Opinion
No. X07 CV 07 5012152 S
November 13, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I
In this action, the plaintiff, Vayle Nelson, through her parents and next friends, Susan Birk and Glen Nelson, seeks to recover damages for personal injuries sustained allegedly as a result of the medical malpractice of the defendants, Karen S. Dettmer, M.D., Litchfield County Pediatrics, LLC, Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, John Dempsey Hospital and the University of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff alleges the following facts in her complaint. In the early morning hours of April 30, 2005, Birk gave birth to the plaintiff at Charlotte Hungerford Hospital. Immediately after she was born, Dettmer evaluated and treated the plaintiff, who, due to her serious medical condition, required transport to another hospital. Dettmer contacted the transport team for John Dempsey Hospital and the University of Connecticut Health Center at 3:45 a.m. The transport team notified Dettmer that they would dispatch at 7:30 a.m. unless it was notified that the plaintiff's condition deteriorated. The transport team did not arrive until 8:50 a.m. As a result of the delay, the plaintiff sustained severe, permanent brain damage, among other things.
The following additional, procedural facts are relevant and essentially undisputed. On or around April 28, 2006, the plaintiff sought permission to sue John Dempsey Hospital and the University of Connecticut Health Center (collectively, the state) pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160. The claims commissioner dismissed the plaintiff's claim on January 30, 2007 for failure to prosecute as the plaintiff did not comply with discovery orders; a copy of the dismissal was sent to the plaintiff's counsel. On or around April 13, 2007, the plaintiff, with new counsel, sought to reopen the claim, arguing that her prior counsel never notified her that the state had served discovery requests; that she was advised by letter, dated March 30, 2007, that her former attorney was no longer representing her; and that she had not learned of the dismissal of her claim until April 9, 2007. By memorandum of decision, dated June 1, 2007, the claims commissioner vacated the dismissal, reopened the claim and granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state.
Section 4-160, in relevant part, provides: "(a) When the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. "(b) In any claim alleging malpractice against the state, a state hospital or a sanitorium or against a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor or other licensed health care provider employed by the state, the attorney or party filing the claim may submit a certificate of good faith to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with section 52-190a. If such a certificate is submitted, the Claims Commissioner shall authorize suit against the state on such claim.
"(c) In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section or by the General Assembly pursuant to section 4-159 or 4-159a, the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted, except that evidence of such authorization shall not be admissible in such action as evidence of the state's liability. The state waives its immunity from liability and from suit in each such action and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity complained of. The rights and liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances.
"(d) No such action shall be brought but within one year from the date such authorization to sue is granted . . ."
According to the exhibits attached to the state's motion for summary judgment, the state served written discovery requests, dated May 17, 2006, on the plaintiff. The plaintiff moved for an extension of time and the claims commissioner gave the plaintiff until August 15, 2006 to respond. On or around September 27, 2006, the state moved for an order of compliance to which the plaintiff objected. The claims commissioner gave the plaintiff until October 31, 2006 to comply. On or around November 7, 2006, the state moved to dismiss the claim for failure to comply. The plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time on or around December 12, 2006 that the claims commissioner granted on December 14, 2006 giving the plaintiff an additional thirty days to respond. On January 26, 2007, the state sent a letter to the claims commissioner requesting that the court grant its motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff's prior counsel, Joel T. Faxon, stated in an affidavit, dated October 1, 2008, both that his "offices received the dismissal orders sent by the claims' commissioner" and that "it is impossible to state when they were received but we presumably received the documents shortly after they were mailed."
The finding and order of the claims commissioner, dated July 11, 2007, gave the plaintiff permission to sue pursuant to § 4-160(b).
The plaintiff filed this action on August 3, 2007. On November 7, 2007, the state moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims commissioner did not have the authority to vacate the dismissal of the claim or to reopen it and because the waiver of the state's immunity violated article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on March 19, 2008 and the state filed a reply on April 8, 2008. The court heard oral argument on these motions on April 14, 2008 and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on a number of questions on July 29, 2008. These briefs were submitted on September 22, 2008 and this court heard additional oral argument on October 6, 2008.
Article first, § 1, provides: "All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community."
II
In the state's motion for summary judgment, it argues that, as the claims commissioner did not have the statutory authority to reopen the plaintiff's claim, his actions constitute an invalid waiver of sovereign immunity and deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff asserts first that the statutory framework does not allow the claims commissioner to dismiss a claim prior to the hearing on the merits and, therefore, the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim is invalid. In the alternative, the plaintiff argue that the claims commissioner has statutory authority to vacate and reopen a claim.
