Opinion
H049819
05-24-2023
MONA SALCIDA MURILLO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Bernadino County Super. Ct. Nos. WHCSB2100251 & FSB19885.
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Mona Salcida Murillo, an inmate of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), filed what she titled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or writ of mandate to seek replacement of or compensation for three money orders and one cashier's check she alleges she gave to Salinas Valley State Prison officials for deposit into her account. Those funds were never credited to her.
We use the term "instruments" to refer to the money orders and cashier's check collectively. (See Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3104, subds. (b)-(g) [defining money orders and cashier's checks as forms of negotiable instruments].)
We ordered that the petition be considered a petition for a writ of mandate with CDCR as the respondent. We will now issue a peremptory writ commanding CDCR to deposit the money orders and cashier's check in petitioner's inmate trust account or credit her account in the amounts of the money orders and cashier's check.
Petitioner initially named two prison officials as respondents.
We summarize the factual and procedural background based on documents the parties provided in support of and in opposition to the writ petition. Where the parties' interpretations of these documents differ, we note the difference.
The California Code of Regulations provides procedures for inmates to receive funds through the mail. These regulations provide that inmates may receive funds in the form of a money order, cashier's check, or other negotiable instrument, and that the instrument shall be made payable to CDCR with the inmate's last name and departmental identification number and the sender's name and address noted on the face of the instrument. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3140, subd. (a)(1).) Any money order, cashier's check, or other negotiable instrument that does not contain the sender's name and address on its face is considered contraband and will be disposed of after the inmate is informed of its contraband nature. (Id., subd. (a)(5).) The regulations provide: "Funds received in the mail shall be removed from the envelope by mailroom staff, and the envelope shall be imprinted with a stamp that reads 'Funds Enclosed.' The date, amount, and initials of the person processing the funds shall be recorded on the envelope before it is forwarded to the inmate. The stamped envelope is the inmate's receipt for the funds." (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Regulations state that mailroom staff "shall arrange the day's remittances in numerical order," and shall list the remittances in sequence on a report of collections. (Id., subd. (a)(6).) Finally, the regulations provide that when a money order, cashier's check, or other negotiable instrument is received, "the face of the envelope in which the funds were received shall be imprinted with a stamp indicating the funds have been accepted at this time. This stamp is not intended to indicate that the funds are immediately available for inmate use, but only that the funds were accepted for processing by the department." (Id., subd. (d).)
Even though these regulations indicate that the prison mailroom is responsible for processing instruments and delivering them for credit in an inmate's account, petitioner alleges that the mailroom repeatedly forwarded instruments to her. In late 2020, petitioner filed a grievance with the prison alleging that she received two money orders in the mail that were delivered to her, that she gave the two money orders to a corrections officer for deposit, and that these funds were never credited to her account. After the corrections officer acknowledged that petitioner gave him the money orders to be deposited, prison officials ultimately approved credits to petitioner's account of $635, the combined amount of the two money orders.
Petitioner now alleges that the prison mailroom forwarded to her three more money orders and one cashier's check, that she provided the instruments to a corrections officer to be posted to her inmate account, and that these amounts were not credited to her account. She alleges that in March 2021, she received two money orders in the mail, one for $305 and the other for $325. She provided documents titled "notice of money order or check left in mail" that were signed by the corrections officer, annotated the amounts and money order numbers, and stated that the money orders were attached. Petitioner also provided a "prison request form" that states below what purports to be the corrections officer's signature that petitioner turned over the two money orders to him, and that the corrections officer "took control and possession of the money orders and process[ed] them to the accounting Dept. per policy."
Petitioner also alleges that in May 2021, she received another money order for $800 and a cashier's check for $1,100 in the mail, both in the same envelope. Petitioner again provided documents titled "notice of money order or check left in mail" for both instruments, both with the corrections officer's signature. Petitioner also provided a copy of an envelope addressed to her that contains a prison stamp and handwritten notations indicating that the envelope contained a money order for $800 and a certified check for $1,100, with numbers for the two instruments annotated.
