Opinion
No. 97-CV-6722 JG.
September 20, 1999
Vergyl Mulligan, Cayuga Correctional Facility, Moravia.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, By Avi Lew, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendants Brion D. Travis, Parole Officer Gaddy, and Justice Anne G. Feldman.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
*1 Alleging that defendants unlawfully deprived him of his civil rights by knowingly using forged documents to revoke his parole, Vergyl Mulligan brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mulligan seeks monetary damages and the imposition of disciplinary action against all defendants.
The Attorney General has moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims against State defendants Justice Anne G. Feldman; Brion D. Travis, the Chairman of the Division of Parole; and Parole Officer Gaddy. As to each of these defendants, the Attorney General argues that: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mulligan's claims; (2) this Court should abstain, or decline on the basis of comity, from hearing and determining the matters raised in the complaint; (3) the State defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; and (4) the State defendants are protected from a suit for money damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. As to Justice Feldman, the Attorney General argues that the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes a suit for money damages. As to Travis, the Attorney General contends that Mulligan has failed to allege that Travis was personally involved in the deprivation of Mulligan's civil rights.
Because the motion to dismiss the complaint is submitted by the Attorney General, the motion does not address the claims against defendants Robert E. Wangenstein and Corrections Officer Sterlacci, both of whom are employed by the City of New York.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted as to Justice Feldman, and denied as to Brion D. Travis and Parole Officer Gaddy.
BACKGROUND
Although the specific allegations of plaintiff's pro se complaint are not easily deciphered, it appears to allege the following facts, all of which must be accepted as true at this stage of the proceedings. See Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991). In August 1991, plaintiff Vergyl Mulligan was convicted of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of three to ten years in prison. He was released to parole supervision on February 17, 1994.
On June 1, 1995, the Division of Parole issued a warrant against plaintiff. Based on a "Refusal Form" — a document that apparently indicates that a parolee refuses to attend a preliminary hearing regarding his parole revocation, and that is to be signed by a New York City Corrections Officer and the parolee-the Division of Parole held a hearing in absentia on June 13, 1995. At that hearing, Hearing Officer Albano found Mulligan guilty of violating his parole. Mulligan was then detained pending a final hearing.
Mulligan claims that ordinary protocol mandates that he sign his name on the Refusal Form in front of his parole officer, who in this case was Officer Gaddy. However, Mulligan alleges that (a) Corrections Officer Sterlacci forged plaintiff's signature on the Refusal Form; (b) Mulligan was not aware of the hearing on June 13, 1995, due to the forging of his signature (Aff. at 3); and (c) Brion D. Travis sent Parole Officer Gaddy this forged Refusal Form, which Travis was aware was forged. (Aff. at 5.)
"Aff." followed by a number refers to pages in "Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Notice Motion to Amend his Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a)," dated January 3, 1999. "Reply" followed by a number refers to pages in "Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint."
*2 In August 1995, plaintiff brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of New York before the Honorable Anne G. Feldman, asserting that he was not provided a preliminary hearing, despite having requested one. (Complaint, ¶ IV.) Plaintiff alleges that Justice Feldman never decided his petition.
On April 18, 1996, plaintiff appeared at a final parole revocation hearing. Hearing Officer Albano found Mulligan guilty of violating his parole, and the Division of Parole sentenced Mulligan to fourteen months in prison. (Aff. at 3.)
Mulligan also alleges that Parole Officer Gaddy made him sign back-dated violation papers, although Mulligan has not clearly articulated how this injured him. (Reply at 2.) The Attorney General does not discuss this allegation.
DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all factual allegations contained therein. See Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991). The Court may grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1065 (2d Cir. 1985).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. See Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 1990). Furthermore, complaints under § 1983 "must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple, and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983." Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, federal courts treat papers filed by pro se litigants under a more relaxed standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Fariello v. Rodriguez, 148 F.R.D. 670, 674 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
According to the Attorney General, the complaint must be dismissed because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Attorney General argues that since a federal court may not sit in appellate review of a state court proceeding, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. The Attorney General is correct in his argument that the only permissible review of state court proceedings is by the superior state court or the Supreme Court of the United States. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-84 (1983) (citing Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970) ("[L]ower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.")).
