Opinion
C.A. No. 09C-10-103 PLA.
Submitted: February 15, 2010.
Decided: February 17, 2010.
ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.
DENIED.This 17th day of February, 2010, it appears to the Court that:
1. After experiencing persistent problems with her new Suzuki Verona, Plaintiff Diane Murray ("Murray") brought claims against its manufacturer, Defendant American Suzuki Motor Corporation ("Suzuki"). Murray's suit alleged violations of the Delaware Automobile Warranty Act (also known as the "Lemon Law"), the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Improvement Act, and the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act. Upon a Motion to Dismiss filed by Suzuki, the Court held that Murray's Magnuson-Moss claim was time-barred by the four-year limitations period set forth in § 2-725 of Delaware's version of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-725 provides that a cause of action accrues "when tender of delivery is made." As the Court explained in its Opinion of January 25, 2010:
The parties dispute whether, in the context of a claim brought against a vehicle manufacturer, "tender of delivery" refers to the manufacturer's delivery to a dealership or other middleman, or to the delivery of the vehicle to the end consumer. Because Murray filed suit more than four years after Suzuki delivered the Verona to the dealership, but less than four years after the dealership delivered the car to her, a different result will obtain depending upon which interpretation is applied.
Unfortunately for Murray, when called upon to interpret the relevant "delivery" under § 2-725, this Court has repeatedly held that "the warranty limitations period accrues on the date the defendant charged with the breach tenders delivery."
Murray v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 2010 WL 323506, at *4 (Del. Super. Jan. 25, 2010) (citation omitted).
Murray now applies to the Court for certification of two questions of law and interlocutory appeal of the portion of the Court's decision dismissing her Magnuson-Moss claim. Specifically, Murray seeks to have the following questions certified:
(a) Whether the statute of limitations set forth in 6 Del. C. § 2-725 (2) begins to accrue upon tender of delivery of the vehicle to the dealer or upon delivery to the consumer; and
(b) Whether interpretation of the language of 6 Del. C. § 2-725 (2) as meaning tender of delivery to the dealer instead of to the ultimate intended purchaser violates the intents and purposes of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which protects the warranty rights of consumers and provides them with a means to enforce a manufacturer's breach of warranty upon tender of goods to them.
Pl.'s Application, ¶ 3.
Murray contends that the previous decisions of this Court offer "conflicting interpretations of the tender language" used in 6 Del. C. § 2-725. She proposes that these questions of law are urgent and important in that Murray's vehicle is inoperable due to the alleged defects and the use of the manufacturer's date of tender to start the limitations period of § 2-725 vitiates the ability of plaintiffs to enforce manufacturers' warranties, despite the consumer-protective purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
2. In response, Suzuki denies that this issue meets the criteria for certification of questions of law or an interlocutory appeal. Suzuki argues that the Court's decision did not determine a substantial issue or establish a legal right. Furthermore, Suzuki indicates that the meaning of "tender" under § 2-725(2) has not been subject to conflicting interpretation because "only in those limited instances where the date of delivery by the manufacturer is unknown and/or irrelevant" has the Court used the date of delivery to the consumer as the operative "delivery" triggering the running of the limitations period.
Def.'s Resp., ¶ 4.
3. Under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42, an interlocutory appeal will not be certified unless the trial court's order determines a substantial issue, establishes a legal right, and meets at least one of the five additional criteria set forth in Rule 42(b). The first Rule 42(b) criterion incorporates the "criteria applicable to proceedings for certification of questions of law set forth in Rule 41." The reasons for which the Supreme Court will accept certified questions of law under Rule 41 include, in relevant part, that "[t]he decisions of the trial courts are conflicting upon the question of law." Certification may also be appropriate where the issue is a matter of first impression or the "question of law relates to the constitutionality, construction or application of a statute of this State which has not been, but should be, settled by the Court." A question of law may be certified by this Court "if there is an important and urgent reason for an immediate determination of such question or questions by [the Supreme] Court and the certifying court has not decided the question or questions in the case."
