school district defined one of two major disputes between the parties, the other one being whether the minor child will be permitted to travel to Peru. The same two issues were before the court, Prestley, J., in August 2018. In her August 9, 2018 order, Judge Prestley wrote: "The two issues before this court are (1) whether the child should be permitted to travel to each parties’ home of origin out of country, and (2) whether the child should begin school attendance in kindergarten in the town of Glastonbury (father’s residence) or the town of West Hartford (mother’s residence)." (August 9, 2018 Order (# 123), Prestley, J.).
Judge Prestley ordered that: "With respect to the first issue, each party shall be permitted to travel with their child to their homes of origin, in Peru and Poland, or on vacation to another country, for up to two weeks vacation time during the year." (August 9, 2018 Order, Prestley, J.).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds all facts by a preponderance of the evidence presented. The court has listened carefully to the witnesses and assessed their credibility. "It is the sole province of the trial court to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses ... It has the advantage of viewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better equipped ... to assess the circumstances surrounding the dissolution action." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 107 Conn.App. 488, 497, 945 A.2d 1043, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 948, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008).
The court applies all relevant law. The court also unseals all financial affidavits and takes judicial notice of all pleadings in the court’s file. "[Connecticut Code of Evidence § 2-1(c) ] provides that a court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute in that [they are] either (1) within the knowledge of people generally in the ordinary course of human experience, or (2) generally accepted as true and capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn.App. 15, 24, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 329 (2013). "Judicial notice ... meets the objective of establishing facts to which the offer of evidence would normally be directed ... Judicial notice relieves a party only of having to offer proof on the matter; it does not constitute conclusive proof of the matter nor is the opposing party prevented from offering evidence disputing the matter established by judicial notice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 22. "Notice to the parties is not always required when a court takes judicial notice. Our own cases have attempted to draw a line between matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, of which notice should not be taken without giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard ... and matters of established fact, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned, such as court files, which may be judicially noticed without affording a hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simes v. Simes, 95 Conn.App. 39, 51, 895 A.2d 852 (2006). "Connecticut Code of Evidence § 2-2(b) provides: ‘The court may take judicial notice without a request of a party to do so. Parties are entitled to receive notice and have an opportunity to be heard for matters susceptible of explanation or contradiction, but not for matters of established fact, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.’" Id., 51 n.14.
The parties were married on October 8, 2011 in East Hartford, Connecticut.
The complaint, the defendant’s first cross complaint (# 103), and the defendant’s amended answer and cross complaint (# 133) alleged the parties were married on October 11, 2011. The defendant’s amended cross complaint (# 162) alleged the parties were married on October 8, 2011. The testimony at trial was consistent with the amended cross complaint (# 162).
The plaintiff lived in Connecticut for at least twelve months before he filed this action. The parties have one child together: Matthew Nietupski, born March 2013.
The parties entered into a parenting agreement (# 125) on August 14, 2018, which was adopted as an order of the court, Prestley, J., on the same date. Under the terms of the agreement, Matthew is with the defendant from Monday at 4:30 p.m. until Saturday at 9 a.m. The plaintiff picks up Matthew from school every day and has parenting time with him until 4:30 p.m. Matthew is with the plaintiff the first three weekends of each month from Saturday at 9 a.m. until school starts on Monday morning. The defendant has parenting time with Matthew the fourth weekend of the month. As a result of the current parenting plan, Matthew wakes up in West Hartford every school day.
During the marriage, the parties lived in Glastonbury where Matthew attended prekindergarten at Nayaug elementary school. When the parties separated, the defendant moved to West Hartford to live with her mother. Matthew moved with her, affording him the opportunity to attend school in either municipality.
The plaintiff is presently thirty-seven years old and in reasonably good health, although he suffers from back problems. The plaintiff was born in Poland and speaks Polish as his first language. He works in building maintenance for the town of West Hartford. The plaintiff works Monday to Friday from 4:30 p.m. until 12:30 a.m. He lives in Glastonbury with his sixty-nine-year-old, Polish-speaking father.
