Summary
In Mott v. Stewart, 2002 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 23165 (D. Ariz. 2002), a federal district court granted Mott's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Summary of this case from Pickle v. StateOpinion
No. CV 98-239-TUC-RCC
August 29, 2002
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's May 18, 1998 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. Petitioner is presently confined at Arizona State Prison Complex-Perryville. On September 1, 2000, the Honorable Glenda E. Edmonds, United States Magistrate Judge, filed her Report and Recommendation, recommending that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. On September 25, 2000, Petitioner filed her Objection to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. On October 12, 2000, Respondents filed their response to Petitioner's objections. The Court heard oral argument on the objections to the Report and Recommendation on July 2, 2002. After a thorough and de novo review of the record, the Court will grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus. SUMMARY OF THE CASE
While the Court is ultimately not adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the Report and Recommendation's recitation of the facts and procedural history of this case was of assistance and will be incorporated into the Order of this Court.
On January 9, 1991, Petitioner Shelly K. Mott was indicted by a Pima County grand jury on two counts of child abuse under circumstances likely to produce death or serious bodily injury and one count of first degree murder. (File doc. #9, Resp't ex. H.) At trial, the following evidence was introduced:
In State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 (1997), the court erroneously stated that Petitioner was indicted by the Pinal County grand jury. Id. at 539.
On the evening of January 1, 1991, Mott left her two-and-one-half-year-old daughter, Sheena, at home in the care of her boyfriend, Vincent Near. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 538 (1997) (in banc), cert. denied, Mott v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997). When she returned less than one hour later, she found Near standing over Sheena and fanning her with a towel. Id. Near told Mott that Sheena had fallen off the toilet and hit her head. Id.
A short time later, Hank Gnatowsky stopped by Mott's home. Id. He found Near reading a first aid book. Id. Mott was sitting by some child care pamphlets entitled "Your Baby's safety" and "Your Baby and Crying." Id. Near told Gnatowsky that Sheena had fallen off the toilet. Id. Gnatowsky, who was a former paramedic, advised taking Sheena to a hospital and offered to take her himself. Id. Near declined his offer of help. Id. Gnatowsky found Sheena in her room. Id. She appeared to be sleeping, but her eyes were fluttering and her hands were moving as if she was dreaming. Id. Gnatowsky spoke to her, but she did not respond. Id. Before leaving, Gnatowsky twice more told Mott that Sheena should go to the hospital. Id. Near again refused his help. Id.
The next morning, Sheena would not wake up. Id. A distraught Mott went to the home of her friend, Erin Scott, and told her what had happened. Id. Mott explained she did not seek help sooner because she was worried that authorities would take Sheena away because of her bruises. Id. Mott returned home and brought Sheena to Scott's home. Id. Scott noticed the back of Sheena's head was very soft and she was exhibiting spasms. Id. Scott called for an ambulance. Id. Sheena died one week later as a result of a brain hemorrhage. Id.
At trial, expert medical testimony established that Sheena's injury was too severe to have been caused by a fall from the toilet. Id. She was found to have other marks of abuse including numerous bruises, abrasions, whip marks, and cigarette burns. Id. Mott admitted to police that she knew Near had been abusing her daughter and dressed her in a way to hide her bruises. Id. She also admitted she did not believe Near when he said Sheena had fallen. Id. She said she wanted to leave Near because she did not want Sheena to be hurt by him. Id. She claimed she never reported the abuse because she did not want to get Near in trouble. Id. Sandy Mott, Shelly Mott's former sister-in-law testified that in her opinion, Shelly was an emotional person who could stand up for herself. (File doc. #9, Resp't ex. B at 101.) In addition, Carol Osborne, a neighbor of Shelly Mott's when she lived in Pennsylvania, testified that Mott was outgoing, emotionally expressive and could stand up for herself. Id. at 112-13. Both Sandy Mott and Carol Osborne testified in the prosecution's case-in-chief. During closing argument, the prosecution argued that Sandy Mott and Carol Osborne's testimony established that Mott always stood up to Near. (File doc. #8, Resp't ex. L. at 113-14.)