Petitioner submitted grievances and inmate appeals to prison officials, seeking to have her account credited for the three money orders and one cashier's check. While some of her inmate appeals were "granted" in the sense that prison or CDCR officials agreed to investigate the matter further or provide additional responses to her appeals, the parties agree that petitioner has not been credited with funds for any of these four instruments. Petitioner also submitted to this court a memo from the prison warden in response to a complaint from petitioner about the March 2021 money orders. In the memo, the warden declined to provide relief to petitioner because her issue could be resolved through the inmate appeal process, but the warden did acknowledge that the corrections officer "processed and forwarded the two (2) money order[s] in the amount[s] of $305.00 and $325.00 to SVSP Accounting Office on March 26, 2021." With regard to the May 2021 money order and cashier's check, a "claimant grievance claims decision response" document states that the corrections officer denied taking possession of the instruments. However, this document also notes that the corrections officer did, in fact, collect the money order and cashier's check and that a facility logbook notes that two instruments were received from petitioner on May 21, 2021, and were taken to the accounting office.
Petitioner also provided documents indicating that she filed a claim through the government claims program in late May 2021, seeking compensation for the three money orders and the cashier's check. Petitioner also attached a letter she addressed to the CDCR General Counsel's office approximately five months after the claim was submitted, indicating that no response to the claim had been received and stating that if a response was not received within 20 days, she would file suit in superior court. Petitioner then sued prison officials in small claims court in May 2022 to be compensated for the three money orders and the cashier's check. CDCR's litigation coordinator responded by asserting the defendants were protected by governmental immunity, petitioner failed to perfect service, and the claim was not substantiated. In October 2022, the court dismissed petitioner's small claims court action without prejudice.
After requesting and receiving informal, preliminary briefing from the parties, we issued an order in which we designated the petition as a petition for a writ of mandate, appointed counsel for petitioner, and explained: "Petitioner's documentary evidence supports her assertion that on March 26, 2021, a correctional officer took from her one money order in the amount of $305 and one money order in the amount of $325 for the purpose of having them delivered to the inmate trust supervisor for deposit into her inmate trust account. It also supports her assertion that on May 21, 2021, a correctional officer took from her one money order in the amount of $800 and one cashier's check in the amount of $1,100 for the purpose of having them delivered to the inmate trust supervisor for deposit into her inmate trust account. The parties agree that these funds were never deposited into petitioner's inmate trust account." We also issued an alternative writ directing CDCR either to deposit the instruments in petitioner's inmate trust account or credit her account in the amounts of the instruments, or to show cause why it should not do so. CDCR elected not to comply with the alternative writ and instead filed a return (which it termed an answer). Petitioner filed a reply.
III. DISCUSSION
"A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) "The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, an adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law. It must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) "A traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is a method of compelling the performance of a legal, usually ministerial duty. [Citation.] Generally, a writ will lie when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy; the respondent has a duty to perform; and the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. [Citation.]" (Walnut Valley Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 234, 237, fn. 4.)
CDCR's return raises three points in opposition to issuance of a writ of mandate. First, CDCR asserts that a writ of mandate is not appropriate because petitioner has an adequate legal remedy available by pursuing a claim under the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), and then by pursuing a small claims action or limited civil action if the tort claim proves unsuccessful. Second, CDCR contends that petitioner failed to establish that any CDCR official violated a ministerial duty owed to her. CDCR asserts that petitioner did not show she received valid instruments in the mail that comply with state regulations, and that petitioner has not provided information about who mailed her these instruments that could help determine whether the instruments were valid. Along these lines, CDCR attached a declaration by the corrections officer who allegedly accepted the instruments from petitioner. In this declaration, the corrections officer acknowledged signing the "notice of money order or check left in mail" documents for the four instruments but denied seeing or taking possession of any of the instruments, and he declared that he did not remember signing the prison request form petitioner provided concerning the March 2021 money orders. Finally, CDCR asserts that it is not liable for the value of the money orders because petitioner could obtain replacement money orders from the sending institution.
CDCR does not specifically contend that petitioner could obtain a replacement for the cashier's check.
