Opinion
HHBCV166034252S
12-21-2017
NATASHA B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge
The plaintiff, Natasha B., appeals the final decision of the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (department), which substantiated findings of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect and upheld the placement of the plaintiff’s name on the department’s central abuse and neglect registry. On July 13, 2017, the court issued a decision upholding the substantiation of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect, but ordered supplemental briefing on an issue the plaintiff raised at oral argument regarding the placement of her name on the registry. Familiarity with the court’s decision of July 13, 2017, is assumed. The court now addresses the issue of the placement of the plaintiff on the registry. For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed.
Natasha B. is entitled to confidential treatment of her identity pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101k(a). She is referred to as the " Appellant" throughout the department’s final decision but as the " plaintiff’ throughout this decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The incident giving rise to the placement of the plaintiff’s name on the abuse and neglect registry was an altercation that occurred on July 13, 2007, when the plaintiff was serving as a one-to-one worker with C, a thirteen-year-old girl at a residential treatment facility. The department found that the plaintiff repeatedly struck C’s face with a closed fist in an incident in which C had been physically aggressive and out of control. The department further found that the plaintiff did not spontaneously stop striking the child, but had to be pulled off her by a facility staff member.
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 17a-28, the identities of children in the department’s care are not disclosed in this decision.
Both the department and the New Britain police investigated the incident. The New Britain police subsequently advised the department that a warrant was being sought for the plaintiff’s arrest on charges of risk of injury and assault in the third degree. On August 28, 2007, the department substantiated the plaintiff for physical abuse of C, physical neglect of C, emotional neglect of C, and physical neglect of E, another child at the facility where the incident occurred. Because the incident was " so egregious, " the department also recommended placement of the plaintiff’s name on the central registry even though the incident in question was the only known incident involving the plaintiff. Record (R.), p. 22.
On January 26, 2015, the plaintiff wrote to the department, representing that she had just learned from a prospective employer that her name was on the department’s registry. She requested that her name be removed from the registry because she had no criminal record as a result of the incident; she had " paid her dues" by giving back to the community and receiving counseling; and the incident was not premeditated or malicious. R., p. 3. She further represented that she was currently pursuing a career that could require her to work with children, and having her name on the registry would prevent her from pursuing such a career. She included three character reference letters and a copy of dismissal of the criminal case that had been brought against her as a result of the incident. R., pp. 3, 25-27.
The department treated her letter as a request for a substantiation hearing, which it scheduled for February 17, 2015. The plaintiff represented herself at that hearing. After the department presented its case, the plaintiff testified about the incident, her arrest and the dismissal of the criminal charges against her after she completed counseling and community service, and her subsequent employment history. She denied that she had intentionally hurt C and testified that she had not had any other incidents in her subsequent employment.
Although the transcript of the first day of the hearing bears the date of February 17, 2016, the hearing officer notes-the date as February 17, 2015, in both her opening remarks and in her final decision. All other evidence in the record indicates that the first day of the hearing was February 17, 2015.
On February 23, 2015, the hearing officer issued a notice that further evidence was required regarding whether the plaintiff’s name should be on the central registry. In the notice, the hearing officer advised the parties to " be prepared to present evidence regarding whether the Appellant has demonstrated changed circumstances since the time of the substantiation." R., p. 33. More particularly, the hearing officer wanted " specific documentation about the services that the Appellant participated in including length of time and successful completion of any services, as well as documentation as to where the Appellant has worked since she was terminated from Alliance Staffing, including confirmation that she has had no further incidents in the workplace." R., p. 33. The second day of the hearing was scheduled for May 5, 2015, but was continued several times at the plaintiff’s request. The second day of the hearing was eventually held on May 17, 2016. The plaintiff was represented by counsel on that day. Neither the plaintiff nor her counsel objected to the second day of the hearing as noticed by the hearing officer. Neither the plaintiff nor her counsel raised an issue regarding the burden of proof at any time before or during the second day of the hearing. The plaintiff testified at the second day of the hearing but offered no documentation of her employment history since the time of the incident at issue in 2007.
