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granting summary judgment motion for defendant when plaintiff failed to show that his diabetes, under treatment, substantially limited any major life activity. The court noted that plaintiff's only hypoglycemic reactions occurred when he failed to "successfully maintain his blood sugar level by administering insulin, eating snacks, and/or ceasing work activity. In other words, these reactions occurred in the absence of corrective measures. Even if Nawrot occasionally suffers from hypoglycemia despite his best efforts at mitigation, there is no suggestion that these infrequent and limited episodes substantially limit him from working, not only at Bestfoods, but in a broad category of jobs."
Summary of this case from Sepulveda v. GlickmanOpinion
No. 99 C 630
June 21, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ralph Nawrot ("Nawrot") brings suit against his former employer, CPC International, n/k/a Bestfoods, Inc., ("Bestfoods"). In Count I of his complaint, Nawrot alleges that Bestfoods violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by refusing to accommodate his disability and terminating him based on his disability. In Count II, Nawrot claims that he was terminated in violation of the retaliation provisions set forth in the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In Count III, he contends that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. Before this court is Bestfoods' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed herein, Bestfoods' motion is granted.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cox v. Acme Health Serv., Inc., 55 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1995). A genuine issue of material fact exists for trial when, in viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the non-movant, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1998).
The movant bears the burden of establishing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1995). If the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must set forth specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is not sufficient to oppose successfully a summary judgment motion; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Weighing evidence, determining credibility, and drawing reasonable inferences are jury functions, not those of a judge deciding a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2515.
II. Factual Background
Bestfoods is a corporation licensed to do business in Illinois. The company has a facility in Chicago at 2816 South Kilbourn Avenue. Nawrot is a resident of Palos Heights, Illinois. He was hired by Bestfoods in 1976 and was terminated in August 1998. In about 1983, Nawrot became a warehouse supervisor. As such, he supervised 15-20 employees, substituted on occasion for the warehouse superintendent, and managed truck and rail shipments. His duties required that he walk around the warehouse, unload and deliver packages and supplies, and take responsibility for maintaining a clean and safe warehouse.
Nawrot is a diabetic who suffers from bouts of hypoglycemia. In 1980, Bestfoods learned about Nawrot's condition, and the company was aware that Nawrot monitored his blood sugar level with insulin and intake of food. Company policy prohibits food on the work floor. The parties dispute whether Nawrot was permitted to take breaks to enable him to control his diabetes. Bestfoods claims that throughout his employment, Nawrot took breaks to eat snacks and maintain his blood sugar level. In contrast, Nawrot maintains that despite his repeated requests, he was not allowed to take breaks to eat when he felt the impending onset of a hypoglycemia reaction. He claims that he did not take breaks because he was never given permission to do so, although Bestfoods counters that Nawrot did not need permission.
Around September 1995, Nawrot had a series of encounters with Bertha Dandridge ("Dandridge"), a Bestfoods employee who was a Jehovah's Witness. In one instance, when Dandridge refused to assist a delivery driver with his packages, Nawrot testified that he "said [to himself] or if [the driver] heard, I didn't think [Dandridge] was able to hear. I said, 'and she's supposed to be a Jehovah's Witness." On another occasions, Dandridge was upset at work and Nawrot told her, "calm down, you're a Witness. You know, don't start yelling and screaming." On a third occasion, when Dandridge refused to make coffee for Nawrot but did so for another colleague, Nawrot commented, "I thought you told me Jehovah's Witnesses don't make coffee."
Dandridge complained about Nawrot's conduct to his then supervisor, William Thompson ("Thompson"). Thompson met with Nawrot to discuss Dandridge's complaints. Nawrot explained to Thompson that he had been interested in learning about Dandridge's religion and had conversed with her about theology on numerous occasions. Nawrot then relayed to Thompson the context in which his comments were made. In the first instance, he said, he had tried to relieve the tension between the driver and Dandridge. The second comment was intended to pacify Dandridge by reminding her of her faith. The last remark was made in jest in reference to Dandridge's prior statement to Nawrot that Jehovah's Witnesses did not make coffee. Nawrot asserts that the matter was resolved as a misunderstanding.
In January 1996, Nawrot called his then direct supervisor Thomas Dobbs ("Dobbs") into a meeting with the second shift employees and read aloud a list of employee complaints. Dobbs later yelled at Nawrot, telling him that he had embarrassed Dobbs in front of employees.
In February 1996, Nawrot and another supervisor, Charles Billings ("Billings") had a verbal altercation within earshot of other employees. When questioned about the situation, Nawrot informed Dobbs and Edward Conway ("Conway"), the plant manager, that Billings had yelled at Nawrot, who smelled alcohol on Billings' breath. Nawrot claimed that he had merely asked Billings to calm down and walked away. Conway told Nawrot that he acted appropriately under the circumstances.
In August 1996, when Judy Blazic ("Blazic"), a clerk under Nawrot's supervision, refused to follow his instructions, she and Nawrot engaged in a "shouting match." Blazic claimed that Nawrot said to her, "you are nothing but a woman clerk," but he denied her allegation when he spoke with Dobbs about the incident. At the end of 1996, Nawrot received positive performance evaluations. Dobbs told Nawrot that he had a good rapport with employees and on another occasion, told him that he was better than the previous first shift supervisor.
On February 19, 1997, Nawrot was introduced to a new temporary employee who was scheduled to work under his supervision. Nawrot refused to shake the employee's hand and told her, "I would shake your hand but I just went to the bathroom and did not wash my hands." Nawrot advised Conway that at the time that he made that statement, he was suffering from hypoglycemia, which affected his thought processes. Nawrot also provided a written note from his doctor, which explained that Nawrot's condition caused him to make the inappropriate statement. Nevertheless, Nawrot was issued a written warning ("February warning"), which read as follows:
Your statement was inappropriate, unprofessional, insensitive, demonstrates poor manners and judgment and is unacceptable behavior by any CPC employee, especially a supervisory employee.
You have been previously counseled about similar inappropriate behavior (comments regarding an employee's religion, inappropriate comments at team meeting, shouting incidents with other employees. Future occurrences of this or similar behavior will result in your termination.
When Nawrot spoke to Conway about his personnel file in January 1997, Nawrot was told that his file contained no negative memos. When Nawrot reviewed his file in the aftermath of the February warning, he discovered written reports of the incidents involving Dandridge, Dobbs, Billings, and Blazic.
Starting January 1997, Nawrot began having trouble controlling his blood sugar levels and became more susceptible to hypoglycemic reactions. He asked Dobbs and Mark Schmidt ("Schmidt"), a human resources manager, for permission to take frequent short breaks to monitor and control his blood sugar level. Dobbs refused and Schmidt repeatedly informed Nawrot that the matter was being considered but had not yet been ruled upon. After renewing his request, Nawrot felt that he needed to take a leave of absence so that he could constantly monitor his blood sugar level and eliminate the risk of erratic behavior. On February 26, 1997, Nawrot requested and was approved for a medical leave of absence. In the application for Nawrot's leave of absence, his doctor noted that the February incident, as well as confusion and inappropriate behavior was caused by insulin-induced hypoglycemia.
On March 25, April 1, and May 20, 1997, Nawrot renewed his requests for short breaks to monitor his diabetic condition. In or about March 1997, Nawrot met with Conway and Rizzo, a human resources manager. Nawrot reaffirmed his need for breaks and explained that such an accommodation would prevent his aberrant behavior. Rizzo and Conway suggested that Nawrot transfer to another position in the refinery department. Nawrot declined to do so because he was aware that Bestfoods intended to close the refinery, which it did shortly thereafter. Rizzo and Conway then encouraged Nawrot to take a short term disability leave, and then at the end of six months, apply for long term disability leave. Nawrot was concerned about retaining his job in case he could not qualify for long term disability. When he learned that the company could not guarantee his job, Nawrot declined to apply for disability leave.
Rizzo's first name was not provided to this court.
A doctor's note indicated that Nawrot was ready to return to work on April 28, 1997. However, Bestfoods posted signs with plant security to keep Nawrot from returning to work until June 1997. Upon his return, Nawrot again approached Rizzo about accommodations. Rizzo denied Nawrot's requests. Nawrot then told Rizzo that he would have to contact the EEOC, to which Rizzo replied that he was not afraid of the EEOC. On or about April 29, 1998, Nawrot gave a letter to Bestfoods' CEO requesting accommodations and complaining about the management's refusal to provide him with accommodations. Nawrot was later told that a committee was working on his request but he received no further response. Soon after Nawrot's return from medical leave, Dobbs ordered him transferred from the first shift to the second shift so that Dobbs could keep a more careful watch on Nawrot. When Nawrot asked for an explanation, Dobbs told him that he did not have to provide one.
In the spring of 1998, Bestfoods terminated Margaret Ermalowicz ("Ermalowicz"), an hourly employee, for fighting. The union filed a grievance against Bestfoods contesting Ermalowicz's discharge. Ermalowicz's arbitration hearing was held on April 1998. On several occasions before that hearing, Nawrot met with Ermalowicz to talk with her about her arbitration case. Nawrot told her that Bestfoods had not discharged other employees who had been caught fighting, and urged Ermalowicz to argue that her fight occurred off company property. Nawrot also discussed Ermalowicz's termination with union officers Walter Posey ("Posey") and Charles Dent ("Dent") although he denies having spoken to them in their official capacities. Nawrot did not inform Bestfoods about his discussions with Ermalowicz, Posey, or Dent. At his deposition, Nawrot testified that he would not have assisted Ermalowicz "at all if it wasn't for what the company had done to me."
On June 30, 1998, Nawrot made an announcement to a group of employees who had gathered for a meeting. He recalled his words at his deposition:
I know there's a rumor going around that I was supposedly supposed to have solicited Margaret Ermalowicz for sex. And I told them, I assure you that is not true, And, as you people know, especially you ones who have been here a while, I never, ever got sexually involved with. . . . And I said further, she is not of my class that I would associate with in any kind of sexual manner.
After that meeting, Nawrot accused Donna Herman ("Herman"), a Bestfoods' hourly employee, of spreading rumors about him and Ermalowicz. Herman told Schwab that Nawrot later yelled at her, grabbed her arm, and twisted it. Herman also filed internal complaints concerning her encounters with Nawrot. When Bestfoods interviewed Nawrot, he admitted that he made the announcement to the employees, and that he had confronted Herman and accused her of spreading rumors about him. However, he denied touching Herman. Bestfoods interviewed employees identified by Herman as witnesses to the arm-twisting incident but they denied having seen anything.
In July 1998, the arbitrator ordered Bestfoods to reinstate Ermalowicz, and she resumed working at Bestfoods on July 20, 1998. Sometime after the arbitration hearing and before the arbitrator's decision was issued, Ermalowicz and Nawrot had a falling out. They had previously maintained a social relationship wherein Nawrot had loaned her money and given her gifts, including a dog. Nawrot now believed that Ermalowicz was spreading rumors about him stalking her and soliciting her for sex. The day that Ermalowicz returned to work, Schwab advised Nawrot to refrain from having contact with Ermalowicz.
One day, as he was leaving the plant after work, Nawrot passed by Ermalowicz and sang several times, "I'm stalking my dog, not you." On another occasion, as they were both leaving work, Nawrot confronted Ermalowicz and asked her, in reference to the alleged rumors she was spreading about him, "when are you going to tell the truth?" On July 21, 1998, Nawrot sent a three page letter to Ermalowicz discussing, among other things, the rumors, and noting the reason to celebrate after how hard we worked on your defense." On July 23, and 28, 1998, Ermalowicz filed two internal complaints against Nawrot.
