Opinion
No. UWY-CV-02-4003594-S.
April 23, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs New London County Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "New London") and Erie Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Erie") instituted this subrogation lawsuit against defendants Nissan North America, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Nissan") and Sonitrol Security Systems of Hartford, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Sonitrol") seeking monies paid for damages and losses to Amadeu and Marie Periera under their respective insurance policies following the July 27, 2001, fire at the Periera's home on 21 Laurel Crest Drive in Burlington, Connecticut. Plaintiff Erie has brought a similar subrogation claim seeking monies for the damages and losses of personal property of one Kimberly Boulanger as the result of the same fire.
As to the defendant Nissan, the plaintiffs allege that a product defect in a 1996 Nissan Altima parked in the two-car garage at the Pereira residence caused the fire. As to defendant Sonitrol, the plaintiffs allege that the heat detector located in the garage did not operate properly, thus delaying notification to the proper authorities and, in turn, the timely suppression of the fire. They further allege that this delay caused substantial damages and losses that could and would have otherwise been avoided or minimized.
The relevant counts brought by New London against Sonitrol include the following causes of action: (1) Reckless, Wanton and Willful Misconduct (Count Three); (2) Breach of Contract (Count Four); Negligent Misrepresentation (Count Five); Intentional Misrepresentation (Count Six); and (5) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes Section 42-110a (Count Seven). Plaintiff Erie's causes of action are identical to those of plaintiff New London except that Erie does not include causes of action for negligent and intentional misrepresentation (Erie's counts are numbered 8 through 10 in the complaint).
Initially, the Pereiras had sued both Nissan and Sonitrol for losses not covered by insurance. However, all of the Pereiras' claims have now been resolved. Defendant Nissan has also resolved these cases with all of the parties involved.
Amadeu and Maria Pereira entered into a contract with Sonitrol on or about May 22, 1993. As stated in the contract, Sonitrol and the Pereiras contracted for monitoring services only. Sonitrol would also respond to complaints and/or requests by the customer if so notified. The contract, at paragraph 12, contains a Limitation of Damages Clause, limiting any losses caused for any reason to $190.80. The contract also contains a provision, at paragraph 13, requiring all claims or lawsuits to be brought within one year from the act or omission complained of, in this case the alleged failure of the heat detector to operate on the day of the fire, July 27, 2001. Paragraph 14 of the contract provides the following clause: "Client hereby waives his right of recovery against the Dealer for any loss covered by insurance on the premises or its contents to the extent permitted by any policy or law."
Sonitrol, by way of motions filed on August 14, 2006 and February 7, 2007, has filed for Summary Judgment based upon six different theories. First, it argues that the clause contained in paragraph 14 of the contract bars plaintiffs' recovery. Second, it maintains that plaintiffs have no proof that the subject heat detector failed to work properly. Third, it asserts that the plaintiffs can not prove wanton, willful or reckless conduct. Fourth, it argues that the losses and damages claimed by the plaintiffs were not proximately caused by any conduct on the part of the defendant. Fifth, it asserts that the Limitation of Liability Clause in the Contract between Sonitrol and the Pereiras is enforceable and valid. Finally, it claims that three of the claims brought by plaintiff New London and one claim brought by Erie are time-barred under the terms of the subject contract.
The parties appeared before the court on two separate occasions to argue these motions. The arguments were concluded on April 10, 2007, at which time the court reserved decision.
II. LAW
The standard for a motion for summary judgment is well established. "A Motion for Summary Judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue where there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hertz Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any issues exist. Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Hertz at 381.
The opposing party must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "A material fact is a fact which will make a difference in the result of a case." Deming v. National Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 757, 905 A.2d 623 (2006).
A. Waiver of Subrogation Claim
It is axiomatic that New London, as subrogee of the Pereiras, has no greater rights than the Pereiras against Sonitrol. Orselet v. DeMatteo, 206 Conn. 542, 546-47, 539 A.2d 95 (1988). Defendant argues that, since the Pereiras waived any right of recovery against Sonitrol in paragraph 14 of the contract, New London may not recover against Sonitrol.
Section 1 on the New London County Mutual policy contains the property coverage. Sections 1 and 2 (Conditions), provides, in relevant part, in Paragraph 8 at Page 18 of 18 as follows:
Subrogation. An "insured" may waive in writing before a loss all rights of recovery against any person. If not waived, we may require an assignment of rights of recovery for a loss to the extent that payment is made by us. If an assignment is sought, an "insured" must sign and deliver all related papers and cooperate with us.
