Opinion
No. 1-12-2667
08-07-2013
QAE-DAH MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY; DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY; BOARD OF REVIEW, Defendants-Appellants, and NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, Defendants.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 11 L 50391
Honorable Robert L. Cepero, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hyman and Mason concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Circuit court's administrative review judgment reversed where the Board's decision that plaintiff voluntarily resigned without good cause attributable to her employer, thereby disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits, was not clearly erroneous. ¶ 2 Plaintiff, Qae-Dah Muhammad, filed a complaint for administrative review seeking to reverse a decision by the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Board) that she voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to her employer and was ineligible for benefits under section 601A of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/601A (West 2010)). The circuit court reversed the Board's decision and defendants (the Board, the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Department), and the Director of the Department (Director)) now challenge the propriety of that order on appeal. Although plaintiff has not filed a brief in response, we will consider the appeal pursuant to the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 131-33 (1976). ¶ 3 The record shows that plaintiff began working part-time as a telephone interviewer for National Opinion Research Center (NORC) on January 28, 2008, and submitted her resignation on June 17, 2010, which became effective July 3, 2010. Plaintiff then filed for unemployment benefits claiming that she left her employment with NORC because she had been unsuccessful in raising her production numbers, for which she had been placed on final warning. As reasons given to NORC for leaving, plaintiff cited the lack of leadership and administrative support, mistreatment by staff and management forcing her to work in poorly lit areas, and ear drum damage from the headsets she had to wear. Plaintiff also stated that she sent "constant" letters to human resources complaining about her work environment in an attempt to resolve the situation. ¶ 4 NORC protested that claim, stating that plaintiff voluntarily left her employment for personal reasons. In support, NORC submitted plaintiff's resignation letter, wherein she stated that working at NORC was challenging, that she experienced emotionally painful treatment, and that it was imperative that she leave due to "lack of leadership, and administrative support." ¶ 5 NORC also submitted a letter addressed to human resources, which plaintiff included with her resignation letter, in which she stated that she had been placed on "final warning," and does not have the "drive, know how or energy to turn it around." Plaintiff also criticized the leadership skills of NORC supervisors, and complained about repeatedly being seated in unlit and noisy areas. In addition, NORC submitted copies of letters from management to plaintiff, reflecting her history of receiving verbal and written warnings for low monthly statistics, failure to follow supervisor directives, and failure to meet its minimum 16-hour work week requirement. Those letters reflect, inter alia, that plaintiff began receiving warnings in October 2009, received a "final warning" on May 7, 2010, and received a written warning on May 18, 2010. ¶ 6 On February 18, 2011, the Department claims adjudicator denied plaintiff's claim, finding that she voluntarily left employment for personal reasons, in lieu of being fired, and was ineligible for benefits under section 601(A) of the Act. Plaintiff appealed, and, on February 2, 2012, a Department referee conducted a telephone hearing in which plaintiff was the sole participant. ¶ 7 In that hearing, plaintiff testified that she resigned from NORC because the environment there was uncomfortable and supervisors did not respond to her numerous complaints about issues such as the noisy and distracting work atmosphere, and being repeatedly asked to work in areas with inadequate lighting. Her attempts to resolve these problems were "to no avail," so she left NORC in order to keep her sanity and integrity intact. ¶ 8 Plaintiff testified that her work productivity was tremendously affected by distractions caused by her fellow employees, who would often socialize. When she complained to supervisors about the noise, she was told that those employees were conducting phone interviews, but plaintiff felt that her managers wanted to make her uncomfortable so that she would leave. Plaintiff testified that due to the noise, she had to increase the volume on her work headset, which "created a problem" with her right ear. Plaintiff did not further elaborate regarding any impact on her hearing, and acknowledged that NORC is a call center where numerous employees work on a production floor, separated only by partial cubicles. ¶ 9 Plaintiff also testified that she was frequently seated in areas with inadequate or no lighting. She acknowledged that she did not always work in unlit areas, and that light came in through the windows on the occasions when she did. Plaintiff testified that when she raised the lighting issue with supervisors, she was given numerous excuses for why they could not turn the lights on for her, such as that the lights were on a timer and could not be turned on. ¶ 10 Plaintiff acknowledged that she was on final warning when she submitted her resignation, and stated that she did not want to be fired. Her morale was low and she felt there was "no way" she could turn things around in relation to her productivity. Plaintiff briefly referred to an electronic journal that she kept, in which she outlined relevant incidents, but stated that she did not submit any of that information to the referee. ¶ 11 On February 3, 2012, the referee affirmed the claims adjudicator's denial of plaintiff's claim for unemployment benefits. In doing so, the referee found that, based on a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to NORC, and was thus disqualified from receiving benefits under section 601(A) of the Act. The referee further found that plaintiff was not subject to such conditions or abuse as would have rendered her job unsuitable, and that plaintiff should have made reasonable efforts to resolve conflicts before voluntarily terminating employment and seeking unemployment benefits. ¶ 12 Plaintiff appealed to the Board, and submitted a letter which contained her summary of excerpts from a work journal that she kept. In that letter, plaintiff recounts incidents from June 2008, October 2008, and October 2009, that she felt supported her claim and illustrated the mistreatment she received from management, but did not explain why she failed to introduce this information at the hearing. ¶ 13 On April 13, 2012, the Board affirmed the referee's decision. In doing so, the Board indicated that it had reviewed the entire record, including plaintiff's application for benefits and the transcript of the hearing, and found it to be adequate and the further taking of evidence unnecessary. The Board also found that there was insufficient evidence to show that plaintiff left work with good cause attributable to NORC, and incorporated the referee's decision, which it found to be supported by the record and the law, into its own decision denying plaintiff's claim for benefits. Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint for administrative review and the circuit court reversed the Board's decision. ¶ 14 Defendants now appeal, arguing that the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous. We initially observe that our review of plaintiff's challenge is limited to the propriety of the Board's decision. Phistry v. Department of Employment Security, 405 Ill. App. 3d 604, 607 (2010). ¶ 15 The question of whether plaintiff voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to her employer involves a mixed question of law and fact, to which we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. Childress v. Department of Employment Security, 405 Ill. App. 3d 939, 942 (2010), citing AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001). An agency decision is clearly erroneous where a review of the entire record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Phistry, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 607. ¶ 16 An individual claiming unemployment insurance benefits has the burden of establishing her eligibility. Grigoleit Co. v. Department of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 64, 68 (1996); Collier v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 157 Ill. App. 3d 988, 991 (1987). Pursuant to the Act, a former employee is ineligible for benefits if she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer. 820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2010); Childress, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 943. ¶ 17 Good cause results from circumstances that produce real and substantial pressure to terminate employment and that would compel a reasonable person working under the same circumstances to act in the same manner. Childress, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 943. In determining whether an employee had good cause for leaving employment, the focus is on the conduct of the employer (Grant v. Board of Review of Illinois Department of Employment Security, 200 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1990)), and a cause is attributable to the employer if it is produced or created by the employer's actions or inactions (Jaime v. Director, Department of Employment Security, 301 Ill. App. 3d 930, 936 (1998)). ¶ 18 At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she resigned from NORC because of the uncomfortable environment and her supervisors' failure to respond to her numerous complaints about her working conditions. Plaintiff testified that the atmosphere at work was too noisy due to the loud and distracting conversations in which her coworkers engaged. However, she acknowledged that NORC is a call center where numerous employees simultaneously work on a production floor, and are separated only by partial cubicles. Given the nature of the business and plaintiff's job as one of many telephone interviewers, evidence of the noisy work environment did not show that she was subject to conditions or abuse that would have rendered the job unsuitable. Nor did plaintiff present evidence that a health concern related to the noisy environment was a justifiable reason to terminate her employment. See Zbiegien v. Department of Labor, 156 Ill. App. 3d 395, 400-01 (1987). ¶ 19 Plaintiff also testified that she was often seated in areas with inadequate or no lighting, which made it difficult for her to do her work. However, she acknowledged that she was not always seated in poorly lit areas, and, on the occasions that she was seated in those areas, light came in from surrounding windows. The record before the Board did not contain any documents to substantiate plaintiff's testimony that she raised the lighting issue with NORC supervisors or that NORC ignored any such complaints. Rather, the only documentation in the record reflects that NORC issued numerous warnings to plaintiff throughout the course of her employment, relating to her low productivity, low attendance, and failure to follow her supervisor's directives. ¶ 20 In fact, plaintiff acknowledged to the referee that at the time she resigned, she was on final warning and that she did not want to be fired. Plaintiff also acknowledged her low productivity statistics, testified that she felt there was "no way" she could turn things around in that regard, and, in her claim for unemployment benefits, listed her inability to raise her production numbers, for which she had been placed on final warning, as the reason she resigned from NORC. Further, in her resignation letter, plaintiff also acknowledged that she had been placed on final warning, and stated that she does not have the "drive, know how or energy to turn it around." The evidence before the Board thus shows that plaintiff resigned due to her history of low production statistics, for which she was on final warning, and her perceived inability to change the situation, rather than to any good cause attributable to NORC. ¶ 21 Moreover, in rendering its decision, the Board incorporated the referee's decision in its entirety, including the referee's finding that plaintiff should have made reasonable efforts to resolve any conflicts before voluntarily terminating her employment. Here, aside from plaintiff's testimony that she "registered concerns" on "numerous occasions" to various levels of NORC management, there is no evidence that plaintiff made any such attempts. Although plaintiff mentioned an electronic journal in which she outlined particular incidents where she "requested the lights to be turned on," she acknowledged that she did not supply any of that information to the referee. Although plaintiff submitted a five-page letter containing her summary of excerpts from that journal to the Board on appeal, pursuant to applicable regulations, the contents of that letter could not properly be considered by the Board. White v. Department of Employment Security, 376 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672-73 (2007); 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2720.315(b)(1)(B) (2008). ¶ 22 The regulations governing appeals to the Board specify that an appellant requesting to submit additional evidence must, inter alia, provide an explanation showing that she was unable to introduce the evidence at the hearing before the referee for reasons that were not her fault and which were outside of her control. 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2720.315(b)(1)(B) (2008). The notice of appeal to the Board that plaintiff completed and signed included this requirement. Nevertheless, plaintiff failed to comply with it, and failed to provide any explanation as to why she did not introduce the contents of her five-page letter as evidence at the hearing. As such, that letter was not properly before the Board, nor was the Board obliged to take it into consideration in rendering its decision. White, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73; 56 Ill. Adm. Code §2720.315(b)(1)(B) (2008). ¶ 23 Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the Board's decision to deny plaintiff unemployment benefits was clearly erroneous. Phistry, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 607. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and affirm the Board's decision finding plaintiff disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. ¶ 24 Reversed.