The defendant is presently forty-one years old and in good health. She is certified by the State of Connecticut as a Spanish teacher and works as such twenty-five hours a week. The defendant is a native of Peru; Spanish is her first language. She testified at trial with the assistance of the Spanish interpreter. The defendant lives with her Spanish-speaking mother on the first floor of a three-family house. Matthew’s aunt and cousins live in one of the other units. Matthew spent his first few years in a trilingual household. He now lives in two bilingual households. Polish is the primary language in the plaintiff’s home; Spanish is the primary language in the defendant’s home. Matthew receives instruction in Spanish in school and receives private instruction in Polish.
As a result of the defendant’s concerns that Matthew was not achieving developmental milestones, in March 2016, when Matthew was two years old, the Glastonbury school system assembled a Planning and Placement Team (PPT). At the time, Matthew was struggling with early literacy, word-sound fluency, and had some behavioral problems. The Glastonbury PPT determined Matthew was eligible for special education services as a student with developmental delays and recommended he receive speech and language services twice a week. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.)
A Planning and Placement Team or "PPT" is the "individualized education program team as defined in the IDEA and who participate equally in the decision making process to determine the specific educational needs of a child with a disability and develop an individualized education program for the child. For purposes of the evaluation, identification or determination of the specific educational needs of a child who may be gifted or talented, the PPT means a group of certified or licensed professionals who represent each of the teaching, administrative and pupil personnel staffs, and who participate equally in the decision making process." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 10-76a-1(14).
Matthew is learning three languages at the same time— English, Spanish, and Polish. Fluency in those three languages will serve Matthew in good stead in the future but at present his trilingual environment is causing him some learning difficulties.
Matthew’s teachers in West Hartford reported to the parties that Matthew was the least prepared student in his kindergarten class. The Charter Oak PPT adopted the Individual Education Plan promulgated by Glastonbury and augmented it with a reading goal. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7.) Matthew has made great strides in his educational development with the individual attention he is receiving and now is almost functioning at grade level.
The defendant enrolled Matthew in therapy with Rocio Chang-Angulo to help the child cope with the stress of his parent’s divorce. Unfortunately, the defendant did not consult with the plaintiff beforehand. When the plaintiff learned of the therapy, the defendant’s unilateral action caused some friction between the therapist and the plaintiff, which caused the therapist to decline further treatment. The parties, with the assistance of the GAL, were able to enroll Matthew in counseling with a new therapist, Dr. Kevin Connolly.
The defendant struggles with making decisions bilaterally; she has not yet become accustomed to co-parenting.
When the Children’s Law Center was first appointed as Matthew’s GAL, the matter was assigned to Attorney Jodie Comer Oshana, who recommended at the August 8, 2018 hearing before Judge Prestley that Matthew attend kindergarten in Glastonbury. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3.) Judge Prestley concluded that both Glastonbury and West Hartford have excellent, comparable school systems but decided to have Matthew attend school in West Hartford for other reasons. (August 9, 2018 Order (# 123), Prestley, J.)
When Attorney Oshana was unable to continue as Matthew’s GAL, the matter was transferred to Attorney Hojaiban, who recommended that Matthew continue in the West Hartford school system, primarily because it would not be in Matthew’s best interests to uproot him from his current circumstances. The fact that Matthew wakes up in West Hartford on school days also factored into Attorney Hojaiban’s recommendation. Attorney Hojaiban consulted about her recommendation with Attorney Oshana, who concurred.
In her August 9, 2018 order, Judge Prestley found that "it is clearly the mother who has taken the initiative in accessing services such as Birth to Three and therapy for this child. In her testimony, the mother indicated that she worked with special needs children for ten years as a paraprofessional and was aware of milestones that her child wasn’t reaching that caused her concern. She demonstrated extensive knowledge and a real understanding of the child’s issues, his diagnoses, and his programming. This court is cognizant of the fact that it is not unusual in an intact family for one parent to take the lead in accessing services for their child. And this court does not suggest that the father is any less devoted to his child than the mother." (August 9, 2018 Order (# 123), Prestley, J.) The testimony at trial was consistent with Judge Prestley’s findings and this court sees no reason to deviate from her conclusions. This court is convinced that the plaintiff is as devoted to Matthew as the defendant.
The defendant wishes to take Matthew to her native Peru next summer to meet her extended family and to allow him to immerse himself in her culture. The plaintiff, who has visited Peru with the defendant, believes the environment in Peru is not suitable for a child of tender years. The plaintiff wants to delay Matthew’s trip to Peru until he is thirteen. He is also concerned that the defendant will go to Peru but not return.