However, the Attorney General misapprehends the nature of plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff is not asking this court to sit in review of a state court proceeding. Plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he brought in State Supreme Court, Kings County, alleges that Mulligan was not provided a preliminary hearing within the requisite fifteen days. The § 1983 action brought before this Court, by contrast, seeks monetary damages based on the allegedly unconstitutional actions undertaken by defendants in revoking Mulligan's parole. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.
C. Abstention
*3 The Attorney General next argues that the complaint should be dismissed under the abstention doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). This doctrine generally forbids a federal court from enjoining a state court proceeding, and is derived from fundamental principles of federalism and comity. See id. at 41. To determine whether abstention is proper, a court should consider three questions:
(1) whether there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) whether an important state interest is involved; and (3) whether the federal plaintiff has an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his constitutional claims during or after the proceeding.
Christ the King Reg'l High Sch. v. Culvert, 815 F.2d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 1987). This is not a proper case for Younger abstention, as plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not committed to the jurisdiction of state bodies, and there is no pending state court proceeding relating to those claims.
Finally, the Attorney General asserts that, even if abstention is not required, this Court should decline, as a matter of comity, to hear this case and instead should refer the matter to the state courts. According to the Attorney General, the decision to defer to the jurisdiction of the state courts, when abstention is not required, is a matter committed to the district court's discretion. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662-664 (1978). However, in Will there was ongoing, duplicative litigation in the state and federal courts. That is not the situation here. Plaintiff's complaints in this case are original, and they are matters over which this court has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the principles of comity do not warrant the dismissal of this case.
D. The Claims Against Justice Feldman
Mulligan alleges that Justice Feldman issued an order directing the DOC to produce him before the court. (Aff. at 4.) When the DOC ignored Feldman's order, according to Mulligan, he was denied an opportunity to demonstrate that official documents were forged. Mulligan contends that he contacted Justice Feldman and informed her that the DOC refused to comply with the order to produce him before the court. Justice Feldman allegedly dismissed this petition based on erroneous information. (Aff. at 4.) Plaintiff does not describe the source of this erroneous information or its nature.
The Attorney General contends that the claim against Justice Feldman must be dismissed under the doctrine of judicial immunity. A claim for money damages against state court judges is foreclosed by absolute immunity from civil liability conferred upon judges acting within the scope of their judicial capacities. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, Mulligan does not contend, nor is there any indication, that Justice Feldman acted extrajudicially in dismissing his petition. In demonstrating the extent of judicial immunity, the Supreme Court has stated that:
*4 [t]his immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. . . . We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable `every person' who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; see also Montero, 171 F.3d at 760. Thus, even if Mulligan had alleged that Justice Feldman's conduct was malicious and corrupt, she would still be immune from a suit for money damages. Accordingly, the claim against Justice Feldman is dismissed.
E. Claims Against Brion D. Travis 1. Travis's Personal Involvement
According to the Attorney General, Mulligan's failure to advance specific factual allegations against Travis warrants dismissal of the complaint. It is true that Mulligan did not set forth specific allegations against Travis in either his complaint or in his reply to the defendant's motion to dismiss. However, after the Attorney General filed his brief in support of the present motion, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint, and stated in his moving papers that Travis was aware that the Refusal Form was forged. (Aff. at 5.) Plaintiff further alleged that he sent Travis a letter accompanied by a copy of his original habeas petition challenging his confinement. (Aff. at 5.)
The Attorney General did not oppose Mulligan's motion to amend the complaint, and the motion was granted.
Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to recover damages from a state official if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant was "personally involved" in the alleged deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). Personal involvement may be established through evidence of "direct participation, or failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or gross negligence in managing subordinates." Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, Mulligan has alleged that Travis failed to remedy an alleged wrong after learning that Mulligan had been denied due process. Specifically, Mulligan allegedly wrote to Brion Travis and informed him that the Refusal Form was forged, and that he had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that he was not provided a preliminary hearing. Plaintiff's claim that he personally notified Travis of the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights is sufficient to state a claim of personal involvement under § 1983. See Wright, 21 F.3d at 502 (holding in § 1983 case that, where defendant had received a habeas corpus petition in which the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a host of rights connected with a hearing, the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged the defendant's personal involvement); Francis v. Travis, No. 96-CV-3211, 1997 WL 1068706, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1997) (holding in § 1983 case that, where different plaintiff in prior suit against Travis personally notified him of violations in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this would have been sufficient to state a claim of personal involvement on Travis's part).
