Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-CV-00993 3:21-CV-01342
02-25-2022
KEITH D. NEFF, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMISSIONERS OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, et al., Defendants. KEITH D. NEFF, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COMMISSIONERS OF CENTRE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court are two civil actions seeking damages and injunctive relief initiated by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Keith D. Neff (“Neff”) on June 3, 2021, and July 20, 2021, respectively. (Doc. 1); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2021), ECF No. 1. Neff is currently incarcerated in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Frackville (“SCI-Frackville”). (Doc. 75, at 4). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that civil actions No. 3:21-CV-00993 and No. 3:21-CV-01342 be consolidated. Additionally, the undersigned finds that the amended complaint filings fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that allowing leave to amend would be both futile and inequitable. Thus, it is further recommended that Neff's second amended complaints be dismissed without leave to amend.
I. Background and Procedural History
Neff, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant actions by filing a complaint on June 3, 2021, and July 20, 2021, respectively. (Doc. 1); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2021), ECF No. 1. Neff filed the motion for injunctive relief on June 21, 2021, which the Court denied on December 15, 2021. (Doc. 10; Doc. 77). On October 21, 2021, the Court granted Neff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 32; Doc. 57). On August 26, 2021, the Court granted Neff's applications for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2021), ECF No. 12. After conducting its statutorily-mandated screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court found that both complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and granted Neff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 58; Doc. 59); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2021), ECF No. 14. On December 15, 2021, and December 21, 2021, respectively, after again having conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of Neff's amended complaints, the Court granted Neff leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 77); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2021), ECF No. 52.
Subsequently, Neff has filed several documents entitled “Amended Complaint” in both actions. (Doc. 78; Doc. 79; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88; Doc. 89; Doc. 90; Doc. 91; Doc. 92); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 53; No. 54; No. 56; No. 57; No. 58; No. 59; No. 60; No.61; No. 62; No. 63; No. 64; No. 65; No. 66; No.67). Many of the filings are identical. (Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 87; Doc. 88; Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 53; No. 54; No. 57; No. 58; No. 59; No. 60). Liberally construing Neff's pro se status, the Court will consider “amended complaint” fillings in conducting its statutorily mandated screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In the second amended complaints, Neff does not identify which damages are sought against Defendants “Wapirski, ” Miller Whitey Nelson, “Republican Herald, ” Commissioners of Schuylkill County and Centre County, “George Halcovage, Bender, [and] Hess, ” and Joseph Groody (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 78, at 1; Doc. 79, at 1; Doc. 80, at 1; 86, at 2; Doc. 88, at 1); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 53, at 1; No. 54, at 1; No. 57, at 1; No. 58, at 2; No. 59, at 2; No. 60, at 1. From what can be gleaned from the pleadings, Neff asserts that the Defendants engaged in a criminal conspiracy of human trafficking, as well as racketeering, kidnapping, and deprivation of liberty and property. (Doc. 88, at 1-4); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2022), ECF No. 61. Neff does not allege facts that describe how the Defendants allegedly violated his constitutional rights. For relief, Neff requests “an interlocutory injunction, preliminary injunction, preventative injunction, prohibitory injunction, and a provisional injunction, ” as well as punitive damages. (Doc. 87, at 1); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2022), ECF No. 59, at 1.
The matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to screen the second amended complaint and dismiss it if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. Legal Standards
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
“Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). “When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” In re CoreStates Trust Fee Litig., 837 F.Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd 39 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1994).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). Federal courts may hear cases “in which a well-plead complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983). Legal insufficiency of a claim generally does not eliminate a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware Cty., Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).
Courts considering a jurisdiction-based dismissal have two standards in evaluating whether jurisdiction is proper, with the applicable standard determined by the nature of the challenge to jurisdiction itself. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
[J]urisdictional challenges take two forms: (1) parties may make a ‘factual' attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the court's jurisdiction; or (2) they may make a ‘facial' challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's allegation but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court's jurisdiction.Corman v. Torres, 287 F.Supp.3d 558, 566 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015)).
