Opinion
A24A0947
02-08-2024
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
In September 2022, Derrick Nicholson was indicted on a single count of aggravated stalking. Prior to trial, Nicholson filed several pro se motions seeking to quash, dismiss, and/or suppress the indictment. The trial court entered a single order denying all of these motions, and Nicholson then filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.
Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), direct appeals generally may be taken from "[a]ll final judgments, that is to say, where the case is no longer pending in the court below[.]" A criminal case is not final and ripe for appeal until all of the charges against the defendant have been resolved. See Keller v. State, 275 Ga. 680, 680-681 (571 S.E.2d 806) (2002) (holding that a criminal case remains pending until the court enters a written judgment of conviction and sentence on each count). Here, Nicholson's case remains pending below, as it has yet to go to trial. Accordingly, Nicholson was required to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures - including securing a certificate of immediate review from the trial court - to obtain immediate appellate review of the order at issue. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (b); Stewart v. State, 240 Ga.App. 154, 154 (522 S.E.2d 743) (1999) (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment is an interlocutory order). Nicholson's failure to follow those procedures deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal. See Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 172 (1) (829 S.E.2d 348) (2019) ("The jurisdiction of an appellate court to consider an appeal depends upon whether the appeal is taken in substantial compliance with the rules of appellate procedure prescribing the conditions under which the judgment of the trial court may be considered appealable.") (Punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.