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Nelson v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas
May 6, 2010
2010 Ark. 218 (Ark. 2010)

Opinion

CR 10-311

Opinion Delivered May 6, 2010

Pro Se Motion for Belated, Appeal [Circuit Court of Faulkner County, CR 2009-415, Hon. Charles E. Clawson, Judge], Motion Denied.


On July 7, 2009, judgment was entered reflecting that petitioner Jeffery M. Nelson had entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of Faulkner County in CR 2009-415 to being a felon in possession of a firearm; possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; and manufacturing, delivering, and possession of marijuana, a controlled substance. A sentence of 120 months' imprisonment with thirty-six months suspended imposition of sentence for each offense was imposed to be served concurrently.

On July 21, 2009, petitioner filed in the trial court a pro se pleading labeled, "Motion for Reconsideration Rule 37.1" in which he alleged that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel in the guilty plea proceeding. He also claimed that the prosecutor failed to reveal all the evidence against him. While the motion referred to "reconsideration," it appears that the pleading was intended as petitioner's original petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. On August 21, 2009, the trial court denied the pleading on the ground that it did not comply with Rule 37.1(c) (2009). No appeal was taken, and petitioner now seeks leave to proceed with a belated appeal of the order, as permitted by Rule 2(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure-Criminal (2009). In his prayer for relief, he further asks to be allowed to file a belated Rule 37.1 petition in the trial court.

As grounds for the motion, petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in denying the request for Rule 37.1 relief under Rule 37.1(c), and that the allegations contained in the petition were meritorious. Whether the trial court erred in denying the relief sought, however, is not at issue. The sole issue presented by the motion for belated appeal is whether the petitioner has stated good cause for the failure to timely file a notice of appeal and otherwise comply with the prevailing rules of procedure to perfect the appeal. See Perry v. State, 2010 Ark. 84 (per curiam).

A petitioner has the right to appeal an adverse ruling on a petition for postconviction relief. Daniels v. State, 2009 Ark. 607 (per curiam) (citing Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664 S.W.2d 475 (1984) (per curiam)). With that right goes the responsibility to comply with our rules of procedure. This court will consider a belated appeal under the exceptions in Rule 2(e) only when a petitioner shows good reason for the failure to follow rules of procedure. Id.; see Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986) (per curiam). All litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating good cause for not doing so. Cummings v. State, 2010 Ark. 123 (per curiam); Marshall v. State, 2009 Ark. 420 (per curiam).

As the petitioner here has stated no reason for his failure to file a notice of appeal from the August 21, 2009 order, he has not established good cause for his failure to comply with procedural rules. With respect to petitioner's request that this court grant him leave to proceed in the trial court with a belated Rule 37.1 petition, there is no provision in the rule for a belated petition. Rule 37.2(c) (2009); see Meraz v. State, 2010 Ark. 121 (per curiam).

Motion denied.


Summaries of

Nelson v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas
May 6, 2010
2010 Ark. 218 (Ark. 2010)
Case details for

Nelson v. State

Case Details

Full title:Jeffery M. NELSON, Petitioner v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent

Court:Supreme Court of Arkansas

Date published: May 6, 2010

Citations

2010 Ark. 218 (Ark. 2010)

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