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vejseli v. Pasha, 282 Conn. 561, 572, 923 A.2d 688 (2007). "Although a motion to dismiss is certainly the preferred means of challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction, we know of no authority for the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction can never be challenged through any other procedural vehicle, most importantly by means of a motion for summary judgment." (Emphasis omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 119, 891 A.2d 106 (2006); see also Esposito v. Specyalski, 268 Conn. 336, 348, 844 A.2d 211 (2004) ("[o]nce the question of tack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The test is whether the party moving for summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadlerock Joint Venture II, L.P. v. Milazzo, 287 Conn. 379, 390, 949 A.2d 450 (2008).
This court recognizes that it is precluded from considering the merits of the claims commissioner's decision. "[T]he question whether the principles of governmental immunity from suit and liability are waived is a matter for legislative, not judicial, determination . . . [T]he trial court does not have jurisdiction over an administrative appeal from the claims commissioner's discretionary denial of authorization to bring an action against the state because [t]he commissioner of claims performs a legislative function directly reviewable only by the General Assembly." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 618, 872 A.2d 408 (2005). Nevertheless, in this case, the state asks the court to determine whether the claims commissioner had the statutory authority to vacate his dismissal or to reopen the plaintiffs' claim. "Statutory interpretation is a quintessentially judicial function and this court has never hesitated to construe a statute to determine whether it constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity." Id., 619. Thus, the court has jurisdiction to consider the claims commissioner's statutory authority.
III A.
The first issue is whether the claims commissioner had the statutory authority to dismiss the plaintiff's claim. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Esposito v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 286 Conn. 319, 327, 943 A.2d 456 (2008).
Under the statutory scheme, discovery is allowed in matters before the claims commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-151(c), which, in relevant part, provides: "[t]he Claims Commissioner may administer oaths, cause depositions to be taken, issue subpoenas and order inspection and disclosure of books, papers, records and documents . . ." Additionally, the claims commissioner is allowed to promulgate regulations; General Statutes § 4-157; and § 4-157-5 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, in relevant part, provides that "[p]rior to the hearing on the merits, appropriate motions, including motions concerning discovery, inspection and disclosure of books, papers, records or documents, may be filed by the claimant or the attorney general . . ."
Moreover, General Statutes § 4-151(e) provides: "If any person refuses to testify or to produce any relevant, unprivileged book, paper, record or document, the Claims Commissioner shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, who shall apply to the superior court for the judicial district in which such person resides for an order compelling compliance. Further refusal of such person shall be punished as provided by section 2-46. If such person is the claimant, the Claims Commissioner shall summarily dismiss his claim and order it forfeited to the state." General Statutes § 4-158(a) also gives the claims commissioner the authority to deny or dismiss a claim. Thus, there is explicit statutory and regulatory authority for the claims commissioner to entertain pre-hearing discovery motions and to dismiss a claim.
Inasmuch as the title to General Statutes § 4-151 is "Hearings," the plaintiff argues that the power given to the claims commissioner in § 4-151(e) to dismiss a claim only applies to a substantive hearing and not to a prehearing matter such as discovery. The title of the statute is not, however, necessarily determinative. See Burke v. Fleet National Bank, 252 Conn. 1, 13, 742 A.2d 293 (1999) ("[a]lthough the title of a statute is not determinative of its meaning, we often have looked to a statute's title as some evidence of that meaning"). A review of § 4-151 indicates that while most of its subsections do indeed refer to hearings, subsection (c) concerns typical pre-hearing matters such as depositions, inspection and disclosure of books, papers, records and documents. Under the statutes, particularly § 4-151(e), this court finds that the claims commissioner has the authority to dismiss a claim prior to a substantive hearing on the merits when the plaintiff has not responded to discovery orders.
In the alternative, the plaintiff argues that even if the claims commissioner had the authority to dismiss the claim, he did not follow the statutory procedure in § 4-151(e). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the claims commissioner did not report her failure to respond to discovery to the attorney general and that the attorney general did not obtain a court order compelling compliance. Therefore, the plaintiff argues that the claims commissioner's dismissal of her claim was improper.
This court finds that the plaintiff's interpretation of § 4-151(e) leads to an absurd and unworkable result. When a claimant brings a claim against the state, presumably discovery requests may be made upon individuals of the particular department or agency involved. If the individuals do not respond to the requests, some mechanism must be triggered to secure compliance. Section 4-151(e) secures such compliance. It is unreasonable to construe the statute to mean that the attorney general's office is required to get a court order to make the claimant to respond to discovery. The last sentence of subsection (e) logically refers directly back to the first sentence allowing the claims commissioner to dismiss summarily a claim and order it forfeited to the state where the claimant "refuses to testify or to produce any relevant, unprivileged book, paper, record or document." Thus, the court finds that the claims commissioner followed the statutory procedure of § 4-151(e) in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for failure to respond to discovery requests.
B.
The next issue is whether the claims commissioner had the authority to vacate the dismissal or reopen the dismissed claim. The plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 4-160(a) clearly authorizes the claims commissioner to waive sovereign immunity when he "deems it just and equitable." Additionally, the plaintiff maintains that the legislature gave broad discretion to the claims commissioner in General Statutes § 4-151(b), which, in relevant part, provides that "[t]he Claims Commissioner shall not be bound by any law or rule of evidence, except as he may provide by his rules." At the hearing before this court, the plaintiff admitted that the claims commissioner has not promulgated any regulation within § 4-157-1, et seq., Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, that applies to this question.
As noted by the state, the question of vacating the dismissal or reopening the claim is not merely a procedural issue; it involves sovereign immunity which, in turn, implicates subject matter jurisdiction. See Vejseli v. Pasha, supra, 282 Conn. 572. The state argues that the statutory scheme authorizes a specific waiver. Specifically, it argues that § 4-158(a) allows the claims commissioner to take only four actions in regards to a claim: "(1) order that a claim be denied or dismissed, (2) order immediate payment of a just claim in an amount not exceeding seven thousand five hundred dollars, (3) recommend to the General Assembly payment of a just claim in an amount exceeding seven thousand five hundred dollars, or (4) authorize a claimant to sue the state . . ." The state also asserts that General Statutes § 4-158(b) provides the only remedy for a denied or dismissed claim. In relevant part, it provides: "[a]ny person who has filed a claim . . . may request the General Assembly to review a decision of the Claims Commissioner (1) ordering the denial or dismissal of the claim . . . including denying or dismissing a claim that requests permission to sue the state . . . A request for review shall be in writing and filed with the Office of the Claims Commissioner not later than twenty days after the date the person requesting such review receives a copy of the decision. The filing of a request for review shall automatically stay the decision of the Claims Commissioner." The state argues that General Statutes § 4-159(b) provides the last step in the process: "[t]he General Assembly shall: (1) With respect to a decision of the Claims Commissioner ordering the denial or dismissal of a claim pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 4-158: (A) Confirm the decision; or (B) Vacate the decision and, in lieu thereof, (I) order the payment of the claim in a specified amount, or (ii) authorize the claimant to sue the state . . ." In light of this exact statutory scheme, the state argues that once the claims commissioner dismisses a claim, only the legislature can vacate the claim commissioner's decision. Therefore, the state asserts that the claims commissioner's decision to vacate the dismissal or to reopen the claim clearly ignored the statutory framework — a framework that provided for a review process the plaintiff never utilized.
At first glance, the state's argument seems unduly inflexible while the plaintiff's argument seems both reasonable and logical. The statutory scheme provides that the claims commissioner is not bound by any rule of law or evidence, is allowed to promulgate his own rules and can issue disciplinary orders. See, e.g., General Statutes §§ 4-151 and 4-157. Hence, it should reasonably follow that he would be able to vacate those orders. Nevertheless, this argument assumes that the claims commissioner has the same common-law, inherent powers that a judge has and disregards both the rules limiting an administrative agency's authority as well as those concerning waivers of sovereign immunity.
"An administrative agency, as a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, must act strictly within its statutory authority . . . [An administrative agency] possesses no inherent power. Its authority is found in a legislative grant, beyond the terms and necessary implications of which it cannot lawfully function." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. State Employees' Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 406, 650 A.2d 158 (1994). Moreover, "[w]e employ additional rules of statutory construction with regard to a statute that is claimed to waive the state's sovereign immunity. [B]ecause the state has permitted itself to be sued in certain circumstances, this court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . Where there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity . . . Further, this court has stated that the state's sovereign right not to be sued without its consent is not to be diminished by statute, unless a clear intention to that effect on the part of the legislature is disclosed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 549-50, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). Thus, while the claims commissioner is entrusted to authorize suit against the state when he deems it just and equitable, and while he has broad discretion, he must act within the confines of his statutory authority.