In Escamilla v. Department of Corrections &Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498 (Escamilla), an inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be compensated for personal property prison officials seized upon his entry to an administrative segregated housing unit that was not returned to him upon his release from the unit. (Id. at pp. 501-502.) The trial court granted the habeas petition, ordering CDCR to compensate the inmate for his property. (Id. at p. 505.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that "[the] petition for writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a petition for writ of mandamus seeking specific recovery of [the inmate's] personal property or its value and therefore is not a 'claim for money or damages' pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act.]" (Id. at p. 509.)
The court in Escamilla relied on three prior decisions to hold that issuance of the writ of mandate was proper. First the court noted that in Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113 (Minsky), an arrestee sought to recover $7,720 police officers took from him during his arrest and allegedly transferred to a pension fund for first responders. (Escamilla, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 506, citing Minsky, supra, at pp. 117-118.) The court in Escamilla quoted Minsky, in which the California Supreme Court held that the" 'government in effect occupies the position of a bailee when it seizes from an arrestee property that is not shown to be contraband. [Citation.]'" (Escamilla, supra, at p. 506, quoting Minsky, supra, at p. 121.) The court in Escamilla then noted that in Holt v. Kelly (1978) 20 Cal.3d 560 (Holt), an arrestee's property was not returned to him after his release from jail, and the arrestee petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the return of the property. (Escamilla, supra, at p. 508, citing Holt, supra, at pp. 562-563.) The court in Escamilla quoted Holt in holding that" 'an arrestee who seeks in good faith to specifically recover property taken from him [or her] at the time of his [or her] arrest is exempt from the claim filing provisions of the Government Code, even though some or all of the property may have been dissipated and respondent may be compelled to respond in damages in lieu of property.'" (Escamilla, supra, at p. 507, quoting Holt, supra, at p. 565.) Finally, the Escamilla court observed that in Long v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 782 (Long), a person filed suit seeking return of personal property the city seized from his home, and the city sought summary judgment because the plaintiff did not comply with the Tort Claims Act's claims presentation requirements. (Escamilla, supra, at p. 509, citing Long, supra, at p. 784.) Escamilla quoted Long's holding that" 'where confiscated property is lost and cannot be returned due to the government's own negligence, the government may not benefit from its own wrongdoing by contending the resulting action, necessarily limited to monetary damages, is subject to the [Tort Claims Act.]' [Citation.]" (Escamilla, supra, at p. 509, quoting Long, supra, at p. 786, italics omitted.) The Escamilla court applied these three decisions to conclude that "Escamilla's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a petition for writ of mandamus seeking specific recovery of personal property or its value and therefore is not a 'claim for money or damages' pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act]." (Escamilla, supra, at p. 509.)
While Escamilla indicates that a writ of mandate is appropriate to command compensation for inmate property that prison officials wrongfully do not return, CDCR relies instead on Flores v. Department of Corrections &Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199 (Flores) to assert that a writ of mandate is not available because petitioner has other means of seeking relief, such as by pursuing an action in small claims court. The inmate in Flores alleged that prison officials confiscated his television during a routine search of his cell. (Id. at p. 202.) The inmate pursued an inmate appeal to have the television returned, but the inmate appeal was denied on the grounds that the television was contraband because it did not contain proper identification marks. (Id. at pp. 202-203.) The inmate then petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking replacement of the television or compensation for its loss, and the trial court sustained CDCR's demurrer. (Ibid.) The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Flores court first held that "[a] civil action for conversion lies where a person has been wrongfully dispossessed of his or her personal property," and that Flores "has not shown that the remedies by way of an action for conversion were unavailable to him or inadequate." (Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.) Thus, the court held that the inmate had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and as a result, issuance of the writ was not appropriate. (Ibid.) Second, the Flores court held that under state regulations governing confiscation of inmate property, the inmate did not show that CDCR had a clear, present, and ministerial duty to replace the television or compensate him for it. The court held: "The exhibits to the petition indicate the television was confiscated from plaintiff's cell by prison officials because it was not engraved with his name or CDCR number; further, neither the television nor the receipt plaintiff offered to show his purchase of it bore a serial number that could be used to link the confiscated television to the receipt to prove his ownership. The regulations provide that 'every reasonable effort will be made to determine the rightful owner of' confiscated property. This provision does not impose a mandatory duty to determine a particular person to be the owner, or to return the property to that owner, when a given state of facts exists. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3193, does not impose on defendants a clear, present, and ministerial duty to return, replace, or compensate an inmate for property confiscated as contraband." (Id. at p. 207.)
