Opinion
BCD-CIV-2021-00058
01-03-2023
NECEC TRANSMISSION, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs & Intervenors, v. BUREAU OF PARKS AND LANDS, et al., Defendants & Intervenors.
Party Name: Avangrid Networks, Inc. NECEC Transmission, LLC Bureau of Parks & Lands, Maine Dept of Agriculture, Conservation & Forestry Maine House of Representatives Maine Public Utilities Commission Maine Senate Intervenors Cianbro Corporation H.Q. Energy Services, (U.S.) Inc. Industrial Energy Consumer Group Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 104 Maine State Chamber of Commerce NextEra Energy Resources, LLC Natural Resources Council of Maine Thomas B. Saviello Theresa E. York Robert C. York Wendy A. Huish Jonathan T. Hull Christine M. Geisser Attorney Name: John Aromando, Esq. Jared Desrosiers, Esq. Joshua Dunlap, Esq. Sara Murphy, Esq. Jonathan Bolton, Esq. Sara Murphy, Esq. Phillip Coffin, Esq. Cyrus Cheslak, Esq. Jeffrey Russell, Esq. Timothy Woodcock, Esq. Andrew Hamilton, Esq. Casey Olesen, Esq. Jonathan Andreau Pottle Sigmund Schutz, Esq. Robert Borowski, Esq. Anthony Buxton, Esq. Benjamin Grant, Esq. Gerald Petruccelli, Esq. Scott Dolan, Esq. Christopher Roach, Esq. James Kilbreth, Esq. David Kallin, Esq. Jeana M. Mccormick, Esq. Oliver Walton, Esq.
Party Name: Avangrid Networks, Inc. NECEC Transmission, LLC Bureau of Parks & Lands, Maine Dept of Agriculture, Conservation & Forestry Maine House of Representatives Maine Public Utilities Commission Maine Senate
Intervenors Cianbro Corporation H.Q. Energy Services, (U.S.) Inc. Industrial Energy Consumer Group Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 104 Maine State Chamber of Commerce NextEra Energy Resources, LLC Natural Resources Council of Maine Thomas B. Saviello Theresa E. York Robert C. York Wendy A. Huish Jonathan T. Hull Christine M. Geisser
Attorney Name: John Aromando, Esq. Jared Desrosiers, Esq. Joshua Dunlap, Esq. Sara Murphy, Esq. Jonathan Bolton, Esq. Sara Murphy, Esq. Phillip Coffin, Esq. Cyrus Cheslak, Esq. Jeffrey Russell, Esq. Timothy Woodcock, Esq. Andrew Hamilton, Esq. Casey Olesen, Esq. Jonathan Andreau Pottle
Sigmund Schutz, Esq. Robert Borowski, Esq. Anthony Buxton, Esq. Benjamin Grant, Esq. Gerald Petruccelli, Esq. Scott Dolan, Esq. Christopher Roach, Esq. James Kilbreth, Esq. David Kallin, Esq. Jeana M. Mccormick, Esq. Oliver Walton, Esq.
ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE BUREAU OF PARKS AND LANDS AS MOOT, AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Michael A. Duddy Judge, Business & Consumer
Defendants Bureau of Parks and Lands ("BPL") and Maine Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") (collectively, the "State Defendants") move to dismiss as moot all Contract Clause claims against BPL on the grounds that the Law Court has already decided the Contract Clause issues involving BPL in Black v. Bureau of Parks and Lands, 2022 ME 58, A.3d . Plaintiffs seek judgment against BPL on the pleadings precisely because the Law Court has already decided the Contract Clause issues involving BPL in Black. Since it makes little sense to render a second decision against BPL on Plaintiffs' Contract Clause claims, the Court dismisses as moot all claims against BPL in this litigation.
DISCUSSION
The claims pertaining to BPL in this action are contained in Count III of the Verified Complaint. In Count III, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors seek a declaration that Section 1 of the Initiative violates the Contract Clause of the state and federal Constitutions (Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 11 of the Maine Constitution). In Black, the Law Court held that retroactive application of Section 1 of the Initiative to the Project violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶ 35. As Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: "The Law Court left nothing to decide with respect to Plaintiffs' Contracts Clause claim." Pl.s' Mot. J. Pleadings 8. The outcome in Black obviates any need for this Court to render a decision regarding the issues concerning BPL contained in Count III.
