Opinion
No. 513 C.D. 2012
03-05-2013
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
William Neal (Neal) petitions pro se for review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Office of Attorney General. The ALJ upheld the decision of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), which determined that Neal's challenge to the accuracy of his criminal history record made under the Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA) was invalid. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On March 24, 2011, Neal challenged the accuracy of his criminal history record information pursuant to Section 9151 of the CHRIA, alleging, in essence, that a prohibited offensive weapons charge and a burglary charge from 1992 were improperly listed and needed to be removed. (Certified Record (C.R.), Attachment A.) A review of the record indicates that Neal believed that the charges, which appear on records from Philadelphia County, were improperly listed because the district attorney did not have authority to issue the charges and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Both charges were listed with a disposition of "disposition unreported—no further action" on Neal's criminal history record as maintained in the central repository by PSP. (C.R., Attachment B.)
18 Pa. C.S. § 9151. Section 9151 of the CHRIA provides:
(a) General rule.—Any individual or his legal representative has the right to review, challenge, correct and appeal the accuracy and completeness of his criminal history record information.
(b) Prisoners.—Persons incarcerated in correctional facilities and institutions may authorize a correctional employee to obtain a copy of their criminal history record information for the purpose of review, challenge and appeal.
Neal previously presented a similar challenge on January 16, 2011, but PSP concluded that the challenge was invalid because Neal failed to specify what information in his criminal history record was incorrect or what the correct version of the information should be, as required by the guidelines for challenging the accuracy of criminal history record information. (C.R., Attachment E.)
On April 28, 2011, PSP responded to Neal's challenge via letter, concluding that Neal's challenge was invalid. (C.R., Attachment A.) PSP stated that the charges were considered non-convictions. (Id.) PSP explained that the notation of "disposition unreported—no further action" meant that PSP contacted all available sources to obtain a disposition and no disposition information could be located. (Id.) PSP further explained that in order for non-conviction information to be removed from Neal's criminal history record, Neal must apply to the court of jurisdiction for a court-ordered expungement. (Id.)
Neal appealed the decision of PSP to the Attorney General pursuant to Section 9152 of the CHRIA, and the ALJ held a hearing at which both Neal and PSP participated. During the hearing, Neal's testimony indicated that he was attempting to challenge the validity of the underlying charges rather than the accuracy of his criminal history record information with respect to those charges. (C.R., Appendix 6, at 5-10, 24-28.) Counsel for PSP indicated at the hearing that PSP's position was that such a challenge was beyond the scope of the CHRIA, citing this Court's decision in Clark v. Pennsylvania State Police, 760 A.2d 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). (Id. at 10-11.) Nevertheless, Joanna Miller, a representative of PSP who reviews challenges to the accuracy of criminal history record information under the CHRIA, presented testimony at the hearing regarding the accuracy of Neal's criminal history record. Ms. Miller testified that in processing Neal's challenge, she obtained certified records from Philadelphia County regarding Neal's criminal history. (Id. at 15.) Ms. Miller further testified that the charges of prohibited offensive weapons and burglary were listed in those records, but had been struck out. (Id. at 16-18.) Additionally, Ms. Miller testified that the information contained in the records she reviewed from Philadelphia County confirmed that Neal's criminal history record information as maintained by PSP was accurate. (Id. at 15.)
The ALJ also made efforts to explain to Neal that she could not address such a challenge, because under the CHRIA, the ALJ only has the authority to determine the accuracy of Neal's criminal history record as maintained by PSP. (C.R., Appendix 6, at 6-10, 23, 26.)
Following the hearing, the ALJ upheld PSP's decision concluding that Neal's challenge was invalid. (C.R., Appendix 7.) The ALJ indicated that PSP introduced certified records kept by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Philadelphia County pertaining to Neal and that a line had been drawn through the prohibited offensive weapons and burglary charges that Neal was challenging. (Id.) The ALJ also stated that the criminal history record information pertaining to Neal as maintained by PSP characterizes each charge as "disposition unreported—no further action" and that Neal admitted that he was not convicted of either offense. (Id.) The ALJ determined that the use of the notation "disposition unreported—no further action" reflects, as best as printed records can, the fact that in lower court records, a line has been drawn through both of the offenses at issue. (Id.) The ALJ also determined that Neal's inquiry regarding the authority under which these charges were filed was beyond the scope of a challenge to the accuracy of criminal history record information. (Id.) Neal now petitions this Court for review.
