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holding that the plaintiff's request that his supervisor "advocate for more minority and female representation in high-level management . . . [did] not constitute protected activity within the meaning of § 2003e-3."
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Civ. File No. 99-516 (PAM/JGL).
June 26, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Vatsal Munshi ("Munshi") was employed by Defendant Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("Alliant") from 1977 until he was laid off in 1996. Munshi is a native of India, but he has lived in the United States since 1967. He has dark skin and speaks with a heavy accent. Munshi was initially hired by Honeywell, but was transferred to Alliant when Alliant was spun off from Honeywell in 1990. At the time of his termination, Munshi was Director of Facilities and Real Estate for Alliant. In this position, Munshi was responsible for overseeing and regulating utility consumption at all facilities owned or managed by Alliant, implementing any cost-saving measures he could identify, and exploiting revenue-producing opportunities. Munshi was also responsible for real estate purchases, sales, and management for the company throughout the country. At the time of his termination, he managed a staff of five people.
Munshi amassed a good performance record at Alliant. He was promoted frequently, and in 1995 he was placed in Alliant's Management Incentive Program, which allows upper-level management to qualify for bonuses. In the year preceding his termination, Munshi earned more than $130,000 in salary and bonuses.
Until February 1996, Munshi's immediate supervisor at Alliant was John Buck ("Buck"). Buck reported directly to Alliant's CEO, Richard Schwartz ("Schwartz"). Buck described Munshi's performance as "outstanding," and in one memo to Schwartz indicated that Munshi had increased the company's revenues by almost $4.5 million in fiscal year 1996 alone. After Buck left Alliant, Munshi was supervised for several months by Bob Gustafson ("Gustafson"), the head of Corporate Human Resources. In May 1996, however, Munshi came under the direct supervision of Scott Meyers ("Meyers"), Alliant's Chief Financial Officer. Like Buck, Meyers also reported to Schwartz.
Not long after Munshi began reporting to Meyers, Meyers decided to eliminate Munshi's position. According to Alliant, the company was in the midst of a corporate restructuring program, in which most positions at the corporate headquarters were transferred to the individual manufacturing plants. Meyers testified that he decided that Munshi's department was redundant and not necessary to the company. (Meyers Dep. at 128.) At the time he made the decision, he was not aware that, during fiscal year 1996, Munshi had saved the company a significant amount of money. (Id. at 163-64.) Meyers' decision was approved by Schwartz.
In early September 1996, Munshi was informed that his position was going to be eliminated. Alliant offered Munshi another position, but made clear that this position was a temporary one, lasting only 3 to 6 months. Moreover, although Munshi would have received his same salary, he would not have been eligible for the bonus program in the new position. (Dep. Ex. 46.) Munshi refused Alliant's offer, and left the company on November 1, 1996.
On June 20, 1997, Munshi filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC investigated the charge, and on December 7, 1998, issued a finding of reasonable cause to believe discrimination occurred. On December 22, 1998, the EEOC issued Munshi a notice of right to sue. Munshi filed suit in Hennepin County District Court, and Alliant removed the suit to this Court on March 31, 1999. In his Complaint, Munshi claimed that Alliant discriminated against him on the basis of his race, national origin, and age, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363 et seq. ("MHRA"); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a ("ADEA"). Munshi also claimed that Alliant retaliated against him in violation of § 1981, Title VII, the MHRA, and the ADEA. He later stipulated to the dismissal of his ADEA claims. Alliant now seeks summary judgment on all of Munshi's claims. Alliant claims that Munshi's termination was the result of a reduction in force ("RIF") and not the result of any illegal discriminatory motive. Alliant contends that Munshi has failed to carry his burden to prove the existence of discrimination, and that judgment should be entered for Alliant as a matter of law.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). In employment discrimination cases, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
B. Discrimination Claims
1. Direct Evidence
A plaintiff may show discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (establishing framework for cases involving circumstantial evidence); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (establishing framework for cases involving direct evidence). Under the direct evidence analysis, a plaintiff must present "evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude sufficient to permit the factfinder to infer that the attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision."Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). Once the plaintiff has made this threshold showing, "the burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove that it would have terminated the employee even without the illegitimate criterion." Philipp v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1995). Munshi argues that he has direct evidence of discrimination, in the form of comments made by Schwartz, Alliant's CEO. According to Buck, Munshi's former supervisor, after a meeting at which Munshi made a presentation to Schwartz, Schwartz told Buck that Schwartz did not understand a word Munshi said, and that Buck should fire Munshi. (Buck Aff. ¶ 8.) Munshi contends that this evidence shifts the burden to Alliant, so that the Court need not engage in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
Alliant disputes the import of these remarks, claiming that Schwartz meant that he did not understand the logic of Munshi's presentation, and thus thought Munshi should be fired. Thus, according to Alliant, Schwartz's statements are not direct evidence of a discriminatory motive. Alliant also argues that Schwartz did not participate in the decision to terminate Munshi, so that his statements cannot be construed to reflect the alleged discriminatory attitude of Alliant in Munshi's termination.