Connecticut has long recognized the enforceability of waiver of subrogation provisions in contracts. As stated in Orselet:
[T]he insurer can take nothing by subrogation but the rights of the insured, and is subrogated to only such rights as the insured possesses . . . Therefore, any defense which a wrongdoer has against an insured is good against the insurer subrogated to the rights of the insured." Id. at 546-47.
Sonitrol argues that Judge Thompson upheld the enforceability of a waiver of subrogation provision in an alarm contract in the case of Albany Insurance Co. v. United Alarm Services, Inc., 194 F.Sup.2d 87 (D.Conn. 2002). In that case, Judge Thompson held that, since under Connecticut law, Albany as subrogee had no greater rights against United Alarm Services than its subrogor, Fairfield Processing, Albany could not recover against United Alarm Services based on the fact that Fairfield Processing had waived its right to recover against United Alarm Services.
Plaintiff New London argues that, in order for its policy provision to apply, the Pereiras would have had to waive all of their rights of recovery before a loss. It suggests that since the Pereiras only waived their right to recovery to those losses covered by insurance they did not waive their rights to all recovery. In fact, New London notes, that the Pereiras brought a separate lawsuit in this matter for items that were not covered by insurance. It claims that the purpose of this policy provision is to allow the insured to waive all of their rights before a loss in return for some quid pro quo considerations. It further contends that to allow the insured to waive only the insurer's rights, but not their own, allows the insured to gain a benefit at the expense of the insurer and without any corresponding consideration from the insured. This result, it maintains, is not allowed by the language of the insurance contract which requires the insured to release all claims and is not contemplated by the agreement between Sonitrol and the insured since the agreement only allows the insured to waive their rights to the extent allowed by the policy or law.
New London also argues that the Albany Insurance case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Albany, the District Court did not discuss or refer to the policy language which it was applying to allow Albany Insurance Company's insureds to waive its rights to recovery. In the present action, the New London policy allows the insured to waive all of its rights, not just a few rights. In the Albany case, the alarm contract's waiver provision included the language, "it is expressly understood that no insurance company, insurer or bonding company . . . shall have . . . any right of subrogation against [the defendant alarm company]." The language contained in the instant matter is entirely different.
"Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . . where there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law." Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 252 Conn. 479, 495, 746 A.2d 1277 (2000). In the instant matter, the court finds that the language contained in the alarm contract is ambiguous. The phrase waiving the homeowner's "right of recovery to the extent permitted by any policy or law," for instance, is ambiguous. It does not specify, as the contract in the Albany case, that the rights of the insurance company are barred. Why would the homeowner have any rights with regard to monies already covered by insurance? The fact that the insurance company is not mentioned in the clause creates an ambiguity for the court. Therefore, the intent of the parties is unclear. Sonitrol has not met its burden on a summary judgment motion. The motion is denied regarding the first ground.
B. Sonitrol's claim that plaintiffs have no proof that the subject heat detector failed to work properly
Sonitrol claims that the plaintiffs have not produced any proof that the heat detector did not function properly.
The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's alarm system expert, Jeffrey D. Zwirn, creates a material issue of fact in this regard. Mr. Zwirn's affidavit suggests that a "rate of rise" heat detector was present in the house, but that it was never physically connected (wired) to the alarm system's protective loop circuit wiring. Sonitrol claims that heat detectors, not rate of rise detectors, were installed in the subject garage. A material issue of fact exists in this regard. Also, there is a question of fact regarding the proper functioning of the alarm system. The motion for summary judgment on the basis of the second ground claimed, is denied.
C. Sonitrol claims that the plaintiffs cannot prove that the actions of Sonitrol constituted Reckless, Wanton or Willful Misconduct
". . . [W]illful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention." Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 342-43, 813 A.2d 1003 (2003). The question of whether conduct is willful, wanton, and/or reckless is a question addressed to the court when "the mind of a fair and reasonable man could reach but one conclusion." Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 534 note 10, 542 A.2d 711 (1988). Sonitrol claims that New London cannot prove reckless, wanton or willful misconduct because the only person in the house at the time of the fire received a call from Sonitrol approximately nine seconds after they received an alarm signal and within seconds of the time that he had called 911.
