Opinion
NNHCV186079090S
10-29-2019
Nicole Natale v. City of New Haven et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Ozalis, Sheila A., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
OZALIS, J.
I.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant The City of New Haven (the City) has moved for summary judgment as to the plaintiff Nicole Natale’s six-count second revised complaint, filed on January 16, 2019. Count One alleges a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1), against the City, and Counts Two through Six allege violations of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(5) against Assistant Chief Generoso (Generoso), Lieutenant Otoniel Reyes (Reyes), Sargent Ronald Perry (Perry), Sargent Raymond Tennant (Tennant), and Detective Brian DiAnge (DiAnge), respectively. The plaintiff alleges that while employed as a police officer for the City, she suffered adverse employment actions because of her gender, female, and sexual orientation, lesbian. The defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of gender or sexual orientation discrimination.
All references herein to the complaint are to the plaintiff’s second revised complaint, as it is the operative complaint for purposes of this motion.
The plaintiff does not allege the correct statutory provisions. However, if parties are sufficiently apprised of the claims, then the failure to specifically plead the statute may be excused. Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn.App. 630, 636, 14 A.3d 334 (2011). The plaintiff’s failure to plead a statute must be raised by the defendant or the flaw is waived if the statutory claim is actually litigated. Mullen & Mahon, Inc. v. Mobilmed Support Services, LLC, 62 Conn.App. 1, 773 A.2d 952 (2001). Accordingly, this court will analyze the plaintiff’s claims as if she properly alleges violations of § 46a-60(b)(1) and § 46a-81c(1) because the defendant was on notice of these claims and substantively responded to them without objection. Section 46a-60(b)(1) provides in relevant part: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section ... [f]or an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent ... to discriminate against [an] individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s ... sex ..." Section 46a-81c(1) provides in relevant part: "It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section ... [for an employer ... to discriminate against [an individual] in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s sexual orientation ..."
For the same reasons stated in footnote 2, infra, the court will analyze this claim under the proper statute, § 46a-60(b)(5). Section 46a-60(b)(5) provides in relevant part that it shall be a discriminatory practice "[f]or any person ... to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared to be a discriminatory employment practice."
The following facts are relevant to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff identifies as a lesbian woman. (Compl. ¶2.) She was employed by the City of New Haven Police Department (the Department) beginning in January 2000. (Pl. Dep. 10:8-10.) The plaintiff was assigned to the Homicide Unit, on the day shift, and first worked under Chief Lawlor. (Pl. Dep. 14:23-25, 15:1-7.) Reyes subsequently came to be the supervisor in the Homicide Unit. (Pl. Dep. 15:6-25, 16:1-2.) The plaintiff alleges that while under the supervision of Reyes, Generoso, Perry, and Tennant, the plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions because of her gender and sexual orientation. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that she was reprimanded, unlawfully transferred, denied overtime, instructed to arrest the wrong suspect in a criminal case, and deprived of a riding partner while on patrol, all on account of her protected classes. (Compl. ¶4.) Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies by first filing her complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). Pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-100, the plaintiff received a release of jurisdiction letter from the CHRO on December 19, 2017, and timely filed her complaint with this court on March 15, 2018.
General Statutes § 46a-100 provides in relevant part: "Any person who has filed a complaint with the commission ... and who has obtained a release of jurisdiction ... may bring an action in the superior court ..."
The defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2019, accompanied by a memorandum of law. In response, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on July 8, 2019, supplemented by an affidavit. Thereafter, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff’s opposition on July 15, 2019 and on July 16, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s affidavit. On July 19, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion to strike her affidavit, and on August 12, 2019, this court sustained the plaintiff’s objection when the motion was argued at short calendar.
II
DISCUSSION
"In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ... When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ... Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § 380 [now § 17-45]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fiano v. Old Saybrook Fire Co. No. 1, Inc., 332 Conn. 93, 101, 209 A.3d 629 (2019).
