Opinion
No. 99 C 6852
September 12, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendants Jerry Williams and Amalgamated Transit Union Local 308's (collectively "ATU") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff McDonald Newkirk ("Newkirk") filed this action against ATU alleging violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. ("LMRDA"). ATU's motion asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because ATU is not a "labor organization" as defined in the LMRDA. 29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff has filed this action under LMRDA against ATU. ATU is an organization which represents approximately 2800 employees of the Chicago Transit Authority. ATU is bound by a collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Transit Authority, "a political subdivision, body politic and municipal corporation." (Defs. Stmt. of Uncontested Facts ¶ 4.) ATU does not represent employees of any other organization, nor is it a party to any other collective bargaining agreements.
The majority of these facts are taken from IDC's Local Rule 12(M) Statement of Material Facts. See infra Part II. Effective September 1, 1999, the Court's local rules have been amended to reflect a new rule number, Local Rule 56.1. The substance of this rule has gone unaltered. IDC and most of the cited prior case law use the old title. In the interest of accuracy, the Court will use the new title.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ. p. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of submitting affidavits and other evidentiary material to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) Only genuine disputes over "material facts" can prevent a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To overcome a defendant's motion, the plaintiff cannot rest on the pleadings but must, by affidavit or other means, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). While the record "and all reasonable inferences drawn from it [are to be viewed] in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion," Bisciglia v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 45 F.3d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1995), the non-movant must show more than "some metaphysical doubt" regarding the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
II. Local Rules 56.1(a)(3) (b)(3)
In addition to the requirements for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c), Local Rules 56.1(a)(3) and 56.1(b)(3) require the parties moving for and opposing summary judgment to state the material facts of the case supported by references to the record. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to submit a statement which sets forth facts it contends are material and which entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. The movant is required to set forth each fact in a short numbered paragraph and include a specific reference to the record to support the fact.
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the party opposing the motion to submit a response to each numbered paragraph of the movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts, indicating any disagreement with the moving party. If the party opposing summary judgment fails to state any disagreement with the facts set forth in the movant's statement, those facts are deemed admitted. The standard set out in Local Rule 56.1 has been strictly enforced in this district, see Pasant v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 768 F. Supp. 661, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1991);Davis v. Frapolly, 756 F. Supp. 1065, 1069-70 (N.D. Ill. 1991), and in the Court of Appeals. See Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1992); Schultz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1992); Capitol Converting Equip., Inc. v. LEP Transp., Inc., 965 F.2d 391, 394-95 (7th Cir. 1992); Bell, Boyd Lloyd v. Tapy, 896 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir. 1990)
ATU filed a Statement of Uncontested Material Facts along with its motion for summary judgment against Newkirk. That statement clearly asserts that ATU represents only municipal employees, specifically, Chicago Transit Authority workers. The statements are properly supported by the affidavit of Jerry Williams, Sr. Newkirk failed to file a 56.1(b) (3) statement in response and failed to file any opposition to the summary judgment either in memorandum or motion form despite the fact that the Court provided Newkirk numerous extensions of time and specific instructions in open court. Thus, the facts in ATU's Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute are deemed admitted
III. LMRDA Violation
ATU's sole argument for summary judgement is that it is not covered by LMRDA's definition of a "labor organization." ATU contends that because it does not fall within this definition, this Court has no jurisdiction over this matter.
A necessary element of any claim under the LMRDA is the Defendant's status as a "labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 402 (i), 501(b). This does not mean that this Court's jurisdiction is dependant on this element. Rather, this Court's jurisdiction over the present case, as with any claim under LMRDA, arises under the federal law, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "[T]he absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1990) (citations omitted); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Because there are no disputed issues of material fact, this motion can be recast as a request for summary judgment on the merits.
Under LMRDA, an organization is considered "a labor organization" if it "exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances. . . . " 29 U.S.C. § 402 (i) (emphasis added). The LMRDA specifically excludes from its definition of employers: "[T]he United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 402 (e). Thus, so long as a union represents only government employees, it cannot be sued under the LMRDA by its members.
ATU submitted affidavits revealing that all of ATU's members are employed in the public-sector, and that it is not now attempting to organize any private-sector workers. Newkirk has not provided any contrary evidence. Given this evidence, Newkirk's cause of action against ATU under LMRDA fails, since the ATU is not a "labor organization" as defined by this statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ATU's motion for summary judgment is granted.