Opinion
22-ALJ-22-0077-AP
07-11-2022
Kimball B. Murphy, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and Summer Breeze Outdoor, Respondents.
ORDER
Deborah Brooks Durden, Judge
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is an appeal by Kimball B. Murphy (Appellant) from a February 1, 2022, decision of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Department) disqualifying Appellant from receiving unemployment benefits. The Department found Appellant voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employment. On appeal, Appellant argues she was effectively discharged by Summer Breeze Outdoor (Employer) following a heated exchange with the company owner. The South Carolina Administrative Law Court (Court) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 41-35-750 (2021). Upon consideration of the briefs and record, the Court affirms, finding substantial evidence supports the Department's decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Appellant worked for Employer from January 13, 2020, to February 12, 2020, most recently as an office manager. On February 12, 2020, a delivery truck arrived at Employer's place of business without prior notice. As a result, Appellant and one other employee were the only employees present to receive the delivery. The other employee immediately notified the owner of the business that the truck arrived. The owner arrived shortly thereafter to assist in unloading the delivery truck. The owner was upset with the delivery truck driver because this was not the first time the truck made a delivery without notice. Appellant did not want to assist with unloading the truck and went inside while the owner unloaded the truck. Appellant contends the owner yelled at her and discharged her for refusing to help. Employer contends the owner did not require Appellant to assist in unloading the truck and the owner did not yell at Appellant. Employer further contends Appellant resigned.
Appellant reopened a claim for unemployment insurance benefits on March 11, 2020. The Department's claims adjudicator issued a determination on December 8, 2020, holding Appellant indefinitely disqualified from receiving benefits upon finding she voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employment. Appellant appealed to the Department's Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal held an evidentiary hearing on March 31, 2021. On April 5, 2021, the Tribunal mailed a decision affirming the claims adjudicator's decision. Appellant appealed to the Department's Appellate Panel (Panel). On February 1, 2022, the Panel issued a decision affirming the Tribunal's decision. This appeal followed.
ISSUE
Is the decision of the Panel disqualifying Appellant from unemployment insurance benefits upon a finding she voluntarily quit her employment without good cause supported by substantial evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding that the Employment Security Commission, a predecessor of the Department, was an agency within the meaning of the APA). Accordingly, the APA's standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the Department. See, SC Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380, 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2021); Gibson, 282 S.C. at 386, 318 S.E.2d at 367; McEachern v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 370 S.C. 553, 557, 635 S.E.2d 644, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2006). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by section 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2021). See § 1-23-600(D) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in section 123-380(5)). That section states:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of an agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.§ 1-23-380(5).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). In applying the substantial evidence rule, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Appellant argues the Panel's finding she voluntarily quit her most recent employment without good cause is erroneous in light of the evidence in the record. The Court disagrees. Section 41-35-120(1) of the South Carolina Code (2021) states a worker is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he left his most recent employment voluntarily, "without good cause." The phrase "good cause" as used in section 41-35-120(1) contemplates "a cause attributable to or connected with claimant's employment." Stone Mfg. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 219 S.C. 239, 247, 64 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1951); see also, State-Record Pub. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 254 S.C. 1, 9, 173 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1970) ("This court has heretofore, on more than one occasion, construed the phrase 'without good cause' as meaning without good cause connected with employment."). "To constitute good cause, the circumstances which lead an employee to leave the job must be such as would cause a reasonable person to leave." 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 102 (updated Aug. 2013).
A claimant has the burden to show he has met the benefit eligibility conditions. Hyman v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 234 S.C. 369, 373, 108 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1959). An employee who voluntarily leaves his employment has the burden of showing good cause for leaving. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 104 (updated Aug. 2013). "An employee who voluntarily resigns from employment without good cause is ineligible for unemployment benefits." Ex Parte S.C. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 332 S.C. 286, 288, 504 S.E.2d 345, 346 (Ct. App. 1998). The weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a matter is within the province of the trier of fact. S.C. Cable Television Ass'n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness's demeanor and veracity and to evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).
The Tribunal's hearing officer heard testimony from both Appellant and Employer's owner. The hearing officer found the testimony of Employer's owner more convincing than Appellant's testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the end of Appellant's employment. The Tribunal and subsequently the Panel found Appellant voluntarily resigned her employment without any actions by the Employer that would cause a reasonable person to leave their employment. The Court may not overturn the finding of fact by the Panel as to the weight and credibility of the witnesses' testimony. The evidence before the Panel could reasonably be interpreted to suggest Appellant voluntarily resigned for a reason other than one connected with her employment. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Panel's conclusion Appellant voluntarily resigned without good cause.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Appellate Panel's decision is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.