As a preliminary matter, the court must address the evidentiary issues raised by the parties’ arguments. The plaintiff argues that the court may not rely solely on deposition testimony in granting a motion for summary judgment. However, it is well settled that "[w]hile [a party’s] deposition testimony is not conclusive as a judicial admission; General Statutes § 52-200; it is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradictory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact." Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn.App. 449, 450 n.2, 671 A.2d 1329 (1996). Furthermore, although this court denied the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to the present motion, it notes that "a nonmoving party’s conclusory affidavits alone are insufficient grounds to deny a motion for summary judgment." Walker v. Housing Authority, 148 Conn.App. 591, 597, 85 A.3d 1230 (2014).
A. COUNT ONE
Turning to the party’s substantive arguments, the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of discrimination is twofold. First, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that she suffered an adverse employment action. Second, the defendant argues that, even assuming all of the alleged employment actions are materially adverse, the plaintiff cannot show that these actions were motivated by discriminatory animus on account of the plaintiff’s gender or sexual orientation. In support of its motion, the defendant submits the plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the City acted with discriminatory motive. In support of her argument, the plaintiff submits her own affidavit, and an unauthenticated printout of the reported overtime hours in the General Investigations Unit for 2016.
"In defining the contours of our state antidiscrimination statutes, we have looked for guidance to federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal statutory counterpart to [General Statutes] 46a-60." Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 164, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998); see also Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349 (1996). "When a plaintiff claims disparate treatment ... this court employs the burden-shifting analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this analysis, the employee must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination." Craine v. Trinity College, 259 Conn. 625, 636-37, 791 A.2d 518 (2002). Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, then the burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly adverse actions. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. 802; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Third, if the defendant carries this burden, then the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason is false and a pretext for illegal discriminatory bias. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. 804; Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 253; Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc., 316 Conn. 65, 73-74, 111 A.3d 453 (2015).
"In order to establish a prima facie case, the complainant must prove that: (1) he is in [a] protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Board of Education of Norwalk v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 505, 832 A.2d 660 (2003). The defendants do not argue that the plaintiff fails to satisfy the first two prongs of the McDonnell Douglas test. By all accounts, the plaintiff is a qualified detective who identifies as lesbian: both gender and sexual orientation are protected classes under Connecticut law, and the plaintiff’s credentials are undisputed. Instead, the defendants focus their argument on the third and fourth prongs of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
It is well settled in Connecticut that "[a] plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment ... To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities." Amato v. Hearst Corp., 149 Conn.App. 774, 781, 89 A.3d 977 (2014), quoting Brown v. American Golf Corp., 99 Fed.Appx. 341, 343 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Galabya v. New York City Board of Education, 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) ("to constitute an adverse employment action ... a change in working conditions must be ‘materially adverse.’ "). The plaintiff alleges that she suffered multiple adverse employment actions while employed by the City. Specifically, she alleges that she was transferred, denied overtime, excluded from an investigation, reprimanded, deprived of a riding partner, and instructed to arrest the wrong suspect.
"[A] transfer is an adverse employment action if it results in a change of responsibilities so significant as to constitute a setback to the plaintiff’s career ... The key ... is that the plaintiff must show that the transfer created a materially significant disadvantage ..." (Citations omitted.) Galabya, supra, 202 F.3d 641; accord Flynn v. New York State Division of Parole, 620 F.Supp.2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In demonstrating materially significant disadvantage, the "plaintiff [must] proffer objective indicia of material disadvantage; subjective, personal disappointment is not enough." (Citation omitted.) Beyer v. Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2008). "[I]f a transfer is truly lateral and involves no significant changes in an employee’s conditions of employment, the fact that the employee views the transfer either positively or negatively does not of itself render the ... receipt of the transfer [an] adverse employment action." Kessler v. Westchester County Dept. of Social Services, 461 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2006), quoting Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005). "Although a transfer from an elite unit to a less prestigious unit could constitute an adverse employment action, a plaintiff cannot rely on her own opinion of the difference in prestige levels to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Flynn, supra, 620 F.Supp.2d 485-86, citing Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 254-55 (2d Cir. 2007).
