Opinion
11487 Index 302650/15, 20478/14E
05-14-2020
G. Wesley Simpson, P.C., Brooklyn (G. Wesley Simpson of counsel),for Anthony Newell, appellant. Cheven Keely & Hatzis, New York (Thomas Torto of counsel), and O’Dwyer & Bernstien, LLP, New York (Steven Aripotch of counsel), for Tina D. Bronston, respondent/appellant. Saretsky Katz & Dranoff, L.L.P., New York (Sam Tarasowsky of counsel), for Jose A. Javier, respondent.
G. Wesley Simpson, P.C., Brooklyn (G. Wesley Simpson of counsel),for Anthony Newell, appellant.
Cheven Keely & Hatzis, New York (Thomas Torto of counsel), and O’Dwyer & Bernstien, LLP, New York (Steven Aripotch of counsel), for Tina D. Bronston, respondent/appellant.
Saretsky Katz & Dranoff, L.L.P., New York (Sam Tarasowsky of counsel), for Jose A. Javier, respondent.
Richter, J.P., Oing, Singh, Moulton, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Robert T. Johnson, J.), entered on or about June 1, 2018, which granted defendants Bronston's and Javier's motions for summary judgment dismissing Newell's complaint as against them, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny Javier's motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
These actions arise from a three-car motor vehicle accident. Defendant Javier was driving his livery cab, followed by defendant Bronston and plaintiff Newell, when he stopped short to pick up a passenger. Bronston stopped without hitting Javier's cab, but Newell rear-ended Bronston's vehicle.
Issues of fact as to Javier's comparative negligence preclude the summary dismissal of Newell's complaint as against him. A jury could rationally find that Javier's conduct was a "substantial cause" of the accident, i.e., that his sudden stop in the unobstructed moving lane of traffic created a foreseeable chain of events that resulted in the rear-end collision between Bronston and Newell (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 [2008] ; Baez–Pena v. MM Truck & Body Repair, Inc., 151 A.D.3d 473, 477, 56 N.Y.S.3d 307 [1st Dept. 2017] ).
The court correctly dismissed Newell's complaint as against Bronston. Newell's rear-ending of Bronston's stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on his part, and he failed to provide a nonnegligent explanation for the accident (see Morgan v. Browner, 138 A.D.3d 560, 28 N.Y.S.3d 594 [1st Dept. 2016] ; Padilla v. Zulu Servs., Inc., 132 A.D.3d 522, 523, 17 N.Y.S.3d 855 [1st Dept. 2015] ). As the motion court found, there is no evidence of negligence on Bronston's part.