Opinion
HHDCV156063590S
04-27-2016
National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4 v. Samantha Ferreira
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Kevin G. Dubay, J.
FACTS
On November 11, 2015, the plaintiff, National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-4, filed a complaint against the defendant, Samantha Ferreira, seeking collection of a debt owed. On February 3, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant as she is a resident of Georgia and has been for the past five years. In support of the motion to dismiss, the defendant provided supporting memorandum and the defendant's affidavit. On March 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss arguing that since the contract was signed in Connecticut, the court has jurisdiction pursuant to Connecticut's Long-Arm Statute, General Statutes § 52-59b. The court heard oral arguments at short calendar on March 21, 2016.
On March 15, 2016, the defendant filed a reply brief arguing that the plaintiff's counsel admitted that she knew the defendant did not live in Connecticut as she verified that the defendant's work place was in Georgia. In support, the defendant attached emails from the plaintiff's counsel, however, the court cannot consider such evidence as " [i]t is well settled that statements of counsel are not evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Temlock v. Temlock, 95 Conn.App. 505, 517, 898 A.2d 209, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 910, 902 A.2d 1070 (2006).
DISCUSSION
The motion to dismiss is the proper vehicle to assert the court's lack of personal jurisdiction. See Golodner v. Women's Center of Southeastern Connecticut, Inc., 281 Conn. 819, 825, 917 A.2d 959 (2007); Practice Book § 10-30. If a defendant challenges a court's personal jurisdiction, then the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction. Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 118, 918 A.2d 867 (2007). " [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651-52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
The defendant argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant as she is a resident of Georgia and has been for the past five years. In response the plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied because the contract was signed in Connecticut and, thus, the court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b.
In analyzing a challenge to personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the court must first inquire whether the long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction under the particular facts of the case. See Frazer v. McGowan, 198 Conn. 243, 246, 502 A.2d 905 (1986). If the statute authorizes jurisdiction, the next question is whether it would offend due process to assert jurisdiction. Id. " The twin touchstones of due process analysis under the minimum contacts doctrine are foreseeability and fairness." United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 41, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985). The act of signing a promissory note from a bank in Connecticut arguably falls within General Statutes § 52-59b(a)(1): " Transacts any business within the state." That phrase has been construed so as to include " a single purposeful business transaction." Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981). In determining whether business has been transacted " we do not apply a rigid formula but balance considerations of public policy, common sense, and the chronology and geography of the relevant factors." Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.App. 287, 298, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990).
In the present case, the plaintiff has not filed any counteraffidavits or other evidence to rebut the defendant's jurisdictional allegations. The plaintiff relies on the allegation that the plaintiff signed the note in Connecticut and lived in Connecticut when she received the funds under the note. There are no facts concerning whether the note was used to conduct business in Connecticut, obtain property in Connecticut, or whether the defendant consented to Connecticut jurisdiction, which are factors that the court should consider. See Savin v. Ranier, 898 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1990) (defendant obtaining financing for New York business from Connecticut resident with note payable in Connecticut does not amount to defendant transacting business in Connecticut); Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Castelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-95-0465911-S, (April 25, 1995, Handy, J.) (holding that signing promissory note in Connecticut not sufficient to extend jurisdiction under long-arm statute); People's Bank v. Zadora, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 059972 (September 22, 1992, Pickett, J.) (7 Conn. L. Rptr. 408) (holding that signing a contract in Connecticut, without more, does not satisfy minimum contacts); R.O.I. Development Corp. v. Weiss, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 391594 (December 21, 1992, Dunn, J.) (8 Conn. L. Rptr. 122) (holding that a single contract signed in Connecticut does not necessarily satisfy minimum contacts).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.