Opinion
3:24-CV-0089 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0133 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0157 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0182 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0197 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0208 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0251 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0277 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0288 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0298 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0299 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0300 (DNH/ML) 3:24-CV-0360 (DNH/ML)
06-11-2024
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. INT'L MONETARY FUND, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTH., et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENT, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. E. CARIBBEAN CENT. BANK, et al., Defendants. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. CENT. BANK OF W. AFRICAN STATES, Defendant. JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff, v. THE WORLD BANK GRP., et al., Defendants.
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, Pro Se
JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge
The Clerk has sent thirteen pro se Complaints in the above captioned actions together with applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by Jamil Abdul Muhammad (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's IFP applications, and (2) recommend that Plaintiff's Complaints be dismissed without leave to amend.
Muhammad v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, et al., 3:24-CV-0089 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad I”); Muhammad v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al., 3:24-CV-0133 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad II”); Muhammad v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, et al., 3:24-CV-0157 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad III”); Muhammad v. United States Dep't of Treasury, et al., 3:24-CV-0182 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad IV”); Muhammad v. Office of Mgmt. and Budget, et al., 3:24-CV-0197 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad V”); Muhammad v. Int'l Monetary Fund, et al., 3:24-CV-0208 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VI”); Muhammad v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al., 3:24-CV-0251 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VII”); Muhammad v. Bank of Int'l Settlement, et al., 3:24-CV-0277 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad VIII”); Muhammad v. European Cent. Bank, et al., 3:24-CV-0288 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad IX”); Muhammad v E. Caribbean Cent. Bank, et al., 3:24-CV-0298 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad X”); Muhammad v. Cent. Bank of W. African States, 3:24-CV-0299 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XI”); Muhammad v. Bank of Cent. African States, 3:24-CV-0300 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XII”); and Muhammad v. The World Bank Group, et al., 3:24-CV-0360 (DNH/ML) (“Muhammad XIII”).
I. BACKGROUND
Liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaints are largely repetitive and assert that his rights were violated by various entities and individuals named as defendants in Muhammad I-Muhammad XIII. (Muhammad I-XIII, Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaints are nonsensical, replete with legal jargon, and appear to relate to concerns that Plaintiff has with financial institutions. (Id.) In Muhammad I and Muhammad II Plaintiff filed supplements to the Complaints, which-like the Complaints-are largely nonsensical. (Muhammad I, Dkt. Nos. 3, 5; Muhammad II, Dkt. Nos. 4, 6.) In Muhammad III, Plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that, amongww other things, Plaintiff is “the registered owner of JAMIL ABDUL MUHAMMAD Once known as Horace Vernon Bryson.” (Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 4 at ¶ 3.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 15(d) “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may . . . permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Plaintiff failed to file a motion to supplement. In addition, the “Supplements” filed by Plaintiff do not relate to events that occurred after the respective Complaints were filed.
Plaintiff has filed applications to proceed IFP. (Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 2.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONS TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP applications, the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. (Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 2.) Therefore, Plaintiff's applications to proceed IFP are granted. (Id.)
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his IFP applications have been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . requires the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense....[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Clervrain v. Robbins, 22-CV-1248, 2022 WL 17517312, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3170384 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (D'Agostino, J.). A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (McAvoy, C.J.).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaints with this principle in mind, I recommend that the Complaints be dismissed without leave to amend.
As they currently stand, Plaintiff's Complaints fail to provide fair notice of the claims he attempts to assert. By way of example, the Complaints allege:
This STATEMENT OF CLAIM being submitted is pursuant to 42 U.S. Code subsection 1983, Conspiracy to Defraud plaintiff Civil, Human Rights, 42 U.S. Code Subsection 12101, Ame-Ricans with Disabilities Act, 18 U.S. Code Subsection 241 Conspiracy Against Rights, violating numerous Constitutional Rights consisting of 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, 13thprohibiting slavery, peonage without just compensation. International Law pursuant to article 4 forbids all forms of slavery including Modern day slavery and slave trading, which states no one shall be held in slavery or servitude. The 14 Amendment is also being sited in this civil complaint for plaintiff not receiving equal protection of the law. Failure to disclose (FD) and compensate Beneficial Owner, U.S. Residence Share holder, Securities holder has been enforced upon Plaintiff who owns shares, stock, equity shares, that are traded Globally on NASDAQ, NYSE, and other major trading platforms as a Exchange Traded Fund (ETF), Unit Investment Trust UIT), Class A Common Stock, Penny Sock, Equity Shares, and Pooled Investment.(Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 1 at 22; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 1 at 20; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 1 at 21; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 1 at 6 [errors in originals].)
