Opinion
September 30, 1955.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, N. Vernon Hawthorne, J.
Wm. J. Pruitt, Miami, for appellant.
J.W. Watson, Jr., and Robert M. Haverfield, Miami, for appellees.
Neivert was discharged as a police officer of the City of Miami on charges of misconduct filed against him by the Chief of Police, after a hearing on such charges was had before the Civil Service Board of the city. He applied to the Circuit Court of Dade County for a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings had before the Civil Service Board, naming as parties respondent the City Manager and Director of Public Safety of the City of Miami. and the members of the Civil Service Board. He did not make the City of Miami a party respondent. He attached to his petition a transcript of the record of the hearing before the Civil Service Board and alleged that the record showed on its face that the Board "acted in a manner in violation of the essential requirements of the law and the rights of petitioner" in various respects, alleged therein. The prayer of the petition was that the named respondents "show cause" why the petitioner should not be reinstated to his position as a police officer and that the court "quash and set aside the Order discharging Petitioner from his employment with the City of Miami, Florida, as a police officer. * * *" The petition also prayed that "the order of this court direct that the Petitioner be reinstated as of the date of his unlawful discharge, with all remuneration and compensation and emoluments that would be due and owing to him, as though his employment had not been terminated nor interrupted."
The respondents moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds, among others, that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that the petition failed to join indispensable parties. The lower court dismissed the petition without stating the reason for its dismissal, and Neivert has perfected an appeal to this court from the order of dismissal.
The parties are in agreement here that the lower court did not pass on the merits of Neivert's claim that he had been wrongfully discharged, and that the dismissal of the petition was on one or the other of the technical grounds mentioned above. Neivert contends here that certiorari will lie to review the action of an administrative body in the circumstances here present, and that his failure to join the City of Miami as a party respondent was not a fatal defect under Rule 1.18 of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The respondents contend that Neivert's petition sought to compel them to perform a legal duty, so that mandamus was his only remedy, and that the failure to join an indispensable party is ground for dismissal, even under Rule 1.18, supra.
On the first point, it is well settled that certiorari will lie to review the action of an administrative agency or board exercising quasi-judicial functions. Schott v. Brooks, Fla. 1952, 56 So.2d 456; City of Pensacola v. Maxwell, Fla. 1950, 49 So.2d 527, and cases therein cited. See Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., Fla. 1954, 69 So.2d 659, 665, for the most recent statement by the court as to the scope of the review in certiorari of an order of a quasi-judicial body. The fact that Neivert's petition prayed for mandatory relief — that is, that he be reinstated with back pay — may be considered surplusage. The primary relief prayed was that the court review the proceedings and quash the order discharging Neivert; if that relief should be granted, it would follow automatically that he would be reinstated to the position held by him prior to his discharge. Whether this would be with or without back pay, and for what period of time, would depend on the applicable provisions of law.
We hold, therefore, under the authority of City of Pensacola v. Maxwell, supra, 49 So.2d 527, that Neivert's petition for the writ of certiorari properly invoked the jurisdiction of the lower court to review the proceedings of the Civil Service Board relating to the charges filed against him; and it follows that the City of Miami was not an indispensable party to a review of such proceedings. It is not necessary to decide, then, whether an indispensable party defendant may be added "at any stage of the action" under Rule 1.18, supra.
For the reasons stated, the order appealed from should be and it is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
DREW, C.J., TERRELL, J., and ALLEN, Associate Justice, concur.