The plaintiffs assert that there are issues of material fact concerning whether Sonitrol's conduct was reckless, wanton and/or willful. They cite Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 83, 14 A.2d 713 (1940) for the proposition that "whether the defendant's conduct constitutes heedless and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights was a question of fact for the jury . . . Mr. Zwirn's on site inspection revealed, according to his affidavit, that there was no physical evidence that a heat detector in the subject two bay garage was ever physically connected to the existing fire alarm system's protective loop circuit wiring. Without any protective loop circuit wiring to the initiating device itself, it would be technically impossible to function. In view of the fact that a full functioning system was required by the contract, the fact that one of the alarms was not wired could be found to constitute gross negligence and certainly reckless misconduct. Therefore, there are issues of material fact that prevent the entry of summary judgment in favor of Sonitrol on the basis of ground three of the summary judgment motions.
D. Sonitrol alleges that the plaintiffs cannot prove that any alleged delay in activating the alarm was the Proximate Cause of any losses
In order to recover damages, a causal relationship must exist between a defendant's wrongful conduct and a plaintiff's injury. Cordona v. Valentin, 160 Conn. 18, 24, 273 A.2d 697 (1970). "Although the elements of a cause of action may be established on the basis of inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence, . . . such inferences must be reasonable and logical, and the conclusions based on them must not be the result of speculation and conjecture . . . When an element necessary to a cause of action cannot be established without conjecture, the evidence presented cannot withstand a motion for directed verdict." Boehm v. Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 389, 517 A.2d 624 (1986). The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is identical to that of a motion for directed verdict. Delahunty v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 582, 588, note 10, 674 A.2d 1290 (1996). Sonitrol argues that it is undisputed that the Sonitrol alarm signal activated at 3:56:26 p.m. Therefore, it contends that the plaintiffs must prove that the Sonitrol heat detector should have gone off earlier, and assuming it did, that the plaintiff's losses and damage to the property would have been minimized. Sonitrol contends that the plaintiffs cannot prove damages because: (1) any proof of damages is speculative, (2) they have never responded to interrogatories itemizing damages, and (3) they have not disclosed an expert witness with respect to same. Moreover, they claim, the plaintiffs cannot prove that, even assuming that the alarm could and should have activated earlier, such activation would have made a material difference in the fire suppression activities of the fire department. The fire department had arrived approximately 30 minutes after it received the alarm in this rural area.
In Vastola v. Connecticut Protective System, Inc., 133 Conn. 18, 47 A.2d 844 (1946), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must, through competent evidence, remove from the realm of speculation the issue of whether the failure of an alarm to activate was the proximate cause of the claimed losses. The plaintiffs in Vastola had claimed that the failure of the burglar alarm to activate was the cause of a burglary. Reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that it would be "pure speculation" as to whether the ringing of the alarm would have prevented the burglary. "Whether that would have been the result had the apparatus been in working order can never be known. It would depend on contingencies without number, any one of which would have been sufficient to disappoint it." Id. at 22. Thus, Sonitrol claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on the fourth ground.
Plaintiffs maintain that there are issues of material fact because the conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' losses. The failure of Sonitrol's fire and security system to properly detect that a fire had started in the garage was one of the proximate causes of the plaintiffs' losses.
". . . [T]he issue of causation is a question of fact for the trier of fact." Abrahams v. Young Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997). The question of proximate cause should be submitted to the trier of fact, if there is room for reasonable agreement. Hughes v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 22 Conn.App. 586, 577 A.2d 1132 (1990). The deposition of Mr. Zwirn indicates, at pages 160-61, that "had the fire alarm system been connected properly, tested and maintained, that the damages would have been contained within the garage area, because time is the most important commodity when it comes to fire protection. The smaller a fire is the easier it is to put out. To the extent the alarm would have been sounded earlier, the fire would have been much smaller." This creates an issue of material fact in the court's view. The fact that this expert has not been disclosed for this purpose or that the plaintiffs have not itemized damages may be the subject of pre-trial motions. There was no motion to strike either the affidavit or the testimony of Mr. Zwirn. It seems to the court that it would be relatively simple for the plaintiffs to submit the non-garage damages vs. the garage damages, and to disclose Mr. Zwirn at this time. However, on the basis of the record before the court, the testimony of Mr. Zwirn presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of proximate cause. The motion for summary judgment on the basis of the fourth ground is denied.