See also Smalls v. Allstate Ins. Co., 396 F.Supp.2d 364, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("receiving unfavorable schedules or work assignments ... do[es] not rise to the level of [an] adverse employment action ... because [it does] not have a material impact on the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment"); Albuja v. National Broadcasting Co. Universal, Inc., 851 F.Supp.2d 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (the allegation that the plaintiff was given an undesirable night shift assignment did not constitute an adverse employment action because the plaintiff "ha[d] not asserted that working night shifts caused any diminution in his compensation or job responsibilities").
The plaintiff alleges that her transfers were materially adverse because they resulted in the denial of overtime opportunities. A plaintiff’s failure to "cite to any particular instance in which he sought an overtime opportunity, or an instance where he was denied an ordinary course overtime opportunity" is fatal to a claim of denied overtime. Dhar v. New York City Dept. of Transportation, United States District Court, Docket No. 10-CV-5681 (ENV)(VVP) (E.D.N.Y. 2014) aff’d, 630 Fed.Appx. 14 (2d Cir. 2015). In addition, the fact that the plaintiff may have "earned less than others is insufficient on its own to raise an inference of discrimination." Id., 8.
See also Ramsey v. New York City Health & Hospitals, Corp., United States District Court, Docket No. 98-CV-1594 *7 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000) ("the fact that an overtime job may have on various occasions been taken away from [the] plaintiff and given to another ... worker is not evidence of a discriminatory employment practice adverse to [the] plaintiff for purposes of his disparate treatment claim"); Aiello v. Stamford Hospital, United States District Court, Docket No. 09-CV-1161 *12 (VLB) (D.Conn. August 8, 2011) (same).
In the end of 2014, the plaintiff was transferred to the Sexual Assault Unit, where she stayed for approximately three months. (Pl. Dep. 18:3-16.) The plaintiff avers that this transfer was an adverse employment action because it was accompanied by a loss in overtime opportunities. (Pl. Aff. ¶8, Compl. ¶4d.) However, the plaintiff has no evidence that this transfer was materially adverse. She was placed on the day shift in the Sexual Assault Unit, a schedule which she admittedly preferred. (Pl. Dep. 13:19-24.) She avers that she made more money in the Homicide Unit due to more frequent call-ins when homicides were "fresh" (Pl. Aff. ¶8), but submits no objective evidence of times when she was denied overtime opportunities while in the Sexual Assault Unit. The plaintiff further alleges that she was criticized during a meeting with Generoso, Reyes, Perry, and Tennant, presumably about her performance, which led to the transfer. (Compl. ¶4e-g, Pl. Dep. 109:2-8.) The plaintiff testified that during this meeting she was informed that she was being transferred from the Homicide Unit due to her failure to call in. (Pl. Dep. 138:10-24.) Later, however, the plaintiff testified that she was transferred due to "manpower issues" (Pl. Dep. 138:14-19) and that she didn’t believe she was disciplined at the meeting. (Pl. Dep. 91:23-25.)
The plaintiff also testified that her union informed her that the Department acted permissibly in transferring her, and that "it’s the same thing as if you’re assigned districts in patrol; if you go from one district to the other district ... they can do that." (Pl. Dep. 71:19-22.) Essentially, the union advised the plaintiff that her transfer was a lateral one. "[I]f a transfer is truly lateral," Kessler, supra, 461 F.3d 207, it is not an adverse employment action. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s averment that the Sexual Assault Unit was a "dumping ground" where the Department placed detectives with lessor skill (Pl. Aff. ¶3) cannot sustain her claim because "a plaintiff cannot rely on her own opinion of the difference in prestige levels to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Flynn, supra, 620 F.Supp.2d 485-86. This is also true with regard to the plaintiff’s claims about the status of working in the General Investigations Unit as compared with the Homicide Unit.
