Opinion
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1973.
Page 1246
Robert Leland Johnson, Denver, for appellant Lilly Citron.
Litvak, Schwartz & Karsh, Alan E. Karsh, Denver, for appellant National Acceptance Co.
Sanford B. Hertz, Denver, for appellee Smith Investment Co.
Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker & Grover, John S. Pfeiffer, Philip E. Riedesel, Denver, Isaacson, Rosenbaum & Goldberg, Denver, for defendants-appellees Travis Investment Co., Moss Travis and Edith Travis.
SILVERSTEIN, Chief Judge.
Three separate actions were brought against Travis Investment Co., a partnership, and the partners, Moss Travis and Edith D. Travis, challenging the validity of a deed of trust executed by Stanley Singer and his wife, Renee, in favor of Travis Investment Co. as security for a debt. All of the plaintiffs claimed some interest in one or more of the four parcels of real estate covered by the deed of trust. The three actions were consolidated for trial and are consolidated in this appeal. The deed of trust was executed and delivered in blank form to Moss Travis, who completed the instrument by inserting the legal descriptions of the four parcels of real property. It was admitted that Travis had authority to fill in the descriptions as to two of the parcels referred to as the 'Seventeenth Street Property' and the 'Wazee Street Property.' His authority to insert the descriptions of the other two parcels, the 'Jackson Street Property' and the 'Colorado Boulevard Property' was disputed.
This appeal is the second in this action. In the first appeal we held (in Travis Investment Co. v. National Acceptance Co., not officially published, but reported at 476 P.2d 1006) that, 'a deed of trust is not void merely because the holder of the deed of trust, acting under the directions of the property owner, inserts the legal description of the property in the deed of trust at a later time.' We further held that if Singer gave Travis authority to insert the descriptions of the two disputed properties into the deed of trust it would be valid as to such parcels.
Prior to the first appeal, the trial court made no findings of fact on this issue and the cause was therefore remanded for the making of such findings. On remand the trial court found that Travis did have such authority and upheld the validity of the deed of trust. The deed of trust being valid, the title of Travis Investment Co., which was derived therefrom, was superior to the interests of plaintiffs and judgments dismissing all the actions were entered accordingly.
Two of the plaintiffs, National Acceptance Company and Lilly Citron, appeal. National Acceptance Company reasserts its contention that a deed of trust delivered in blank is void. However, we reaffirm our decision in the former appeal on that issue. The Acceptance Company also asserts that the trial court's finding that Travis had authority to include the two disputed parcels in the deed of trust was erroneous because Travis' testimony was 'unbelievable'and 'inherently incredible' and therefore without evidentiary value.
Citron asserts that the finding was erroneous because there was not sufficient evidence to support that determination. She contends that the evidence shows that there was no contract between Travis and Singer because there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and because there was no real assent to the terms thereof because of a mistake of fact.
The evidence does not support the arguments raised by either National Acceptance Co. or Citron, and we affirm the judgments. We have carefully reviewed the record with particular emphasis on the testimony of Travis and Singer. A recital of the dealings between these two would serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say that their testimony concerning the authority of Travis to include the two disputed parcels in the deed of trust is in almost complete conflict and sometimes self-contradicting. However, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial court that Travis did have the requisite authority and that finding will not be overturned. Cook v. Hargis, 164 Colo. 368, 435 P.2d 385.
Judgments affirmed.
COYTE and SMITH, JJ., concur.