Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 03-0719, SECTION "T"(3).
July 15, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgement filed on behalf of the Defendant, Pearl River Navigation ("PRN"). The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are relatively undisputed. On August 30, 2002, the plaintiff was employed by PRN as a deckhand assigned to work aboard the M/V East Pearl River ("the tug"). On the aforementioned date, the tug, with a two man crew consisting of Captain Wilmer R. Jenkins ("Captain Jenkins") and the plaintiff, Richard Mott ("Mr. Mott") pulled into PRN's yard # 3 to pick up a barge, the Suard 96 ("the barge"). The barge was moored along the bank of Irish Bayou in a fleet of three barges. To take the barge out of the fleet, the tug made up face lines to the stern of the barge.
As deckhand, Mr. Mott then proceeded to first untie the bow and then stern lines which were attaching the Suard 96 to the adjacent barge. Mr. Mott then brought the line which was securing the stern of the barge aboard the tug. Mr. Mott then attempted to drag the stern line, one end of which was hanging off of the barge and into the water, up onto the barge by putting one end of the line over his shoulder and walking towards the center of the barge. At some point while Mr. Mott was dragging the line over his shoulder, the line became taught because the other end of the line was in fact also secured to the shore. Mr. Mott's injuries were allegedly a result of a "jerk" of some sort resulting from the line becoming taught.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Argument and Analysis
I. Defendant's Arguments:
The defense argues that they are not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because they were caused by the seaman's own negligence. The defense cites three possible causes for the plaintiff's injuries, all of which are construed by the defense to be negligence on the part of the plaintiff: (1) the plaintiff's failure to determine what the opposite end of the line was tied to; (2) the plaintiff's failure to coil the line; and (3) the plaintiff carrying of the line over his shoulder and dragging it across the barge.
The defense claims that Mott has not identified any action by PRN that led to his injuries. The defense further alleges that there was no error in the configuration of the lines and that in no way did securing the barge to shore render the barge or anything therewith unseaworthy. In addition, the defense alleges that even if the configuration of the line was improper, this was not the proximate cause of Mott's injuries; instead, it was the plaintiff's own negligent performance of his duties which was the cause of his accident.
In support of their arguments, the defense cites a variety of Fifth Circuit cases. In support of Mott's negligence being the sole cause for his injuries, thereby barring him from recovery, the defense cites Kendrick v. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 669 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1982), which held that where a seaman's own negligence is the sole proximate cause of his injury, there is no recovery under the Jones Act.
The defense also cites Boudreaux v. United States, 280 F.3d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 2002), which held that a seaman is negligent where he is presented with two or more methods of performing his duties and chooses an unsafe manner where a safe manner was possible. The Court in Boudreaux goes on to explain that the mere existence of a potentially unseaworthy condition does not give rise to liability under the Jones Act or general maritime law where the plaintiff's choice in performing his duties in an unsafe manner was the direct cause of the harm. Id. at 461.
II. Plaintiff's Arguments:
The Plaintiff suggests that the normal and customary configuration for the fleeting of barges is that only the barge closest to shore be tied to the bank and then any additional barges are only secured to each other. The plaintiff also suggests lines connecting barges should not be connected to anything else. The plaintiff alleges that the additional barges should not be tied to the bank because then the deckhand would have to try to get to shore to untie the barge. The plaintiff contends that the above allegations support that the mooring configuration that existed at the time Mr. Mott was injured was not the common or correct practice in the industry.
The plaintiff next submits that Mr. Mott's actions in pulling the line out of the water were entirely reasonable and that the evidence shows that all the actions taken by the plaintiff in performing his duties on the day in questioned were common practice and those of a reasonable seaman under the same circumstances.
Lastly, the plaintiff contends that since Captain Jenkins admits witnessing the incident and he admittedly failed to take any actions to correct Mr. Mott actions, that if it was found by this Court that the manner in which Mr. Mott was performing his duties was unsafe, then Captain Jenkins, the defendant's employee, would have been negligent for either failing to properly train Mr. Mott or for not having stopped the unsafe operation.
III. Court's Analysis:
For a seaman to recover under general maritime law or the Jones Act due to the unseaworthy condition of a vessel," the injured seaman must prove that the owner has failed to provide a vessel, including her equipment and crew, which is reasonably fit and safe for the purposes for which it is to be used . . . In addition the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between his injury and the breach of duty that rendered the vessel unseaworthy." Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001). In the instant action, the plaintiff has brought suit against the defendant under the Jones Act and in the alternative General Maritime Law alleging that the defendant through it's negligence and/or the unseaworthiness of it's vessel caused the plaintiff to sustain injuries. The defense controverts these assertions alleging that their vessel was seaworthy and that they were in no way negligent. The defense goes on to contend that even if the vessel was possibly unseaworthy or they and/or their employees were possibly negligent, the unseaworthy condition and/or their negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Even if all of the defendant's assertions are accepted, they do not provide a basis for summary judgment, but instead are arguments to the finder of fact for the assessment of comparative fault. The defendants' motion argues facts which a reasonable jury might accept and utilize to place comparative fault on the plaintiff for the plaintiff's actions. There are factual disputes inherent in each of the allegations plaintiff has made. This Court finds that as genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgement, filed on behalf of Defendant, Peal River Navigation, be and the same is hereby DENIED.