Opinion
23-3009
11-12-2024
JEAN BOSCO MUTARAMBIRWA, Appellant v. TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE; ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY; DENNIS DOWD; LOUISE G. SPENCER; MEDIATRICE MUTARAMBIRWA; GEORGE LOPEZ
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 8, 2024
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-20-cv-06155) District Judge: Honorable Claire C. Cecchi
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
OPINION [*]
KRAUSE, CIRCUIT JUDGE.
Appellant Jean Bosco Mutarambirwa appeals from the District Court's denial without prejudice of his motion for a preliminary injunction. Because that denial is not a final, appealable order, we will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Our jurisdiction is putatively invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). While we lack appellate jurisdiction over Mutarambirwa's appeal, we always have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction. George v. Rushmore Serv. Ctr., LLC, 114 F.4th 226, 234 (3d Cir. 2024).
After a New Jersey court concluded Mutarambirwa had harassed his wife, it entered a restraining order against him which, among other things, prevents him from possessing a firearm for the greater of two years or the duration of the restraining order, as authorized by New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-17-35. Dissatisfied, Mutarambirwa brought a § 1983 action, alleging the PDVA infringes his First and Second Amendment rights, and sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court denied his request for a preliminary injunction, and Mutarambirwa timely moved for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
Our jurisdiction usually depends on a final order from which an appeal is taken, Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 438 (3d Cir. 2003), and because reconsideration was still pending at that point, the District Court's denial was not a final order. Nonetheless, Mutarambirwa then noticed this appeal. In the normal course, once the District Court denied reconsideration while his appeal remained pending, we could consider it a final order over which we could exercise jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i).
Here, however, the District Court denied Mutarambirwa's motion "without prejudice" and invited him to "file a renewed motion for reconsideration . . . following the Supreme Court's" then-forthcoming decision in United States v. Rahimi, 144 S.Ct. 1889 (2024). App. 21-22. And because denials "without prejudice" do not constitute final, appealable orders, Def. Distributed v. Att'y Gen. of N.J., 972 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2020), Mutarambirwa has appealed a non-final order. We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction and will dismiss on that basis.
[*] This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.