The first count of child abuse was based on Mott's decision to leave Sheena alone with Near. Mott, 187 Ariz. at 539. The second count was based on Mott's failure to summon medical help when she returned. Id. The third count, felony murder, required a finding that Mott was guilty of knowing and intentional child abuse. (File doc. #7, Pet'r's mem. at p. 2, n. 1.)
The three counts against Mott were actually two, three and four of the indictment. (File doc. #7, Pet'r's mem. at 4.) Count one was against Near alone. Id.
At trial, Mott offered the expert testimony of Dr. Cheryl Karp, Ph.D., on the issue of mens rea. Mott, 187 Ariz. at 539. Karp was to testify "on the character traits of battered women and the presence of those traits in the defendant" which if believed by the jury, could have negated the element of knowledge or intent. Id. Mott was a battered woman and, according to Karp, would have formed a "traumatic bond" with the batterer. Id. Battered women feel helpless and depressed. Id. at 540. They "cannot sense danger or protect others from danger." Id. They are "inclined to believe what the batterer tells [them] and will lie to protect him." Id. "Karp concluded that [Mott's] history of being abused, in conjunction with her limited intelligence, prohibited her from being able to decide to take Sheena to the hospital." Id. The trial court ruled the testimony of Dr. Karp regarding Battered Woman Syndrome inadmissible on the issue of mens rea. Id. at 539.
Dr. Karp was allowed to testify about other issues including Petitioner's intelligence.
On the first count of child abuse, the jury found Mott guilty of the lesser-included charge of child abuse of a person under fifteen under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Id. On the second count, the jury found Mott guilty of knowing or intentional child abuse likely to produce death. Id. The second count supplied the requisite predicate offense allowing the jury to find Mott guilty of felony murder. Id. Mott was sentenced to a term of four years for the first count, twelve years for the second count, and thirty-five years without the possibility of parole for felony murder. Id. The twelve year term and the thirty-five year term were to run concurrently. Id.
Mott filed a direct appeal arguing, inter alia, that the trial court "committed reversible error by excluding expert testimony that she suffered from `battered woman syndrome." State v. Mott, 183 Ariz. 191, 192 (App. 1995). The court of appeals reversed holding that the exclusion of expert testimony was a denial of due process. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals. State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 (1997) (in banc). Mott filed a petition for writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied review. Mott v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 1234 (1997).
On May 18, 1998, Mott filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. She alleges she was denied her constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a fair trial and to present a defense when the trial court precluded expert testimony on the behavioral characteristics of battered women offered to dispute the elements of the offense presented by the State. (File Doc. #1, Pet. at 1.) Respondents concede the issue has been properly exhausted. (File doc. #8, Resp'ts answer at 21.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The writ of habeas corpus is available to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The district court's standard of review is described as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceeding unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).
"A state court's decision can be `contrary to' federal law either 1) if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or 2) if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts `materially indistinguishable' from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result." Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406-07 (2000)). "A state court's decision can involve an unreasonable application of federal law if it either 1) correctly identified the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable." Id.
The two categories overlap somewhat and a petitioner's claim might have to be tested against both standards. Id. A state court's application of federal law is unreasonable, if it is clearly erroneous. Id. at 1152-54. "[W]hen analyzing a claim that there has been an unreasonable application of federal law. [the court] must first consider whether the state court erred; only after we have made that determination may we then consider whether any error involved an unreasonable application of controlling law within the meaning of § 2254(d)." Id. at 1155.
ANALYSIS
The central issue in this case is the scope of a state's right to limit the introduction of evidence offered to (1) negate the specific intent element of an offense and (2) refute the state's evidence without infringing on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. In State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 (1997), the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that "Arizona does not allow evidence of a defendant's mental disorder short of insanity either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime." Id. at 541. The court ruled that Dr. Cheryl Karp's testimony about battered woman syndrome and Petitioner's history of abuse was not admissible for the purpose of demonstrating that defendant's mental incapacity negated specific intent. Id. at 544. In its opinion, the court outlined three concerns underlying its decision; (1) that the state's efforts to limit the use of the insanity defense would be undermined by psychological testimony aimed at negating mens rea; (2) that the type of psychological evidence offered to negate mens rea would be confusing to juries; and (3) that allowing such evidence would compel juries to release upon society dangerous criminals. Id. at 540-45.