On about August 10, 1998, Nawrot commenced a two-week vacation and returned on August 24. During this period, Bestfoods completed its investigation of Ermalowicz's complaints. Upon reviewing the July 21 letter and interviewing Ermalowicz, Schwab concluded that Nawrot had ignored the order to avoid contact with Ermalowicz, that he had harassed her, and that Nawrot had assisted her with the arbitration case against Bestfoods. On August 24, 1998, Nawrot was terminated. Nawrot was 57 years old at the time of his termination. His position as first shift warehouse supervisor remained vacant for more than four months. In January 1999, Bestfoods transferred Randy Tones ("Tones") into the position. Tones is forty years old.
On October 23, 1998, Nawrot filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging violations of the ADA and the ADEA. On December 23, 1998, the EEOC issued Nawrot a right to sue letter, and he filed this action on February 2, 1999.
III. Analysis
A. Disability Discrimination
The ADA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privilege of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). There are two components of disability discrimination: disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. See Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999). Nawrot alleges both types of discrimination.
In order to make out his claim, Nawrot must establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability within the purview of the ADA. A qualified individual is one who is able to perform the "essential functions of the employment position" at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The parties do not dispute that Nawrot has been able to satisfactorily perform his duties. An individual has a disability when she has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (C). Diabetes is a recognized medical impairment. Unless an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, however, it does not qualify as a disability under the ADA. See Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 2000).
An individual is also considered disabled under the ADA when she has a record of a substantially limiting impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). Nawrot does not rely on this provision to establish his disability.
Nawrot claims that he is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. An individual is substantially impaired when she is significantly restricted from performing a class or a broad range of jobs as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Relying on Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999), Bestfoods urges this court to examine Nawrot's diabetes in its corrected state when determining whether it constitutes a disability. Indeed, the Supreme Court requires us to make the disability determination with reference to mitigating measures. 119 S.Ct. at 1146, 1147. See also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999).
Nawrot asserts that he has experienced at least three hypoglycemic reactions at work. On these three occasions, Nawrot contends that he was rendered unconscious or incoherent. Nawrot does not specify whether these reactions occurred when his diabetes was controlled. It appears, however, that they occurred when Nawrot was unable to successfully maintain his blood sugar level by administering insulin, eating snacks, and/or ceasing work activity. In other words, these reactions occurred in the absence of corrective measures. Even if Nawrot occasionally suffers from hypoglycemia despite his best efforts at mitigation, there is no suggestion that these infrequent and limited episodes substantially limit him from working, not only at Bestfoods, but in a broad category of jobs. In fact, Nawrot's diabetes did not limit him from performing his duties and responsibilities throughout his 22 year tenure at Bestfoods, 15 of which were as a supervisor.
Nawrot argues that he cannot work in several classes of occupations, including commercial truck driving and heavy construction. Again, he does not indicate whether he is precluded from these positions even when his diabetes is in its corrected state. Without establishing this fact, for which he bears the burden of proof, Nawrot cannot withstand summary judgment.
The court also notes that Nawrot's contention regarding the classes of occupations from which he is restricted was not properly submitted. He set forth this statement in his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A) response to Bestfoods' statements of fact. Because Nawrot's contention was not directly responsive to Bestfoods' statement, however, it should have been articulated in his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of additional facts so that Bestfoods could reply.
In the alternative, Nawrot argues that he was regarded as disabled. Bestfoods was aware of Nawrot's diabetes. Defendants' awareness of Nawrot's impairment, however, does not mean that they perceived Nawrot as being disabled as that term is defined in the ADA. As set forth above, to establish that a claimant is substantially limited in working, a claimant must show that she is substantially limited in her ability to work generally. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1998). To be "substantial," a limitation must be one that affects the claimant's ability to perform a class or range of jobs. Id., 133 F.3d at 511. In turn, the employer's perception of the claimant's inability to work must have comparable breadth. Id. Nawrot fails to show that anyone at Bestfoods believed that Nawrot's diabetes restricted him from working generally. Thus, Nawrot cannot sustain his ADA claims.
The evidence produced by Nawrot suggests that Bestfoods was not at all responsive to their employee's simple medically-necessary requests. This court, however, is unable to reach the question of accommodation because of Sutton. Even if Bestfoods wronged Nawrot, that wrong, under the Supreme Court's construction of the ADA, is not legally actionable because Nawrot is not disabled within the purview of the statute.