On appeal, Neal essentially argues that the ALJ erred in limiting the scope of the hearing and her decision to the issue of whether Neal's criminal history record information was accurate as maintained by PSP. Neal also appears to argue that the Attorney General failed to perform an adequate investigation regarding his appeal.
"The Court's review of an order of an ALJ of the Office of Attorney General relating to the CHRIA is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Dunbar v. Pa. State Police, 902 A.2d 1002, 1004 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 667, 916 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1119, 127 S. Ct. 2947 (2007).
We will first address Neal's argument that the ALJ erred in limiting the scope of the hearing and her decision to the issue of whether Neal's criminal history record information was accurate as maintained by PSP. In conjunction with this contention, Neal puts forth the same arguments relating to the validity of the underlying prohibited offensive weapons and burglary charges that he attempted to present to PSP and the ALJ. This Court has held that a person cannot use the CHRIA as a means to attack collaterally the underlying criminal proceedings giving rise to the information contained in his or her criminal history record. See Clark, 760 A.2d at 1205 (providing that petitioner could not "utilize the [CHRIA] as a means to attack collaterally his valid . . . arrest and subsequent conviction"). Notwithstanding Neal's assertions to the contrary, we conclude that Neal is improperly using the CHRIA to attack collaterally the prohibited offensive weapons and burglary charges. Thus, the ALJ did not err in limiting the scope of the hearing and her decision to the issue of whether Neal's criminal history record information was accurate as maintained by PSP.
In his brief, Neal appears to indicate that he tried to present a challenge to the underlying charges to the trial court and district attorney, and after receiving no response, he properly "appealed" to the Attorney General under the CHRIA. Neal misunderstands the purpose of the CHRIA, which is to ensure the accuracy of an individual's criminal history record information, not to ensure the validity of the underlying criminal proceedings from which an individual's criminal history record information is derived. See Clark, 760 A.2d at 1205. Thus, Neal cannot bring his challenge to the underlying prohibited offensive weapons and burglary charges under the CHRIA, as the ALJ and this Court have jurisdiction only over a challenge to the accuracy of Neal's criminal history record information.
We next address Neal's argument that the Attorney General failed to perform an adequate investigation regarding his appeal. Neal appears to argue that the Attorney General should have conducted an investigation into the validity of the underlying charges. Such an investigation is not cognizable under the CHRIA. See Clark, 760 A.2d at 1205; 18 Pa. C.S. § 9161(3) (providing that "[t]he Attorney General shall have the power and authority to[] . . . [m]ake investigations concerning all matters touching the administration and enforcement of [the CHRIA] and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder" (emphasis added)). We conclude, therefore, that the Attorney General did not fail to conduct an adequate investigation regarding Neal's appeal.
To the extent that Neal's arguments can be interpreted to challenge the adequacy of PSP's investigation into or the ALJ's review of the accuracy of Neal's criminal history record information, we reject those arguments. As previously stated, Ms. Miller testified that she obtained certified records regarding Neal's criminal history record information from Philadelphia County, compared those documents to the criminal history record information kept by PSP, and concluded that the documents were consistent with each other. (C.R., Appendix 6, at 15-18.) The ALJ reviewed these documents, which were admitted into the record without objection, and agreed that the documents were consistent with each other. Our review of these documents also indicates that the criminal history record information from Philadelphia County shows that the prohibited offensive weapons and burglary charges were struck out, and that the criminal history record information from PSP reflects that by indicating "unreported unknown—no further action." Moreover, Neal testified at the hearing that he was not convicted of either offense. (Id. at 25.) Thus, PSP and the ALJ did not err in conducting their respective reviews of Neal's challenge. --------
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of March, 2013, the order of the Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Attorney General is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge