Opinion
D058435 Super. Ct. No. ED64935
01-13-2012
In re the Marriage of ANTHONY P. NELIPOVICH and JILL NELIPOVICH. ANTHONY P. NELIPOVICH, Petitioner and Respondent, v. JILL NELIPOVICH, Respondent and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Alan B. Clements, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Appellant Jill Nelipovich appeals from the family court's judgment of dissolution in which the court found (1) the parties' marital residence to be Anthony's separate property not subject to any community property interest under In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366 (Moore) and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426 (Marsden) and (2) Anthony did not breach his fiduciary duty to Jill. Jill contends the family court erred in these rulings by ignoring a refinance of the original loan with a "community property loan," assertedly giving the community a 100 percent interest in the house, and also because there was no credible evidence rebutting the presumption of undue influence by Anthony stemming from her execution of a quitclaim deed in his favor. She maintains the evidence shows Anthony breached his fiduciary duty to her by using the community property for his own gain. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take some of the factual background from our prior unpublished opinion. (In re Marriage of Nelipovich (Aug. 18, 2009, D053907) [nonpub. opn.].) Anthony and Jill were married on January 25, 1997, and separated on August 1, 2004. Anthony filed a petition for dissolution on July 1, 2005.
In December 1996, while he and Jill were living together but before their marriage, Anthony purchased a house (the Property) for $155,296. Before their marriage, the parties had discussed purchasing a house and jointly decided to purchase the house after Jill found it. The purchase was financed through a Veteran's Administration loan that did not require Anthony to provide a downpayment. Both the grant deed and deed of trust show
Anthony took title as a single man. He and Jill began residing in the Property immediately after the purchase and continued to reside there throughout their marriage. The parties paid all mortgage payments and household expenses on the Property from a joint checking account.
Anthony observes that the record on appeal does not contain the grant deed and the associated deed of trust for the Property's initial purchase, but that it is contained in the clerk's transcript of our prior appeal, in which the parties stipulated to use the superior court case file. We take judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal and the superior court file. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d), 459.)
Anthony refinanced the Property three times during the marriage. He first refinanced the Property in May 1999 to take advantage of a lower interest rate. Anthony did not make an out-of-pocket downpayment when he refinanced the Property in 1999; according to him, the lender relied on the equity in the Property. Jill was not a cosignor on any of the loan documents for the 1999 refinance, but the lender required that Jill sign a quitclaim deed quitclaiming the Property to Anthony "as his sole and separate property." Jill was not present when Anthony executed the loan documents, so the notary left the quitclaim deed with Anthony so that Jill could sign it and have it notarized. Anthony presented Jill with the quitclaim deed telling her to sign it, and she took it to a notary without discussing it with anyone. Jill did not question Anthony about the refinance as she trusted him to make such a decision. She was not involved in the loan process; she did not sign the loan application or provide any information regarding her income. After the 1999 refinance, Anthony continued to hold title to the Property in his name.
Anthony refinanced the Property a second time in August 2002 to obtain a lower interest rate and to generate funds to pay off the financing on a community vehicle that Jill was using. According to Anthony, he received approximately $30,000 to $40,000 in funds from the second refinance, and he used approximately $25,000 to $30,000 of that amount to pay off the financing on Jill's vehicle. Jill was not involved in the 2002 refinance; she was not a cosignor on any of the loan documents for the 2002 refinance, and the lender did not require her to sign a quitclaim deed. Record title to the Property remained in Anthony's name after the second refinance, and the deed of trust indicated that Anthony held the Property as his sole and separate property.
The special master who assisted the parties in attempting to resolve their dispute over the Property determined its equity was reduced by $59,400 as a result of the second refinancing.
Anthony refinanced the Property for a final time in February 2003 to take advantage of lower interest rates and to generate additional funds. He applied the funds he received from this third refinancing to pay off another vehicle purchased during the marriage. Once again, Jill did not cosign any of the loan documents for the third refinance, and the lender did not require a quitclaim deed. Anthony continued to hold title to the Property in his name after the third refinance.