The rationale of Sutton leads to a distorted result. Although a court must consider the effect of mitigating measures when determining whether physically or mentally impaired plaintiffs are entitled to statutory protection from discrimination, the alleged failure to accommodate can preclude a plaintiff from utilizing those mitigating measures on the job. Here, a question of material fact exists as to whether Bestfoods prohibited Nawrot from controlling his diabetic condition. Yet according to Sutton, this court cannot reach the question of discrimination because Nawrot is not deemed disabled when viewed in his corrected state, and as such, is not included within the purview of the ADA.
In another example, suggested by the dissent in Sutton, let us assume that for one reason or another, an employer prohibits an employee from utilizing her prosthetic limbs. She sues, and the court dismisses her case because with prosthesis (which she is not allowed to use at her job) the employee is fully able to work. If this employee is not substantially limited, with the aid of prosthesis, in her ability to engage in major life activities like walking or taking care of herself, Sutton deems her unprotected by the ADA. Or, let us discuss the facts of Sutton. The employer measures applicants' qualifications for pilot positions based on their uncorrected vision. The high court considers the effect of corrective lenses in finding that the plaintiffs are not disabled.
In the aftermath of Sutton ADA plaintiffs are placed in a legal bind: the employer strips the plaintiff of all ameliorative measures, but in court, the judge pretends that the plaintiff is always clothed with those measures. The court in Sutton attempts to minimize the narrowing effect of its holding by suggesting that an impaired person would be disabled because she is substantially impaired, if not in her ability to work, in her ability to perform other major life activities such as walking or running in the case of the individual with prosthetic limbs. See 119 S.Ct. at 2149. With the advance in science and technology, however, individuals — with the aid of prostheses — can engage in such activities. Under the court's definition, then, they would not be considered disabled.
Sutton also suggests that the the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition may provide succor to those plaintiffs truly deserving of protection under the ADA. Specifically, the court observed that the severely myopic plaintiffs in that case should have advanced the argument that they were regarded due to their impairment as substantially limited in the activity of seeing. See 119 S.Ct. at 2150. This device does not help Nawrot, whose claim is: "I am disabled; Bestfoods refused to accommodate my disability and as a result of the refusal to accommodate, I could not perform my job properly." Because Bestfoods did not regard Nawrot as disabled, the "regarded as" buoy extended in Sutton is of no assistance.
B. Termination
On August 24, 1998, Bestfoods terminated Nawrot. Nawrot alleges that his discharge was in retaliation for his repeated requests for accommodation and an act of discrimination based on his disability and his age. He also advances a retaliation claim under Title VII. The proscriptions against retaliation articulated in the ADEA and the ADA employ language similar to that in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); thus, Title VII case law and its articulation of the burden-shifting method of proof guides this court in its analysis of all three of the termination related claims asserted by Nawrot. See Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000) (ADEA) Davidson, 133 F.3d at 511 (ADA).
Nawrot does not indicate how he falls into Title VII's protected class.
As discussed in the previous section, Nawrot's ADA claims cannot be sustained under Sutton. The following discussion provides an alternative basis for the dismissal of Nawrot's ADA claims.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court observed that it had not yet "squarely addressed" whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method utilized in Title VII claims also applied to ADEA actions. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., No. 99-536. 2000 WL 743663, at *5 (June 12, 2000).
In the absence of direct evidence of retaliatory animus, the plaintiff bears the burden of setting forth a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. Once the prima fade case has been established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir. 1998). If the employer's proffered reason is lawful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's reasons are pretextual. Id. The burden of persuasion rests, at all times, with the plaintiff. Id.
