Summary
In Greenberg, the Appeals Court reversed an order of summary judgment entered against the defendant, an attorney, where there was a genuine and material issue of fact whether the defendant attorney had notice of the insurance company's subrogation rights to a portion of a client's settlement proceeds.
Summary of this case from Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. v. TravalineOpinion
March 6, 1979.
Nathan Greenberg, pro se.
Greenberg, the defendant, appeals from a summary judgment entered against him under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The affidavit in support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the defendant's counter affidavit raise a genuine and material issue of fact: whether the defendant, a lawyer, had notice, when he received settlement proceeds on behalf of a client whom he represented in a motor vehicle tort action, of the plaintiff National Union Fire Insurance Company's subrogation rights to the property damage component of the aggregate settlement proceeds. Whether Greenberg knew of the plaintiff's subrogation claim would have been decisive. General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360 (1944). The plaintiff's affidavit and the defendant's counter affidavit put that very question in issue, and the defendant was, therefore, entitled to a hearing on the merits. Stetson v. Selectmen of Carlisle, 369 Mass. 755, 763-764 (1976). Perry v. Schlaikjer, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 866 (1977). Kaplan v. Birger, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 878 (1977).
Judgment reversed.