"The rule that an administrative agency may not ordinarily review a decision and revoke action once duly taken is a wholesome and salutary rule but is by no means inflexible . . . The need for an opportunity for correction of errors, change of mind, or obtaining more adequate factual grounds for a decision is no less present in the case of a decision of . . . [the administrative agency] than in the case of a judgment of a Court. The mere filing of a decision confers nothing in the nature of a vested right . . . If the power to revoke and review decisions were unlimited, however, there would be no finality to the proceeding [and] the result would be subject to change at the whim of members [of an agency] or due to the effect of influence exerted upon them, or other undesirable elements tending to uncertainty and impermanence . . . An administrative agency may be permitted to reverse itself in correcting matters which were overlooked and were of slight materiality, but which were capable of speedy and practical correction . . . without prejudice to the rights of any one . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shea v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 170 Conn. 610, 615, 368 A.2d 159 (1976).
This common-law view allowing reconsideration in appropriate circumstances was adopted by our legislature in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA); General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189. Specifically, General Statutes § 4-181a provides for reconsideration in various scenarios. Section 4-181a does not apply, however, to the claims commissioner; see General Statutes § 4-164a; and no equivalent statute or regulation applies to him.
As noted, the claims commissioner is empowered by § 4-151(c) to order discovery. The legislature authorized a process and sanctions for failure to comply in § 4-151(e). Once a claim is dismissed, General Statutes §§ 4-158(b) and 4-159 provide the process for review, which is conducted by the General Assembly. No equivalent statute or extant rule confers authority upon the claims commissioner to vacate a dismissal or to reopen a claim.
Section 4-159, in relevant part, provides: "(a) Not later than five days after the convening of each regular session and at such other times as the speaker of the House of Representatives and president pro tempore of the Senate may desire, the Claims Commissioner shall submit to the General Assembly (1) all claims for which the Claims Commissioner recommended payment of a just claim in an amount exceeding seven thousand five hundred dollars pursuant to subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 4-158, and (2) all claims for which a request for review has been filed pursuant to subsection (b) of section 4-158, together with a copy of the Claim Commissioner's findings and the hearing record of each claim so reported."
"(b) The General Assembly shall: (1) With respect to a decision of the Claims Commissioner ordering the denial or dismissal of a claim pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 4-158: (A) Confirm the decision; or (B) Vacate the decision and, in lieu thereof, (I) order the payment of the claim in a specified amount, or (ii) authorize the claimant to sue the state . . ."
To the extent the claims commissioner has the authority to make his own rules; see § 4-157; such promulgation might have resolved this issue and would have given the imprimatur of the General Assembly since his rules must be approved by the legislature. See General Statutes § 4-168.
There is, however, one statutory exception. The claims commissioner may revisit a claim pursuant to General Statutes § 4-156. Section 4-156, in relevant part, provides that "[u]pon the discovery of new evidence, any claimant aggrieved by an order of the Claims Commissioner rejecting or recommending the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, may apply for rehearing . . ." The plaintiff argues that once she learned that her claim had been dismissed, she provided new evidence of both the discovery responses and the good faith certificate required by General Statutes §§ 4-160(b) and 52-190a.
As stated, § 4-160(b), in relevant part, provides: "In any claim alleging malpractice against the state, a state hospital . . . or against a physician . . . employed by the state, the attorney or party filing the claim may submit a certificate of good faith to the Claims Commissioner in accordance with section 52-190a. If such a certificate is submitted, the Claims Commissioner shall authorize suit against the state on such claim." (Emphasis added.) In D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 622, 872 A.2d 408 (2005), our Supreme Court found that "the effect of the statute was to convert a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to medical malpractice claims, subject to the discretion of the claims commissioner, to a more expansive waiver subject only to the claimant's compliance with certain procedural requirements."
Under D'Eramo, if the plaintiff in the present case had filed her certificate of good faith before her claim was dismissed, the claims commissioner would have been required to grant the plaintiff permission to sue. The plaintiff filed, however, her certificate on April 13, 2007 — months after her claim was dismissed. Nothing in D'Eramo requires or gives the claims commissioner authority to vacate his dismissal or reopen a claim. Therefore, D'Eramo is not controlling.
This court disagrees with the plaintiff. Discovery responses and a good faith certificate are not new evidence that entitled the plaintiff to a rehearing — they are simply what she was required to provide prior to her claim being dismissed. "To entitle a party to a new trial for newly-discovered evidence, it is indispensable that he should have been diligent in his efforts fully to prepare his cause for trial; and if the new evidence relied upon could have been known with reasonable diligence, a new trial will not be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LaCroix v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 107 Conn.App. 332, 335, 945 A.2d 489 (2008). The plaintiff does not contest the assertion that if she had been reasonably diligent in her efforts to prepare her claim fully, her discovery responses and good faith certificate could have been filed prior to the dismissal of her claim. Because the plaintiff could have provided this information with reasonable diligence, it is not new evidence that entitled her to a rehearing.
