Opinion
24A-JV-615
09-16-2024
M.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Aaron J. Spolarich Bennett Boehning &Clary, LLP Lafayette, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Elvis Rivera-Salinas Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Montgomery Circuit Court Trial Court Cause Nos. 54C01-2304-JD-75, 54C01-2305-JD-89 The Honorable Darren C. Chadd, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Aaron J. Spolarich Bennett Boehning &Clary, LLP Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Elvis Rivera-Salinas Certified Legal Intern Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge
[¶1] M.W., a delinquent child, violated the conditions of her probation and was eventually made a ward of the Indiana Department of Correction ("the DOC"). M.W. now appeals, challenging her placement in the DOC. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On April 28, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging that then fifteen-year-old M.W. (born in September 2007) had been physically violent with her mother and brother. The State sought a delinquency adjudication for two counts of domestic battery, which would be Class A misdemeanors if committed by an adult. On May 24, 2023, the State filed a second delinquency petition alleging that M.W. engaged in criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult, because M.W. damaged a Chromebook at her school that month.
[¶3] The trial court held a consolidated fact-finding hearing where it determined that M.W. committed the two counts of domestic battery, and M.W. admitted that she committed the count of criminal mischief. The trial court adjudicated M.W. a delinquent child and set the matter for a dispositional hearing on June 30, 2023. On that date, the trial court placed M.W. on probation for nine months. As part of its dispositional order, the trial court ordered GPS monitoring and set a curfew for M.W., specifying that M.W. could "leave the home only if with her mother, for employment, for approved counselling, or as otherwise specifically approved." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 42, 48, 53, 55.
[¶4] On July 11, 2023, less than two weeks later, the State filed a petition for emergency detention based on a series of alleged probation violations. The trial court granted the petition. The next day, the State filed a petition to revoke M.W.'s probation alleging that, among other things, M.W. had been using marijuana, had stolen a neighbor's cellphone, had stolen alcohol from CVS, and had been sneaking out of her mother's home at night. See id. at 60-61.
[¶5] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on August 2, 2023, where M.W. admitted to the allegations. At that hearing, M.W.'s probation officer testified that M.W. faced issues with her mental health that needed to be addressed, including recent diagnoses of major depressive disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, cannabis use disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The probation officer added that M.W. "ha[d] a significant problem with authority, or accepting any sort of direction, from nearly everyone that [the officer] observed [M.W.] to have come in contact with." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 18. The probation officer also expressed concerns about substance abuse, noting that M.W. had used "[m]arijuana, alcohol, and . . . a chemical substance . . . [that] can be used to clean off keyboards . . . [t]hat produces some sort of euphoric effect . . . when the user ingest[s] it," which posed a risk for long-term brain injury or death. Id. at 19. The probation officer opined that "family therapy [was] definitely necessary" based on "the toxic relationship between [M.W.] and her mother and her family members." Id. The probation officer added that addressing M.W.'s needs in the community had not gone well, and that M.W.'s needs could not be met in the community. The probation officer recommended that M.W. be placed in the Josiah White residential program in Wabash. The probation officer noted that she had been in touch with the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS"), which was "in agreement with the need for residential placement" for M.W. Id. at 21.
[¶6] The trial court entered a written order directing that M.W. "should be placed in a residential [p]lacement" at the Josiah White facility. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65. The court stated that this placement option was in M.W.'s best interests because M.W. was "out of the control of her parents, probation, and her home detention monitoring agency." Id. The trial court noted that, "[b]ased on the information received, [M.W.] ha[d] continued to commit delinquent acts, including stealing from stores and her neighbor" and "alcohol and drug use." Id. The court added that, "[s]ince being recently placed [on] probation," M.W. "ha[d] not complied with curfew, ha[d] been sneaking out of her home, ha[d] removed her GPS monitor in order to conceal her location, and ha[d] been associating with persons without her parent's knowledge." Id. The court said that it "believe[d] that [M.W.] pose[d] a danger to herself and the community." Id. M.W. was accepted into the Josiah White facility and began programming.
[¶7] About two months later, on September 29, 2023, the trial court held a review hearing and determined that M.W. should remain at the residential facility. The trial court held another review hearing on February 16, 2024. By that point, M.W. had completed the residential programming. However, there was evidence that M.W.'s behavioral issues and lack of effort had prevented her from completing the program by the anticipated completion date of January 19, 2024. When asked to elaborate on behavioral issues that impeded progress, M.W.'s case manager referred to "staff disrespect," noting that M.W. "had urinated in a trash can" and had also been "defiant with her peers[.]" Tr. Vol. 2 p. 56.