Both Attorney Oshana and Attorney Hojaiban recommended that Matthew be allowed to travel outside of the United States. Judge Prestley ordered that "[E]ach party shall be permitted to travel with their child to their homes of origin, in Peru and Poland, or on vacation to another country, for up to two weeks vacation time during the year." (August 9, 2018 Order, Prestley, J.)
The parties will each have to decide what constitutes a suitable environment for Matthew countless times until he reaches eighteen years of age. In the event the defendant goes to Peru and decides to stay, despite the presence of her mother and sisters in this country, the plaintiff will have legal remedies to have Matthew returned to the United States. The United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention as a result of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq.
"The Hague Convention ... establishes the legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of minor children wrongfully removed or kept from their country of habitual residence. Under the Hague Convention, a parent, or other individual or institution, who claims that a child has been wrongfully removed may seek assistance from the ‘Central Authority’ of any signatory nation in securing the voluntary return of the child ... As an alternative, under those circumstances wherein the abducting parent refuses to cooperate, the party seeking the child’s return may commence judicial proceedings to obtain an order for the child’s return." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 332-33, 752 A.2d 955 (2000).
Peru is also a signatory to the Hague Convention. A list of signatories to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is available at http://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24, last visited January 7, 2019. This list of countries indicates that the Convention entered into force in Peru on August 1, 2001.
Neither party is seeking alimony from the other.
During the trial, the defendant orally abandoned her efforts to seek a portion of the plaintiff’s retirement assets.
The parties would have provided post-secondary educational support to their child to the extent they were able to do so if the family had remained intact.
The court has jurisdiction in this matter.
All statutory stays have expired and the court is free to enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage.
The allegations of the complaint are proven to be true.
The marriage has broken down and cannot be repaired.
Neither party is more at fault for the failure of the marriage than is the other.
ORDERS
In accordance with the findings enumerated above, and in consideration of the various statutory criteria the court employs in entering a judgment of dissolution, the court issues the following orders.
The parties shall share joint legal custody of Matthew, who shall reside primarily with the defendant for school purposes. The defendant shall determine which school Matthew attends. All other decisions regarding Matthew’s education shall be made jointly.
Child Support
The plaintiff shall pay $133 per week to the defendant as child support by automatic wage withholding. Until such a wage withholding order is in place, payment is to be made by direct deposit to the defendant’s designated bank account. The presumptive child support amount under the child support guidelines is $156. The parties agreed to the plaintiff paying $130 per week in child support, which is a deviation from the child support guidelines. The court cannot find any of the deviation criteria set forth in section 46b-215-5c(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies to be applicable to this action and so cannot order child support in the amount of $130 per week. The court-ordered child support payment of $133 per week is within fifteen percent of the presumptive support amount under the child support guidelines and therefore not a substantial deviation from the guidelines. See General Statutes § 46b-86(a) which provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be a rebuttable presumption that any deviation of less than fifteen percent from the child support guidelines is not substantial and any deviation of fifteen percent or more from the guidelines is substantial."
The guidelines are official regulations established by the commission for child support guidelines pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-215a and approved by the legislative regulation review committee pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-215c. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 et seq.
" ‘Presumptive support amounts’ means the child support award components calculated under sections 46b-215-2c and 46b-215a-3a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, prior to consideration of the deviation criteria specified in section 46b-215a-5c of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-1(21).
The plaintiff shall not be entitled to a deduction from his child support obligation because of amounts he expends during his parenting time.
Child support shall terminate upon (a) the child reaching the age of eighteen, or if the child turns eighteen and is still in high school, child support shall continue until the age of nineteen or the completion of twelfth grade, whichever occurs first, (b) the death of the child, or (c) the emancipation of the child before he reaches the age of nineteen.
Each parent shall pay one-half of the cost of mutually agreed-upon school activities, lessons, field trips, sports and other extracurricular activities— including Polish lessons. All such activities shall be agreed upon by the parties in advance, which agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld. Each parent is responsible for getting the child to all of his activities, lessons, and religious events during his or her parenting time.