The hearing officer issued her final decision on May 20, 2016. She reversed the department’s decision to substantiate the plaintiff for physical neglect of E, but upheld the department’s findings of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect of C, and upheld its decision to place the plaintiff’s name on the central registry. This appeal followed.
FACTS
The facts found by the hearing officer are recited in the court’s decision of July 13, 2017, and will be summarized more briefly here and as needed in the discussion. On the day of the incident at issue, the plaintiff was assigned as a one-to-one worker with C, a thirteen-year-old girl who was a resident at the Klingberg Family Center in. New Britain. C and other children on the unit were out of control that evening. After C and another girl began throwing chairs, staff at Klingberg decided that C should be confined to her room. The plaintiff held the door shut for several minutes as C attempted to get out of her room. Eventually she let go of the door and pushed C back into her room. The situation escalated. C kicked the plaintiff, who was seen charging back at C. The plaintiff punched C in the face multiple times. C was heard yelling, " mom get off me" during the struggle. When C hit the plaintiff back, the plaintiff and C each began pulling each other’s hair. One Klingberg staff member attempted to separate the plaintiff and C but was unable to do so. Another Klingberg staff member then interceded, pulling the plaintiff off C and removing the plaintiff from the room. C sustained head injuries, including lumps to her head as well as bruises and scratches. The swelling on her head as well as the marks were visible the next day but were gone three days later.
During the fight, C, who had been diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, had a flashback to prior abuse by her mother. Although C had felt safe and comfortable at the Klingberg facility before the incident, her therapist noted that after the incident C did not feel safe and had some anxiety about remaining there. The plaintiff, who had been C’s one to one worker for more than five months before the incident, would have been aware that C had significant emotional issues.
The plaintiff was terminated from her position due to the incident and was subsequently arrested for risk of injury and assault in the third degree. In 2009, the criminal charges were dismissed after the plaintiff completed the conditions required for accelerated rehabilitation.
The conditions of the plaintiff’s accelerated rehabilitation included completion of community service and counseling. The plaintiff completed the required hours of community service at a church, running errands, cleaning, and other tasks. She was also required to engage in eight hours of counseling, including anger management, which she completed with the minister. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s court-ordered counseling, the plaintiff’s minister did not recommend further counseling.
On the first day of the hearing, the plaintiff admitted that she used an inappropriate strategy during the incident. The plaintiff denied any intent to harm C. She explained that if she had intended to harm C, the child would have gone to the hospital with more injuries than she sustained because the plaintiff was large in size compared to C. The plaintiff also said that she would have been unable to close her fist to strike C because her fingers were numb from holding the door so long. She said that she might have accidentally struck C, but did not do it with intent to harm her. The hearing officer found that the plaintiff’s testimony that she was unable to make a fist or that she accidentally struck C was unpersuasive and implausible in light of the witness reports.
The hearing officer found that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that she gained insight into how her violent physical altercation with C was a wholly inappropriate response to the situation. The plaintiff continued to minimize the impact of the incident by sharing the story of running into one of the children from Klingberg at a local diner, where the child appeared not to remember her and had a courteous interaction with her.
The hearing officer also found that the plaintiff has had no other criminal incidents or department investigations since the July 13, 2007 incident, and she had no prior substantiations. The plaintiff has worked as a patient care assistant since the incident, serving elderly populations and with those suffering with mental illness and disabilities. She testified that she has had no complaints at work and has always received positive feedback. She did not provide any documentation from her employers about her work history since this incident.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
This appeal is brought pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § § 4-166 et seq., and in particular, General Statutes § 4-183. " At the outset, it is important to underscore that the scope of judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision under § 4-183 is very restricted ... [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ... An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hogan v. Dept . of Children & Families, 290 Conn. 545, 560-61, 964 A.2d 1213 (2009). This court may not " retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact ... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 561.
General Statutes § 4-183(j) provides: " The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. If the court finds such prejudice, it shall sustain the appeal and, if appropriate, may render a judgment under subsection (k) of this section or remand the case for further proceedings. For purposes of this section, a remand is a final judgment."
" In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must defer to the agency’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses ... The reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence in the record ... but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Frank v. Dept . of Children & Families, 312 Conn. 393, 411-12, 94 A.3d 588 (2014).