The Flores court distinguished Escamilla, noting that both Escamilla and the Minsky decision cited in Escamilla "cited specific code sections imposing a duty on officers to return an arrestee's or prisoner's property when the arrestee or prisoner is discharged from custody." (Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 207.) The Flores court also observed that "Escamilla did not discuss the issue of an adequate remedy at law." (Id. at p. 208.) Additionally, the Flores court noted, "[i]n Escamilla, the property in issue was not taken from the inmate as contraband; it was merely taken and held for safekeeping." (Id. at p. 208.) Thus, the court concluded that unlike in Escamilla, CDCR officials in Flores "were not acting as bailees charged with an obligation to safely keep and return the television," and Flores did not allege facts showing that the television was not contraband. (Ibid.) Thus, the Flores court held that the inmate "has not demonstrated that his claim is a proper one to pursue by petition for writ of mandate." (Ibid.)
We find the reasoning in Escamilla persuasive, and we hold that a petition for a writ of mandate is a proper method for petitioner to seek relief under the current circumstances. CDCR had a clear, present, and ministerial duty to process petitioner's instruments for deposit in her account. The California Code of Regulations provides that prison officials, not inmates, are responsible for processing money orders and cashier's checks mailed to inmates. If the instruments are properly made out, prison officials are to deposit the funds in the inmate's account." 'In a broad sense a bailment is the delivery of a thing to another for some special object or purpose, on a contract, express or implied, to conform to the objects or purposes of the delivery which may be as various as the transactions of [humans.]' [Citation.]" (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762, fn. 5.) CDCR's return states that in order to create a bailment, petitioner must show that prison officials: "(1) took possession of her money orders; and (2) negligently lost them, creating a bailment such that respondents owe her a ministerial duty to return the items." Under either the case law definition above or CDCR's definition, a bailment was created here. Prison officials received the money orders and cashier's check for petitioner in the mail, they had a special object or purpose to process the instruments for deposit in petitioner's account, and they did not do so. Petitioner, according to the regulations, was not supposed to receive the instruments and was not at fault for handing them to the corrections officer. CDCR's own documents demonstrate that the corrections officer took the instruments to be processed for payment, and that the instruments were never credited to petitioner's account. State regulations required prison officials to deposit the funds in petitioner's account, just as in Escamilla prison officials were required to return the inmate's property upon his release from administrative segregation. Thus, as in Escamilla, "the most appropriate writ to direct the government to return personal property or its value in a bailment or bailment-like situation is a writ of mandamus." (Escamilla, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.)
Under Escamilla, a claim for specific recovery of personal property or its value is the proper subject of a petition for a writ of mandate, and the mere fact that CDCR personnel disposed of the personal property does not convert an inmate's claim for specific recovery of personal property into a claim for money or damages that requires compliance with the Tort Claims Act's claim presentation requirements. As Escamilla observed, quoting Minsky," 'even if [property taken from an arrestee] is no longer traceable to any property presently in defendant's possession and thus is not strictly available for specific recovery, we believe that plaintiff's cause of action would not be foreclosed by the claims statutes.'" (Escamilla, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 512, quoting Minsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 121122, fn. 7, italics omitted.) Escamilla also recognized that under Holt, an arrestee whose property was not returned to him following his release from jail could petition for a writ of mandate without pursuing any civil remedy, because" 'an arrestee who seeks in good faith to specifically recover property taken from him [or her] at the time of his [or her] arrest is exempt from the claim filing provisions of the Government Code,'" and because the bailee" 'may not convert his wrongful dissipation of the property into an advantage by using it to support an essentially dilatory defense based on failure to comply with the claims statutes.'" (Escamilla, supra, at p. 512, quoting Holt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 565.) Thus, Escamilla held that the inmate "was not required to comply with the Act's claims presentation requirements before filing the instant petition ...." (Escamilla, supra, at p. 513.) Similarly here, petitioner is seeking to compel CDCR to perform the ministerial act of depositing her money orders and cashier's check. The fact that prison officials may have misplaced or disposed of the instruments does not convert petitioner's claim into a claim for money or damages that requires compliance with the Tort Claims Act's presentation requirements.