The Law Court's Black decision has provided Plaintiffs with complete relief on their Contract Clause claims against BPL. Accordingly, the claims against BPL in this case have been rendered moot. See Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Me. 1996) (litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy); Brunswick Citizens for Collaborative Gov't v. Town of Brunswick, 2018 ME 95, ¶ 7, 189 A.3d 248 (insufficient practical effects to justify rendering a decision). There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, A.I. v. State, 2020 ME 6, ¶ 9, 223 A.3d 910, but none of the exceptions apply here. Restating the holding in Black will not generate worthwhile collateral consequences; will not provide any additional guidance to the bar and public on the BPL Lease issue; and is unnecessary to address an issue capable of repetition but evades review.
Plaintiffs resist dismissal on several grounds. Plaintiffs argue that dismissing the claims against BPL as moot would deny Plaintiffs effective judicial relief, because Plaintiffs would not obtain declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. The Court disagrees. The Black Court in a per curiam opinion plainly and clearly declared "that retroactive application of section 1 of the Initiative violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution." Black, 2022 ME 58, ¶ 35__, A.3d__ . The fact that the pronouncement was delivered in the context of a M. R. Civ. P. 80C appeal rather than declaratory judgment action is a distinction without functional difference.
The Black Court was not asked to decide whether application of the Maine Constitution's Contract Clause would lead to the same outcome. Black, 2022 ME 58, ¶ 35 n.11, A.3d . Even if this Court were to proceed with judgment on the pleadings, it would not reach the state Contract Clause issue. Courts are reluctant to consider and decide constitutional issues that do not need to be decided. See Town of Burlington v. Hosp. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 2001 ME 59, ¶ 19, 769 A.3d 857. Here, since a comprehensive decision providing complete relief was rendered pursuant to the federal Contract Clause, there would be no reason for the Court to consider the state Contract Clause argument, and the Court would decline to do so.
Moreover, the Court's statements in Black about retroactivity and the Commerce Clause are not dicta, because it was necessary for the Law Court to decide the question of retroactive application in order to determine the justiciability of the case. Id. ¶¶ 32-35.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that the Black decision has left them "only vague assurances about Section 1, none of which would be binding on future or even current State executives, administrators, and legislators whose views on the Project may blow with the political winds." Pl.s' Opp'n to Def.s' Mot. Dismiss 2. The Court is unpersuaded. The Law Court's decision in Black is not ambiguous. It is clear and comprehensive, and contrary to Plaintiffs' characterization provides concrete assurances barring the unconstitutional retroactive application of Section 1 to the Project. See Black, 2022 ME 58, ¶¶ 32-69, __ A.3d __. It is not plausible that current or future decision makers will or would disregard Black. Moreover, when there appears to be no evidence to suggest an executive branch agency would disregard the decision of a court, courts are reluctant to enjoin the agency. See Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 2020 ME 109, ¶ 39, 237 A.3d 882. That is the case here. There is no indication whatsoever that BPL or any other state agency will act in a manner inconsistent with the Court's pronouncements. To the contrary, the agencies involved are simply waiting for the courts to decide the issues. Under the circumstances, even if the Court were to provide a declaratory judgment, the Court would decline to issue an injunction against the state agencies involved.
Plaintiffs argue there is what they call "bizarre dissonance" between BPL being the prevailing party in Black and a party seeking dismissal in this case on the grounds of mootness. Pl.s' Opp'n to Def.s' Mot. Dismiss 2 n.1. However, there is no disharmony between defending the BPL Lease in Black-a result very much desired by Plaintiffs-and advocating for the Law Court's opinion in Black to be the last word on the matter.
Finally, relying on the decision in United States v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 151 F.Supp.3d 998 (D. Ariz. 2015), Plaintiffs contend that res judicata, not the mootness doctrine, applies in this case. County of Maricopa, however, is a case involving traffic stops, and is distinguishable on its very different facts. Here, the relief sought by Plaintiffs is not in substance different from the relief they obtained in Black: a holding by the State's highest court that retroactive application of Section 1 of the Initiative violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the mootness doctrine, not res judicata, applies to the analysis.
Notably, County of Maricopa held that the United States' claims against the Defendant Sheriff of Maricopa County Joseph M. Arpaio were not moot, but justiciable, in light of continued civil rights violations by Arpaio and the Sheriffs Office after the issuance of an injunction in prior litigation brought by private plaintiffs, which demonstrated a real and immediate threat of future harm. Cnty. of Maricopa, 151 F.Supp.3d at 1013.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss All Claims Against the Bureau of Parks and Lands is GRANTED on the grounds of mootness. Count III is dismissed, and BPL is dismissed as a party to this case. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED in relevant part.
So Ordered
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is instructed to incorporate this Order by reference on the docket for this case.