In examining Nawrot's claims, the court proceeds directly to the pretext stage of the burden-shifting method of proof. Bestfoods states that Nawrot was discharged as a result of his inappropriate behavior. In February, 1997, Nawrot, upon meeting a new temporary employee, refused to shake her hand, instead telling her that, "I would shake your hand, but I just went to the bathroom and did not wash my hands." Bestfoods issued Nawrot a final written warning explicitly stating that further improper conduct would result in termination. That final warning memo also alluded to Nawrot's pre-February 1997 history of inappropriate conduct: the improper comments concerning Dandridge's religion, his confrontation with Dobbs, and his verbal altercation with Billings and Blazic.
Nawrot's subsequent termination occurred, Bestfoods asserts, because Nawrot engaged in inappropriate conduct involving Ermalowicz. Nawrot admits to the following allegations lodged against him: namely, that he announced to a group of employees that he did not solicit sex from Ermalowicz, that he accused Herman of spreading rumors about him; that she filed an internal complaint against him; that he had various encounters with Ermalowicz, including meeting with her to discuss her defense to the arbitration hearing, repeatedly singing "I'm stalking my dog, not you" as he passed her, approaching her to ask when she would tell the truth and rectify the rumors she was allegedly spreading about him, and sending her a thee-page letter discussing the rumors. Upon concluding an investigation into Ermalowicz's internal complaint against Nawrot, Bestfoods determined that Nawrot had ignored the company's order to avoid contact with Ermalowicz, that he had harassed her, and that he had assisted her with her arbitration case against Bestfoods. Bestfoods maintains that these findings compelled the company to terminate Nawrot in late August, 1998.
Once the employer has presented its nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action, the plaintiff must establish that the reason is pretextual. Pretext is "more than a mistake on the part of the employer; pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action." Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997). To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff may show that the employer's proffered reasons are (1) factually baseless; (2) not the actual motivation for the discharge; or (3) insufficient to motivate the discharge. Id. The pretext inquiry focuses on the honesty, not the accuracy, of the employer's stated reasons. Id.
Nawrot tries to downplay the significance of the above incidents. The bulk of his defense centers on the incidents involving Dandridge, Dobbs, Billings, and Blazic. Nawrot asserts that he was told that there were no negative or disciplinary memos in his personnel file, but that he later discovered that written memos had documented the pre-February 1997 incidents. He appears to be arguing that these incidents were not serious enough to warrant documentation and that they were fabricated subsequent to his discharge to support Bestfoods' actions. Nawrot also asserts that many of the pre-February 1997 incidents were resolved as misunderstandings, and that no fault was attributed to him.
However, the fact that details surrounding the pre-February 1997 incidents are disputed does not warrant the denial of summary judgement because those incidents were not critical to Bestfoods' decision to fire Nawrot. Instead, Bestfoods' decision was based on the handshake incident plus the incidents surrounding Ermalowicz. Nawrot's response to these charges does not create a genuine issue of fact. Nawrot insists that the bathroom comment was innocuous because it was triggered by his hypoglycemia, and because the temporary employee did not take offense, as evidenced by her failure to lodge a complaint against him. Nawrot also states that he was told to stay away from Ermalowicz for his own interest, and that as such, it was not a firm directive. He adds that his contact with Ermalowicz was made off the company premises and after work hours. In essence, he concedes that he engaged in these acts, but he denies that any wrongdoing occurred.
The court need not discuss whether Bestfoods violated the ADA by censuring Nawrot for conduct that was allegedly symptomatic of his medical impairment. As discussed in the previous section, Nawrot is not protected by the ADA because he is not disabled within the meaning of the statute.
Nawrot's defense, however, does not establish that Bestfoods's proffered explanation is pretextual. Although Nawrot contextualizes the incidents cited by Bestfoods as examples of his improper behavior, he does not refute their underlying factual bases. In addition, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that his employer "did not honestly believe in the reasons g[iven] for firing [the plaintiff]." Tincher, 133 F.3d at 1131. In Bestfoods's view, Nawrot's admitted interactions with Ermalowicz were improper, and he was fired accordingly. On this record, there is no basis for finding that Nawrot's termination was induced by his diabetes, his requests for accommodation, or his age.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Bestfoods' motion for summary judgment on all counts of Nawrot's complaint is granted. This case is closed.