In July 2006, while the petition for dissolution was pending, Anthony sold the Property for $475,000, and received net sale proceeds of $204,623. Anthony and Jill received one-half of the sale proceeds subject to the terms and conditions of a stipulation and order. The parties thereafter could not agree upon the Property's characterization, and stipulated that all relevant documents and calculations would be submitted to a special master for his opinion as to the characterization and division of the Property. On December 3, 2007, the special master concluded that the amount taken from the equity of the property and applied to community purposes during the marriage, calculated to be $90,580, exceeded the value of the Moore/Marsden community interest.
The family court held a short cause dissolution trial on July 14, 2008, primarily to address the Property's characterization. At trial, Jill testified that during her marriage to Anthony, she did not believe Anthony considered the Property his separate property, and she did not believe it was his separate property. She painted the house and gardened, and they made improvements to the Property during the marriage. According to Jill, she and Anthony "never had any discussion about his house" but she was shocked that he considered it his separate property at the time of their separation. Jill testified that at the time she signed the quitclaim deed in 1999, she did not believe she was giving up any interest in the house. She claimed she never asked Anthony about that first refinance "because he would shut me up if I asked him regarding anything about money." Jill's father, Richard Bartholome, testified he never heard Anthony refer to the Property as his separate property; Bartholome and his wife considered the Property to be Jill and Anthony's family home.
After taking the issue under submission, the trial court made an oral ruling on July 21, 2008, that the Property was Anthony's separate property and there was no community property interest due to Jill under a Moore/Marsden analysis. It found Anthony did not breach any fiduciary duty toward Jill.
On October 10, 2008, the court entered a judgment of dissolution, which terminated marital status effective July 14, 2008, and set forth the court's ruling on the Property. Jill purported to appeal from this judgment. This court dismissed the appeal on grounds the family court's ruling with respect to the Property was a nonappealable interlocutory order. (In re Marriage of Nelipovich, supra, D053907.)
In part, the October 10, 2008 judgment of dissolution states: "1. The Court finds that the [Property] was the separate property of [Anthony], and that there was no resulting community property interest in the residence sale proceeds subject to division and due to [Jill] pursuant to the appropriate application of the formula as set forth within the cases of [Moore, supra, 28 Cal.3d 366 and Marsden, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 426]. [¶] 2. The Court further finds that, in dealings between [Anthony] and [Jill] regarding the purchase and refinance of [the Property] that [Anthony] did not breach his fiduciary duty to [Jill], as set forth within . . . Family Code section 721[, subdivision] (b)."
In September 2010, the parties filed a judgment on reserved issues incorporating a stipulated judgment and a specified waiver of their right to appeal. The waiver provision states that the parties waive their right to appeal "the terms of only the Judgment On Reserved Issues, hereinafter entered based upon and incorporating this Agreement." The stipulated judgment further states: "However, such waiver is made with the acknowledgment and understanding of each party that the division and equalization of the community property set forth herein may be ultimately affected in the event that [Jill] reinstates her appeal of certain terms of the Judgment of Dissolution previously filed with the Court in this action on October 10, 2008." Jill appeals from the September 2010 judgment. Anthony concedes that under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subd. (a)(1), Jill has the right to challenge the interlocutory orders on appeal from the final judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. General Principals of Appellate Review
We apply settled principles of appellate review. We are required to presume the trial court's judgment is correct and must draw all inferences in favor of its decision. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) " 'If the decision of a lower court is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds [on] which the lower court reached its conclusion. The rationale for this principle is twofold: (a) an appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and not the reasons given for its action; and (b) there can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct.' " (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)
Generally, courts apply the substantial evidence standard of review to a family court's factual findings regarding the character and value of the parties' property. (In re Marriage of Sivyer-Foley & Foley (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 521, 526; see In re Marriage of Ruiz (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 348, 356, fn. 3; In re Marriage of Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.) However, the California Supreme Court has held that where resolution of the characterization issue " 'requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values,' " the issue is a mixed question of law and fact in which legal issues predominate, appropriate for de novo review. (Ruiz, at p. 356, fn. 3, quoting In re Marriage of Lehman (1998) 18 Cal.4th 169, 184.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, " 'we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the [findings]. [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. . . . To be substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. 'The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.' " (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1266 [citations omitted]; see also Estate of Teel (1944) 25 Cal.2d 520, 527.)
The family court did not issue a statement of decision in connection with the judgment. Accordingly, we presume the court made findings necessary to support the judgment (In re Marriage of Starr (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 277, 287), and our review is for the existence of substantial evidence to support these findings. (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622-623.)