CDCR's reliance on Flores is misplaced. Flores held that the inmate "has not shown that the remedies by way of an action for conversion were unavailable to him or inadequate." (Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.) Thus, the court held that the inmate had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and consequentially, issuance of the writ was not appropriate. (Ibid.) In so holding, Flores recognized that the question of whether a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists turns on the facts of each particular case; however, if "it is clear . . . that mandate is the only remedy that can furnish the relief to which the petitioner is entitled . . . the petitioner is entitled to the writ. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Under Escamilla and the cases it discusses, a claim for specific recovery of property is a proper subject for a petition for a writ of mandate and does not require compliance with the Tort Claims Act's presentation requirements, even if the prison's actions resulted in loss of the property and require compensation through money damages. Thus, petitioner here, unlike the inmate in Flores, has presented a sufficient petition for a writ of mandate.
As in Escamilla, prison officials took petitioner's property (three money orders and a cashier's check) as a bailee. Unlike Flores, there is no indication that petitioner's property constituted contraband in the sense that they failed to contain the sender's name and address. None of the communications from prison officials to petitioner indicate that the money orders or cashier's check failed to conform with prison requirements. To the contrary, documents from prison officials demonstrate that the corrections officer took the instruments to the prison accounting office to deposit in petitioner's inmate account, which regulations state should not have occurred if the instruments were not properly made out. The documents provided by CDCR do not indicate that the mailroom, the accounting office, or any other prison official ever provided any notice of deficiency in the instruments. State regulations thus required prison officials to deposit the funds in petitioner's account, just as in Escamilla prison officials were required to return the inmate's property upon his release from administrative segregation. Thus, as in Escamilla, petitioner may petition for a writ of mandate without pursuing a claim under the Tort Claims Act and a resulting civil action. Flores does not undermine this position.
CDCR attempts to distinguish petitioner's situation from Escamilla by noting that the court in Flores stated that the Escamilla opinion "did not discuss the issue of an adequate remedy at law," and therefore petitioner here is still required to pursue any alternate remedy she has. (Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) However, the decisions cited in Escamilla determined that the aggrieved parties in those cases were not required to pursue remedies under the Tort Claims Act, and those decisions supported the holding in Escamilla that "Escamilla was not required to comply with the [Tort Claims Act's] claims presentation requirements before filing the instant petition ...." (Escamilla, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) Minsky, Holt, and Long all held that the aggrieved parties in those cases were not required to pursue a remedy under the Tort Claims Act, and Escamilla held that the same rationale applies to a situation where prison officials fail to return non-contraband property to an inmate. In addition, the court in Escamilla held that because the inmate filed internal appeals with the prison system, CDCR "was given prompt notice of Escamilla's claim prior to his filing of the instant petition, which gave it an opportunity to conduct an early investigation of his claim and attempt to settle that claim and avoid similarly caused future injuries or liabilities. We are not persuaded that the public policy purposes of the [Tort Claims Act's] claims presentation requirements were, in the circumstances of this case, substantially contravened or undermined by Escamilla's filing of the instant petition without first filing a claim ...." (Ibid.) Similarly here, petitioner filed inmate grievances and appeals, pursued claims for the value of the instruments, and attempted to pursue a small claims court action. CDCR has been provided with adequate notice of petitioner's complaint and has been given the opportunity to remedy the situation. The public policy purposes of the Tort Claims Act's claims presentation requirements are not substantially contravened or undermined by petitioner's filing of the petition for a writ of mandate under these circumstances.