If reviewing a factual attack, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. If a facial attack, a court “considers the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F.Supp.3d 278, 289 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen a civil amended complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed. App'x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the amended complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In this case, because Neff is a prisoner suing a governmental employee and brings his suit in forma pauperis, both provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F.Supp.2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 8 54 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. Discussion
A. Consolidation is permitted as a matter of convenience and judicial economy.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may consolidate actions arising out of a common question of law or fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Rule 42 states:
(a) Consolidation. If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may:
(1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions;
(2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
Consolidation of separate actions presenting a common issue of law or fact is permitted as a matter of convenience and economy in judicial administration. See In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 298 n.12 (3d Cir. 2005). To facilitate the administration of justice, District courts are afforded broad power to consolidate actions, whether on motion of a party or sua sponte. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1964). In considering consolidation, “the court must balance the savings of time and effort gained through consolidation against the prejudice, inconvenience, or expense that it might cause.” Demchak Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 13-2289, 2014 WL 4955259, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014).
Neff's filings docketed in the civil actions No. 3:21-CV-00993 and No. 3:21-CV-01342 have been reviewed and the undersigned finds that they involve common questions of law and fact. The actions assert the same violations of Neff's rights, including, but not limited to, deprivation of liberty and property, kidnapping, human trafficking, legal malpractice, slander, and conspiracy. (Doc. 84, at 1-4; Doc. 87; Doc. 88, at 1-4); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 58, at 1-4; No. 59; No. 60, at 1-4). Defendants in both cases are essentially the same. (Doc. 78, at 1; Doc. 79, at 1; Doc. 80, at 1; 86, at 2; Doc. 88, at 1); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 53, at 1; No. 54, at 1; No. 57, at 1; No. 58, at 2; No. 59, at 2; No. 60, at 1. In fact, Neff's allegations in these two cases raise identical constitutional claims against Defendants and multiple, identical documents were filed in both actions. (Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 87; Doc. 88); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342, ECF No. 53; No. 54; No. 57; No. 58; No. 59; No. 60.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 42(a), it is respectfully recommended that the Court sua sponte consolidate Neff's civil action No. 3:21-CV-01342 case into his civil action No. 3:21-CV-00993 case, and that the Clerk of Court close civil action No. 3:21-CV-01342. See Pa. Gen. Ins. v. Landis, 96 F.Supp.2d 408, 410 (D.N.J. 2000) (providing that a court may consolidate two actions sua sponte). The undersigned will conduct its statutorily-mandated screening of the second amended complaints under civil action No. 3:21-CV-00993. (Doc. 78; Doc. 79; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88).
B. The second amended complaints fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
At the outset, the second amended complaints fail to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As discussed supra, Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Here, even when liberally construed as is necessary for pro se complaints, Neff fails to simply, concisely, and directly allege what his claims are and does not provide fair notice of the grounds on which his intended claims rest. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). He lists numerous allegations, claiming that Defendants deprived Neff of his substantive right to property, stemming from theft, bribery, extortion, and kidnapping, and his substantive right to liberty, as his parole was denied for unspecified reasons. (Doc. 88, at 1). Neff alleges no facts relating to a particular occurrence in which his constitutional rights were deprived, how each named Defendant is personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings, or how the numerous requests for injunctive relief will redress those wrongdoings. (Doc. 78, at 1; Doc. 79, at 1; Doc. 80, at 1; Doc. 86, at 2; Doc. 88, at 1).