E. Sonitrol claims that the Limitation of Liability Clause in the plaintiffs' contract with Sonitrol limits the recoverable damages to one-half year's monitoring chargesThe contract between the homeowners and Sonitrol contained the following clause:
C. Client understands and agrees that if Dealer should be found liable for any loss or damage due from a failure to perform any of its obligations or a failure of the equipment to properly operate, Dealer's liability shall be limited to a sum equal to the total of one-half year's monitoring payments, or Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars, whichever is the lesser, as liquidated damages and not as a penalty. This liability shall be exclusive and shall apply if loss or damage, irrespective of cause or origin, results directly or indirectly to person or property from performance or non-performance of any of Dealer's obligations or from negligence, active or otherwise, of Dealer, its employees or agents.
Limitation of Liability clauses similar to the one above have been held valid and enforceable under Connecticut Law. See Leon's Bakery, Inc. v. Industrial Electric Service, Inc., 990 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1993); National Fire Insurance Co. v. PPG Industries, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Hartford, Docket No. X03 CV 02 4022069 (May 8, 2006, Langenbach, J.); Forester v. Advanced Electronic Services, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at New Britain, Docket No. X03 CV 01 0510854 (October 9, 2002, Aurigemma, J.) ( 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 314); U.S. Fidelity Guaranty v. Sonitrol Services Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 93 0134267 (July 29, 1996, Arnold, J.). The theory allowing such provisions is that the homeowners may protect themselves by purchasing insurance and the amount of damages as the result of a failure may be difficult to calculate. Sonitrol requests that summary judgment enter on all counts with a limitation of damages to $190.80 representing six months of monitoring service.
A contract provision seeking to limit a party's liability must be narrowly construed and will not exculpate intentional or bad faith conduct. New England Variety Distributors, Inc. v. Alarm Sec. Protection Co., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV 95 0545381 (September 25, 1998, Peck, J.) [23 Conn. L. Rtpr. 85]. It is not illegal for a party to have a contract to limit his liability in damages for non-performance of his promises, although such a provision is not effective in case he acts fraudulently or in bad faith. A. Corbin, Contracts, Section 85.18 (2003).
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides:
A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy . . . The law of torts imposes standards of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. One cannot exempt himself from such liability for harm that is caused either intentionally or recklessly.
Restatement (Second) Contracts, Section 195(1) cmt. a (1979).
"The law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person of his own negligence . . . Such provisions, however, have been upheld under proper circumstances." BD Associates, Inc. v. Russell, 73 Conn.App. 66, 72, 807 A.2d 1001 (2002). Such a clause is only valid if it appears "plainly and precisely that the limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility." Id.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has observed:
. . . exculpatory provisions undermine the policy considerations governing our tort system. The fundamental policy purposes of the tort compensation system (are) compensation of innocent parties, shifting the loss to responsible parties or distributing it among appropriate entities, and deterrence of wrongful conduct. It is sometimes said that compensation for losses is the primary function of tort law . . . (but it) is perhaps more accurate to describe the primary function as one of determining when compensation (is) required . . . An equally compelling function of the tort system is the prophylactic factor of preventing future harm. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. Hanks v. Powder Ridge Restaurant Corporation, 276 Conn. 314, 327, 885 A.2d 734 (2005). "An attempted exemption from liability for a future intentional tort or crime or for a future willful or grossly negligent act is generally held void." 8 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. 1998) Sec. 19:23, pp. 291-92. It is against public policy to enforce clauses of this nature. As stated in Teleflex Incorporated v. Collins Aikman Products Company, Inc., 961 F.Sup. 368, 371 (D.Conn. 1996):
More pointedly, an exculpatory clause is unenforceable when, in contravention of acceptable notions of morality, the misconduct for which it would grant immunity smacks of intentional wrongdoing. This can be explicit, as when it is fraudulent, malicious or prompted by the sinister intention of one acting in bad faith. Or, when, as in gross negligence, it betokens a reckless indifference to the rights of others, it may be implicit.
The court views the Limitation of Liability Clause, relating to damages, in the same light as it would an exculpatory clause. The amount allowed by the damages limitation contained in the contract at issue is so de minimus that it effectively obfuscates any claim for reckless or intentional tort.
The court holds that the Limitation of Liability Clause in the contract is valid only as to any claims for breach of contract or simple negligence. It is noteworthy that Section C. of the contract provides that the limitation of damage remedy is exclusive for any loss either resulting from the failure of the Dealer (Sonitrol) in the performance or non-performance of the Dealer's obligations under the contract or for their negligence. Thus, it would seem that both the contract and negligence remedies were intended by the parties to be the only remedies to which the Limitation of Liability Clause applied.