Munshi has also raised specter of discrimination in comments made by Meyers at his deposition. Although it is undisputed that Munshi is dark-skinned and has such a heavy accent that it is often difficult to understand him, Meyers testified that there was no difference between the color of his skin (Meyers is white) and the color of Munshi's skin (Meyers Dep. at 105-07.) Meyers also claimed that he did not notice that Munshi had any accent at all. (Id. at 100-05.) According to Meyers, Munshi's accent and skin color were "not an issue" for him. (Id. at 105.) To paraphrase Shakespeare, perhaps Meyers "doth protest too much." William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 3, sc. 2. A reasonable jury could view Meyers' comments as indicating that he may have had a discriminatory motive when he decided to terminate Munshi.
Taken in the light most favorable to Munshi, Schwartz's comments to Buck and Meyers' deposition testimony are certainly distressing. The proper interpretation to be given these statements, however, is for the finder of fact. It is not the province of the Court, on a motion for summary judgment, to resolve factual disputes. Thus, while the factfinder may determine that Schwartz's comments and Meyers' testimony constitute direct evidence of discrimination, for the purposes of this Motion the Court will treat the comments as circumstantial evidence, and will analyze Munshi's claims under the more rigorous burden-shifting standard set forth below.
2. Circumstantial Evidence
a. Prima Facie Case
Munshi's race and national origin discrimination claims, whether under Title VII, the MHRA, or § 1981, are analyzed using the same framework. See Jackson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 803 F.2d 401, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1986) (Title VII); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (MHRA); Lawrence v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1999) (§ 1981). Under the familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff in a discrimination claim bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) an adverse employment action was taken against him; and (3) there is a causal connection between membership in the group and the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under § 1981, the plaintiff must also prove that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute, such as making and enforcing contracts. Smith v. DataCard Corp., 9 F. Supp.2d 1067, 1078 (D.Minn. 1998). The parties do not dispute that Munshi's claims involve an enumerated activity.
Alliant contends that there is an additional element to Munshi's prima facie case. According to Alliant, because Munshi's termination was part of a company-wide RIF, he is required to produce additional evidence that race or national origin played a role in his termination. Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 109 F.3d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir. 1997).
The "additional evidence" that must accompany a prima facie case in the RIF context is evidence of a discriminatory animus. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 1985). It is not enough for a plaintiff in the RIF context to show that he was qualified for the job, that he had good performance reviews, or the like. LaGrant v. Gulf Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th Cir. 1984). In a single termination case such evidence, absent any legitimate explanation for the termination, may be circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer. See MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) ("As a matter of both common sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred."). In the RIF context, however, such evidence cannot be sufficient to raise a question as to the employer's motive. Holley, 771 F.2d at 1166. The RIF plaintiff must present additional evidence of a discriminatory motive, whether in the form of discriminatory comments by the decisionmaker, statistical evidence that the employer consistently lays off members of the plaintiff's ethnic group, or some such evidence. Id.
In this case, however, it is far from clear that Munshi's termination was part of a RIF. Munshi has presented testimony from Alliant's head of human resources that Munshi's termination was an "individual job elimination," not part of a RIF. (Gustafson Dep. at 146.) Munshi's evidence creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether his termination was indeed part of a RIF. However, as will be discussed in more detail below, even assuming that Munshi's termination was part of a RIF, Munshi has come forward with the required "additional evidence" to raise a question of fact as to whether Alliant may have had a discriminatory motive in terminating him.
There is no dispute that Munshi has met his burden to prove the first two elements of his prima facie case of discrimination: he is a member of a protected group, and he lost his job. Although Alliant argues that Munshi cannot prove a causal connection between his termination and his status as a member of a protected group, Alliant does not focus on this element of Munshi's prima facie case. Rather, Alliant concentrates on whether Munshi can rebut Alliant's allegedly legitimate explanation for his termination with evidence of pretext. Thus, the Court finds that Munshi has met his burden to prove all of the elements of his prima facie case.