Visitations with the child are not dependent upon the payment of child support. "The duty to support is, however, wholly independent of the right of visitation. Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 742, 345 A.2d 48 (1974)." D’Amato v. Hart-D’Amato, 169 Conn.App. 669, 685 n.12, 152 A.3d 546 (2016). In the event the plaintiff fails to pay child support, the defendant’s remedy is to seek a finding of contempt, not to withhold visitation.
Health Insurance
If either parent has access to health insurance through his or her employer, that parent is to maintain health insurance for Matthew so long as said health insurance is available at a reasonable cost, defined as at or below 7.5 percent of the parent’s net income.
If neither parent has health insurance through employment, the parties shall agree on such insurance coverage that is affordable and share the expense or, if so qualified, shall enroll Matthew in the Husky Plan or any successor thereto.
HUSKY Health is the State of Connecticut’s public health care program offering cost-free, or low cost, coverage to eligible children, parents, relative caregivers, elders, individuals with disabilities, adults without dependent children, and pregnant women. HUSKY Health benefits include: preventive care, primary care and specialist visits, hospital care, behavioral health services, dental services, and prescription medications. State of Connecticut, Connecticut’s Health Care for Children and Adults, available at http://www.ct.gov/hh/cwp/view.asp?a=3573&q=421552, last visited January 4, 2019.
The defendant shall be responsible to pay 54 percent and the plaintiff shall be responsible to pay 46 percent of all uninsured or unreimbursed medical expenses for Matthew, in accord with the Child Support Guidelines. Unreimbursed medical expenses include but are not limited to any pharmaceutical, psychiatric, psychological, optical and dental/orthodontic expenses, whether such expense is medically necessary or cosmetic in nature. The phrase "medical and dental expenses" shall be interpreted broadly by the parties so as to include, rather than exclude, such treatment for Matthew.
The plaintiff shall pay 46 percent of work-related child care costs.
Requests for reimbursement shall be made timely and shall include sufficient documentation so as to allow the other party to know the provider of said service, the nature, date and cost of the service and what insurance coverage has been or will be received and applied to the bill.
Any request for additional information must be made within seven days of the receipt of the request for reimbursement.
The time limits for reimbursement detailed below shall begin once the additional information has been supplied or the parties agree that the request is sufficient.
Reimbursement shall be made within thirty days of the receipt of the request if the amount is under $100, and sixty days if over that sum.
The health insurance coverage contemplated by this paragraph shall remain in place for Matthew until he attains the age of twenty-six if the medical plan allows for continued coverage beyond the age of majority.
The provisions of General Statutes § 46b-84(e) are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
Parenting Plan
During the school year, Matthew shall be with the defendant from Monday at 4:30 p.m. until Saturday at 9 a.m. The plaintiff shall enjoy parenting time with Matthew every Monday to Friday from after school— or 2 p.m. if there is no school— until 4:30 p.m. Matthew shall be with the plaintiff the first three weekends of each month from Saturday at 9 a.m. until school starts on Monday morning— or 4:30 p.m. if there is no school. The defendant shall enjoy parenting time with Matthew the fourth weekend of the month. Both parents shall share equal responsibility for pick-ups and drop-offs of Matthew. The defendant shall be responsible for dropping off Matthew on Saturday mornings and the plaintiff shall be responsible for all other transitions.
During summer vacations, Matthew shall be with the defendant from Monday at 4:30 p.m. to Friday at 10 a.m. and with the plaintiff from Friday at 10 a.m. until Monday at 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff shall pick up Matthew on Fridays and defendant shall pick up Matthew on Mondays.
Vacations
Each party shall have two weeks exclusive vacation time with Matthew during the year. Said vacation time may— but does not necessarily have to— be taken in consecutive weeks.
Each vacation week shall consist of five weekdays and a weekend before and after the weekday period.
The parties shall exchange vacation schedules no later than May 15 of each year.
In the event that there is a conflict of schedules that the parties cannot resolve through discussion, the plaintiff’s schedule shall prevail in all even-numbered years and the defendant’s schedule shall prevail in all odd-numbered years.
The vacations shall take into consideration Matthew’s planned activities that have been approved previously by the parties.
No additional vacation time shall be taken by either parent without written agreement of the other parent, but such agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld.
When Matthew is in school, vacations shall be alternated by the parties with the plaintiff having the first such vacation of the academic year, the defendant the next and so on.