Due to the difficult nature of the work in the Sexual Assault Unit, the plaintiff requested a transfer out of that unit to either the Robbery/Burglary Unit or the General Investigations Unit, on the day shift. (Pl. Dep. 117:15-25, 118:1-18, Pl. Aff. ¶13.) The plaintiff was transferred to the General Investigations Unit pursuant to her request, but placed on the night shift (Pl. Dep. 121:22-25, 122:1) under Perry. (Pl. Dep. 22:25, 23:1-8.) The plaintiff testified that being placed on the night shift was an adverse employment action because it was a less desirable shift (Pl. Aff. ¶4); however, receiving subjectively undesirable work shifts does not rise to the level of an adverse employment action where there is no objectively material disadvantage. See Beyer, supra, 524 F.3d 164.
The plaintiff further alleges that the transfer from the Sexual Assault Unit to the General Investigations Unit deprived her of overtime opportunities. (Pl. Dep. 25:4-10, 26:3-10.) She testified that her teammates were consistently called in for overtime, but that she was never called. (Pl. Dep. 79:8-24.) Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that she was denied an overtime opportunity to travel to Maine to obtain a DNA swab from a suspect. (Pl. Aff. ¶13, Compl. ¶4j.) However, the plaintiff testified that she ultimately was authorized to travel to Maine, and received overtime for doing so. (Pl. Dep. 78:12-16.) Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that she was denied an overtime opportunity in conjunction with a homicide investigation. Relatedly, she alleges that under the supervision of Reyes in the Homicide Unit, she was excluded from obtaining information about two homicide files that were her responsibility (Compl. ¶4a), while her male heterosexual colleagues were not so excluded. (Pl. Aff. ¶10, Pl. Dep. 59:15-25, 60:1-4.) Specifically, the plaintiff claims that she was denied the overtime opportunity to interview and proffer the homicide suspect in these cases, who was located in Bridgeport. (Pl. Dep. 65:9-25, 66:1-22.). However, the plaintiff testified that she was ultimately permitted to participate in the handling of the case, and was eventually permitted to interview the suspect in Bridgeport. (Pl. Dep. 65:9-25, 66:1-22.)
As the plaintiff has failed to cite to any instance where she was actually denied an overtime opportunity, this is fatal to her claim. See Dhar, supra, 630 Fed.Appx. 14 (2d Cir. 2015). There also can be no adverse employment action where the plaintiff "has not produced evidence to show that the transfer was to an assignment that was materially less prestigious, materially less suited to his skills and expertise, or materially less conductive to career advancement." Galabya, supra, 202 F.3d 640. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff’s transfers and alleged denials of overtime were not adverse employment actions within the purview of McDonnell Douglas.
Next, the plaintiff alleges that she was instructed by Generoso to arrest the "wrong suspect" in a criminal case. (Compl. ¶4i, Pl. Aff. ¶15.) However, by the plaintiff’s own admission, she did not supply Generoso with pertinent information related to the arrest warrant that may have caused him to think twice before instructing the plaintiff to obtain it. (Pl. Dep. 104:4-20.) This is also not a materially adverse action because it did not change the plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment. In addition, the plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of a partner in her patrol car for two weeks because of her gender and sexual orientation, despite a safety mandate by Generoso that officers should pair up when responding to calls. (Compl. ¶4h, pl. Aff. ¶9, Pl. Dep. 97:13, 98, 99:119.) There is no evidence that this alleged deprivation was materially adverse. Instead, the plaintiff testified that she was alone because her partner was on vacation (Pl. Dep. 98:25, 99:1-8.)
To the extent that the plaintiff claims the action of depriving her a partner in the patrol car was retaliation (Pl. Dep. 99:5-10), and the defendant responds (Def. Mot. Summ. Judg. 2021), this claim is not before the court. The plaintiff does not plead retaliation in her complaint, and as a result this court will not consider it.