The court’s review of a challenge to the allocation of the burden of proof between parties in an administrative appeal is plenary. See In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 452, 51 A.3d 334 (2012); and see New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699, 714-20, 638 A.2d 589 (1994). If a decision is ambiguous as to the burden of proof applied, the court will read an ambiguous decision " so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment." See In re Jason R., supra, 306 Conn. 453; see also Kaczynski v. Kaczynski, 294 Conn. 121, 126, 981 A.2d 1068 (2009). In an administrative appeal, moreover, a plaintiff cannot assert a claim that was not presented to the agency below. See Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 85 Conn.App. 854, 862, 859 A.2d 932 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 906, 868 A.2d 748 (2005).
DISCUSSION
A
Inclusion in the Registry
This court has previously upheld the substantiation of the department’s findings of physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect. It turns now to the issue of the plaintiff’s placement on the central registry for abuse and neglect and to an issue the plaintiff raised only at oral argument before being ordered to submit a supplemental brief
The plaintiff argues that the hearing officer improperly upheld her placement on the central registry because there was insufficient evidence of intent or chronicity. The department argues, to the contrary, that there was a finding of intent based on substantial evidence and that a finding of chronicity is not mandatory, but is only one factor that the hearing officer must consider. The court agrees with the department.
General Statutes § 17a-101k requires the commissioner of children and families to maintain a registry of individuals who have been substantiated for abuse or neglect and who pose a risk to children. Section 17a-101k works " in tandem" with General Statutes § 17a-101g, which establishes the department’s responsibilities upon receiving a report of abuse or neglect of a child. See Hogan v. Dept. of Children and Families, supra, 290 Conn. 568-70. Section 17a-101g requires the department to classify, evaluate, investigate, and determine whether such reported abuse or neglect has occurred. Id., 569. If the department determines that abuse or neglect has occurred, the department must also determine " whether: (1) [t]here is an identifiable person responsible for such abuse or neglect; and (2) such identifiable person poses a risk to the health, safety or well-being of children and should be recommended by the commissioner for placement on the child abuse and neglect registry established pursuant to section 17a-101k." General Statutes § 17a-101g(b).
As required by General Statutes § 17a-101k(i), the department has promulgated regulations to implement the registry. See Regulations, Connecticut State Agencies § § 17a-101k-1 to 17a-101k-16. Section 17a-101k-3(b) provides in relevant part: " A person shall be deemed to pose a risk to the health, safety or well-being of children, and listed on the central registry, when: (1) the child abuse or neglect resulted in or involves (A) the death of a child, (B) the risk of serious physical injury of a child; ... [or] (4) the individual responsible for physical or emotional abuse is a person entrusted with the care of a child ..." Similarly, the department’s policy manual provides: " The identified perpetrator shall be recommended by investigations staff for placement on the Registry, and shall be confirmed by the Hearings Officer for placement on the Registry when: ... the perpetrator of physical or emotional abuse is a person entrusted with the care of a child as defined in the operational definitions ... (Emphasis added.) Department of Children & Families Policy Manual § 34-2-8. The regulations and the department’s policy thus authorize placement on the registry when a perpetrator of physical abuse is a person entrusted with the care of a child, whether or not more than one incident of abuse was involved. The hearing officer found, and the plaintiff has not disputed, that the plaintiff was a person entrusted with the care of a child. R., 63. The hearing officer found, and the court has previously upheld the finding, that the plaintiff perpetrated physical abuse upon the child. These facts justify the plaintiff’s placement on the registry under the regulations and policy manual.
" Section 34-2-8 of the department’s policy manual requires the department to make a separate finding as to whether a person responsible for child abuse or neglect poses a risk to children, and if so, whether the person’s name should be placed on the central registry. In making that determination, the department must consider the responsible person’s intent, the severity of the impact on the children, the chronicity of the neglectful conduct, and whether domestic violence was involved." F.M. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, 143 Conn.App. 454, 463-64, 72 A.3d 1095 (2013). While the hearing officer must consider these factors, no one factor is an essential element for placement on the registry.