Moreover, the Complaints state that they are seeking
A fair resolution for relief sought in these civil matters of a Derivative suit against personal board members and corporate financial foreign and domestic agencies listed as defendant(s), plaintiff Jamil Abdul Muhammad is ordering the U.S. Marshall to hand deliver this initial filing
to defendant(s) FORMS 8-K, 10-Q, 10-K, 20-F, to insure plaintiff request for financials and owed assets of common stock, dividends, derivatives, nominal interest, of plaintiff personal property are honored and delivered back to plaintiff and the courts, without unfair treatment and foul play, limiting excuses indicating there was never any request from plaintiff for such important owed assets, shares, common stock, dividends, nominal interest, owed and outstanding illegally detained from plaintiff.(Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 1 at 24; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 1 at 22; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 1 at 23; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 1 at 8; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 1 at 8 [errors in originals].)
Given its lack of clarity, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the Complaints because they are not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. and because Plaintiff's claim or claims against the named defendants are entirely unclear. (Muhammad I-XIII, Dkt. No. 1.)
The Court also notes that Plaintiff's assertions are of the kind typically used by litigants who affiliate themselves with the sovereign citizen movement. The sovereign citizen movement is “a loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior; the FBI has labeled the sovereign citizens a domestic terrorist group.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see United States v. McLaughlin, 949 F.3d 780, 781 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (noting that “so-called ‘Sovereign Citizens' seek to clog the wheels of justice and delay proceedings so justice won't ultimately be done. They do so by raising numerous-often frivolous-arguments, many alleging that the Courts or the Constitution lack any authority whatsoever.”); Muhammad v. Smith, 13-CV-0760, 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (D'Agostino, J.) (“Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources.”) (collecting cases); see also Balash-Ioannidou v. Contour Mortg. Corp, 22-CV-4506, 2022 WL 3358082, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (rejecting claim that plaintiff “issued a payment through Notary Presentment to Defendants in the amount of $645,300.00” to satisfy her debt, as well as a “Notary Protest” and a “Certificate of Dishonor.”); Tyson v. Clifford, 18-CV-1600, 2018 WL 6727538, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018) (“Adherents of [redemptionist] claims or defenses ‘believe that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings.'”); Steinkirchner v. Gordon, 19-CV-1241, 2020 WL 549087, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2020) (“While the Court is not in the business of issuing general advisory opinions, it can say with confidence that the Plaintiff's one-sided effort to discharge her debts does not create a legal or factual basis for the claims she struggles to assert.”); Stoute v. Navient, 19-CV-11362, 2019 WL 13234780, at *2 (D. Mass. July 2, 2019) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that Navient could not pursue collection on alleged student loan debt pursuant to U.C.C. § 3-505 because it failed to respond to his correspondence); McKay v. U.S. Bank, 14-CV-0872, 2015 WL 5657110, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 24, 2015) (denying plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment that the defendant was not the real mortgage holder and to quiet title based upon their mailing of a “notarial presentment” and a “notarial notice of Dishonor” to the defendant bank).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaints be dismissed as frivolous. (Muhammad I-XIII, Dkt. No. 1.)
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
In this instance, I conclude that any amendments to Plaintiff's Complaints would be futile. Plaintiff's claims and allegations are factually and legally frivolous. Any amendments to Plaintiff's Complaints are not likely to be productive and will further clog the wheels of justice. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaints be dismissed without leave to amend. See Igarashi v. Skull & Bone, 438 Fed.Appx. 58, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the district court “properly dismissed the complaint without providing an opportunity to amend because any amendment would have been futile in light of the incredible nature of the allegations.”); Smith v. Jackson, 21-CV-0005, 2021 WL 3518327, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2021) (Lovric, M.J.) (recommending dismissal without leave to replead where the claims were frivolous and the claims could not be cured by amendment), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2775003 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021) (D'Agostino, J.); Herschaft v. New York City Police Dep't, 18-CV-4770, 2018 WL 4861388, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (dismissing the complaint as frivolous and declining leave to amend where the “complaint [wa]s devoid of any basis in law or fact” and concluding that such defects “cannot be cured by amendment”); Chicherchia v. Fox Studios, 10-CV-0278, 2010 WL 7746199, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010) (dismissing without leave to amend the plaintiff's complaint as frivolous because any amendment would be futile).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP applications (Muhammad I, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad II, Dkt. No. 8; Muhammad III, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad IV, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad V, Dkt. No. 5; Muhammad VI, Dkt. No. 6; Muhammad VII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad VIII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad IX, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad X, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XI, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XII, Dkt. No. 2; Muhammad XIII, Dkt. No. 2) are GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaints (Muhammad I-XIII, Dkt. No. 1) as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Order and Report Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).