When Matthew is in school, neither parent shall remove him from school for a vacation without the written agreement of the other parent, but such agreement shall not be unreasonably withheld.
If a vacation plan requires travel overnight outside the state of Connecticut, the traveling parent shall provide the other parent with an itinerary for such travel, including but not limited to means of travel (including airline name and flight numbers), dates and times of travel, address of accommodations, and a contact telephone number. Vacations may include travel outside the United States.
Said itinerary shall be provided to the other parent at least one week in advance of the planned travel.
The vacation schedule shall supercede the weekly schedule and the holiday schedule shall supercede both other schedules.
The parties may alter this vacation schedule by written agreement.
Holidays
Halloween shall follow the normal rotation of the weekly schedule.
Thanksgiving shall be with the plaintiff in even-numbered years from after school on Wednesday— or Wednesday at 4 p.m. if Matthew is not in school— until Thursday at 8 p.m., and with the defendant from Thursday at 8 p.m. until return to school on Monday morning— or Monday at 9 a.m. if Matthew is not in school. The schedule shall be reversed in odd-numbered years.
Christmas Eve/Christmas Day shall be with the defendant in even-numbered years from after school on the day the vacation begins— or December 23 at 4 p.m. if Matthew is not in school— until December 25 at 1 p.m., and with the plaintiff from December 25 at 1 p.m. to December 26 at 8 p.m. The vacation schedule shall be in effect from that point forward. The schedule shall be reversed in odd-numbered years.
New Year’s Eve shall be with the plaintiff in even-numbered years from December 31 at 4 p.m. until noon on January 1 and with the defendant in all odd-numbered years. The regular parenting schedule shall be in effect from that point forward.
Easter weekend shall be from after school on the Thursday before the holiday— or Thursday at 4 p.m. if Matthew is not in school— to return to school on Monday— or Monday at 9 a.m. if Matthew is not in school, and shall be with the plaintiff in odd-numbered years and the defendant in even-numbered years.
Memorial Day weekend shall be from after school on Friday— or Friday at 4 p.m. if Matthew is not in school— until return to school on Tuesday— or Tuesday at 9 a.m. if Matthew is not in school, and shall be with the defendant in odd-numbered years and the Plaintiff in even-numbered years.
Fourth of July shall be from 9 a.m. on July 4 until 9 a.m. on July 5 and shall be with the plaintiff in odd-numbered years and with the defendant in even-numbered years.
Labor Day weekend shall be from 9 a.m. on the Friday before the holiday until return to school on Tuesday— or Tuesday at 9 a.m. if Matthew is not in school— and shall be with the defendant in odd-numbered years and with the plaintiff in even-numbered years.
Mother’s Day and Father’s Day shall always be with the parent celebrating the holiday and shall run from the Saturday before the holiday at 8 p.m. until return to school on Monday— or Monday at 9 a.m. if Matthew is not in school.
A Monday holiday not specifically addressed in this judgment shall be spent with the parent whose weekend it follows. The transition time shall follow the regular parenting schedule.
Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur shall be spent with plaintiff.
The court heard no testimony about the parties’ religious affiliations but their August 14, 2018 agreement (# 125) provided that Matthew would spend these holidays with the plaintiff. In addition, the defendant proposed in her trial management compliance that Matthew spend these holidays with the plaintiff.
The parties may alter this holiday schedule by written agreement.
General Parenting Orders
Neither parent shall do anything to harm Matthew’s relationship with the other parent and shall make every effort to ensure that Matthew is able to enjoy a loving and positive child/parent experience with the other parent as well as that parent’s extended family.
The parties shall do everything within their control to ensure that all of their extended family and friends do likewise.
The parties shall not make demeaning or denigrating comments about the other parent or the other parent’s extended family to Matthew or within his hearing and shall do everything within their control to ensure that all of their extended family and friends do likewise.
Each party shall provide the other party with a current street address, telephone number and email address at all times.
When Matthew is in the physical custody of one parent overnight, that parent shall prearrange a time during which the other parent may speak to him by telephone.
Matthew shall have reasonable and unrestricted telephone or computer video contact with each parent while in the other parent’s care.
Neither parent shall take any action, either overtly or covertly, to interfere with the other parent’s right to receive all information from third parties regarding Matthew’s health, education, religious upbringing, and general welfare.