In this case, under either a substantial evidence or de novo standard of review, we uphold the family court's characterization and findings.
II. The Court Correctly Characterized the Property as Anthony's Separate Property
Jill contends the family court erred by characterizing the Property as Anthony's separate property. She relies on In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446 (disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 815-816, itself superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Marriage of Brooks (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 187-189), for the proposition that under Civil Code section 5110, a presumption arises that the proceeds of a loan acquired during the marriage are community property, and In re Branco (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1621 (Branco), in which the court addressed application of the Moore/Marsden rule when community funds from a mortgage secured by separate property are used to pay off a prenuptial loan obtained by the owner of the separate property. Jill maintains the court did not consider the community nature of the loans in the Property's refinancing, which increased the community interest in the property at the time of the 1999 refinance to 100 percent.
Anthony responds that under Family Code section 770, the Property became his separate property at the time of the purchase, which took place before the marriage. He conceded at trial, and also does on appeal, that under Moore/Marsden, Jill acquired a pro tanto community interest in the Property during the marriage stemming from the principal pay-downs on the mortgage made with community funds as well as a proportionate increase in the property's fair market value. (See In re Marriage of Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 497, 502.) According to Anthony, both Authmuth and Branco are distinguishable on their facts in that the loans in those cases were determined to be community loans, and in the present case, the family court determined the refinance loan to be a separate property loan rather than a community loan. He argues the court did not err in determining that there was no remaining community property interest in the Property after applying the Moore/Marsden method.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
The status of property as community or separate is determined at the time of acquisition. (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291; see also In re Marriage of Lehman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 177 [What is determinative of characterization is "a single concrete fact-time"].) Section 770, subdivision (a) provides in part: "Separate property of a married person includes . . . [¶] (1) All property owned by the person before marriage." The Property here, purchased in Anthony's name as a single man, meets the statutory definition of separate property, and there is no evidence of any transmutation between the parties at that time. On these basic facts, Jill cannot demonstrate that the family court erred when it determined the Property's status to be Anthony's separate property.
The question then becomes whether the Property's characterization changed at the time of the 1999 refinance due to Anthony having obtained a new mortgage loan. This depends on application of the family law characterization doctrine known as the lender's intent theory, discussed by this court in In re Marriage of Grinius (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1179. The doctrine applies to the characterization of loan proceeds obtained during marriage. (See In re Marriage of Starr, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 288.) Under Grinius, "[l]oan proceeds acquired during marriage are presumptively community property." (Grinius, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187.) And, in the absence of a sufficient showing that "the lender intended to rely solely upon a spouse's separate property and did in fact do so[,] . . . the general presumption prevails." (Ibid.) On this question, we review the family court's determinations on this matter—express or implied—for the existence of substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 1185.) Evidence of lender reliance on Anthony's separate property may be either direct or circumstantial. (Id. at p. 1187.)
Here, we must imply in favor of the judgment a family court finding that the proceeds of the 1999 refinance, and the other refinances, were separate property, and that there was evidence sufficient to rebut any presumption that the loan proceeds acquired during the parties' marriage were community property. The relevant inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to uphold those findings. Here, it is undisputed that Jill was not involved in any way with the second and third refinances; she did not sign any quitclaims or loan documents in connection with those refinances. As for the 1999 refinance, Jill maintains (in connection with her arguments as to breach of fiduciary duty discussed post, section III) there is no evidence the refinancing was based on Anthony's separate property assets.
We conclude Jill has not demonstrated an absence of substantial evidence to support the family court's implied findings as to the characterization of the loans. At the time of the 1999 refinance, the Property securing the loan was Anthony's separate property. " '[F]unds procured by the hypothecation of separate property of a spouse are separate property of that spouse.' " (Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 210, quoting Estate of Abdale (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587, 592; see also Bank of California v. Connolly (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 350, 375; 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Community Property, § 99, p. 658 ["If the loan is secured, thereby evidencing the lender's intent to rely on specified property for satisfaction, the characterization of that property as separate or community governs the characterization of the loan proceeds"].) The proceeds of a loan made on the credit of separate property are governed by the same rule. (Hicks v. Hicks (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 144, 153; In re Estate of Ellis (1928) 203 Cal. 414, 416-417.) Jill points out she and Anthony paid down the loans from community funds within a joint account, but provides no authority that this requires a finding that the original mortgage was satisfied with community funds. The evidence showed the lender required Jill to sign a quitclaim deed in connection with the transaction, but Jill otherwise did not sign the loan application or any other refinancing documents, and she provided no information to the lender concerning her income. We conclude based on these facts there is substantial evidence to support the family court's implied finding that the lender was relying upon the equity in Anthony's house as the source of security for the loan, rather than the strength of both parties' earnings, and that the proceeds were thus Anthony's separate property.