Even assuming that the alleged employment actions were materially adverse, the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination fails under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas because no reasonable jury could connect the Department’s conduct to the plaintiff’s gender or sexual orientation. "When a [complainant] alleges disparate treatment, liability depends on whether the protected trait ... actually motivated the employer’s decision ... That is, the [complainant’s protected trait] must have actually played a role in [the employer’s decisionmaking] process and [have] had a determinative influence on the outcome." (Alterations in original; citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education of Norwalk, supra, 26 Conn. 505, citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120, S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[D]isparate treatment simply refers to those cases where certain individuals are treated differently than others." Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 236 Conn. 104. "[W]hen a plaintiff attempts to establish ... discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must first present some evidence from which an inference may be drawn that other similarly situated individuals not in the protected class were treated more favorably than the plaintiff." Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 516, 43 A.3d 69 (2012).
"To be probative, this evidence must establish that the plaintiff and the individuals to whom she seeks to compare herself were similarly situated in all material respects ... [A]n employee offered for comparison will be deemed to be similarly situated in all material respects if (1) ... the plaintiff and those he maintains were similarly situated and were subject to the same workplace standards and (2) ... the conduct for which the employer imposed discipline was of comparable seriousness." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 514. In other words, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her co-workers had "a situation sufficiently similar to hers to support at least a minimal inference that the difference of treatment may be attributable to discrimination." McGuinness v. Lincoln Hall, 263 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2001).
Here, the plaintiff does not present any objective evidence connecting the Department’s actions to her gender or sexual orientation. She repeatedly asserts that she was treated less favorably than her heterosexual male colleagues because Reyes "does not like females" (Pl. Dep. 113:18-22), and that Reyes had a problem with the plaintiff because she is "a female" and "has a wife" (Pl. Dep. 26:13-14.) Yet, she also testified that no one in the Department made any comments to her about her gender or sexual orientation. (Pl. Dep. 28:16-18, 39:20-23, 109:9-11.) The plaintiff comes forth with no evidence demonstrating how her alleged comparators were similarly situated to her, and even submits an unauthenticated list of police earnings showing that her male partner Sacco, who presumably would be the most similarly situated, was paid less overtime than she was. (Pl. Ex. To Aff.)
In further support of her argument, the plaintiff makes sweeping generalizations devoid of evidentiary support about how all men in the department were treated more favorably, without providing specific facts from which a jury could compare the treatment of heterosexual male employees. For example, the plaintiff testified that no male employee was ever ordered to issue an arrest warrant as quickly as she was (Pl. Dep. 106:13-15), that every male detective was allowed to travel wherever they needed to conduct an investigation (Pl. Dep. 111:11-15), and that Reyes never spoke to male employees the way that he spoke to her. (Pl. Aff. ¶6.) She presents no evidence, aside from her own perceptions, that Reyes or any of the other defendants had a bias against lesbian women. "Mere statements of legal conclusions ... and bald assertions, without more, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact capable of defeating summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Citimortgage, Inc. v. Coolbeth, 147 Conn.App. 183, 193, 81 A.3d 1189 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 925, 86 A.3d 469 (2014).
While the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case is de minimis at the summary judgment stage, Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001), "a jury cannot infer discrimination from thin air," Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1998). Because the plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, this court need not address whether the defendant has met its burden in establishing that the plaintiff’s gender and sexual orientation was not a motivating factor in its employment actions. As a result, the defendant has succeeded in demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact that could give rise to an inference of discrimination and granting summary judgment is proper. Therefore, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count One is granted.
B. COUNTS TWO, THREE, FOUR, FIVE & SIX
With regard to Counts Two through Six, the plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of aiding and abetting discriminatory conduct under General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(5) where she has failed to prove that any discriminatory conduct has occurred. See Agosto v. Premier Maintenance, Inc., 185 Conn.App. 559, 197 A.3d 938 (2018) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment on aiding and abetting count where the plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case of discrimination). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Counts Two through Six is granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s second revised complaint is granted in its entirety.