Opinion
2019–06280 Index No. 618419/16
08-05-2020
Andres NARVAEZ–REYES, Appellant, v. Jorge Juan PALOMINO III, et al., Respondents.
Cannon & Acosta, LLP, Huntington Station N.Y. (June Redeker of counsel), for appellant. John J. Bello, Jr., Hauppauge, N.Y. (John C. Meszaros of counsel), for respondents.
Cannon & Acosta, LLP, Huntington Station N.Y. (June Redeker of counsel), for appellant.
John J. Bello, Jr., Hauppauge, N.Y. (John C. Meszaros of counsel), for respondents.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, BETSY BARROS, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (William G. Ford, J.), dated April 11, 2019. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 23, 2016. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys. , 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine, as well as the plaintiff's right knee and left hip, did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). In addition, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Grasso v. Angerami, 79 N.Y.2d 813, 814–815, 580 N.Y.S.2d 178, 588 N.E.2d 76 ; Radoncic v. Faulk, 170 A.D.3d 1058, 1060, 96 N.Y.S.3d 352 ; Skuret v. Yoyo Cab Corp., 169 A.D.3d 849, 850, 92 N.Y.S.3d 730 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
DILLON, J.P., HINDS–RADIX, BARROS and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.