It is noted that the plaintiff alleges that her previous counsel never made her aware of the discovery requests. Nevertheless, "[t]he negligence or inattention of an attorney is the negligence or inattention of the client." Jarvis v. Martin, 77 Conn. 19, 21, 58 A. 15 (1904).
Despite the lack of new evidence and the statutory framework, the claims commissioner maintains and the plaintiff argues that the claims commissioner retains jurisdiction over a claim until he submits it to the legislature pursuant to § 4-159. Hence, the plaintiff argues that until such submission, the claims commissioner has complete discretion over the case, including that to vacate a dismissed matter.
In the claims commissioner's memorandum of decision, attached to the state's memorandum of law in support of its motion, the claims commissioner states that he "has frequently considered claimant requests to revisit dismissals entered for failing to prosecute and has vacated orders of dismissal when justice and equity requires such action. The Claims Commissioner retains jurisdiction to consider such requests until such time as a claim is submitted to the General Assembly for review." The claims commissioner added in footnote 6 of his memorandum that, if review is not requested, he retains jurisdiction until the convening of the next regular session of the General Assembly.
Public Acts 2005, No. 05-170 significantly changed General Statutes §§ 4-158 and 4-159. Prior to the change, the claims commissioner submitted his recommendations for each claim to the General Assembly within five days of the convening of each regular session and the legislature reviewed all claims over $7,500. See 48 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 2005 Sess., pp. 5571-72, remarks of Rep. Michael P. Lawlor ("[T]he most important change that this Bill makes is that instead of the current procedure where each and every claim where the initial amount sought was in excess of $7,500, must be approved by the General Assembly . . . And the new procedure under this Bill would be only for those claims where there was either an award of more than $7,500 or the denial of such an award where the claimant actually requested a review of that determination by the General Assembly . . . [T]he new procedure . . . would put the burden on the claimant to seek, in effect, an appeal or review of the Claims Commissioner's decision rather than all of those automatically sent over to the Legislature"). Under the previous versions of the statutes, the claims commissioner may have retained jurisdiction over claims until they were reported to the legislature because the claims process was arguably not final until legislative review.
Public Acts 2005, No. 05-170 became effective October 1, 2005 — months before the plaintiff filed her claim.
After the statutes were changed, all claims are not submitted to the legislature. No automatic review exists and the burden is on the claimant to request review. See id. The claims commissioner is only required to report to the General Assembly the claims for which he recommended payment over $7,500 and the claims for which review was filed. General Statutes § 4-159. If a claim falls into neither category, then there is no statutory basis for the claims commissioner to retain jurisdiction.
In the present case, the claims commissioner had not recommended payment nor had the plaintiff filed for a review. Because the plaintiff's dismissed claim was not required to be reported and because there was no automatic review, the claims commissioner did not have statutory authority to retain jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim until the convening of the next regular session of the legislature. Additionally, "[t]here is no warrant for [an administrative] agency to replace the statutory scheme with rule-making procedures of its own invention." Salmon Brook Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 177 Conn. 356, 367, 417 A.2d 358 (1979); see also Breiner v. State Dental Commission, 57 Conn.App. 700, 710, 750 A.2d 1111 (2000) ("[w]here rules were not adopted and promulgated pursuant to the applicable provisions of the [Uniform Administrative Procedures Act], they are considered invalid and of no effect" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Furthermore, "[a]bsent such language by the legislature, this court cannot engraft amendments into the statutory language . . . As [our Supreme Court has] stated in numerous other cases, it is not the province of a court to supply what the legislature chose to omit. The legislature is supreme in the area of legislation, and the courts must apply statutory enactments according to their plain terms." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 87 Conn.App. 537, 559, 867 A.2d 37 (2005), aff'd, 280 Conn. 405, 908 A.2d 1033 (2006). Consequently, the court finds that the claims commissioner did not retain jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim.
The plaintiff's interpretation also allows claimants to bypass the provisions for legislative review in §§ 4-158 and 4-159 and renders the time limitation in § 4-158(b) meaningless. "Interpreting a statute to render some of its language superfluous violates cardinal principles of statutory interpretation. It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Promotional Events, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008).
In sum, the claims commissioner had no statutory authority to vacate his dismissal of the plaintiff's claim or to reopen it. Therefore, his subsequent waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid. As a result, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the state's motion for summary judgment is granted.
The state also argues that the claims commissioner's action to vacate the dismissal violated article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut. "[T]his court has a basic judicial duty to avoid deciding a constitutional issue if a nonconstitutional ground exists that will dispose of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 635 n. 15, 904 A.2d 149 (2006). Because this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it does not decide the constitutional issue.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the state's motion for summary judgment is granted.