Because Munshi has established a prima facie case, Alliant must rebut that showing by presenting evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action it took against Munshi. Coffman v. Tracker Marine, 141 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1998). If Alliant can make this showing, Munshi must then prove that the reason offered by Alliant was a pretext and that illegal discrimination was a "motivating reason" for Alliant's action. Id.
b. Legitimate Explanation for the Termination
Alliant has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Munshi's termination. According to Alliant, since Alliant spun off from Honeywell, the company has engaged in a process called "decentralization" in which functions performed at the headquarters are transferred to the individual manufacturing plants. Alliant claims that Munshi's job was a victim of decentralization, because the company determined that it did not need a central director of facilities, but rather would allow each plant to manage its own facility. This is a legitimate explanation for Munshi's termination, and Alliant has met its burden.
c. Pretext
The burden then shifts back to Munshi to show that genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Alliant's legitimate explanation is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Coffman, 141 F.3d at 1245. In making this showing, Munshi may rely on the same evidence he used to show a causal connection between his termination and his race or national origin.Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Munshi has offered different types of evidence to show that Alliant's allegedly legitimate reasons for the decision to terminate him were pretexts for illegal discrimination. He has some possible direct evidence of racial animus, in the form of Schwartz's comments to Buck, discussed at length above. Taken in the light most favorable to Munshi's position, these comments show that Alliant's management, at the highest level, may have harbored discriminatory attitudes.
Alliant claims that its decision was justified by legitimate business reasons and that the Court should not delve into the merits of those reasons. The Court recognizes that "[a] company's exercise of its business judgment is not a proper subject of judicial oversight." Evers v. Alliant Techsys., Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotingRegel v. K-Mart Corp., 190 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, the Court is bound to inquire whether what the company claims are legitimate business reasons were in fact actually motivated by discrimination. Id. at 959. In this case, Munshi has put forward persuasive evidence that the people who made the decision to terminate him were not acting for legitimate business reasons, thus raising a question as to pretext.
Alliant justifies its decision to terminate Munshi by citing to other layoffs, revenue reduction, and the company-wide "decentralization" philosophy. Ultimately, Alliant's justifications amount to the same claim: Munshi's position was eliminated to save the company money. (Meyers Dep. at 128 (testifying that he thought Munshi's department was redundant).) However, Meyers' testimony reveals that, despite his opinion that the department was redundant, he did not know or understand what Munshi and Munshi's department did, nor was he aware that Munshi had saved the company more than four million dollars in one fiscal year alone. (Id. at 144-47, 163.) As Alliant's own CEO testified, reasonable people could differ as to whether Alliant had a legitimate business reason for Munshi's termination. (Schwartz Dep. at 127-29.) A jury could certainly conclude from all of this evidence that Alliant's claimed legitimate business justification for Munshi's termination was false.
Munshi points to additional evidence that he claims shows pretext. Included in this evidence are incidents in which Munshi felt that Alliant was not taking his quest to find other employment seriously, and a comparison between Munshi and two allegedly similarly situated white employees. None of this evidence is as persuasive as the evidence discussed above. With respect to the similarly situated white employees, it is not at all clear that these employees were in fact similarly situated. Moreover, Munshi's claims with respect to Alliant's treatment of his attempts to secure other employment are somewhat attenuated. However, the tenuous nature of this evidence does not diminish the persuasive force of the other evidence Munshi has put forward. His evidence has raised a genuine issue of fact on whether Alliant's proffered reason for his termination was a pretext. Thus, summary judgment is not warranted on his discrimination claims.
C. Retaliation Claims
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title [ 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e- 2000e-17], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996); Coffman, 141 F.3d at 1245. If Munshi can establish a prima facie case, the Court should apply the same burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas discussed above with reference to Munshi's discrimination claims. Munshi has failed, however, to prove a prima facie case of retaliation.
Munshi points to four incidents when he alleges he engaged in statutorily protected conduct: (1) at a meeting with Schwartz in February 1996, he asked Schwartz not to judge employees on the basis of their sex, race, or age; (2) he complained to human resources personnel in April 1996 about an alleged remark about his ethnic background that another employee reported to him; (3) he asked Meyers and three members of the human resources staff to investigate an incident of harassment involving another Indian employee in June or July of 1996; and (4) he e-mailed Meyers on July 11, 1996, to recommend that Meyers advocate for more minority and female representation in high-level management positions. Munshi's conversation with Schwarz and his e-mail to Meyers simply do not constitute protected activity within the meaning of § 2000e-3. See, e.g., Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1986) (employee's attempts to get employer to adopt affirmative action program not protected conduct).
In neither of these situations was Munshi opposing any illegal conduct on the part of Alliant. Moreover, his request to Meyers and human resources that they investigate harassment allegedly perpetrated on a fellow employee is not causally connected to Munshi's termination because, as he points out, the decision to terminate him was made in late May or early June, prior to this request.
Finally, Munshi's complaints to human resources about a remark allegedly made by an unknown employee about his ethnic background cannot support his retaliation claims. There is no evidence that the relevant decisionmakers in the decision to terminate Munshi were aware of Munshi's complaints. Absent such knowledge, there is no causal link between those complaints and Munshi's termination. Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th Cir. 1997). Munshi has failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliation, and Alliant is entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court determines that summary judgment is inappropriate on Munshi's discrimination claims, but must be granted on Munshi's retaliation and reprisal claims.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 19) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and
2. Counts Two and Six of Plaintiff's Complaint, claiming retaliation and reprisal, are DISMISSED.