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Motors Ins. Corp. v. State

Court of Appeals of South Carolina
Nov 8, 1993
313 S.C. 279 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)

Opinion

Opinion No. 2089

Submitted September 7, 1993

Decided November 8, 1993 Rehearing Denied December 16, 1993

Appeal from Aiken County Robert A. Smoak, Jr., Master In Equity

Affirmed.

C. LaVaun Fox, of Fox and Verenes, Aiken; and William H. Burkhalter, Jr., North Augusta, for appellants. Dalton H. Watkins, Columbia, for respondent.


This is an action to determine title to a motor vehicle. Motors Insurance Corporation sued, among others, Edward F. Willing and BW Inc., alleging that the body of a stolen vehicle which had been insured by Motors Insurance was now part of another vehicle, the title to which is in the name of Willing and BW. Motors Insurance seeks title to this other vehicle. The circuit court referred the matter to the master for final judgment with direct appeal. The master found that Motors Insurance had rightful title to the other vehicle. Willing and BW appeal. We affirm.

The master made the following findings of fact supported by evidence of record. In late 1985, M M Chevrolet, Inc., not a party to this appeal, bought a 1986 Chevrolet Blazer from General Motors and insured the same with Motors Insurance. The insurance coverage extended to losses from theft. In February, 1986, the Blazer was stolen from the auto dealer's lot. Motors Insurance indemnified the dealer for its loss and was assigned all right, title, and interest in the Blazer. Some time later, Willing and BW acquired possession of the whole 1986 Blazer from a third party, removed the body, and placed it on a salvaged vehicle that apparently belonged to them. Thereafter, Willing and BW conveyed title to the salvaged vehicle to Kevin and Kimberly Leonard. Later, however, the Leonards reassigned all of their interest in the salvaged vehicle to Willing and BW. Motors Insurance seeks title to this vehicle.

Although the record does not disclose the identity of this party, this information is not necessary for our review.

I.

Willing and BW first contend the master erred in admitting a copy of a "build sheet" and an impression made from a vehicle body part which revealed a "build sequence number." Willing and BW assert this evidence is hearsay and violates the best evidence rule. Motors Insurance apparently introduced and developed testimony regarding this evidence in order to show that the salvaged vehicle's body came from the 1986 Chevrolet Blazer.

As we understand the record, a "build sheet" is a document produced by the automobile manufacturer that lists the specifications for a particular car which it has manufactured. It also contains the vehicle's identification number, production date, and the dealer to whom it will be shipped.

We need not address these evidentiary rulings. Allegations made in a complaint that are not denied in the answer are deemed admitted. SCRCP 8(d); Fidelity Trust Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 158 S.C. 400, 155 S.E. 622 (1930). In its Complaint, Motors Insurance alleged that the 1986 Blazer's body was removed from its frame by an unknown party, that this body was placed on the frame of the salvaged vehicle by an unknown party, and that BW in turn sold the salvaged vehicle to Kevin and Kimberly Leonard. In their Answer, Willing and BW do not deny these facts. They merely deny "any wrongdoing" concerning the "vehicle described in the Complaint." They also allege the salvaged vehicle that BW sold to the Leonards was a "legitimate" vehicle in all respects.

The Complaint does not allege that Willing and BW made alterations to either of the vehicles. The Answer does not deny the Blazer's body is now a part of the salvaged vehicle. If Willing and BW lacked sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the facts pleaded in the Complaint, they should have so stated. SCRCP 8(b). Because they did not, these particular allegations of the Complaint are deemed to be admitted. The "build sheet" and impression evidence were not needed to prove the Blazer's body had been placed on the salvaged vehicle. Wilson v. Chandler, 235 N.C. 373, 70 S.E.2d 179 (1952). Therefore, any error in admitting them into evidence was harmless.

II.

Because a person can pass to his successor no greater title than he acquired, a thief or one in the subsequent chain of title cannot grant good title to stolen property, even to a bona fide purchaser. See Marvin v. Connelly, 272 S.C. 425, 252 S.E.2d 562 (1979). Therefore, notwithstanding the body of the 1986 Blazer is now a part of the salvaged vehicle, title to the 1986 Blazer remains with Motors Insurance. At a minimum, therefore, Motors Insurance has title to the body of the salvaged vehicle.

The issue remains, however, whether Motors Insurance should be awarded title to the entire salvaged vehicle. Willing and BW contend that even if the body of the 1986 Chevrolet Blazer is owned by Motors Insurance, the master erred in awarding the entire salvaged vehicle to Motors Insurance. They contend the salvaged vehicle, minus the Blazer body, belongs to them.

Motors Insurance introduced as evidence a valid certificate of title to the 1986 Blazer, which Willing and BW did not attempt to refute. Moreover, Willing's son testified that when Willing and BW purchased the 1986 Blazer from a third party, the vehicle's ignition switch was broken out of the steering column. Furthermore, they took the Blazer without a document of title. Finally, Willing and BW did not introduce any documentary proof they had purchased the 1986 Blazer for value. This evidence supports the master's finding that Willing and BW were not bona fide purchasers of the 1986 Blazer.

One who obtains possession of a vehicle knowing, or failing to exercise care to ascertain, that the vehicle is stolen property is not entitled to consideration for any money he expends in enhancing its value. See Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 253 Ky. 74, 68 S.W.2d 756 (1934); Ochoa v. Rogers, 234 S.W. 693 (Tex.Civ.App. 1921). The true owner is entitled to reclaim the property in the condition in which he finds it. Id. Because Willing and BW were not bona fide purchasers of the 1986 Blazer, they are not entitled to any improvements, additions, or enhancements that are now a part of it.

Accordingly, the judgment of the master is

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Motors Ins. Corp. v. State

Court of Appeals of South Carolina
Nov 8, 1993
313 S.C. 279 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)
Case details for

Motors Ins. Corp. v. State

Case Details

Full title:MOTORS INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent v. The STATE of South Carolina…

Court:Court of Appeals of South Carolina

Date published: Nov 8, 1993

Citations

313 S.C. 279 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)
437 S.E.2d 555

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