The five criteria provided under the rule are as follows:
(i) Same as Certified Question. Any of the criteria applicable to proceedings for certification of questions of law set forth in Rule 41; or (ii) Controverted Jurisdiction. The interlocutory order has sustained the controverted jurisdiction of the trial court; or (iii) Substantial Issue. An order of the trial court has reversed or set aside a prior decision of the court, a jury, or an administrative agency from which an appeal was taken to the trial court which had determined a substantial issue and established a legal right, and a review of the interlocutory order may terminate the litigation, substantially reduce further litigation, or otherwise serve considerations of justice; or (iv) Prior Judgment Opened. The interlocutory order has vacated or opened a judgment of the trial court; or (v) Case Dispositive Issue. A review of the interlocutory order may terminate the litigation or may otherwise serve considerations of justice.
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b).
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i).
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 41(b)(ii).
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 41(b)(i) (iii).
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 41(a)(i).
4. The Court does not consider certification of the questions of law proposed by Murray or an interlocutory appeal to be appropriate under the standards of Supreme Court Rules 41 and 42. In its opinion, the Court conceded that its past decisions occasionally "risked confusion" by using the date of delivery to the consumer as the operative "delivery date" under § 2-725 without further explanation as to whether the date of delivery to the manufacturer was known. Confusion, however, does not automatically imply conflict. As the Court noted in its opinion, past decisions directly addressing a dispute over the meaning of "tender of delivery" under § 2-725 have held that the tender by the manufacturer to the dealership or other middleman is the operative "date of delivery." Those opinions using the consumer's delivery date as the date of tender involved factual settings in which the manufacturer's tender date was either unknown or irrelevant to the outcome of the statute of limitations analysis. The Court has therefore been uniform and consistent in interpreting "tender of delivery" for purposes of § 2-725 to refer to the initial tender by the manufacturer. Thus, the questions presented by Murray are neither unsettled issues nor subject to conflicting decisions.
See Wilson v. Class, 605 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. Super. 1992); Jakotowicz v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2005 Del. Super. LEXIS 283, at *14 (Del. Super. Aug. 17, 2005).
5. Moreover, under Supreme Court Rule 41(a), Delaware Courts may certify questions of law only when "the certifying court has not decided the question or questions in the case." It is clear the Court has decided the questions presented in this case, as this decision is the source of Murray's petition for interlocutory appeal. Furthermore, the Court does not consider this issue to be "important and urgent" such that it requires immediate determination by the Supreme Court. Thus, certification of the questions Murray has proposed would be improper under Rule 41.
6. Because of the tendency of interlocutory appeals to disrupt litigation and greatly delay the ultimate resolution of a case, their certification and acceptance is a rare event. In deciding whether to certify an interlocutory appeal, this Court must guard against permitting "a piecemeal approach to litigation." Murray has not demonstrated that any of the Rule 42(b) criteria for certification of an interlocutory appeal are met, and the Court concludes that certification would unnecessarily disrupt the progress of this case and undermine the principles of judicial economy that the procedures in Supreme Court Rules 41 and 42 are intended to protect. The present approach to § 2-725 has been settled law in this Court since at least 1992, when Wilson v. Class was decided. The use of the consumer's delivery date as the date of "tender" where the time of the manufacturer's tender was unknown or irrelevant did not give rise to a conflict in the Court's subsequent case law, particularly as Wilson explicitly contemplated this approach. The Court's application of Wilson and its progeny to bar Murray's Magnuson-Moss claim did not terminate Murray's case, as her claims under Delaware's Lemon Law and the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act are subject to a different limitations period and are not time-barred. Murray's arguments for a new approach to applying the § 2-725 limitation period to Magnuson-Moss claims may be presented on appeal after her remaining causes of action have been litigated and final judgment has been entered.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1015, 1016 (Del. 1997).
Id.
605 A.2d at 910.
Id. at 909 (noting that in past cases where the Court was "unable to find evidence of the manufacturer's delivery date," it could substitute the date of delivery to the consumer on the logic that "the date the manufacturer delivered the car to the dealer could not, in any event, have been later than the date the dealer sold the car to a consumer.").
7. For the foregoing reasons, Murray's Application for Certification of Questions of Law and Interlocutory Appeal is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.