Nails v. Amguard Ins. Co.

Full title: ANGELA NAILS, Plaintiff, v. AMGUARD INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants.

Court: United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania

Date published: Jul 10, 2023

Civil 3:23-CV-557 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 10, 2023)

Opinion

Civil 3:23-CV-557

07-10-2023

ANGELA NAILS, Plaintiff, v. AMGUARD INSURANCE CO., et al., Defendants.

Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge

Mariani Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

Angela Nails, a resident of Georgia, has filed this pro se personal injury lawsuit in federal court. Nails' complaint appears to name three defendants: the alleged tortfeasor who struck her car, Jerry Privette, Privette's employer, Hide-N-Seek Towing, and the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, Amguard Insurance Company. According to Nails' complaint all three of these defendants are directly responsible to her for payment of as much as $300,000,000 in damages which she alleges stem from a February 2022 automobile accident. (Doc. 1).

Amguard, the alleged tortfeasor's insurance company, has now moved to dismiss Nails' complaint, arguing that Pennsylvania law, which governs this diversity personal injury lawsuit, does not permit a tort plaintiff like Nails to maintain a direct cause of action against the alleged tortfeasor's insurance carrier. Because we agree that such claims are not permitted under Pennsylvania law for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this motion to dismiss be granted.

II. Background

While Angela Nails' pro se complaint demands a great deal from the reader, liberally construed it appears that Nails is alleging that she was injured and her automobile was damaged in a February 14, 2022, rear end accident caused by Jerry Privette, a tow truck driver employed by Hide-N-Seek Towing. (Doc. 1). Nails alleges that the accident was entirely Privette's fault, and further contends that the tortfeasor, his employer, and the employer's insurance carrier have wrongfully failed to settle any personal injury or vehicle damages claims. On the basis of these averments Nails sues Privette, Privette's employer, Hide-N-Seek Towing, and the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, Amguard Insurance Company, demanding payment of $300,000,000 in damages which she alleges stem from this automobile accident. (Id.)

The insurance carrier defendant, Amguard Insurance Company, has now filed a motion to dismiss this complaint which contends that under Pennsylvania law a person like Nails who claims that she was injured as a result of the actions of an alleged tortfeasor may not bring a direct action against the tortfeasor's liability insurer. Therefore, Amguard seeks dismissal of this complaint. (Doc. 7). This motion is fully briefed, (Docs. 8 and 14) and is therefore ripe for resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this motion to dismiss be granted.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S-, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. Nails Cannot Maintain Direct Actions Against Her Alleged Tortfeasor's Liability Insurance Carrier under Pennsylvania Law.

There is a certain ambiguity to the jurisdictional basis for Nails' pro se federal court complaint. However, this much is clear: Nails alleges that she is a resident of Georgia and Amguard is a Pennsylvania company. Moreover, Nails asserts claims against Amguard under Pennsylvania law. Therefore, we will treat Nails' claims against Amguard as grounded upon this court's diversity jurisdiction. “As a federal court sitting in diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania shall apply to the instant case.” Maghakian v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 171 F.Supp.3d 353, 358 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir.2000)).

Construing Nails' claims against Amguard under the governing principles of Pennsylvania law we are constrained to observe that Pennsylvania law plainly forecloses such claims. As one court has recently observed:

“It is well-settled that under Pennsylvania law, an injured party has no right to directly sue the insurer of an alleged tortfeasor unless a provision of the policy or a statute create such a right.” Apalucci v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 145 F.3d 630, 632 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Vella v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 1:17-CV-1900, 2018 WL 1907335, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2018) (“In Pennsylvania, it is well-settled law that a third-party claimant cannot bring a cause of action for bad faith against an alleged tortfeasor's liability insurer.” (citing Strutz v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 415 Pa.Super. 371, 609 A.2d 569, 570-71 (1992) and Brown v. Candelora, 708 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. Commw. 1998))).

Holovich v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 600 F.Supp.3d 572, 579 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Simply put, “absent a permissive statute or policy provision, a tort claimant cannot maintain a direct action against the insurance company.” Mallalieu-Golder Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., 254 F.Supp.2d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

Given this settled tenet of Pennsylvania law, Nails may not maintain a direct action against Amguard based upon the alleged negligence of one of its policyholders. However, this does not mean that Nails is completely without legal recourse. Instead, Nails must pursue her claims directly against her alleged tortfeasors, and then if she secures a recovery from the tortfeasor, she can rely upon the insurer to fulfill its contractual obligations to pay any tortfeasor claims. On this score, we note that Nails has brought direct claims against Privette and Hide-N-Seek Towing in this complaint. We also observe that these defendants have moved to dismiss this complaint against them noting that, like Nails, they are residents of Georgia and therefore are not subject to the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 16). We will address this motion through a separate Report and Recommendation.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the Amguard Insurance Company's motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) be GRANTED.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.