With respect to the finding of intent, the department considers whether " there was reason to believe that the individual responsible had sufficient knowledge and resources, the ability to utilize them and an understanding of the implications for failing to provide appropriate care, but made a conscious decision not to do so ..." Regs., Conn, State Agencies § 17a-101k-3(e)(1). In this case, the hearing officer considered that factor and determined that the plaintiff had been the child’s one-to-one worker for five months and that she had the knowledge and resources available not to engage in the violent altercation, but made a decision to not do so. This finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record, including the following: C’s behavioral outburst on the evening of the incident was not unusual, but was a symptom of the issues that troubled her and required her placement at Klingberg. Although the unit was " chaotic" that evening, with multiple children acting out, other Klingberg staff members were nearby, and in fact another staff member had already arrived to assist the plaintiff as the plaintiff began to punch C. That staff member was unable to stop the plaintiff from attacking C. When a second staff member arrived and was able to pull the plaintiff off C, the plaintiff came right back at C and had to be physically removed from the room to prevent further violence. When the staff member who had pulled the plaintiff off C spoke with the plaintiff as she prepared to leave the facility, he had the impression that she was glad to have had a reason to punch C, as if C deserved such abuse. Such evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding of intent.
With regard to severity, the department considers whether " there was an adverse impact to the victim, or a serious disregard for the victim’s welfare ..." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a-101k-3(e)(2). The hearing officer concluded, with substantial support in the evidence, that the child was punched in the face and forehead multiple times, which could have had a serious impact and demonstrated a serious disregard for her welfare.
With regard to chronicity, the department considers, among other factors, whether " there is a pattern or chronic nature to the neglect regardless of the measurable impact to the victim" and whether " there was a previous substantiation of neglect by the individual responsible for current abuse or neglect for an incident or conduct unrelated to the current incident or conduct." Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 17a-101k-3(e)(3) and (4). In this case, the hearing officer considered that the plaintiff had no known prior or subsequent incidents and concluded that the chronicity criterion was not met in this case.
The plaintiff relies on Sanchez v. Katz, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-13-6022396-S (July 10, 2014, Schuman, J.), in support of her claim that a finding of chronicity is mandatory for placement on the registry. In Sanchez, the court did state that " [w]ithout a finding that the same problem considered severe is also chronic, the hearing officer’s conclusion cannot stand." If that statement in Sanchez is construed to mean that there are no circumstances in which a person can properly be listed on the registry for a single incident of neglect or abuse, this court disagrees. Other decisions of the Superior Court have recognized that a single severe event can justify placement on the registry because it can reasonably be inferred that the individual involved " poses a risk to the health, safety or well-being of children, " as required by General Statutes § 17a-101g(b). See Petrosinelli v. Dept. of Children & Families, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-10-6009354-S (October 12, 2011) (Cohn, J.); Asbill v. Dept. of Children & Families, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-10-6008084-S (September 8, 2011) (Cohn, J.). The factors identified in the regulations and the department’s policy manual are to be considered insofar as they are applicable, but the absence of any particular factor does not compel the conclusion that the person cannot properly be listed on the registry.
In this case, the hearing officer found that this was the only incident of abuse or neglect known to the department and that the chronicity factor therefore was not met. In determining, nevertheless, that the plaintiff should be listed on the registry, the hearing officer considered the plaintiff’s attitude about the incident. She observed that the plaintiff had consistently attempted to minimize or explain the incident; the plaintiff did not express any concern for her violent response to the child; and the plaintiff indicated that she did not want to work with children now because she did not want to be under the department’s " umbrella."