We likewise reject CDCR's contention that petitioner failed to establish that any prison official violated a ministerial duty because petitioner "provided insufficient documents to support her claim that she possessed valid money orders payable to CDCR, or that respondents took possession of them." Petitioner provided multiple documents to indicate that prison officials did, in fact, accept her instruments to be processed into her account. In addition to the documents signed by the corrections officer that indicate that petitioner received the instruments, petitioner provided a letter from the prison warden stating that the corrections officer "processed and forwarded" the two March 2021 money orders, an envelope from the prison's mailroom noting that the May 2021 instruments were received, and a claims response document stating that the corrections officer received the May 2021 instruments and took them to the accounting office. Regulations provide that the envelope provided to petitioner for the May 2021 instruments constitutes petitioner's receipt for funds. Thus, petitioner has shown that she received the instruments and prison officials did have a ministerial duty to deposit the funds to her account.
As we stated in our order granting the alternative writ, petitioner's documentary evidence supports her assertions that her instruments were provided to prison officials for deposit, and nothing in CDCR's return demonstrates otherwise. The declaration CDCR provided from the corrections officer asserts that he signed the "notice of money order or check left in mail" documents without actually seeing or taking possession of any of the four instruments and that he does not remember signing the prison request form concerning the March 2021 money orders. However, other documents from CDCR acknowledge that petitioner did receive the instruments and that the corrections officer did take them from petitioner to the accounting office to be deposited. Prison officials received the instruments as a bailee and had a ministerial duty to credit them to petitioner's account. The parties agree that the amounts were never deposited in petitioner's account. The statements in CDCR's documents that it accepted the instruments and sent them to the accounting office for deposit also belie CDCR's argument that the instruments might not have been properly made out. If the instruments were not properly made out, CDCR has provided no explanation why they would be delivered to the accounting office for deposit and why petitioner would be provided an annotated receipt for the May 2021 instruments. Thus, sufficient evidence establishes that prison officials had a ministerial duty to process petitioner's instruments.
CDCR also asserts that petitioner has not demonstrated the existence of valid money orders and a valid cashier's check because petitioner failed to provide "information about the individual or entity sending the money orders and check." Without this information, CDCR contends, CDCR cannot establish whether the money orders and cashier's check actually existed, and if they did exist, whether they were properly made out such that prison officials had a duty to credit petitioner's account. However, regulations provide that if the sender's name and address do not appear on the instruments, the prison is to dispose of the instruments as contraband. The evidence does not demonstrate that the prison disposed of these instruments as contraband; thus, prison officials must have had the sender's information available to them. In addition, there is no indication in the responses to petitioner's letter, inmate grievances and appeals, and claims that CDCR or prison officials ever asked petitioner for this information. CDCR had the opportunity to investigate this matter, including requesting information about the senders of these documents. In addition, CDCR possessed the instruments at various points: in the mailroom, when the corrections officer took possession of them, and when (according to the warden's letter and the "claimant grievance claims decision response" document) they were presented to the accounting office for deposit. If prison officials had any concern about the validity of the instruments, they could have noted any necessary information about the instruments at that time. Regulations required that prison officials, not inmates, process money orders and cashier's checks for deposit, so prison officials were in a better position to copy or annotate any information from the instruments than petitioner was. Thus, petitioner has provided sufficient evidence that valid instruments existed.
Finally, we reject CDCR's argument that petitioner is not entitled to the amounts on the face of the three money orders because she could contact the sender and obtain replacement money orders. Prison officials had a duty to perform the ministerial act of depositing the money orders in petitioner's account, and petitioner is "beneficially interested" in receiving the funds mailed to her, funds that she would have received if prison officials had deposited her money orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.) It may or may not be true that petitioner could obtain replacement money orders, but prison officials accepted the money orders for deposit as a bailee and they did not deposit the funds in petitioner's account. CDCR fails to provide legal authority to support that petitioner should bear the burden and expense of seeking any possible replacement money orders. Petitioner has satisfied the requirements for issuance of the writ to command performance of this ministerial act.
IV. DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to perform its duty, as petitioner's bailee, to deposit the money orders for $305, $325, and $800 and the cashier's check for $1,100 into petitioner's inmate trust account or credit her account in those amounts.
WE CONCUR: GREENWOOD, P.J. LIE, J.