Several aspects of this case prevent the Court from drawing a simple analogy to established case authority. First, Petitioner offered Dr. Karp's testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome not to establish self-defense, but to negate the mens rea element of the charged offense and refute Sandy Mott and Carol Osborne's testimony that Petitioner always stood up to Near. The victim of Petitioner's actions was not Vincent Near, the person who abused her, but another victim of Near's abuse, Petitioner's daughter Sheena. As a result, much of the case authority relating to the admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome in the self-defense context is not relevant in this case. Second, this case is not about the reliability or relevance of Dr. Karp's testimony. Many courts have struggled with the admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome testimony on the grounds of its scientific basis. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision was not based on the reliability or relevance of the proffered evidence. Therefore, the Court will not address these issues or discuss the general admissibility of expert psychological testimony. Finally, Petitioner was charged with specific intent crimes of omission based on her inaction in protecting Sheena from Near's abuse. Petitioner left Sheena with Near despite Near's history of violence and Petitioner failed to take Sheena to the hospital when she appeared to be injured. Specific intent crimes of omission are both more difficult to prove and more difficult to disprove. As a result of the nature of the charges against Petitioner, the possibility of a Due Process violation was heightened because of the defense's limited opportunities to challenge the state's evidence.
The Arizona Supreme Court's decision was based in large part on its characterization of Dr. Karp's testimony as "diminished capacity" evidence. See Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540. The term "diminished capacity" encompasses two distinct concepts in criminal law. "The first variant of what courts have called `diminished capacity' defenses inappropriately is the evidentiary doctrine which . . . is not a defense at all but merely a rule of evidence; specifically, the admission of evidence of mental abnormality to negate mens rea." United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 903 (3rd Cir. 1987). "A second strain of diminished capacity permits a defendant to show not only that he lacked the mens rea in a particular case but also that he lacked the capacity to form mens rea." Id. (emphasis in original). These concepts are also separate from the principle of "diminished responsibility" where a jury could find that a defendant possessed a certain mental state, but should be held less culpable because of a mental defect less severe than insanity. The parties do not dispute that states are entitled to exclude evidence offered for the purpose of establishing (1) a defendant's inability to form the requisite intent and (2) "diminished responsibility." The pivotal issue in this case is whether the state violated Petitioner's constitutional rights by adopting a blanket provision excluding expert psychological testimony offered to negate the mens rea element of the crime or refute evidence introduced by the prosecution.
Federal courts have been reluctant to intrude on a state's ability to regulate the introduction of evidence in criminal matters. "The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification. and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral. philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36 (1968) (plurality opinion)). However, a state's authority to limit the admissibility of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence is not absolute. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (striking down state rule preventing defendant from testifying on issues previously the subject of hypnosis); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (reversing Kentucky conviction for excluding evidence of circumstances surrounding confession); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-302 (1973) (ordering new Mississippi trial because, inter alia, court excluded adverse witness' out of court confession); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (striking down Texas statute prohibiting testimony of defendant's alleged accomplice). Rules excluding evidence from criminal trials "do not abridge an accused's rights to present a defense so long as they are not `arbitrary' or `disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56). A state may limit the introduction of relevant evidence for a "valid" reason. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 54 (1996) (discussing Crane, 476 U.S. at 687). The exclusion of evidence has been found to be unconstitutional only where it has "infringed on the weighty interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 58; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 22-23).
While the exclusion of evidence may rise to the level of a Due Process violation in certain cases, the burden remains on the defendant to show that the evidentiary rule they support "was so deeply rooted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (or perhaps has become so deeply rooted since) as to be a fundamental principle which that Amendment enshrined." Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48. "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'" Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 (quoting California v. Trobetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). As part of this right to present a defense, criminal defendants have the right to compel the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right "to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). "Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, [she] has the right to present [her] own witnesses to establish a defense." Id. "This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." Id.
