Opinion
Decided April 7, 1936.
Where the subject-matter of a settlement with a releasee includes claims against other persons who may be liable for the same wrong, the releasor's cause of action against them is also discharged. Where two instruments are simultaneously executed by an employee, one being a receipt to his employer for final payment under the compensation act, and the other being a release "in full settlement . . . of a disputed claim growing out of a bodily injury," the question whether the employee's intention was to release third parties is to be ascertained from the two documents construed together in the light of the conduct and language of the parties to the documents and of the surrounding circumstances.
CASE, to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on May 26, 1931, at Manchester, when he fell from a window of the defendant's building. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was in the employ of William Jones, who had a contract with the defendant to paint the building in question. The declaration alleges that the accident was "due to a hidden defect in one of the windows, which defect was known or should have been known to the defendant."
On March 31, 1932, the plaintiff brought a petition against Jones for compensation under P. L., c. 178. The case was settled by the company which insured Jones against liability to his employees on April 30, 1932, and at that time the plaintiff signed two documents, one the customary receipt for final payment under the workmen's compensation act, the other a "Receipt and Release" (referred to in the opinion as the release), in which the plaintiff acknowledged the payment of $3,000 "Comp" [compensation] plus the payment of medical bills for the first fourteen days (P. L., c. 178, s. 13) "to be in full settlement, accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim growing out of a bodily injury" sustained by him on or about May 26, 1931. This document contained a certificate signed by the plaintiff's attorney to the effect that the plaintiff signed the release in the attorney's presence and stated "that . . . he understood it fully released and discharged all claims of any kind."
The defendant moved to dismiss the present action, alleging that it was brought for the same injuries for which the plaintiff had sought recovery under his petition for compensation and that the releases executed in settlement thereof inured to the defendant's benefit and barred "any further claim by said plaintiff, Peter Mullen, for injuries growing out of said accident."
The motion was heard by Burque, J., who, after finding various facts, construed the "Receipt and Release" to be binding on the plaintiff in his present suit and ordered judgment to be entered for the defendant. The case is transferred on the plaintiff's exception to this order.
Chretien Craig and O'Connor Saidel (Mr. Saidel orally), for the plaintiff.
Wyman, Starr, Booth, Wadleigh Langdell (Mr. Booth orally), for the defendant.
No question is raised as to the scope of the plaintiff's general exception to the court's order, and it is understood that the entire question of construction is here for consideration. The interpretation of the instruments in controversy necessitates the ascertainment of the plaintiff's intention, and that intention is to be gathered from the two documents construed together in the light of the conduct and language of the parties to the instruments and the surrounding circumstances. Stacy v. Company, 83 N.H. 281, 286; General Motors v. Berry, 86 N.H. 280, 284, and cases cited.
It is true, as the plaintiff suggests, "that the release of a statutory liability to make partial compensation for an injury does not operate full discharge of others who may be liable for the same wrong." Stacy v. Company, 83 N.H. 281, 285. But this rule is of course inapplicable once the subject-matter of the settlement is found to include the claim against the other wrongdoers. And there is here abundant evidence to sustain a finding that the damage settled for when the release was given to Jones was the same for which recovery is now sought. See Colby v. Walker, 86 N.H. 568, 572. The trial court has so found in effect.
The adjuster who made the settlement testified that when, as in the present case, a claimant is in a hurry to receive payment, it is the practice of the insurance company to require a release covering "the public as a whole." He explained the reason for this practice as follows: "We require the general release in order to prevent plaintiff or his representatives from bringing a common law action later on against some other person who might be insured with us, and whose name we are not sure of at the time settlement is made." The court has found that this practice was followed in the present case.
When the documents were submitted to the plaintiff for his signature, his counsel, with the permission of the adjuster, added to the certificate attached to the receipt for payment under the workmen's compensation act the words "against Wm. Jones," so that the certificate reads, "I . . . hereby certify that I have this day interpreted this document to Peter Mullen and he understands it, and have explained to him that the signing of this release will effectually bar _____ from making any further claim against Wm. Jones by reason of accident which happened on or about the 26 day of May, 1931."
The adjuster testified, without objection, that he refused plaintiff's counsel permission to add the same words to the certificate attached to the release, and counsel there certifies that the plaintiff stated to him that he understood that the document "fully released and discharged all claims of every kind." The presiding justice has indicated that this certificate is decisive in his mind to the effect that the plaintiff must have known that such a release discharged all claims against any persons who could possibly have been obligated to him by reason of the accident. Such a finding is amply justified by the evidence.
Exception overruled.
All concurred.