From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Nacson v. Semmel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 11, 2002
292 A.D.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)

Opinion

01-00136

February 4, 2002

March 11, 2002.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and misrepresentation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Martin, J.), dated November 27, 2000, which granted the defendant's motion to vacate her default in opposing his motion for summary judgment and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and as barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Robert A. Ugelow, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Benjamin M. Meskin of counsel), for appellant.

Herman H. Tarnow, New York, N.Y., for respondent.

SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, and BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.


ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default must demonstrate to the court the existence of excusable default and a meritorious defense to the action (see, CPLR 5015). In matrimonial actions, the court has adopted a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults (see, Singer v. Singer, 136 A.D.2d 695; Antonovich v. Antonovich, 84 A.D.2d 799). Here, the court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the default against the defendant. The defendant established excusable default due to the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to inform her of the proper adjourned date and the theft of her counsel's files a week before a response was due (see, Matter of Crawford v. Perales, 205 A.D.2d 307). In addition, the defendant established a meritorious defense to the action.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint. Strong public policy considerations militate against allowing recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress when a claim arises out of the interpersonal relationships in a matrimonial context, as it does here (see, Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8; Eller v. Eller, 136 A.D.2d 678). In any event, all of the causes of action were barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 213; CPLR 214; CPLR 215).


Summaries of

Nacson v. Semmel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Mar 11, 2002
292 A.D.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
Case details for

Nacson v. Semmel

Case Details

Full title:MARC NACSON, APPELLANT, v. ANDREA PEPPI SEMMEL, ETC., RESPONDENT

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Mar 11, 2002

Citations

292 A.D.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
738 N.Y.S.2d 888

Citing Cases

Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer

Despite the abolition of interspousal immunity for torts, New York does not recognize a cause of action to…

Spector v. Wender

Furthermore, public policy considerations militate against allowing recovery for emotional distress in…