Therefore, the court grants Sonitrol's Motions for Summary Judgment as to Count Four of the complaint (Breach of Contract as to New London County Mutual). The court also grants said motion as to Count Five of the Complaint (Negligent Misrepresentation as to New London County Mutual). The court further grants Sonitrol's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count Nine of the complaint (Breach of Contract as to plaintiff Erie). In those counts where summary judgment has been granted, the Limitation of Damages clause shall apply, and damages, if proven, with respect to those counts shall be limited to $190.80 as per the contract clause. Sonitrol's Motions for Summary Judgment as to the remaining counts is denied because the remaining counts allege either reckless, or intentional conduct, or a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court denies said motion as to those counts because of the strong public policy against waiving a person's rights where conduct of the nature alleged is asserted.
F. Sonitrol claims that certain of the plaintiffs'
claims are barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations Clause contained in the contract
Paragraph 13 of the contract between the homeowners and Sonitrol contains the following term:
All claims, actions or proceedings, legal or equitable, against the Dealer must be commenced in court within one (1) year after the cause of action has occurred or the act, omission or event occurred from which the claim, action or proceeding arises, whichever is earlier, without judicial extension of time, or said claim, action or proceeding is barred, time being of the essence of this paragraph.
Plaintiffs New London and Erie originally brought suit by way of a July 19, 2002, complaint with a return date of August 13, 2002. In that lawsuit the plaintiffs alleged two causes of action against Sonitrol, namely: (1) Gross Negligence, Wanton and Willful Misconduct; and (2) Breach of Contract.
On August 6, 2003, New London filed a Second Amended Complaint in which it added the counts of (1) negligent misrepresentation; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (3) violation of CUTPA. Erie amended its' complaint to include a CUTPA count. Sonitrol claims that these additional claims are barred by the one-year limitation period contained in paragraph 13 of the contract.
Plaintiffs claim that the Connecticut Doctrine of "relation back" should apply to the three claims, in that, they claim, Sonitrol had fair notice that a claim was being asserted stemming from the fire. Therefore, they argue that the amendments "relate back" to the time period of the original suit. Second, plaintiffs argue that the suit limitation should only apply to breach of contract claims. In view of the fact that the three new counts are not contractual, they contend that the counts should be allowed. Finally, with respect to the fraudulent misrepresentation count and the CUTPA count they claim that a restriction of the time limitation would be a violation of public policy.
Sonitrol responds to these arguments by stating that the "relation back" theory has never been applied in a situation where the parties have agreed on contract language with a "time is of the essence clause." Further, Sonitrol argues that the contract language is clear that it applies to all claims.
In Lees v. Middlesex Insurance Company, 219 Conn. 644, 594 A.2d 952 (1991) the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted a Section of the Connecticut General Statutes (formerly Section 38-98, now Section 38a-307). That section provided that suit on a policy had to be brought within one year. The Court held that, since a cause of action pursuant to either CUTPA or CUIPA were not suits under the policy, the one-year statute did not apply to those counts. Plaintiffs contend that the Lees case should control.
Sonitrol maintains that Lees is distinguishable from the present case because the contract in the instant case relates to all claims, whereas the statute in Lees related to claims made pursuant to the policy. The court agrees.
However, the central issue for the court regarding this claim is the phrase "without judicial extension" contained in the contract. Sonitrol claims that the court should not apply the "relation back" theory because to do so would violate the terms of the contract. Plaintiffs argue that the new claims involve the same subject matter brought in the original suit. Indeed, the new counts would involve the same witnesses and concern all the events surrounding the original contract and the fire. Without the contract language the court would not hesitate to allow the counts pursuant to the "relation back" theory. Is the contract language sufficiently explicit for the court to grant summary judgment? Should the clause be applied to situations where there are intentional acts and public policy considerations which conflict with the statute as contracted by the parties. What exactly does the term judicial extension mean in this context? Does it mean the court could not allow a suit, for instance, for a period beyond the one year if the papers had been in the hands of a marshal prior to the one-year period. Does it mean that any statute allowing for extension beyond the one year if the improper party were served could not be enforced? Does it contemplate the situation of the doctrine of "relation back"? Can the parties contract away matters which are the subject of judicial interpretation? The court finds the phrase sufficiently ambiguous to deny a summary judgment motion. Therefore, the motion is denied on the basis of the sixth ground claimed by Sonitrol.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Sonitrol's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with respect to Counts Four, Five and Nine of the Second Amended Complaint dated August 6, 2003. The damages on those Counts, if liability is proven, are limited to the contract limitation of $190.80. All other claims in Sonitrol's Motions for Summary Judgment are hereby denied.