Furthermore, Neff has filed numerous documents, including supplements, amendments, “memorandums, ” and “writs of habeas corpus.” (Doc. 78; Doc. 79; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88). The undersigned has reviewed these documents, construing them liberally. Notably, several of these filings, which are largely rambling and incomprehensible, overlap with other actions involving Neff. See Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2021); Neff v. Wapinski, No. 4:21-CV-01334 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2021). Despite the various cross-references, “[n]either Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, which governs pleadings, nor Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, which governs amended and supplemental pleadings, permits [Neff] to submit numerous addenda to his Complaint in this piecemeal fashion.” See Lewis v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5475, 2017 WL 7313822, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2017); see also Walthour v. Child & Youth Servs., No. 09-CV-03660, 2009 WL 5184465, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2009) (“Plaintiffs' pleadings, amendments, and supplemental filings are disjointed and incomplete . . . Defendants cannot be on notice of the claims against them if they are not named in the caption, nor can they adequately respond to claims scattered throughout various pleadings and supplemental fillings.”). Neff's vague and fragmented filings fail to overcome the pleading deficiencies contained in his second amended complaints.
Neff runs afoul of Rule 8(a)(2)'s basic tenant that the “‘plain statement' [must] possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545; see also Cooper v. Link, No. 18-CV-4481, 2018 WL 6528170, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018) (“[Plaintiff] cannot move forward on his complaint as pled because it is not clear what each Defendant did to violate his rights.”). Rather, the second amended complaints largely consist of bald legal conclusions that “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. As such, even though Neff complains that the Defendants violated his rights, he has not set forth any allegations that would “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). As such, Neff's second amended complaints are subject to dismissal in their entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 78; Doc. 79; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88).
C. Leave to amend would be futile.
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. The Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). Pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004); see Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007). “Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, Neff's second amended complaints suffer from the same defects as his previous complaints. On December 15, 2021, and December 21, 2021, respectively, after again having conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of Neff's amended complaints, the Court granted Neff leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 77); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2021), ECF No. 52. In the Orders, Neff was advised that:
[T]he second amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original or amended complaints. The second amended complaint must also establish the existence of specific actions taken by the Defendants which have resulted in identifiable constitutional violations, to the extent Neff intends to bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, Neff is cautioned that he must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and establish at least a modicum of factual specificity regarding the claims he intends to assert and the factual grounds upon which they rest. The second amended complaint should also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred in the original complaint. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with the aforementioned requirements may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety.(Doc. 76, at 11) (citations omitted); Neff v. Comm'r of Centre Cty., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2021), ECF No. 52, at 8.
Although Neff has amended his complaint multiple times, he failed to abide by the Court's Orders to correct the deficiencies presented in his amended complaint.
As discussed supra, the second amended complaints fail to set forth any claims against Defendants upon which relief may be granted, warranting dismissal. Neff's second amended complaints fail to allege when the wrongdoing occurred, which leaves the Court “to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action], ” and “frustrates any efforts to determine whether this pleading was filed within the statute of limitations. Binsack v. Lackawanna Cty. Prison, 438 Fed.Appx. 158 (3d Cir. 2011); Collins v. Bates, No. 1:14-CV-1486, 2014 WL 4447553, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2014). Moreover, the complained of deprivations simply do not rise to the level of constitutionally protected violations. Granting leave to file a third amended complaint “would be antithetical to the guiding principle which animates and informs the exercise of our discretion, which is ‘to make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice.'” Rummel v. Lewisburg Police, No. 4:14-CV-268, 2015 WL 4078033, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2015) (citing Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964)). A third amendment would needlessly compound costs and burdens of this particular litigation for all parties and Neff has already had an opportunity to amend his complaint and amended complaint to state a viable cause of action. See Brown v. Patel, No. 3:18-CV-01242, 2019 WL 2502337, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2019) (denying leave to amend because pro se prisoner-plaintiff failed to correct deficiencies and claims against named defendants still lacked merit).
Accordingly, allowing Neff to file a third amended complaint would be futile, inequitable, cause undue delay, and needlessly increase the costs of litigation in this case.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court consolidate Neff's civil action No. 3:21-CV-01342 case into his civil action No. 3:21-CV-00993 case, and that the Clerk of Court close civil action No. 3:21-CV-01342. (Doc. 78; Doc. 79; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 85; Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88). In addition, it is recommended that Neff's second amended complaints be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), without further leave to amend.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated February 25, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.