In affirming Petitioner's conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court, in essence, held that because a state is permitted to exclude evidence for one purpose, it could exclude that evidence for any purpose. In its decision, the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Fisher, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). The court's reliance on Fisher is misplaced because the Fisher decision concerned whether the District of Columbia was required to allow a "diminished responsibility" type defense. Here, Petitioner offered Dr. Karp's testimony to (1) provide an alternative explanation for her conduct and (2) negate the state's evidence that she acted intentionally or knowingly in failing to protect her child. Dr. Karp's testimony could have refuted Sandy Mott and Carol Osborne's testimony that Petitioner always stood up to Near. The state court decision extended the clearly established legal principle set forth in Fisher to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).
In Mott, the court expressed concern that by adopting Petitioner's position, it would erode Arizona authority limiting use of a mental disease or defect as a defense for a crime. See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 543 (1997). However, the state's efforts to limit the insanity defense is a separate issue from criminal defendants being allowed to present evidence providing an alternative explanation for their conduct or to argue that they did not have the requisite intent and therefore, did not commit the charged offense. The distinction between whether evidence is being introduced to prove insanity or negate an element of the offense may be difficult for jurors to inherently understand. However, detailed jury instructions could explain the limited purpose for which the evidence should be considered. Therefore, juror confusion is not a "valid" reason to exclude Dr. Karp's testimony because its exclusion would be disproportionate to the purpose it was designed to serve. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Egelhoff v. Montana, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996). Finally, the court's concerns that such evidence would compel juries to release dangerous criminals is not warranted because the evidence in this case was offered to negate an element of the offense, not to reduce the defendant's responsibility. The jury could have convicted Petitioner of the lesser offense of reckless or negligent child abuse, which could not have been used as a predicate for the felony murder charge. If the jury was persuaded by the evidence offered to negate mens rea and it created a reasonable doubt as to that element of the offense, a finding of not guilty would not only be appropriate, but required.
After reviewing the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536 (1997) this Court finds that none of the proffered reasons for excluding Dr. Karp's testimony are "valid" when considering a criminal defendant's right to present a defense. The exclusion of evidence of mental disease or defect offered to negate the specific intent element of an offense or to establish an alternative explanation for a defendant's conduct is disproportionate to the purposes stated by the court that it was designed to serve. In this case, the exclusion of evidence was unconstitutional because it infringed on a weighty interest of Petitioner, her ability to present a complete defense. If the jury, after considering the excluded evidence, had convicted Petitioner of two counts of the lesser offense of reckless or negligent child abuse, she would not have been eligible for felony murder. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision was contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14 (1967). In addition, the court's reliance on Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. As a result of the Arizona Supreme Court's erroneous application of clearly established federal law, the Court will grant Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Retroactivity
Respondents contend that Petitioner's claim is barred because by granting relief, this Court would need to announce a new constitutional right for a defendant. The Court's holding in this action was "dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final," does not break new ground or impose "a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). Therefore, the decision in this case does not constitute a "new rule" and does not bar this Court from granting relief. Id. Harmless Error
Finally, the exclusion of the expert psychological testimony evidence in this case is subject to harmless error review. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (constitutionally improper denials of the right to impeach witnesses are subject to harmless error review). Petitioner's mental state at the time she left Sheena with Near and when she returned home to find Sheena injured was crucial in determining whether Petitioner was guilty of intentional child abuse or the lesser offense of negligent or reckless child abuse. The fact that the excluded evidence related to the central issue of the case and provided Petitioner with one of her only opportunities to offer an alternative explanation for her actions prevents this Court from finding that the exclusion of Dr. Karp's testimony was harmless error.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) Petitioner's May 18, 1998 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED;
(2) the State of Arizona is directed to release Petitioner from custody unless it affords her a new trial within 120 days of this Order; and
(3) the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
DECISION BY COURT. This action came on for hearing before the Court. The issues have been heard and a decision having been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1) Petitioner's May 18, 1998 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED;
2) the State of Arizona is directed to release Petitioner from custody unless it affords her a new trial within 120 days of this Order; and
3) the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and CLOSE the case.