2. Eleventh Amendment
*5 The Attorney General argues that Travis, as a state defendant acting in his official capacity, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. To the extent that the plaintiff is proceeding against Travis in his official capacity, his claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir. 1988); Gill v. Stella, 845 F.Supp. 94, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
However, the Attorney General incorrectly assumes that plaintiff's pro se complaint is brought against Travis solely in his official capacity. As the Second Circuit held in Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1993),
the failure of a complaint to specify that claims against government officials are asserted against them in their individual capacities generally does not warrant an outright dismissal at the pleading stage, for in many cases, a complaint against public officials will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both, and only the course of proceedings will indicate the nature of the liability to be imposed. It is therefore more appropriate for the court to allow the case to proceed against the officials in their individual capacities, requiring, if appropriate, an amendment to provide greater notice to the defendants.
Id. at 529-30 (citations, quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Thus, although Mulligan's official-capacity claim against Travis is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, his individual-capacity claim is not. See id. at 529 ("To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state. As to a claim brought against him in his individual capacity, however, the state official has no Eleventh Amendment immunity.") (citations omitted).
3. Qualified Immunity
The Attorney General next argues that Travis is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officers enjoy qualified immunity from damages actions "if their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or if it is objectively reasonable to believe that [their] acts did not violate these clearly established rights." Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). In this case, the Attorney General has failed to establish that it was objectively reasonable for Travis to believe that knowingly using a forged form to the detriment of a parolee did not violate clearly established rights. Indeed, the Attorney General does not even argue that Travis's actions "could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the claim against Travis is denied.
Although a decision denying or revoking parole is quasi-adjudicative and entitled to absolute immunity, see Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), Travis is not being sued for performing an adjudicative function.
F. Complaint Against Parole Officer Gaddy 1. Gaddy's Personal Involvement
*6 As mentioned above, § 1983 permits a plaintiff to collect damages against a state official if he can prove that the defendant was "personally involved" in the alleged violation. Wright, 21 F.3d at 501. In this case, plaintiff states that parole officer Gaddy was personally involved because Gaddy knowingly accepted a forged refusal form. Gaddy should have known this document was forged, plaintiff asserts, because plaintiff was required to provide his signature in front of Gaddy each time he reported to the parole officer. Construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff apparently alleges that Gaddy was familiar with plaintiffs signature, and should thus have recognized that the signature was a forgery. In addition, plaintiff alleges that Gaddy made him sign violation papers which were back-dated. Based on plaintiffs specific allegations, he has sufficiently alleged Gaddy's personal involvement in the deprivation of plaintiff's due process rights.
2. Eleventh Amendment
As it did with regard to Travis, the Attorney General argues that plaintiff's claims against Parole Officer Gaddy are barred because Gaddy is entitled to absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. This argument is meritless. As discussed above, plaintiff's pro se complaint must be construed as asserting claims against Gaddy in both his official and individual capacities, and an individual capacity suit is not precluded by the doctrine of absolute immunity.
3. Qualified Immunity
The Attorney General next argues that Gaddy is entitled to qualified immunity. As mentioned above, government officers are immune from suit "if their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or if it is objectively reasonable to believe that [their] acts did not violate these clearly established rights." Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). However, in support of this argument, the Attorney General simply states that Gaddy is immunized from liability because he acted in good faith in initiating charges against plaintiff and revoking plaintiffs parole. Such conclusory statements do not address plaintiffs allegations that Gaddy knowingly accepted a forged refusal form and intentionally back-dated violation papers. Accordingly, the Attorney General has not established that it was reasonable for Gaddy to believe that his acts did not violate plaintiff's rights, and the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds must therefore be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is dismissed as to defendant Justice Anne G. Feldman. The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to plaintiff's claims against Brion D. Travis and Parole Officer Gaddy.
So Ordered.