The record is replete with evidence that the plaintiff repeatedly denied any responsibility for the incident. In her statement to the department’s investigator on August 6, 2007, the plaintiff denied that she hit C in the face, claimed that if she did hit C in the face, it was not intentional, and denied that any Klingberg staff members were present or could have witnessed the incident. She felt that she was totally in control of her behavior. She blamed Klingberg staff for not helping her control C, and claimed that the bumps on C’s head were self-inflicted. R., p. 18. In her testimony at the administrative hearing in February 2015, the plaintiff said that she had used an " inappropriate strategy to calm the situation"; R., p. 32; but denied that the event had happened as described by other witnesses. She claimed that she could not have struck C with a closed fist because her fingers had become numb from holding C’s door shut. R., p. 100. She said that she might have accidentally scratched or struck C while trying to free her hair from C’s grasp, but said that if it had been her intention to hurt C, C " would have went to the hospital with more injuries than were she had the night of the incident ... it would have been more than just the two bumps that occurred during the altercation." R., p. 101. She thought that the two Klingberg staff members who gave witness statements to the investigator " were coached or they came in collaboration together to make me appear bad, and take the heat off of them, because they should have been ... there to assist me with restraining [C]." R., p. 102. She claimed that it was never her " plan" to go in and hurt C because she was aware of the consequences of hurting a child. R., p. 103. She denied that she had ever threatened E, and offered as evidence the fact that she had seen E in a restaurant at some unspecified time after the incident, and E did not appear to remember her. R., p. 109. She regarded being placed on the registry as " embarrassing." R., p. 105.
The hearing officer’s concern about C’s lack of insight is justified in light of the record. Although the plaintiff had worked with C for more than five months before this incident occurred, the plaintiff never expressed any concern for C. She did not express any sense of responsibility for the incident, blaming it instead on C and Klingberg staff members. She did not show any awareness of the emotional harm that such an altercation could inflict on a child who had previously been beaten by her mother.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hogan v. Dept . of Children & Families, supra, 290 Conn. 545, 964 A.2d 1213 (2009), does not hold that chronicity is a required element for placement on the registry. Although chronicity was present in Hogan, the court did not state that a finding of chronicity was mandatory. It observed that the evidence in that case indicated that " the plaintiff repeatedly refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, proffering a story that neither the arbitrator nor the hearing officer credited ... In abuse and neglect cases, it is well established that the failure to accept responsibility reasonably may be considered as an indication that there is a risk that the abuse will continue." Id., 566. Similarly, in F.M. v. Commissioner of Children & Families, supra, 143 Conn.App. 465-66, the hearing officer found that the plaintiff’s failure to accept responsibility supported the department’s determination that the plaintiff posed a risk to the health, safety, or well-being of children. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of his subsequent appeal, the Appellate Court considered the fact that the plaintiff continued to minimize the effect of his actions on his children. Id., 481-82. While F.M. involved a parent with a history of abusive conduct, the minimization of the conduct is equally significant when a single incident of abuse by a person entrusted with the care of a child is at issue. The hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in considering the plaintiff’s lack of insight about her violent conduct. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s decision that the plaintiff’s inclusion on the registry should be upheld.
B
Burden of Proof
At oral argument in this court, the plaintiff’s counsel asserted that the hearing officer improperly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of placement on the registry when she scheduled a second day for the hearing and required more evidence about the services the plaintiff had received and about whether there were any incidents in her subsequent employment. The department objected to the plaintiff’s untimely assertion of a new issue.
In its decision of July 13, 2017, the court indicated that it considered the hearing officer’s decision to be ambiguous with respect to the burden of proof and ordered supplemental briefing on that issue. Having received and considered the supplemental briefs, and having again reviewed the entire record, including the transcripts of the hearing, the exhibits, and the hearing officer’s decision, the court now concludes that this late-raised issue does not warrant reversal of the hearing officer’s decision. Although there is some ambiguity in the hearing officer’s decision with regard to " changed conditions, " when read as a whole the final decision is reasonably clear that the hearing officer understood and applied the proper burden of proof for the plaintiff’s initial placement on the registry.
It should be noted here that the court ordinarily will not review a claim that was never asserted before the agency. See Solomon v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, supra, 85 Conn.App. 862; see also Valente v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. 15-6029369-S (October 19, 2015) (Schuman, J.) (holding that failure to raise a claim before the agency precluded review), aff’d per curiam, 169 Conn.App. 908, 155 A.3d 328 (2016). The failure to raise a claim before the agency suggests that the plaintiff did not view the issue as significant at the time of the hearing.
The record in this case makes it clear that the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to object to the second day of the proceeding. The hearing officer’s order of February 23, 2015, indicated that the purpose of the second day was to determine " whether the Appellant has demonstrated changed conditions since the time of the substantiation." R., p. 33. More specifically, the hearing officer stated that " specific documentation" was needed regarding the services the plaintiff had participated in, where she had worked since she was terminated as a result of this incident, and confirmation that she had not had any further incidents in the workplace. R., p. 33. The plaintiff obtained counsel before the second day of the hearing. Neither the plaintiff nor her counsel objected to the hearing officer’s notice. When the hearing officer expressly reiterated the purpose of the hearing on the second day of the hearing and expressly asked whether either party had any questions or needed to make a statement on the record, neither the plaintiff nor her counsel asked for clarification of the burden of proof or the purpose of the additional day. R., pp. 134-35. Nor did they object to the order as an improper shifting of the burden of proof. The plaintiff accordingly did not preserve this claim for appellate review.
Although the issue of the burden of proof was not preserved, this court nevertheless exercised its discretion, in its July 13, 2017 decision, to order supplemental briefing to determine whether the issue of the burden of proof should be considered, and whether the case should be remanded to the hearing officer for clarification of the burden of proof. Upon consideration of the supplemental briefs of the parties and further review of the record and the department’s decision in light of those briefs, the court concludes that the record as a whole demonstrates that the hearing officer properly applied the law, including the burden of proof, in determining that the plaintiff’s placement on the registry should be upheld.
Although the hearing officer additionally considered whether changed conditions existed that would warrant removing the plaintiff from the registry, the court is not persuaded that this additional consideration was improper. The abuse and neglect at issue took place in 2007; the plaintiff requested a hearing and removal from the registry in 2015. On the first day of the hearing, the plaintiff voluntarily testified that after her arrest on charges arising out of the incident, she had obtained counseling, performed community service, had the criminal charges dismissed, and had maintained a clean record since the incident. R., 105-06. In the order for a second day of the hearing, the hearing officer gave the plaintiff the opportunity to provide documentary evidence to corroborate her testimony, which could constitute evidence of changed conditions. This was within the hearing officer’s discretion. General Statutes § 4-181a(b) provides that " [o]n a showing of changed conditions, the agency may reverse or modify the final decision, at any time, at the request of any person or on the agency’s own motion."
It is clear from the decision that the hearing officer correctly held the department to its burden of proof on the facts underlying the substantiation for physical abuse, physical neglect, and emotional neglect. See R., p. 63 (finding that the department " has proven, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that its substantiation of the Appellant for the physical abuse of [C] shall be upheld"); and p. 64 (identifying standards that the department was required to demonstrate for substantiation of emotional neglect and physical neglect). In the discussion of the registry, the hearing officer clearly and correctly stated the standards the department was required to apply to include a person on the registry. R., p. 65. It is clear that the hearing officer found the initial inclusion on the registry to be justified based on the evidence of the severity of the plaintiff’s conduct and of her intent, despite a showing of previous or subsequent incidents. The hearing officer also considered the plaintiff’s lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility for the incident. As discussed earlier in this decision, the hearing officer was not precluded from considering these facts. The Supreme Court has recognized that the failure to accept responsibility for abuse " reasonably may be considered as an indication that there is a risk that the abuse will continue." Hogan v. Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 290 Conn. 566.
The ambiguity noted by the court in its July 13, 2017 decision concerns only the consideration of changed conditions. Such changed conditions, if proven, could warrant the removal of the plaintiff’s name from the registry even though her original inclusion was proper. As the department argued in its supplemental brief, the plaintiff was the person who would be in a position to know what services she had engaged in and what evidence supported her claim to have maintained a clean record since the incident in 2007. As a general rule, a person seeking to remove his or her name from the registry bears the burden of proving a change in circumstances. See Montgomery v. Dept. of Children & Families, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-5016544-S (March 2, 2016) (Cohn, J.T.R.).
The department properly concluded that the plaintiff’s original placement on the registry in 2007 should be upheld. The plaintiff has not shown, as required by General Statutes § 4-183(j), that her substantial rights were violated by the agency’s additional consideration of whether changed conditions warranted her removal from the registry in 2016.
IV
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed as to the issue of the registry. As it was previously dismissed with respect to other issues, the appeal is now dismissed in its entirety.