Opinion
No. 14-05-00341-CR
Memorandum Opinion filed July 6, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 339th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 999,265. Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, EDELMAN, and FROST.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Arnold Nickleberry appeals a conviction for aggravated robbery on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress his videotaped confession because it was involuntary. We affirm. Appellant's sole issue contends his confession was involuntary because the videotape shows that he was nervous, not in full control of his thinking ability, and "obviously high on crack cocaine." We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Apr. 25, 2006) (No. 05-11514). When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a mixed question of law and fact, we review the trial court's application of the law to the facts of the case de novo. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). However, we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determinations of historical facts that involve an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 04-10283). A defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 767 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Intoxication, while relevant, does not render a confession involuntary per se. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 651 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Instead, the question becomes whether the defendant's intoxication rendered him incapable of making an independent, informed decision to confess. Id. In this case, the trial court found in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that appellant: (1) failed to present any evidence of coercive or improper police conduct; (2) was interviewed at a reasonable time in the morning, the interview took approximately six minutes, and was not unduly prolonged; (3) was not deprived of any basic necessities; (4) was properly advised of his legal rights in conformity with Miranda and article 38.22, § 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to his videotaped statements; (5) did not appear intoxicated as a result of ingestion of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs of any type at the time of the videotaped interview; (6) did not appear to experience and did not display symptoms of any type of withdrawal from alcohol or other controlled substances at the time of the videotaped interview; (7) was not incapable of making an independent and informed decision to confess to the charged crime at the time of the videotaped interview; (8) was competent to understand and waive his legal rights at the time of the videotaped interview; and (9) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his legal rights under article 38.22, § 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prior to and during his videotaped interview, and freely and voluntarily gave all statements made on the videotape. The videotape shows that: (1) Sergeant Madden read appellant the required statutory warnings and asked appellant whether he understood his legal rights; (2) appellant indicated that he understood his rights and described how he committed the aggravated robbery; and (3) appellant stated that he robbed the complainant of his car because he wanted to sell the car to a "dope dealer" for "some crack" since he had a "crack habit." In addition, Sergeant Madden testified at the suppression hearing that appellant: (1) understood his legal rights; (2) wanted to waive his rights; (3) was very remorseful; and (4) did not appear to be under the influence of any narcotic drugs or alcohol. Contrary to appellant's wholly unsupported characterizations of his demeanor on the tape, we find nothing on it indicating that appellant appeared "high" or otherwise physically or mentally impaired. Because appellant's sole issue thus fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, it is overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
A jury found appellant guilty of the offense and assessed punishment at 28 years confinement.
Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing and cited no portion of the tape or any other evidence to support this claim.
The requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence is based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000).
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (Vernon 2005).