Opinion
No. 78-186
Decided December 28, 1978. Rehearing denied January 25, 1979. Certiorari denied April 2, 1979.
From a summary judgment dismissing his complaint against hospital and its employee for injuries arising from the alleged negligence of the employee, plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part.
1. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS — Transportation of Plaintiff — Within Hospital — Inextricably Involved — Providing Care — Two-Year Statute of Limitations — Applicable — Claim Against Hospital. The transportation of a patient from one area of a hospital to another for the purpose of receiving physical therapy is inextricably involved with providing care for that patient; consequently, the two-year statute of limitations contained in § 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, is applicable to claim against hospital arising from injuries allegedly sustained during such transportation.
2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — Two-Year Statute — Applicable — Licensed Practitioners — Healing Arts — Hospital Employee — Not Covered — Dismissal of Action — Error. The two-year limitation period contained in § 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973, is extended only to medical practitioners who have secured a license to practice the healing arts described in the statute, and, absent a clear legislative intent to restrict further the common law right of action against an employee of a licensed health care facility, such a limitation may not be inferred by the courts; consequently, where individual defendant, a hospital employee, was not such a licensed practitioner, the trial court erred in dismissing complaint against that defendant on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations period had run.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable James C. Flanigan, Judge.
Tague, Goss, Schilken Beem, P.C., Clifford L. Beem, for plaintiff-appellant.
Zarlengo, Mott Zarlengo, Edward J. York, Jr., for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff, James R. Myers, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his complaint against defendants, Charlesetta Woodall and Saint Anthony Hospital, for injuries arising from the alleged negligence of Woodall. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The record reflects that Myers was a patient at Saint Anthony's Hospital on June 24, 1974. On that date, Woodall, an employee of Saint Anthony's was pushing a cart on which Myers was riding for the purpose of transporting Myers from his room to the physical therapy facility in the hospital. In the course of this endeavor, Woodall allegedly caused the cart to collide with some type of metal beam with the result that Myers was injured.
The complaint in this action was filed more than two years after Myers suffered the injury. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment based upon § 13-80-105, C.R.S. 1973. Insofar as pertinent here, the statute provides:
"No person shall be permitted to maintain an action, whether such action sounds in tort or contract, to recover damages from a licensed or certified hospital, . . . due to alleged negligence or breach of contract in providing care, or from any person licensed in this state . . . to practice medicine, chiropractic, nursing, . . . or other healing arts on account of the alleged negligence or breach of contract of such person in the practice of the profession for which he is licensed . . . unless such action is instituted within two years . . . ." (emphasis supplied)
Myers first contends that it was error to dismiss his claim against Saint Anthony's because the statute only affords protection to Saint Anthony's if it is providing health care to patients by persons licensed in the healing arts. The record reflects that Woodall was not licensed to perform any of the healing arts specified in the statute and that she was merely transporting Myers from one area of the hospital to the other. Thus, Myers reasons that no "health care" was involved at the time he was injured. We find no merit in this contention.
Where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity is involved, the statute must be interpreted as written. Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). The limitation period contained in § 13-80-105 was adopted for two separate classes of health care services: licensed hospitals and licensed practitioners. We are concerned here only with a hospital.
[1] The transportation of a patient from one area of a hospital to another for the purpose of receiving physical therapy is inextricably involved with providing care for that patient. The term "providing care" must be deemed to contemplate all activities of hospital employees which are ancillary to and inherently involved in providing medical service to the patient.
Myers next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint against Woodall. We agree.
[2] The two-year limitation period is extended only to medical practitioners who have secured a license to practice the healing arts described in the statute. Woodall is not so licensed, and, absent a clear legislative intent to further restrict the common law right of action against an employee of a licensed health care facility, see Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960), we may not infer that intent. See Jones v. Kristensen, 38 Colo. App. 513, 563 P.2d 959 (1977), aff'd, 195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978).
The judgment dismissing Myers' complaint against Saint Anthony's is affirmed. The judgment dismissing Myers' complaint against Woodall is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate Myers' complaint and for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
JUDGE SMITH and JUDGE STERNBERG concur.