Jill's reliance on Branco, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1621 does not assist her, because the case is factually inapposite. In Branco, a woman owned a house that was subject to a mortgage when she married in 1977. (Id. at p. 1623.) In 1978, she and her husband refinanced the mortgage on the house, and used a portion of the loan proceeds to pay off the original mortgage. (Ibid.) The family court found that the parties' loans were community debts, but that they " 'in no way facilitated the ownership or acquisition of the property.' " (Id. at p. 1627.) The appellate court in Branco disagreed, concluded there was "no meaningful difference, for purposes of determining whether the community acquires an interest in real property, between the use of community funds to make payments on one spouse's preexisting loan and the use of proceeds from a community property loan to pay off the preexisting separate loan." (Ibid.) It stated: "Applied to the present case, the community property interest in the home would be computed by dividing the community's contribution to the purchase price of the home (payments reducing principal made with community funds on the original loan, if any, plus the principal balance of the loan paid off with proceeds [from the post-nuptial mortgage]) by the purchase price. This percentage would then be multiplied by the appreciation of the home during the years of the marriage." (Id. at p. 1629.)
In Branco, unlike here, the parties' loan application used both their names and listed both of their earnings, and the promissory note and new deed of trust were signed by both parties. (Branco, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1623.) Thus, in that case there was ample evidence for the Court of Appeal to conclude the loan proceeds were community funds.
Further, Jill's reliance on section 910, subdivision (a) is misplaced. That section provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, a community estate is liable for debts incurred by either spouse before or during marriage. (§ 910, subd. (a); see Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin. Services, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 56, 64-65.) Section 910 addresses the liability of the community for spouses' debts, not the characterization of the debt as community or separate for purposes of determining whether the community obtained an interest in separate property of one spouse.
Section 910, subdivision (a), provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt." "Debt" is defined by section 902 as "an obligation incurred by a married person before or during marriage, whether based on contract, tort, or otherwise."
III. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Relying on this court's decisions in In re Marriage of Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 277 and In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 624, Jill contends a presumption of undue influence arose from her execution of the 1999 quitclaim deed. She reasons the new loan gave her a greater percentage of the community interest; that the payoff of the loan thus gave Anthony a distinct advantage; and that under Mathews and Haines, Anthony was in turn required to present evidence that her execution of the quitclaim deed was " 'freely and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of its effect of making the residence [Anthony's] separate property.' " Jill argues Anthony did not present evidence that she knew the legal effect of the quitclaim or was aware she was giving up an advantage or benefit; rather, the evidence shows she always believed the Property was a community asset and trusted Anthony to handle the finances for the community's benefit. A. Applicable Principles
"Spouses 'may enter into any transaction with the other, or with any other person, respecting property, which either might if unmarried.' (§ 721, subd. (a).) '[I]n transactions between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners . . . .' (§ 721, subd. (b).)
" 'When an interspousal transaction advantages one spouse, " '[t]he law, from considerations of public policy, presumes such transactions to have been induced by undue influence." [Citation.] "Courts of equity . . . view gifts and contracts which are made or take place between parties occupying confidential relations with a jealous eye." ' " [Citation.] 'Thus, the requirements of section 852 are prerequisites to a valid transmutation but do not necessarily in and of themselves determine whether a valid transmutation has occurred.' [Citation.]
" 'When a presumption of undue influence applies to a transaction, the spouse who was advantaged by the transaction must establish that the disadvantaged spouse's action "was freely and voluntarily made, with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the effect of" the transaction.' [Citation.] 'The question "whether the spouse gaining an advantage has overcome the presumption of undue influence is a question for the trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." ' " (In re Marriage of Lund (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 40, 55.) B. Analysis
Here, the trial court declined to apply a presumption of undue influence to the 1999 refinance or to any other of the parties' dealings, impliedly finding there was nothing unfair about Jill's execution of the quitclaim deed or Anthony's later refinances. The court's ruling may result from different implied findings, including that the 1999 quitclaim deed did not " 'advantage[ ] one spouse to the disadvantage of another' " (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 734) or that if it did advantage Anthony, Anthony rebutted the resulting presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 736-738; In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) We decide here whether substantial evidence supports any of those findings. (In re Marriage of Lund, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 55-56.)
Because the Property was Anthony's separate property at the time of the 1999 refinance and remained so thereafter (subject to a Moore/Marsden calculation for community payments on the loan), Jill's execution of the quitclaim deed did nothing to change the Property's character in Anthony's advantage. This court explained in Mathews in a similar context that "a spouse obtains an advantage if that spouse's position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise gains, benefits, or profits." (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 629.) This case is unlike Mathews, in which during the marriage, the wife signed a quitclaim deed to the husband as part of the process of an initial purchase of a house because her credit deficiencies would have prevented them from making the purchase. Because the house was acquired during the marriage and would otherwise have been presumed a community asset, her execution of a quitclaim deed allowing the husband to take title as his separate property benefitted the husband, and this court held the family court was required to apply the presumption of undue influence. (Id. at p. 630.) However, we upheld the lower court's finding that the husband rebutted the presumption by preponderance of the evidence: that he presented evidence the wife did so freely and willingly and with full knowledge that the effect of the deed was to make the property the husband's separate property. (Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 630, 632.) We have already rejected Jill's contention that the 1999 refinance resulted in a 100 percent community interest in the Property. Absent any advantage to Anthony by Jill's execution of the quitclaim deed, the presumption of undue influence does not arise.
Nor could we say the family court erred if it found Anthony rebutted any presumption of undue influence. In Mathews, the evidence showed the husband and wife agreed that the wife would sign a quitclaim deed as the only way to obtain a lower interest rate on the mortgage. (Mathews, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) The wife freely and voluntarily executed the quitclaim to help with the purchase, and the reasons for it were clear to her. (Ibid.) The husband placed no pressure to sign on the wife, whose native language was Japanese, and there was no language barrier limiting the wife's comprehension of the purchase as she had above-average English skills and worked as an English translator. (Id. at pp. 631-632.) Further the husband entrusted almost all the financial matters to the wife, who had her own separate investment accounts and controlled both her income and the husband's. (Id. at p. 632.)
Here, Jill conclusorily asserts the evidence shows Anthony unduly influenced her to sign the 1999 quitclaim deed, but the evidence shows only that he was advised by the lender that it was required, and he handed it to Jill telling her it was "so [he could] refinance the house." Accordingly, Jill knew the purpose of the quitclaim was to proceed with a refinance of the property. She then took the document to a notary without asking any questions, claiming she "didn't really ask him" because Anthony would "shut [her] up" if she asked him about money. But Jill is an educated woman; she was at the time of trial an adjunct teacher at San Diego State University and San Diego City College with a master's degree and four years toward her doctorate. There is no evidence, as in Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 277, of emotionally charged conversations or that Anthony pressured or threatened Jill if she did not sign the document, and we decline to hold that Anthony's handing of the quitclaim to Jill, without more, constitutes undue influence. On the record before us, the family court was entitled to conclude Anthony rebutted any presumption of undue influence arising from the 1999 refinance or Jill's execution of the quitclaim deed.
Pointing out they had lived together and had a child together, Jill asserts Anthony had a fiduciary duty toward her even before their marriage because they had a de facto partnership. Jill cites no authority for the proposition other than Corporations Code section 16404 and section 721, subdivision (b), which apply to "a husband and wife. . . ." Absent authority suggesting we should extend the fiduciary obligations to nonmarital partners, we decline to do so here. Apart from the claims we have addressed and rejected above, Jill does not otherwise challenge the family court's Moore/Marsden calculation. We will not disturb the family court's findings in that respect.
Spouses' "confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Section 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code. . . ." (§ 721, subd. (b).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
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BENKE, Acting P. J.
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McDONALD, J.