Each party shall make all reasonable efforts to ensure that any notices, reports and/or schedules regarding Matthew received by that party are shared with the other party.
The parent with primary access at the time shall notify the other parent of any serious illness or accident involving Matthew as soon as is practical.
All medical and dental appointments shall be made so as to allow both parents to attend if possible.
The parties shall have the right to attend all public functions involving Matthew, including but not limited to sporting events, school productions, graduations and the like, whether such events take place during their scheduled parenting time or not.
The parties shall consult with one another on all significant, non-routine decisions involving Matthew’s health, education, religion and general welfare, with the singular exception of the selection of Matthew’s school, which selection shall be made by the defendant.
Significant, non-routine decisions shall include but not be limited to the following areas:
educational decisions;
Matthew’s residence;
day care providers, including after school and summer camp programs;
participation in extracurricular activities that require commitments of time and transportation involving the other parent;
nonemergency medical, dental, psychological, psychiatric, optical or orthodontic care including the selection of the health care providers;
participation in religious organizations and activities; and
trips away from home without a parent that involve a distance of more than fifty miles, leaving the state of Connecticut, or overnight stays.
Day-to-day decisions shall be made by the party parenting Matthew at that time.
The court retains jurisdiction regarding post-majority educational support orders for Matthew pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c.
Neither party shall interfere with or disrupt in any manner the parenting time of the other.
Neither party shall schedule activities for Matthew that interfere with the other’s parenting time.
Neither party shall discuss pending legal proceedings regarding Matthew or any adult issues in Matthew’s presence or within his hearing; neither party shall allow any other person to do so. The parties shall not involve Matthew in the court process in any manner.
Neither party shall encourage Matthew to choose between them or make promises to Matthew that they cannot keep.
Neither party shall use Matthew as a messenger or negotiator or seek information concerning the other party from Matthew.
The parties shall participate in OurFamilyWizard to communicate about Matthew. All communication shall be civil and focused on Matthew. The parties shall check OurFamilyWizard daily and reply to a message within twenty-four hours, unless circumstances require a more immediate response.
At all times concerning matters that affect Matthew, the parties shall communicate with each other civilly, devoid of anger and hostility.
The provisions of General Statutes § 46b-84(e) are incorporated by reference into this judgment.
Matthew shall remain in counseling with Dr. Kevin Connolly as long as Dr. Connolly believes Matthew is benefitting from the counseling. The frequency and duration of the counseling sessions shall be at Dr. Connolly’s discretion.
By February 15, 2019, the plaintiff shall provide to the defendant all documents necessary for the defendant to renew Matthew’s passport.
Other Orders
Alimony is not awarded to either party.
Except as specifically provided herein, the parties shall retain the assets listed on their financial affidavits, free from any claim by the other, with the right to change beneficiaries or hypothecate those assets as they may otherwise deem appropriate.
The plaintiff shall be solely liable for all debts and liabilities as listed on his financial affidavit or in his sole name, and shall hold the defendant harmless and indemnify her from said debts and liabilities.
The defendant shall be solely liable for all debts and liabilities as listed on her financial affidavit or in her sole name, and shall hold the plaintiff harmless and indemnify him from said debts and liabilities.
If, in the future, there is discovered a debt that through the parties’ mutual mistake has not been divided pursuant to this judgment, and the debt accrued during the term of the marriage or went to the accumulation of marital property, the parties shall share equally in the costs of repayment of the debt, including all principal, interest, and penalties. If, however, one party incurred the debt without the other party receiving any benefit, then the party incurring the debt, regardless of who is legally liable under the debt contract, shall be wholly responsible for its payment in full, including all principal, interest, and penalties.
The parties shall keep their own bank accounts as listed on their most recent financial affidavits, free and clear of any claim by the other party.
The parties shall be responsible for their own health insurance.
The plaintiff’s October 12, 2018 request to defendant’s counsel, the GAL, and the court (# 142) is denied.
The plaintiff’s October 25, 2018 motion to compel (# 148) is denied.
The plaintiff’s November 28, 2018 request to change school district (# 156) is denied.
JUDGMENT
The court orders the marriage dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown and declares the parties single and unmarried. The foregoing findings are incorporated into the judgment.