[¶8] The case manager agreed that M.W. had "done the minimum effort in order to have satisfied people" at the facility in completing the programming. Id. The case manager added that, with M.W. having completed the programming, the facility would not accept M.W. as a placement any longer. She explained that "the only thing that [M.W.] would be able to do is therapy" at the facility, which was why the facility's leadership did not want M.W. to come back. Id. at 61. The case manager acknowledged that M.W.'s therapist was in favor of allowing M.W. to remain at the facility to participate in therapy. Regarding other placement options, the case manager testified that, at that point, she did not believe that M.W. was ready to return to her mother's home. As to placement in the DOC, the case manager said: "I think that [M.W.] would not be a good fit there although she has a lot to learn. Um, I don't know if another placement would be recommended for her. She has made growth in the aspect of not wanting to use substances." Id. at 57. The case manager noted that M.W. continued to struggle with defiant behaviors, stating: "There have been several instances that I've had to tell her hard news that she's been very upset with me and slammed the door in my face, or punched the walls, or cussed me out, cussed out staff, um, been very defiant, or will mock us[.]" Id. at 58.
[¶9] M.W.'s probation officer testified that, when it came to schoolwork, M.W. had "done very well" and exhibited "exceptional discipline" in ultimately earning ten credits toward her high school diploma. Id. at 64. The probation officer also noted that M.W. had "completed the IOT and substance use treatment program" at the Josiah White facility and "passed all of her drug screens upon returning home from her home passes." Id. However, the probation officer testified that M.W. continued to "struggle[] with" behavioral issues, noting:
[E]ach month with the exception of December [M.W.] has had poor interactions with staff and peers, she's earned special circumstances for tattooing, for kissing a peer. She has gotten in trouble and most recently been placed on a behavioral contract due to her continued behaviors. When staff tried to redirect her or give her direction, she refuses to listen to them. She curses at everyone in the cottage, and the staff members, her case manager, at her mother, she's been defiant in our monthly treatment meetings, towards me disrespectful, just the behaviors have, that got her placed at [Josiah] White's in the first place, have not significantly improved.Id. at 64-65. The probation officer added that she "believe[d] it would be an unwise and unsafe decision to return [M.W.] to her mother's home." Id. at 65. That belief was "[b]ased on [M.W.'s] continued behaviors," including those exhibited when M.W. had "home pass" opportunities to stay with her mother. Id. M.W. had "two successful home passes" out of "maybe eight [or] ten[.]" Id. The probation officer added that, on "[t]he rest, there were . . . problems that she had with her mother and sister" that involved "[r]efusing to follow her mother's rules" and "cursing at her mother, which is a rule in their home that there is no cursing allowed." Id. The probation officer noted that M.W. also defied her mother's authority during a recent visit by "le[aving] home without permission twice . . . while she was supposed to be at home[.]" Id.
[¶10] Regarding placement options for M.W., the probation officer testified that she consulted with a "probation service consultant" from DCS "to see if there were any other placement treatment options for [M.W.]" Id. at 66. The probation officer "was advised that [M.W.] does not qualify for another residential placement . . . [a]s she ha[d] technically . . . successfully completed the [Josiah White] program despite her behaviors." Id. The probation officer relayed that DCS "suggested that probation look into [a] group home setting," which was something she "ha[d] attempted to do . . . without success at th[a]t point[.]" Id. The probation officer noted that she contacted "[t]he Miriam Home at Open Arms," which was the facility DCS told her to contact. Id. Although she "ha[d] called and left messages . . . for over the last week," the probation officer was so far unable to "get anyone to respond[.]" Id. When the State asked if the probation officer had tried contacting other facilities, she said: "No, that's the direction I have from DCS." Id. The probation officer agreed that, as of the review hearing, she did not "have a firm no . . . or a firm yes" regarding a group home option. Id. As for placement in a group home, the probation officer noted that this would be "a nonsecure facility," which was viewed as less restrictive than the residential setting where M.W. had been placed. Id. at 69. The probation officer testified that, "[d]ue to [M.W.'s] behaviors," she "believe[d] [M.W.] needs to set in her . . . level of care," "not [take] a step down." Id.
[¶11] The probation officer noted that, "[a]s far as probation is aware," the DOC was "the only other option available." Id. at 67. The probation officer ultimately recommended that M.W. "go to secured detention" that day and "be ordered to the [DOC]." Id. The probation officer noted that, if the trial court was inclined to allow M.W. to stay with her mother, the probation officer "recommend[ed] that [M.W.] be placed on a suspended commitment to the [DOC]" and engage "Family Preservation Services," noting: "[W]e can try all of that again." Id. at 68. She then cautioned that the community approach did not go well last time.
[¶12] After hearing the evidence, the trial court expressed uncertainty that M.W. had "addressed with any earnest . . . the real issues that needed to be addressed" that led to her placement at the residential facility. Id. at 75-76. The trial court added that, although M.W. had made progress in the intervening months, it "question[ed] whether it would be safe, frankly, to return [M.W.] home at th[at] point." Id. at 76. The court said there was "work yet to be done" regarding M.W.'s behavior and, apart from the DOC, the "entire spectrum" of less-restrictive interventions had been exhausted. Id. at 76. The court ultimately placed M.W. in the DOC. M.W. now brings this consolidated appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] In deciding where to place a delinquent child, the trial court must comply with Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 ("the Dispositional Statute"), which states:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.
[¶14] We review the trial court's placement decision for an abuse of discretion. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the placement decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. In conducting our review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., Meehan v. Meehan, 425 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind. 1981). Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the court's decision disposition and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See id. This deferential standard recognizes the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence and tailor a dispositional order that suits the circumstances based on the available placement options and the particular needs of the child. Cf. D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
[¶15] On appeal, M.W. challenges the trial court's decision to place her in the DOC. M.W. claims that the placement decision was contrary to the Dispositional Statute. She suggests that the trial court should have considered "less restrictive settings that promote[d] both the safety of the community and [her] best interest[.]" Appellant's Br. p. 11. M.W. characterizes her time at the Josiah White facility as successful, asserting that the trial court improperly placed her in the DOC "because she apparently did not successfully complete [the] programming successfully enough." Id. at 14. M.W. points out that her caseworker did not think the DOC was a good fit. M.W. focuses on other evidence favorable to her position, including evidence that she exhibited discipline and progress with respect to her schoolwork, and made strides to address issues with substance abuse. M.W. points out that the Josiah White facility was not refusing her placement because of behavioral issues, but instead because she "maximized all treatment" at the facility, i.e., "[h]er treatment work [was] completed" there. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 61. M.W. also directs us to a letter she wrote to the court, wherein M.W. acknowledged "difficulty" listening to her mother and the facility staff, and informed the court that these issues were "something [she was] willing to continue working on." Ex. Vol. 3 p. 3.
[¶16] We note that, although M.W. generally focuses on the evidence least favorable to the trial court's placement decision, our role is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. Cf., e.g., Meehan, 425 N.E.2d at 161. In this case, the trial court did not immediately place M.W. in the DOC. Rather, the trial court adjudicated M.W. a delinquent child in June 2023 and gave M.W. the opportunity to comply with conditions of probation. However, shortly thereafter, the State filed an emergency petition to detain M.W., and M.W. admitted to violating the conditions of her probation by, among other things, sneaking out, stealing alcohol, and stealing a phone from a neighbor. The trial court then gave M.W. the chance to participate in programming at the Josiah White residential facility. At the instant review hearing, which took place several months later, there was evidence that M.W. had been minimally compliant in completing programming available to her at Josiah White. Although there was evidence that M.W. exhibited commendable discipline in her educational pursuits, there was also evidence that M.W. had not modified the behaviors that led to her placement at the facility. Indeed, there was evidence that M.W. remained defiant when visiting her mother's home and leaving without permission. M.W. also exhibited volatile behavior at the facility.
[¶17] To the extent there was evidence indicating that M.W. might be successful in less-restrictive settings, the record presented conflicting evidence-including evidence that M.W. had previously been unsuccessful on probation-indicating that M.W. needed a more structured environment to successfully modify her behaviors. Indeed, at one point, M.W.'s probation officer advised against any placement less restrictive than the Josiah White facility, recommending that M.W. be "set in her . . . level of care" and not take a step down. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 69. Furthermore, there was evidence that M.W. could not return to the Josiah White facility and that, having completed residential programming, M.W. was ineligible for placement at a comparable residential facility. As for other placement options, M.W. points out on appeal that placement in a group home-rather than the DOC-may have been a viable option. M.W. suggests that the probation department should have contacted facilities other than the Miriam Home at Open Arms, which was the name of the group home DCS identified for consideration by M.W.'s probation officer. M.W. emphasizes that her probation officer "had not received a response" as to whether the Miriam Home at Open Arms home would accept her. Appellant's Br. p. 17. M.W. asserts that, under the circumstances, the court should have ordered a "suspended commitment to the [DOC] with probation" or "held [her] in detention until an appropriate group home was located." Id. M.W. points out that these options "would have permitted [her] to receive . . . intensive family therapy," which was a form of therapy recommended by her therapist. Id.
[¶18] In all delinquency matters, the DOC is generally viewed as a "last resort" because it is the most extreme disposition in the continuum of placement options. See, e.g., G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 190 (Ind. 2024). Here, there was no indication that a less-restrictive placement option was available, and the trial court was confronted with evidence of M.W.'s escalating delinquent conduct, unsuccessful participation in probation in the past, and ongoing defiant behaviors that again involved leaving home without permission. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court was well within its discretion to conclude that placing M.W. in the secure, structured environment of the DOC was in her best interests. We therefore affirm the placement decision.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.