Opinion
No. 08-73308.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed March 21, 2011.
Jesse Adams Moorman, III, Judith L. Wood, Esquire, Law Offices of Judith L. Wood Jesse A. Moorman, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
Kathryn McKinney, Mark Christopher Walters, Esquire, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. A070-925-838.
Before: FARRIS, O'SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Trisha Mukweya, a native and citizen of Uganda, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Mukweya's motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA's final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mukweya failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Uganda to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that petitioner now has a well-founded fear of persecution). Because this issue is dispositive of Mukweya's motion to reopen, we reject her contention the BIA erred by failing to address whether she established prima facie eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Mukweya's challenges to the BIA's May 14, 2003, order, because this petition for review is not timely as to that order. See Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003).