Opinion
04 Civ. 2979 (SAS).
December 18, 2008
For Plaintiffs: Stephen P. Younger, Esq., Clay J. Pierce, Esq., Patterson Belknap Webb Tyler LLP, New York, New York.
Lauren E. Schwartzreich, Esq., Gregory K. McGillivary, Esq., Thomas A. Woodley, Esq., Woodley McGillivary, Washington, DC.
Andrew Quinn, Esq., Quinn Mellea, White Plains, New York.
Will Aitchison, Esq., Aitchison Vick, Inc., Portland, Oregon.
For Defendants: Lorie E. Almon, Esq., Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Esq., Peter Arnold Walker, Esq., Robert S. Witman, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, New York.
James M. Lemonedes, Michele Ann Molfetta, Georgia Mary Pestana, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, New York City police sergeants ("plaintiffs") brought suit against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (collectively "defendants"), claiming systematic violation of their overtime rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act. In July 2008, the Court conducted a five-day jury trial to resolve a single disputed issue of fact, namely whether plaintiff sergeants' "`suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.'" On July 18, 2008, the jury answered in the affirmative.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201- 219.
Mullins v. City of New York (" Mullins I"), 523 F. Supp. 2d 339, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
See 9/18/08 Declaration of James Lemonedes, defendants' counsel, ¶ 5.
Plaintiffs then renewed their pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 and also moved for a new trial under Rule 59. On October 17, 2008, this Court denied both motions. On October 31, 2008, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this Court's October 17 opinion, solely with regard to the motion for judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion for reconsideration is granted, but the Court adheres to its original decision set forth in the October 17 Opinion and Order.
Mullins v. City of New York (" Mullins II"), No. 04 Civ. 2979, 2008 WL 4620709 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2008).
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Judgment as a Matter of Law at 1.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Motion for Reconsideration
A motion for reconsideration is governed by Local Rule 6.3 and is appropriate where "`the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.'" "A motion for reconsideration may also be granted to `correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'"
In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570, 2006 WL 708149, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2006) (quoting Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The purpose of Local Rule 6.3 is to "`ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.'" Local Rule 6.3 must be "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Courts have repeatedly been forced to warn counsel that such motions should not be made reflexively, to reargue "`those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved.'"
Naiman v. New York Univ. Hosps. Ctr., No. 95 Civ. 6469, 2005 WL 926904, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2005) (quoting Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). Accord Commerce Funding Corp. v. Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[A] movant may not raise on a motion for reconsideration any matter that it did not raise previously to the court on the underlying motion sought to be reconsidered.").
DGM Invs., Inc. v. New York Futures Exch., Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 519, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quotation omitted). Accord Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a court will deny the motion when the movant "seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.").
Joseph v. Manhattan Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., No. 96 Civ. 9015, 2006 WL 721862, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2006) (quoting In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
B. Judgment As a Matter of Law
Rule 50 permits a court to override a jury's verdict and enter judgment against a party where "a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." A jury verdict cannot be set aside lightly. A court may not grant judgment as a matter of law unless (1) there is such a "complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture" or (2) there is "such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it]."
United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992)). Accord Doctor's Assocs. v. Weible, 92 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1996).
"A court considering a request for judgment as a matter of law must `consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and . . . give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence.'" "`The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury.'"
Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 429 (quoting Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2001)) (omission in original).
Id. (quoting Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70).
Ordinarily, the scope of a post-verdict renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) cannot exceed the pre-verdict motion made under Rule 50(a). However, if a party opposing a Rule 50(b) motion fails to object to scope in its opposition papers, the objection is waived.
See Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 161 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1994)). See generally Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Six of our sister circuits have held that where a party did not object to a movant's Rule 50(b) motion specifically on the grounds that the issue was waived by an inadequate Rule 50(a) motion, the party's right to object on that basis is itself waived.") (citing, inter alia, Gibeau, 18 F.3d at 109).
III. DISCUSSION
In the October 17, 2008 opinion, this Court limited consideration of plaintiffs' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law to the issue raised in their initial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court — rather than defendants — first noted that defendants limited their initial motion to defendants' failure to provide individualized evidence concerning test plaintiffs, as opposed to pattern and practice evidence. However, failure to raise waiver in opposition to a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law itself constitutes waiver of any objection concerning scope. Therefore, this Court must consider the plaintiffs' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law in full and assess the general sufficiency of defendants' evidence.
However, this Court already considered the full sufficiency of the evidence when addressing plaintiffs' motion for a new trial under Rule 59. A Rule 50(b) motion requires the movant to meet a more stringent legal test than a Rule 59 motion. As this Court previously held that defendants presented sufficient evidence such that plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial, plaintiffs cannot meet the higher hurdle of Rule 50(b). Therefore, for the reasons discussed in the October 17 opinion and order with regard to plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, plaintiffs' motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
See Mullins II, 2008 WL 4620709, at *3-*4.
See DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that under Rule 59, a Court may grant a new trial "even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict" and "need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner").
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is granted, but the Court adheres to its original decision set forth in the October 17 Opinion and Order. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket No. 141). A conference is scheduled for January 9, 2009 at 4:30 p.m.
SO ORDERED: